This book focuses on two primary concerns, language and philosophical thinking. The first part of the book examines the ways that language, particularly the English language, shapes and channels our thoughts. The second part considers the three basic processes in concept formation: abstracting, imagining and generalizing. Lastly, the rational process itself is examined, looking at definition, rational inquiry and philosophical system building. First published in 1967, this edition is a reprint of the 1972 enlarged edition published by University of New (...) Mexico Press. (shrink)

This book focuses on two primary concerns, language and philosophical thinking. The first part of the book examines the ways that language, particularly the English language, shapes and channels our thoughts. The second part considers the three basic processes in concept formation: abstracting, imagining and generalizing. Lastly, the rational process itself is examined, looking at definition, rational inquiry and philosophical system building. First published in 1967, this edition is a reprint of the 1972 enlarged edition published by University of New (...) Mexico Press. (shrink)

Edmund Husserl gave his famous London Lectures (in German) in June 1922 where he says his purpose is to explain “transcendental sociological [intersubjective] phenomenology having reference to a manifest multiplicity of conscious subjects communicating with one another”. This effective definitionof semiotic phenomenology as Communicology was reported in English (1923) by Charles K. Ogden and I. A. Richards in the first book on the topic titled The Meaning of Meaning. This groundwork was in full development by 1939 with the first detailed (...) use of Husserl’s phenomenology to explicate human communication, i.e., the publication of Wilbur Marshal Urban’s Language and Reality. My paper addresses Urban’s use of Husserl’s philosophy toboth explicate the phenomenological method and to explore the constitutive elements of human communication and culture. Urban makes use of the workon language and culture by his famous colleagues at Yale University (USA): Edward Sapir (the linguist), Benjamin Lee Whorf (Sapir’s graduate student),and Ernst Cassirer. My own teacher at the University of New Mexico (USA) was Hubert Griggs Alexander, a doctoral student under Urban and a classmateof Whorf. The interdisciplinary focus on Culture and Communicology by Professors Cassirer, Sapir, Urban, and their doctoral students, Alexander and Whorf are collectively known as the “Yale School of Communicology.” Typical empirical examples of theoretical points are provided in the footnotes. (shrink)

Ethics, in the sense of a recognized branch of inquiry, reputedly began with Socrates and the Sophists, at least for the western world. Ethics, understood as a set of moral standards, traditionalized by maxims and admonitions, has existed in human cultures from so early a time that it would be hazardous indeed to conjecture the date of its probable origin. The "Hopi Ethics" which Mr. Brandt has studied is obviously that of this second sense, whereas his own study, at least (...) insofar as it is a "theoretical analysis" and goes beyond mere description, is "ethics" in the first sense. That the Hopi Indians were somewhat astonished and perplexed by Mr. Brandt's line of inquiry is indicated by some of their quoted remarks, such as their mention of the "hard questions" being put to them, and their amazement at the suggestion of the possibility that "there is no right answer to ethical questions." One gathers, thus, that while the problem of ethical relativism was of high concern to Mr. Brandt, such an idea was nigh unthinkable to the Hopi. (shrink)

The late Benjamin L. Whorf proposed "that the linguistic system of each language is not merely a reproducing instrument for voicing ideas but rather is itself the shaper of ideas, the program and guide for the individual's mental activity, for his analysis of impressions, for his synthesis of his mental stock in trade". Whorf went further, maintaining that each language conceals a hidden metaphysics, and that this metaphysics has a profound influence on normal behavior patterns. Whorf was a disciple of (...) the late Edward Sapir, who earlier but more reservedly suggested the thesis of linguistic influence on thought and action. Whorf, in his enthusiasm, tended toward the extreme view that thought worlds rest on language to such an extent that they defy ultimate translation from one language to another. Even an individual equally versed in two languages could only sense the presence of the basic linguistic difference, but could never verbalize it completely in either language. Such a thesis is called "the linguistic relativity principle" by Franklin Fearing. Joseph Greenberg, on the other hand, though shying away from "absolutes" of translatable meaning, sees the end of scientific linguistics unless some common experience is assumed to be expressible between languages. The ablest solution to this problem appears to be the one proposed by Stanley Newman in a technique of translation through "multiple equivalents". In one place in the discussions, he explains it as follows. (shrink)

