John Henry Newman's theological arguments against the mixture of liberal philosophy and Christian religion have drawn a great deal of scholarly attention. Comparatively underappreciated is Newman's rebuttal of liberal ideas on the philosophical plane. In this line of argument, which runs parallel to his more purely theological critique, Newman uses some of liberalism's own foundational philosophical premises to undermine the conclusions put forth by the exponents of liberal religion. This immanent critique of liberal religion is important not merely because (...) it shows Newman's capacity to engage his opponents on their own terms, but also because it provides an argument against liberal religion that merits consideration even for those who reject Newman's particular theological beliefs. (shrink)

This book constitutes one of the most important contributions to recent Kant scholarship. In it, one of the pre-eminent interpreters of Kant, Henry Allison, offers a comprehensive, systematic, and philosophically astute account of all aspects of Kant's views on aesthetics. The first part of the book analyses Kant's conception of reflective judgment and its connections with both empirical knowledge and judgments of taste. The second and third parts treat two questions that Allison insists must be kept distinct: the normativity (...) of pure judgments of taste, and the moral and systematic significance of taste. The fourth part considers two important topics often neglected in the study of Kant's aesthetics: his conceptions of fine art, and the sublime. (shrink)

Henry Allison is one of the foremost interpreters of the philosophy of Kant. This new volume collects all his recent essays on Kant's theoretical and practical philosophy. All the essays postdate Allison's two major books on Kant, and together they constitute an attempt to respond to critics and to clarify, develop and apply some of the central theses of those books. Two are published here for the first time. Special features of the collection are: a detailed defence of the (...) author's interpretation of transcendental idealism; a consideration of the Transcendental Deduction and some other recent interpretations thereof; further elaborations of the tensions between various aspects of Kant's conception of freedom and of the complex role of this conception within Kant's moral philosophy. (shrink)

Mitigation—preventative actions to reduce the human forcing of climate change with the goal of keeping climate change within a range to which humans can adapt—must be prompt, rigorous, and focused on eliminating emissions of carbon dioxide, beginning with rapid cessation of the use of coal. Carbon dioxide is by far the most threatening greenhouse gas because it remains in the atmosphere for millennia longer than any other major greenhouse gas, and the heat retained on the planet by atmospheric carbon dioxide (...) will continue to emerge from its transitional storage in the deep oceans for millennia after the atmospheric carbon finally dissipates. Sustainable development can be increased and ocean acidification can be stopped only if the dominant fossil fuel regime is promptly replaced by an affordable and accessible alternative energy regime. Poorer countries cannot be reasonably expected to cooperate with vigorous mitigation unless they are assisted with necessary adaptation. (shrink)

Henry E. Allison presents a comprehensive commentary on Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Allison pays special attention to the structure of the work and its historical and intellectual context. He argues that, despite its relative brevity, the Groundwork is the single most important work in modern moral philosophy.

This volume presents seventeen essays by one of the world's leading scholars on Kant. Henry E. Allison explores the nature of transcendental idealism, freedom of the will, and the concept of the purposiveness of nature. He places Kant's views in their historical context and explores their contemporary relevance to present day philosophers.

Henry E. Allison presents a comprehensive commentary on Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals . Allison pays special attention to the structure of the work and its historical and intellectual context. He argues that, despite its relative brevity, the Groundwork is the single most important work in modern moral philosophy.

Although a good deal has been written about Kant's conception of free will in recent years, there has been no serious attempt to examine in detail the development of his views on the topic. This book endeavours to remedy the situation by tracing Kant's thoughts on free will from his earliest discussions of it in the 1750s through to his last accounts in the 1790s. This developmental approach is of interest for at least two reasons. First, it shows that the (...) path that led Kant to view freedom as a transcendental power that is both radically distinct from and compatible with the causality of nature was a winding one. Second, it indicates that, despite the variety of views of free will that Kant held at various times, the concept occupied a central place in his thought, because it was the point of union between his theoretical and practical philosophy. (shrink)

Hastings Center Report, Volume 52, Issue 5, Page 32-42, September–October 2022.

