Altruistic self-sacrifice is rare, supererogatory, and not to be expected of any rational agent; but, the possibility of giving up one's life for the common good has played an important role in moral theorizing. For example, Judith Jarvis Thomson (2008) has argued in a recent paper that intuitions about altruistic self-sacrifice suggest that something has gone wrong in philosophical debates over the trolley problem. We begin by showing that her arguments face a series of significant philosophical objections; however, our project (...) is as much constructive as critical. Building on Thomson's philosophical argument, we report the results of a study that was designed to examine commonsense intuitions about altruistic self-sacrifice. We find that a surprisingly high proportion of people judge that they should give up their lives to save a small number of unknown strangers. We also find that the willingness to engage in such altruistic self-sacrifice is predicted by a person's religious commitments. Finally, we show that folk-moral judgments are sensitive to agent-relative reasons in a way that diverges in important ways from Thomson's proposed intuitions about the trolley problem. With this in mind, we close with a discussion of the relative merits of folk intuitions and philosophical intuitions in constructing a viable moral theory. (shrink)

In analyzing oppressive systems like racism, social theorists have articulated accounts of the dynamic interaction and mutual dependence between psychological components, such as individuals’ patterns of thought and action, and social components, such as formal institutions and informal interactions. We argue for the further inclusion of physical components, such as material artifacts and spatial environments. Drawing on socially situated and ecologically embedded approaches in the cognitive sciences, we argue that physical components of racism are not only shaped by, but also (...) shape psychological and social components of racism. Indeed, while our initial focus is on racism and racist things, we contend that our framework is also applicable to other oppressive systems, including sexism, classism, and ableism. This is because racist things are part of a broader class of oppressive things, which are material artifacts and spatial environments that are in congruence with an oppressive system. (shrink)

The ideas of love and justice have received a lot of attention within theology, philosophy, psychology, sociology, and neuroscience in recent years. In theology, the theological virtues of faith, hope, and love have become a widely discussed topic again. In philosophy, psychology and neuroscience research into the emotions has led to a renewed interest in the many kinds and forms of love. And in moral philosophy, sociology, and political science questions of justice have been a central issue of debate for (...) decades. But many views are controversial, and important questions remain unanswered. In this volume the authors focus on issues that take the relations between the two topics into account. The contributions move from basic questions about the relationships between love and justice through specific, but central problems of a just practice of love to social and political issues of the practice of justice in today's society. Contributors:Richard Amesbury, Ingolf U. Dalferth, Trisha M. Famisaran, Thomas Jared Farmer, Everett Fullmer, Duncan Gale, Kirsten Gerdes, Deidre Green, Eric E. Hall, W. David Hall, Trevor W. Kimball, Ulrich H. J. Körtner, Richard Livingston, Thaddeus Metz, Anselm K. Min, Rob Overy-Brown, Raymond E. Perrier, Panu-Matti Pöykkö, Stephen J. Pope, T. Raja Rosenhagen, Jonathan Russell, Regina M. Schwarz, Roberto Sirvent, Justina M. Torrance, Nicholas Wolterstorff. (shrink)

Revelation is a central category in many religions. Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Mormonism or Unificationists are difficult if not impossible to imagine without it. For some, revelation signifies a decisive event in the past, for others it is a present reality. It plays a central role in shaping religious identities, and it is the reason for much criticism. Some follow a religion only because of its claim to divine revelation, whereas others criticize it as "hearsay upon hearsay" (Paine) on which they (...) would never rest their belief. Some religions have built elaborate institutions of priests and privileged interpreters to safeguard their revelation, control access to it and to protect the right way of interpreting and communicating it. But claims to revelation have also been criticized as strategies of self-immunization, which allow religions to avoid critical public debate of their views and teachings, or legitimize the position of those in power. The 33rd Conference of Philosophy of Religion at Claremont Graduate University in 2012 addressed these complex issues by concentrating on three areas of debate: I. Revelation and Reason, II. Hermeneutics of Revelation, III. Phenomenology of Revelation. (shrink)

Based on the history of the problem of perspectivity, from the origination of the central perspective, its decline in the modern age up to the present plurality of perspectives, the authors of the articles in this volume look into the ...

We welcome Mikhalevich & Powell’s (2020) (M&P) call for a more “‘inclusive”’ animal ethics, but we think their proposed shift toward a moral framework that privileges false positives over false negatives will require radically revising the paradigm assumption in animal research: that there is a clear line to be drawn between sentient beings that are part of our moral community and nonsentient beings that are not.