In Fortführung einer postmodernen Geschichtsschreibung haben sich in den letzten zwei Jahrzehnten deutsche und angelsächsische Historiker verstärkt darum bemüht, eine virtuelle oder konjekturale Geschichtsforschung als den Königsweg zur Überwindung der Krise der Geschichtswissenschaft zu etablieren. Die Was wäre geschehen, wenn...?-Geschichtsschreibung wird vor allem von dem Althistoriker Alexander Demandt als eine erkenntnistheoretische Wunderwaffe, als ein Novum Organon der Geschichtswissenschaft, angepriesen. In diesem Buch wird gezeigt, daß die irreale oder virtuelle Geschichte sich nicht nur in logische und methodologische Widersprüche verstrickt, sondern (...) geschichtstheoretisch einen erheblichen Rückschritt darstellt. Neben der Kritik an dieser erkenntnisvermindernden Strategie in der Geschichtsforschung wird anhand von unterschiedlichen Interpretationen historischer Ereignisse und Entwicklungen gezeigt, daß von der Antike bis heute alternative Geschichtsinterpretationen das eigentliche Bemühen um größere Erklärungskraft der historischen Forschung darstellten. Auf dieser Grundlage werden Ansätze zu einer Methodologie der Geschichtswissenschaft erarbeitet, die die Erkenntnisse der modernen Wissenschaftstheorie dazu nutzen, um ein größeres Erklärungspotential für historische Interpretationen zu ermöglichen. Geschichtsforschung wird in diesem Sinne zu einer Sozialwissenschaft menschlichen Handelns und muß sich deshalb darum bemühen, die theoretischen Fortschritte anderer sozialwissenschaftlicher Fächer zu integrieren und zu verarbeiten. Dieses Buch ist deshalb ein Plädoyer für interdisziplinäre Zusammenarbeit, damit die Geschichtswissenschaft Anschluß findet an die methodisch fortgeschrittenen Wissenschaften. Deshalb müssen sich Historiker, Soziologen, Philosophen oder Politikwissenschaftler gleichermaßen mit diesen Problemen befassen. (shrink)

I argue that Hubert Dreyfus’ work on embodied coping, the intentional arc, solicitations and the background as well as his anti-representationalism rest on introspection. I denote with ‘introspection’ the methodological malpractice of formulating ontological statements about the conditions of possibility of phenomena merely based on descriptions. In order to illustrate the insufficiencies of Dreyfus’ methodological strategy in particular and introspection in general, I show that Heidegger, to whom Dreyfus constantly refers as the foundation of his own work, derives ontological (...) statements about the conditions of possibility of phenomena not merely from descriptions, but also from analyses. I further show that deriving ontological statements directly from descriptions entails implausible results. I do so by discussing representative cases. Based on these general methodological considerations, I show that Dreyfus’ work on action, skill and understanding is introspective. First, I demonstrate that Dreyfus’ influential claim that rules and representations do not govern skillful actions is the result of introspection, because it is merely founded on the absence of rules and representations in representative descriptions of skillful actions. Second, I show that Dreyfus’ work on embodied coping, the intentional arc, solicitations and the background is also based on introspection. These ontological structures are merely reifications of descriptions and are not further substantiated by analyses. (shrink)

In the following I show that Hubert Dreyfus’ account of skill rests on a misguided interpretation of Martin Heidegger’s work on understanding in Being and Time. Dreyfus separates understanding according to the analytic philosophical concept pair, so called ‘know-how’ and ‘knowledge-that’, that corresponds for him to the pragmatist differentiation between skillful acting and theoretical conceptual thinking. Contrary to that, Heidegger argues that only one form of understanding exists that is neither captured by ‘know-how’, ‘knowledge-that’ or a combination of both. (...) Instead of presupposing two radically different ways to engage with the world, one practical-agential, the other theoretical-conceptual, Heidegger shows that all genuine forms of comportments rest on the same form of understanding that exhibits the highest degree of intelligibility when we deal with the world ordinarily. The Heideggerian account therefore comes without the many dichotomies so often criticized in the literature on skill and understanding, and offers a radically different view of world disclosure and of what we do when we ‘theorize’. (shrink)

About three decades ago, AI theory underwent a sharp turn as a consequence of criticism that pointed out the problem of externalism in the cognitivist position. Hubert Dreyfus, undoubtedly the main exponent of this criticism, opened the possibility of a Heideggerian reading using the frame problem to bring to light obscurities that otherwise would have been very difficult to detect. However, the question still remains of whether or not Heidegger’s philosophy can serve as the source of a positive contribution (...) to AI. In this paper, we argue that in the small measure in which such a task has been attempted, its orientation has been hampered by the omission of what, for Heidegger, was the central issue to be pondered: the question for being and the ontological difference. To propose a possible direction in which AI can be headed as a consequence of this novel perspective, we undertake a brief and schematic review of two published projects suggesting that they both manage to avoid the frame problem and also bear this Heideggerian outlook. (shrink)