Bringing together evolutionary biology, psychology, and philosophy, Henry Plotkin presents a new science of knowledge, one that traces an unbreakable link between instinct and our ability to know.

One of the most influential of the Victorian philosophers, Henry Sidgwick (1838–1900) also made important contributions to fields such as economics, political theory, and classics. An active promoter of higher education for women, he founded Cambridge's Newnham College in 1871. He attended Rugby School and then Trinity College, Cambridge, where he remained his whole career. In 1859 he took up a lectureship in classics, and held this post for ten years. In 1869, he moved to a lectureship in moral (...) philosophy, the subject where he left arguably his greatest mark when he produced this work, regarded as his masterpiece. Published in 1874, the book argues the utilitarian approach to ethics, and a systematic and historically sensitive approach to ethical research that influenced utilitarian philosophers well into the twentieth century. It remains a valuable introduction to the philosophy, practice and history of ethics. This reissue includes the 1877 supplement. (shrink)

This essay argues that the key to understanding Kant's transcendental idealism is to understand the transcendental realism with which he contrasts it. It maintains that the latter is not to be identified with a particular metaphysical thesis, but with the assumption that the proper objects of human cognitions are “objects in general” or “as such,” that is, objects considered simply qua objects of some understanding. Since this appears to conflict with Kant's own characterization of transcendental realism as the view that (...) (mistakenly) regards appearances as if they were things in themselves, the essay explicates the connection between the concepts of an object (or thing) considered as such and a thing considered as it is in itself. In light of this, it maintains that Kant's transcendental idealism is compatible with a robust empirical realism and that many of its critics are tacitly committed to a misguided transcendental realism. (shrink)

Henry Richardson argues that we can determine our ends rationally. He constructs a rich and original theory of how we can reason about our final goals. Richardson defuses the counter-arguments for the limits of rational deliberation, and develops interesting ideas about how his model might be extended to interpersonal deliberation of ends, taking him to the borders of political theory. Along the way Richardson offers illuminating discussions of, inter alia, Aristotle, Aquinas, Sidgwick, and Dewey, as well as the work (...) of several contemporary philosophers. (shrink)

Clarifying the mission of the American high school / Ernest L. Boyer--Educational goals and curricular decisions in the new Carnegie Report / John Martin Rich--Essential schools : a first look / Theodore R. Sizer--Teaching and learning : the dilemma of the American high school / Chester E. Finn, Jr.--The paideia proposal : rediscovering the essence of education / Mortimer Adler--The paideia proposal : noble amibitions, false leads, and symbolic politics / Willis D. Hawley--Cultural literacy : let's get specific / (...) E.D. Hirsch, Jr.--Cultural literacy : what every educator needs to know / Thomas H. Estes, Carol J. Gutman, and Elise K. Harrison--A blueprint for public education / John E. Chubb--Should market forces control educational decision making / Jack Tweedie--Teachers as transformative intellectuals / Henry A. Giroux--Dilemma language / Colin Lacey--Rich schools, poor schools : the persistence of unequal education / Arthur E. Wise and Tamar Gendler--Partial privatization of publice school finance / Thomas G. Fox and John Riew--Quality and equality in American education : public and Catholic schools / James S. Coleman--Oranges plus apples, Dr. Coleman, give you oranges plus apples / James Rogers--Synthesis of research on school-based management / Jane L. David--Unfulfilled promises / Betty Malen, Rodney T. Ogawa, and Jennifer Kranz--Effective high schools--What are the common characteristics? / Joseph Murphy and Philip Hallinger--Effective schools : a friendly but cautionary note / Larry Cuban--In education, magnets attract controversy / Mary Haywood Metz--Schools of choice : a path to educational quality or 'Tiers of inequity'? / Kathleen Sylvester--Interesting times / Alan H. Jones--Making a difference in educational quality through teacher education / Carolyn M. Evertson, Willis D. Hawley, and Marilyn Zlotnik--Developing a career ladder : getting down to the basics / Thomas Deering--The career ladder and lattice : a new look at the teaching career / Timothy J.L. Chandler, Stacey L. Lane, Janice M. Bibik, and Bernard Oliver--Equity, quality, and effectiveness in bilingual education / George M. Blanco--Bilingual--No! / Muriel Paskin Carrison--Multiethnic education and the quest for equality / James A. Banks--The limits of pluralism / M. Donald Thomas--The case for keeping mentally retarded children in your regular classrooms / Martin Tonn--Mainstreaming : a formative consideration / Harry N. Chandler--Reflections on three decades of eduction of the gifted / A. Harry Passow--Equity vs. excellence : an eductional drama / James J. Gallagher. (shrink)