This paper discusses a crisis of accountability that arises when scientific collaborations are massively epistemically distributed. We argue that social models of epistemic collaboration, which are social analogs to what Patrick Suppes called a “model of the experiment,” must play a role in creating accountability in these contexts. We also argue that these social models must accommodate the fact that the various agents in a collaborative project often have ineliminable, messy, and conflicting interests and values; any story about accountability in (...) a massively distributed collaboration must therefore involve models of such interests and values and their methodological and epistemic effects. (shrink)

When the Radical Reformers demanded the separation of church and state, it was not to privatize their convictions or depoliticize the church, but rather an attempt to recognize Jesus as Lord over all. The theological movement known as Radical Orthodoxy is currently rethinking theology's influence by secular modernity, thereby making a bold critique of contemporary Christianity. It should not be surprising that Anabaptist theologians have found theological kinship with Radical Orthodoxy. Taking their cuesfrom John Howard Yoder, Henri de Lubac, Jacques (...) Derrida, Stanley Cavell, Hans Urs von Balthasar, Stanley Hauerwas, and others, writers in this volume engage Radical Orthodoxy on topics such as ecclesiology, martyrdom, worship, oath-taking, peace and violence. (Amazon). (shrink)

Abstract:Viennese philosopher and sociologist Wilhelm Jerusalem (1854–1923) has been the subject of renewed interest as an early interpreter of pragmatism in early twentieth century German-speaking intellectual circles. This article introduces a set of English translations of Jerusalem's work on pragmatism by outlining Jerusalem's life, the development of his ideas, and his influence. The accompanying translated pieces come from the period 1907–1910 when Jerusalem was intensively involved in defending and developing pragmatist philosophy. They include the "translator's foreword" to his German translation (...) of James's Pragmatism lectures; a published obituary for James; and two excerpts from his popular Introduction to Philosophy that introduce pragmatism to German students and elaborate his own "empirical," "genetic," "biological and social" point of view, influenced by pragmatism. (shrink)

There are many ways to advance our understanding of the human mind by studying different kinds of sociality. Our aim in this introduction is to situate claims about extended cognition within a broader framework of research on human sociality. We briefly discuss the existing landscape, focusing on ways of defending socially extended cognition. We then draw on resources from the recent literature on the socially extended mind, as well as the literature on collective intentionality, to provide a framework for thinking (...) about the social dimension of individual minds. We then turn to a brief overview of the individualistic approaches advanced by Ludwig and Spaulding in this volume. And we close with a discussion of the transformative role of the social mind in individual life presented by Kern and Moll, as well as the distributed approach to interacting systems defended by Goldstone and Theiner. (shrink)

Research on moral psychology has frequently appealed to three, apparently consistent patterns: Males are more likely to engage in transgressions involving harm than females; educated people are likely to be more thorough in their moral deliberations because they have better resources for rationally navigating and evaluating complex information; political affiliations and religious ideologies are an important source of our moral principles. Here, we provide a test of how four factors ‐ gender, education, politics and religion ‐ affect intuitive moral judgments (...) in unfamiliar situations. Using a large-scale sample of participants who voluntarily logged on to the internet-based Moral Sense Test, we analyzed responses to 145 unique moral and conventional scenarios that varied widely in content. Although each demographic or cultural factor sometimes yielded a statistically significant difference in the predicted direction, these differences were consistently associated with extremely small effect sizes. We conclude that gender, education, politics and religion are likely to be relatively insignificant for moral judgments of unfamiliar scenarios. We discuss these results in light of current debates concerning the mechanisms underlying our moral judgments and, especially, the idea that we share a universal moral sense that constrains the range of cross-cultural variation. (shrink)

Die Frage nach dem Ursprung des Bösen spielt nicht nur für die Theodizee (" Warum lässt Gott das zu?"), sondern auch für das Selbstverständnis des Menschen und die Beweggründe zu (un-)moralischem Handeln eine entscheidende Rolle. Was aber ist genau unter dem Bösen zu verstehen? Wo liegt sein Ursprung? Mit seinen drei Beiträgen, des Theologen und Religionsphilosophen Ingolf U. Dalferth, des früheren Dogmatik-Professors und jetzigen Bischofs Karl Kardinal Lehmann und des Orientalisten und Schriftstellers Navid Kermani, bietet dieser Band Antworten aus (...) der Sicht verschiedener Konfessionen und Religionen. Dabei geht es u.a. um die Unterscheidung zwischen vermeidbaren und unvermeidbaren Übeln, um die Freiheit des Menschen und seine Verantwortung für das Böse und um die Tradition der Gottesklage im Islam. (shrink)