Teachers may be skeptical about the possibility of implementing transition pedagogy, as outlined in the first part of this book, given the current context of higher education. Here we synthetize therefore the pedagogical tools that we have identified in the courses offered by establishments that have practiced a transition pedagogy for a long time, as well as those being used at the Campus de la Transition since 2018. We also draw on interviews with experts and practitioners, psychologists, teachers and explorers (...) of new practices. (Interviews with Chrysoline Brabant – clinical psychologist and certified coach, Mark Swilling – founder of the Sustainability Institute, Jacques Tardif – professor at the University of Sherbrooke and specialist in university pedagogy, Laurent Van Ditzhuyzen – co-founder of the Université du Nous, Thibault Griessinger – PhD in cognitive sciences and founder of Acte Lab, Hubert Trapet and Valérie Fayard – Emmaüs France CEO and vice-chair). The chapter starts with the lightest tools, which can be set up quite easily in a classroom, moving towards the most ambitious, and resulting in a coherent picture of the higher establishment in service of the Great Transition teachings. (shrink)

The scaling of body parts is central to the evolution of morphology and shape. Most traits scale proportionally with each other and body size such that larger adults are essentially magnified versions of smaller ones. This pattern is so ubiquitous that departures from it – disproportionate scaling between trait and body size – pique interest because it can generate dramatically exaggerated traits. These extreme morphologies are frequently hypothesized to result from sexual selection and their study has a long history, with (...) several hypotheses seeking to explain their evolution. Despite this effort, surprisingly little progress has been made in demonstrating the forms of selection that produce different scaling patterns or in identifying the mechanisms that underlie the expression and evolution of scaling relationships. Here we review recent insights regarding the proximate mechanisms that regulate and integrate trait growth and that offer a new framework for studying the evolution of morphological scaling. (shrink)

Among all organisms, the size of each body part or organ scales with overall body size, a phenomenon called allometry. The study of shape and form has attracted enormous interest from biologists, but the genetic, developmental and physiological mechanisms that control allometry and the proportional growth of parts have remained elusive. Recent progress in our understanding of body‐size regulation provides a new synthetic framework for thinking about the mechanisms and the evolution of allometric scaling. In particular, insulin/IGF signaling, which plays (...) major roles in longevity, diabetes and the regulation of cell, organ and body size, might also be centrally involved in regulating organismal shape. Here we review recent advances in the fields of growth regulation and endocrinology and use them to construct a developmental model of static allometry expression in insects. This model serves as the foundation for a research program that will result in a deeper understanding of the relationship between growth and form, a question that has fascinated biologists for centuries. BioEssays 29:536–548, 2007. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

People use social categories to perceive and interact with the social world. Different categorizations often share similar cognitive, affective and behavioral features. This leads to a hypothesis of the common representational forms of social categorization. Studies in social categorization often use the terms “ingroup” and “outgroup” without clear conceptualization of the terms. I argue that the ingroup/outgroup distinction should be treated as an elementary relational ego-centric form of social categorization based on specific cognitive mechanisms. Such an abstract relational form should (...) produce specific effects irrespective of the nature of a particular social category. The article discusses theoretical grounds for this hypothesis as well as empirical evidence from behavioral and brain research. It is argued that what is commonly termed as “ingroup” and “outgroup” can be produced by distinct cognitive operations based on similarity assessment and coalitional computation. (shrink)

Artificial Intelligence, and the cognitivist view of mind on which it is based, represent the last stage of the rationalist tradition in philosophy. This tradition begins when Socrates assumes that intelligence is based on principles and when Plato adds the requirement that these principles must be strict rules, not based on taken-for-granted background understanding. This philosophical position, refined by Hobbes, Descartes and Leibniz, is finally converted into a research program by Herbert Simon and Allen Newell. That research program is now (...) in trouble, so we must return to its source and question Socrates' assumption that intelligence consists in solving problems by following rules, and that one acquires the necessary rules by abstracting them from specific cases. A phenomenological description of skill acquisition suggests that the acquisition of expertise moves in just the opposite direction: from abstract rules to particular cases. This description of expertise accounts for the difficulties that have confronted AI for the last decade. (shrink)

Many researchers have suggested that premise interpretation errors can account, at least in part, for errors on categorical syllogisms. However, although it is possible to show that people make such errors in simple inference tasks, the evidence for them is far less clear when actual syllogisms are administered. Part of the problem is due to the lack of clear predictions for the solutions that would be expected when using modified quantifiers, assuming that correct inferences are made from them. This paper (...) presents the expected solutions for Gricean, reversible, and reversible Gricean interpretations, and evaluates these using three datasets (two currently available, and one new). The evidence supported the adoption of reversible and reversible Gricean interpretations, but not Gricean interpretations on their own. These results suggest that the categorical syllogism task tends to induce different quantifier interpretations from those identified in simple inference tasks. (shrink)