Henry Brooks Adams (February 16, 1838 - March 27, 1918) was an American historian and member of the Adams political family, being descended from two U.S. Presidents.As a young Harvard graduate, he was secretary to his father, Charles Francis Adams, Abraham Lincoln's ambassador in London, a posting that had much influence on the younger man, both through experience of wartime diplomacy and absorption in English culture, especially the works of John Stuart Mill. After the American Civil War, he became (...) a noted political journalist who entertained America's foremost intellectuals at his homes in Washington and Boston.In his lifetime, he was best known for his History of the United States During the Administrations of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, a 9-volume work, praised for its literary style.His posthumously published memoirs, The Education of Henry Adams, won the Pulitzer Prize and went on to be named by the Modern Library as the top English-language nonfiction book of the 20th century.A LETTER TO AMERICAN TEACHERS OF HISTORY. It proposes a "theory of history" based on the second law of thermodynamics and the principle of entropy, which essentially states that all energy dissipates, order becomes disorder, and the earth will eventually become uninhabitable. He applied the physics of dynamical systems of Rudolf Clausius, Hermann von Helmholtz, and William Thomson to the modeling of human history. (shrink)

This piece, which was revised greatly subsequent to the publication of the Methods of Ethics, appears in this collection in its original form. In it, Sidgwick distinguishes between Universal Hedonism and Egoistic Hedonism, the former espoused by Bentham, who nonetheless approves of individual self‐interest, which he regards as inevitable. Mill attempts to forge a connection between the psychological and ethical principles that he and Bentham share, maintaining that, since each person seeks her own happiness, she ought to seek the happiness (...) of others. Sidgwick endeavours to dissociate universal hedonism from the egoistic notions that appear in both Bentham and Mill's positions. (shrink)

This volume, originally published in 2002, assembles the historical sequence of writings that Kant published between 1783 and 1796 to popularize, summarize, amplify and defend the doctrines of his masterpiece, the Critique of Pure Reason of 1781. The best known of them, the Prolegomena, is often recommended to beginning students, but the other texts are also vintage Kant and are important sources for a fully rounded picture of Kant's intellectual development. As with other volumes in the series there are copious (...) linguistic notes and a glossary of key terms. The editorial introductions and explanatory notes shed light on the critical reception accorded Kant by the metaphysicians of his day and on Kant's own efforts to derail his opponents. (shrink)

Aaron Cotnoir does all sorts of interesting things in his contribution to this volume. He makes a helpful distinction between syntactic and semantic objections to the thesis that composition is identity, and outlines some empirical points relevant to the syntactic issue. But the centrepiece is his development of a formal framework for addressing the semantic objections.