Dynamic Consent is both a model and a specific web-based tool that enables clear, granular communication and recording of participant consent choices over time. The DC model enables individuals to know and to decide how personal research information is being used and provides a way in which to exercise legal rights provided in privacy and data protection law. The DC tool is flexible and responsive, enabling legal and ethical requirements in research data sharing to be met and for online health (...) information to be maintained. DC has been used in rare diseases and genomics, to enable people to control and express their preferences regarding their own data. However, DC has never been explored in relationship to historical collections of bioscientific and genetic heritage or to contexts involving Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people.In response to the growing interest by First Peoples throughout Australia in genetic and genomic research, and the increasing number of invitations from researchers to participate in community health and wellbeing projects, this article examines the legal and ethical attributes and challenges of DC in these contexts. It also explores opportunities for including First Peoples' cultural perspectives, governance, and leadership as a method for defining DC on cultural terms that engage best practice research and data analysis as well as respect for meaningful and longitudinal individual and family participation. (shrink)

To understand reality in terms of what is possible has methodological implications which a contemplative philosophy makes explicit. The goal is no longer to determine how things are or must be but rather to provide an overview of how they could be and the diversity with which they already appear. The function of philosophy is not the discovery of a single answer but rather a careful description of the diversity and the heterogeneity of possible answers in different contexts and practices. (...) This approach, inspired by Wittgenstein, was applied to the philosophy of religion by Dewi Z. Phillips in particular. This volume explores his contemplative philosophy of religion in an intense and lively discussion, showing how the description of religious faith and the access to its practice and language change unexpectedly and provocatively in this way of thinking. (shrink)

This book develops a novel approach to distributed cognition and collective intentionality. It is argued that collective mentality should be only be posited where specialized subroutines are integrated in a way that yields skillful, goal-directed behavior that is sensitive to concerns that are relevant to a group as such.

Chords are not pure sets of tones or notes. They are mainly characterized by their matrices. A chord matrix is the pattern of all the lengths of intervals given without further context. Chords are well-structured invariants. They show their inner logical form. This opens up the possibility to develop a molecular logic of chords. Chords are our primitive, but, nevertheless, already interrelated expressions. The logical space of internal harmony is our well-known chromatic scale represented by an infinite line of integers. (...) Internal harmony is nothing more than the pure interrelatedness of two or more chords. We consider three cases: chords inferentially related to subchords, pairs of chords in the space of major–minor tonality and arbitrary chords as arguments of unary chord operators in relation to their outputs. One interesting result is that chord negation transforms any pure major chord into its pure minor chord and vice versa. Another one is the fact that the negation of chords with symmetric matrices does not change anything. A molecular logic of chords is mainly characterized by combining general rules for chord operators with the inner logical form of their arguments. (shrink)

In this paper, we consider one of the ways in which shared valuing is normatively significant. More specifically, we analyze the processes that can reliably provide normative grounding for the standing to rebuke others for their failures to treat something as valuable. Yet problems with grounding this normative standing quickly arise, as it is not immediately clear why shared valuing binds group members together in ways that can sustain the collective pursuit of shared ends. Responding to this difficulty is no (...) easy task, since doing so requires demonstrating that the standing to call on one's fellow participants because of shared forms of valuing is not merely a side effect of members authority to call on their fellow participants to do their fair share in a collective endeavor. This is, to the best of our knowledge, a problem that the sparse literature on shared valuing has yet to consider. We argue that the best way to address this difficulty is to consider the real‐world complexity of how forms of valuing come to be shared within well‐structured collectives and how members internalize the evaluative tendencies that sustain shared valuing. To accomplish those ends, we examine two different ways that shared valuing is cultivated within well‐structured groups and the corresponding ways that members internalize forms of valuing; specifically, we examine differences between forms of valuing that are passed downward from the top of a group, as they are in the U.S. Military, and forms of valuing that bubble‐up through local patterns of interaction, as they do among the Zapatistas of Chiapas. (shrink)

Critics of functionalism about the mind often rely on the intuition that collectivities cannot be conscious in motivating their positions. In this paper, we consider the merits of appealing to the intuition that there is nothing that it’s like to be a collectivity. We demonstrate that collective mentality is not an affront to commonsense, and we report evidence that demonstrates that the intuition that there is nothing that it’s like to be a collectivity is, to some extent, culturally specific rather (...) than universally held. This being the case, we argue that mere appeal to the intuitive implausibility of collective consciousness does not offer any genuine insight into the nature of mentality in general, nor the nature of consciousness in particular. (shrink)

