Kantian Review 11:1-28 (2006)

Henry E. Allison
University of California, San Diego
This essay argues that the key to understanding Kant's transcendental idealism is to understand the transcendental realism with which he contrasts it. It maintains that the latter is not to be identified with a particular metaphysical thesis, but with the assumption that the proper objects of human cognitions are “objects in general” or “as such,” that is, objects considered simply qua objects of some understanding. Since this appears to conflict with Kant's own characterization of transcendental realism as the view that (mistakenly) regards appearances as if they were things in themselves, the essay explicates the connection between the concepts of an object (or thing) considered as such and a thing considered as it is in itself. In light of this, it maintains that Kant's transcendental idealism is compatible with a robust empirical realism and that many of its critics are tacitly committed to a misguided transcendental realism.
Keywords appearances  empirical realism  metaphysical  object in general  thing in itself  transcendental idealism  transcendental realism
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DOI 10.1017/S1369415400002223
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References found in this work BETA

Kant's Theory of Knowledge.Harold Arthur Prichard - 1909 - Oxford, England: Garland.

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Citations of this work BETA

Making Kant's Empirical Realism Possible.Simon Gurofsky - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Chicago
The Bounds of Transcendental Logic.Dennis Schulting - 2021 - London: Palgrave Macmillan.
The Bloomsbury Companion to Kant.Dennis Schulting (ed.) - 2015 - Bloomsbury Academic.

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