Here, Sidgwick discusses Bradley's main ethical principle that self‐realisation is the ultimate aim of practice, noting the oddity of Bradley's acknowledgment in another paper in Ethical Studies that he does not know what he means by ‘self’, ‘real’ or ‘realise’. In an essay comparing determinism and indeterminism, Bradley specifies the notion of ‘self’ by stating that each person has a definite character, which under certain circumstances expresses itself in actions of a particular kind. In his paper on why we ought (...) to be moral, however, Bradley starts afresh, arguing that the self we try to realise is a whole, that is to say, the ultimate end. Then again, in a third paper, he speaks of the person as a social being, stating that ‘we have found self‐realization, duty, happiness in one, when we have found our function as an organ in the social organism.’ Given these various attempts, Sidgwick holds that Bradley's main ethical argument lacks the coherence and completeness it would require to be tenable. (shrink)

In this essay, Sidgwick analyses Fowler's attempt to develop a scientific conception of morality that addresses practical applications rather than theoretical difficulties. After distinguishing the moral sanction from the legal sanction and the social sanction, Fowler turns to the central issue of how we are to justify the application of the moral sanction as the supreme and final sanction in cases of conflict. In his response to this question, Sidgwick suggests that Fowler oscillates between Hume's view, that moral sentiment or (...) strong feeling puts the final stamp of approbation or disapprobation on actions or character, and the incompatible view, that moral judgments or opinions determine the rightness of action. (shrink)

Sidgwick offers a largely unflattering review of Fitzjames Stephen's critique of Mill's On Liberty. Sidgwick observes that, when discussing the legitimate influence of society over the individual, Stephen directs his argument against Mill and Comtism in turn, without seeming to notice that these thinkers hold opposing views on the issue. As a consequence, this generates inconsistencies in his position. Yet, despite the significant amount of wilful paradox and misplaced ingenuity in his work, Stephen does highlight the right arguments to challenge (...) Mill's position in On Liberty. Here, Mill seems to forget the essential limits of the utilitarian method by seeking to establish absolute practical maxims. (shrink)

According to Sidgwick, Green does not present a clear and consistent conception of an ethical system in Prolegomena to Ethics. In its most comprehensive form, Green's doctrine of morality is stated to be a ‘Theory of the Good as Human Perfection’. This pursuit of the ultimate end of rational conduct is taken to be realization of certain human faculties or capacities, that is to say, the self‐realization of the divine principle in man. Amongst other things, Sidgwick questions not only how (...) this relation of man to God is to be philosophically known, but also how the human spirit is to aim at any kind of perfection except the increase of knowledge. (shrink)

In this chapter, Sidgwick discusses the connection between value and psychology. Sidgwick points out that while ancient philosophers were concerned with the proper ultimate object of rational thought, modern thinkers have been interested in the basis and validity of a received code of restrictive, not directive, rules. Whereas modern philosophers concentrate on the general good, ancient Greek philosophers focused on an egoistic good, that is, the good for any individual seeking the true way of life. And yet, the old question (...) ‘What is the Ultimate Good?’ has arisen again. To this question of how to reconcile a desire for one's own Good with the dictates of duty by reason, Sidgwick argues that only Utilitarianism offers a rational account of the ideal subordination of individual psychological impulses to universal ends. (shrink)

This paper is Sidgwick's second critique of aspects of James Martineau's Types of Ethical Theory. Sidgwick begins by highlighting Martineau's unwarranted assumption that if his idiopsychological account is presented to a variety of individuals, they will each provide the same story as his on what the moral sentiment says about its own experience. In short, if presented with similar impulses or incentives to action, people's moral judgments will be similar. Concluding that Martineau's account is erroneous, Sidgwick adopts a view that (...) recognizes irreducible differences in people's moral judgments. (shrink)

Sidgwick reviews what he regards as a thorough, but ultimately unsuccessful, attempt by Leslie Stephen to establish an ethical doctrine that aligns with the theory of evolution. Stephen engages in discussions that fall under three categories. The first is subjective psychology; Stephen analyses from the individual's perspective the kind of consciousness that precedes and determines volition. The second is sociology; his aim here is to develop a positive morality understood as a property of the social organism. The third kind of (...) discussion falls under ethical theory; Stephen's purpose is to determine systematically the ideal code of morality. Although Stephen's work is to be praised for its abundance of pertinent observations and reflections, Sidgwick finds it lacking in ‘clearness of method and systematic arrangement.’. (shrink)