George Herbert Mead is widely considered one of the most influential American philosophers of the twentieth century, and his work remains vibrant and relevant to many areas of scholarly inquiry today. The Timeliness of George Herbert Mead brings together a range of scholars who provide detailed analyses of Mead’s importance to innovative fields of scholarship, including cognitive science, environmental studies, democratic epistemology, and social ethics, non-teleological historiography, and the history of the natural and social sciences. Edited by well-respected Mead scholars (...) Hans Joas and Daniel R. Huebner, the volume as a whole makes a coherent statement that places Mead in dialogue with current research, pushing these domains of scholarship forward while also revitalizing the growing literature on an author who has an ongoing and major influence on sociology, psychology, and philosophy. (shrink)

It is received wisdom in philosophy and the cognitive sciences that individuals can be in emotional states but groups cannot. But why should we accept this view? In this paper, I argue that there is substantial philosophical and empirical support for the existence of collective emotions. Thus, while there is good reason to be skeptical about many ascriptions of collective emotion, I argue that some groups exhibit the computational complexity and informational integration required for being in genuinely emotional states.

Inspired by the success of generative linguistics and transformational grammar, proponents of the linguistic analogy (LA) in moral psychology hypothesize that careful attention to folk-moral judgments is likely to reveal a small set of implicit rules and structures responsible for the ubiquitous and apparently unbounded capacity for making moral judgments. As a theoretical hypothesis, LA thus requires a rich description of the computational structures that underlie mature moral judgments, an account of the acquisition and development of these structures, and an (...) analysis of those components of the moral system that are uniquely human and uniquely moral. In this paper we present the theoretical motivations for adopting LA in the study of moral cognition: (a) the distinction between competence and performance, (b) poverty of stimulus considerations, and (c) adopting the computational level as the proper level of analysis for the empirical study of moral judgment. With these motivations in hand, we review recent empirical findings that have been inspired by LA and which provide evidence for at least two predictions of LA: (a) the computational processes responsible for folk-moral judgment operate over structured representations of actions and events, as well as coding for features of agency and outcomes; and (b) folk-moral judgments are the output of a dedicated moral faculty and are largely immune to the effects of context. In addition, we highlight the complexity of the interfaces between the moral faculty and other cognitive systems external to it (e.g., number systems). We conclude by reviewing the potential utility of the theoretical and empirical tools of LA for future research in moral psychology. (shrink)

Settler colonial imaginaries are constructed through the repeated, intergenerational layering of settler ecologies onto Indigenous ecologies; they result in fortified ignorance of the land, Indigenous peoples, and the networks of relationality and responsibility that sustain co‐flourishing. Kyle Whyte (2018) terms this fortification of settler ignorance vicious sedimentation. In this paper, we argue that Outlaw Country music plays important roles in sedimenting settler imaginaries. We begin by clarifying the epistemic dimensions of vicious sedimentation. We then explore specific cases where Outlaw Country (...) songs function as epistemic scaffolding for maintaining and preserving deeply sedimented settler imaginaries. Finally, we conclude by considering ways of using country music as epistemic scaffolding for constructing resistant epistemologies, through the processes of trickster hermeneutics (Vizenor, 1999) and epistemic chronostratigraphy. (shrink)

It would be a mistake to deny commonsense intuitions a role in developing a theory of consciousness. However, philosophers have traditionally failed to probe commonsense in a way that allows these commonsense intuitions to make a robust contribution to a theory of consciousness. In this paper, I report the results of two experiments on purportedly phenomenal states and I argue that many disputes over the philosophical notion of ‘phenomenal consciousness’ are misguided—they fail to capture the interesting connection between commonsense ascriptions (...) of pain and emotion. With this data in hand, I argue that our capacity to distinguish between ‘mere things’ and ‘subjects of moral concern’ rests, to a significant extent, on the sorts of mental states that we take a system to have. (shrink)

Recent behavioral experiments, along with imaging experiments and neuropsychological studies appear to support the hypothesis that emotions play a causal or constitutive role in moral judgment. Those who resist this hypothesis tend to suggest that affective mechanisms are better suited to play a modulatory role in moral cognition. But I argue that claims about the role of emotion in moral cognition frame the debate in ways that divert attention away from other plausible hypotheses. I suggest that the available data may (...) be more plausibly explained by appeal to predictive and evaluative mechanisms, which are neither wholly affective nor straightforwardly cognitive. By recognizing this fact, we can begin to see why questions about the role of emotion in moral psychology are likely to be empirically misguided. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that recent research on episodic memory supports a limited defense of the phenomena that Daniel Wegner has termed transactive memory. Building on psychological and neurological research, targeting both individual and shared memory, I argue that individuals can collaboratively work to construct shared episodic memories. In some cases, this yields memories that are distributed across multiple individuals instead of being housed in individual brains.