In his reply to Barratt's criticisms of his Methods of Ethics, Sidgwick states that Barratt misapprehends his position by overlooking the fact that he reviews various methods of ethics from a neutral and impartial standpoint. Following Butler, Sidgwick holds that reasonable self‐love and conscience are the two primary principles in human life. He differs from Butler on which precepts of conscience are reasonable, and maintains that the central formula of conscience holds that one ought not to prefer one's own good (...) to the greater good of another. To Barratt's challenge that this confutes the principle of Rational Egoism, Sidgwick replies that the principle is contradicted, not confuted. (shrink)

Sidgwick argues that Calderwood's criticisms of his view on Intuitionism presented in Methods of Ethics derive from a misunderstanding of Sidgwick's project. Sidgwick did not set out to criticize, from the outside, a particular school of thought, but rather to trace the phases and to estimate the scientific value of a specific method of reaching practical decisions. One phase in this process is intuitionism. According to Sidgwick, the only ultimately valid moral intuitions are those that provide the philosophical basis for (...) utilitarianism. (shrink)

In his writings on animal ethics, Spencer maintains that the ultimate end of human conduct as well as of animal conduct is the greatest length, breadth, and completeness of life; acts are good that are conducive to the preservation of offspring or the individual. In this article, Sidgwick considers Spencer's account of both ‘the law of sub‐human justice’ and ‘the law of human justice’. The former, which is recognized as being imperfect both in its general form and in its details, (...) involves the dictum that each individual shall receive the benefits and evils of its own nature and consequent conduct. The latter – the law of human justice – is seen by Spencer as an extension of sub‐human justice, and yet, the application of the law is modified by the condition of gregariousness in a way only faintly indicated in lower species. It is not obvious, says Sidgwick, that Spencer's principle is actually just since it is not the common sense view that justice requires a man to suffer for failures that do not result from wilful wrongdoing or neglect. Despite this, Sidgwick finds some truth in Spencer's account of the origin of the sentiment of justice, which begins with an egoistic sentiment of justice, and then introduces a fear of similar resentment and retaliation by others to create an altruistic sentiment of justice. (shrink)

This piece includes both Bradley's response to Sidgwick's critique of his Ethical Studies and Sidgwick's reply to that response. Bradley states that he has no pretension to solve the problem of the individual in general, and the origin of the Self in particular. Moreover, he says that he repudiates the doctrine that one's self‐realization is achieved when someone else brings about something one desires. To these and other defences, Sidgwick offers various replies: Bradley scarcely attempts to address the charge that (...) his exposition of the self lacks clarity and coherence; and Bradley misunderstands the position that the social organism of which the individual is said to be an essential part is a relative whole, not an absolute whole. (shrink)

Taking ‘what ought to be’ to include both what is commonly judged to be ‘good’ and what is commonly judged to be ‘right’, that is to say, ‘the duty’ of a person, Sidgwick observes that there is a rationally based recognition of the variation in people's duties. Given the failure of people on many occasions to do their duty, we must acknowledge that ‘what ought to be’ to a large degree ‘is not’, and that the former is independent of whether (...) it comes into being. Sidgwick asks if this distinction is ultimate and irreducible. He argues that, although no answer can be provided by considering moral judgements from a psychological or sociological viewpoint, adopting a philosophical or epistemological perspective may allow for the reduction between ‘what is’ and ‘what ought to be’, as this perspective takes both duty and facts to be objects of thought, or knowledge, that exhibit similar relations in thought, relations like that between the universal and the particular, and between inductive method and deductive method. (shrink)

Sidgwick discusses the dilemma confronting the ethical theorist whose first principles, as first principles, do not require a proof, and yet are rarely accepted without a defence. The solution lies in Aristotle's distinction between logical priority and priority in the mind of one person. While a proposition may be self‐evident, that is to say, cognizable without reference to other propositions, some rational process may be required to connect it to propositions already accepted in the mind of one individual.