Abstract“Let us think of the intention to play chess”. On the Role of Chess Analogies in Wittgenstein’s Philosophy starting from 1929. Chess analogies represent a neglected topic in the studies on Wittgenstein. However, already a closer look at the Philosophical Investigations shows the great variety of contexts in which there are analogies to very different aspects of chess. An examination of the entire Nachlass illustrates Wittgenstein’s ongoing interest in chess which began in 1929 and lasted until his death in 1951. (...) The integration of a thorough analysis of the references to chess sheds new light on an adequate understanding of the transition from his early philosophy of the Tractatus logico-philosophicus to his later philosophy, especially in the years 1929 to 1931. In our language of analysis, chess is understood as a codex-based strategy game. In this context and in contrast to it, we consider selected instructive uses of chess analogies in Wittgenstein's Nachlass. By means of such analogies similarities as well as filigree or significant differences in the meanings of linguistic expressions can be very convincingly illustrated, misunderstandings can be removed and complete clarity can be attained. Starting from Wittgenstein's considerations, the method of finding and inventing chess analogies can be developed in perspective into a creative form of practice of linguistic-analytic philosophizing. (shrink)

Ontological commitments and other problems concerning existence arise in connection with various aspects of logical theories. The semantics of quantification theory is usually formulated in such a manner that theorems are all and only those formulae which come out true under all interpretations in all non-empty domains. There are several approaches to include the empty domain. Paradoxically this apparent semantic extension means surrendering several formulae which are valid and intuitively plausible.

In articulating the protection-inclusion dilemma, Friesen et al. (2023) identify an important issue facing institutional review boards (IRBs) and elucidate historical factors contributing to its de...

Some people succeed in adopting feminist ideals in spite of the prevalence of asymmetric power relations. However, those who adopt such ideals face a number of psychological difficulties in inhibiting stereotype-based judgments. I argue that a Spinozan theory of belief fixation offers a more complete understanding of the mechanisms that underwrite our intuitive stereotype-based judgments. I also argue that a Spinozan theory of belief fixation offers resources for avoiding stereotype-based judgments where they are antecedently recognized to be pernicious and insidious. (...) Key Words: Spinozan theory of mind • stereotypes • feminism • dual-process theory. (shrink)

Ingolf U. Dalferth bietet in diesem Buch den Grundriss einer orientierungsphilosophischen Theorie der Hermeneutik, die Hermeneutik als Kunstlehre der Kunstpraxis des Verstehens in den Blick fasst und Verstehen als Tätigkeit und Vermögen von Menschen, sich durch das Kommunizieren mit anderen gemeinsam in den Sinn-Welten des menschlichen Lebens verlässlich zu orientieren. Das erste Kapitel bietet Grundlinien einer philosophischen Hermeneutik am Leitfaden der Frage nach dem Verstehen des Verstehens. Das zweite Kapitel skizziert eine Texthermeneutik, die dem Verstehen von Sinn in der (...) Kommunikation durch Texte nachgeht. Das dritte Kapitel verankert dieses Sinnverstehen in einer Daseinshermeneutik, in der Verstehen als ein grundlegender Modus menschlicher Orientierung in den Sinn-Welten des Lebens in den Blick genommen wird. Das vierte Kapitel bietet Grundzüge einer theologischen Hermeneutik des christlichen Glaubens, der als Resultat der Kommunikation des Wortes Gottes durch Texte analysiert wird und sein Verstehen als hermeneutische Dynamik des Mehrfachsinns, die durch das Setzen orientierender Unterscheidungen zum Aufbau der Sinn-Welten des Glaubens führt. (shrink)

Ingolf U. Dalferth studies the complexity of this procedure in three thought processes which deal with the central concepts in the Christian understanding of malum as privation (a lack of good), as evil-doing and as a lack of faith.

The paper discusses the problem of self-sacrifice as posed by Derrida in Foi et Savior and by Schiller in the Theosophie des Julius. Whereas Derrida understands self-sacrifice as an act of violence against oneself in order not to subject others to violence, Schiller rightly insists that one must distinguish between egotistical and altruistic self-sacrifice. But even this doesn’t go far enough: Altruistic self-sacrifice is different from suffering death as the consequence of an entirely unselfish love. Whoever loses his life out (...) of love does not give it up for others, whether selfishly or unselfishly. He loves the other—to death. Such a death is not a (self-)sacrifice. It results from a passion of love, not an act of violence against oneself. (shrink)