Kings, Countries, Peoples: Selected Studies on the Achaemenid Empire. By Pierre Briant, translated by Amélie Kuhrt. Oriens et Occidens, vol. 26. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2017. Pp. xxv + 633. €99.

This landmark book is now reissued in a new edition that has been vastly rewritten and updated to respond to recent Kantian literature.

Bringing together evolutionary biology, psychology, and philosophy, Henry Plotkin presents a new science of knowledge, one that traces an unbreakable link between instinct and our ability to know.

This piece, which was revised greatly subsequent to the publication of the Methods of Ethics, appears in this collection in its original form. In it, Sidgwick distinguishes between Universal Hedonism and Egoistic Hedonism, the former espoused by Bentham, who nonetheless approves of individual self‐interest, which he regards as inevitable. Mill attempts to forge a connection between the psychological and ethical principles that he and Bentham share, maintaining that, since each person seeks her own happiness, she ought to seek the happiness (...) of others. Sidgwick endeavours to dissociate universal hedonism from the egoistic notions that appear in both Bentham and Mill's positions. (shrink)

Here, Sidgwick discusses Bradley's main ethical principle that self‐realisation is the ultimate aim of practice, noting the oddity of Bradley's acknowledgment in another paper in Ethical Studies that he does not know what he means by ‘self’, ‘real’ or ‘realise’. In an essay comparing determinism and indeterminism, Bradley specifies the notion of ‘self’ by stating that each person has a definite character, which under certain circumstances expresses itself in actions of a particular kind. In his paper on why we ought (...) to be moral, however, Bradley starts afresh, arguing that the self we try to realise is a whole, that is to say, the ultimate end. Then again, in a third paper, he speaks of the person as a social being, stating that ‘we have found self‐realization, duty, happiness in one, when we have found our function as an organ in the social organism.’ Given these various attempts, Sidgwick holds that Bradley's main ethical argument lacks the coherence and completeness it would require to be tenable. (shrink)

In this essay, Sidgwick analyses Fowler's attempt to develop a scientific conception of morality that addresses practical applications rather than theoretical difficulties. After distinguishing the moral sanction from the legal sanction and the social sanction, Fowler turns to the central issue of how we are to justify the application of the moral sanction as the supreme and final sanction in cases of conflict. In his response to this question, Sidgwick suggests that Fowler oscillates between Hume's view, that moral sentiment or (...) strong feeling puts the final stamp of approbation or disapprobation on actions or character, and the incompatible view, that moral judgments or opinions determine the rightness of action. (shrink)

Sidgwick offers a largely unflattering review of Fitzjames Stephen's critique of Mill's On Liberty. Sidgwick observes that, when discussing the legitimate influence of society over the individual, Stephen directs his argument against Mill and Comtism in turn, without seeming to notice that these thinkers hold opposing views on the issue. As a consequence, this generates inconsistencies in his position. Yet, despite the significant amount of wilful paradox and misplaced ingenuity in his work, Stephen does highlight the right arguments to challenge (...) Mill's position in On Liberty. Here, Mill seems to forget the essential limits of the utilitarian method by seeking to establish absolute practical maxims. (shrink)

According to Sidgwick, Green does not present a clear and consistent conception of an ethical system in Prolegomena to Ethics. In its most comprehensive form, Green's doctrine of morality is stated to be a ‘Theory of the Good as Human Perfection’. This pursuit of the ultimate end of rational conduct is taken to be realization of certain human faculties or capacities, that is to say, the self‐realization of the divine principle in man. Amongst other things, Sidgwick questions not only how (...) this relation of man to God is to be philosophically known, but also how the human spirit is to aim at any kind of perfection except the increase of knowledge. (shrink)

As in the preceding chapter, Sidgwick attempts to highlight some difficulties in the views of his Cambridge teacher John Grote. Although Grote has a keen insight, says Sidgwick, into the human element of a philosophy, he is a poor analyst of systems and methods at the abstract level. The value in Grote's work lies in his detailed presentation of two important critiques of Mill. First, he argues convincingly that Mill's qualitative distinction between pleasures either is reducible to a quantitative distinction (...) or causes pure utilitarianism to be abandoned. Second, he points to the peculiarity in Mill's proof of utilitarianism, which takes a Positivist line in arguing that since people pursue happiness, they ought to pursue the happiness of others. (shrink)

In this chapter, Sidgwick discusses the connection between value and psychology. Sidgwick points out that while ancient philosophers were concerned with the proper ultimate object of rational thought, modern thinkers have been interested in the basis and validity of a received code of restrictive, not directive, rules. Whereas modern philosophers concentrate on the general good, ancient Greek philosophers focused on an egoistic good, that is, the good for any individual seeking the true way of life. And yet, the old question (...) ‘What is the Ultimate Good?’ has arisen again. To this question of how to reconcile a desire for one's own Good with the dictates of duty by reason, Sidgwick argues that only Utilitarianism offers a rational account of the ideal subordination of individual psychological impulses to universal ends. (shrink)

This paper is Sidgwick's second critique of aspects of James Martineau's Types of Ethical Theory. Sidgwick begins by highlighting Martineau's unwarranted assumption that if his idiopsychological account is presented to a variety of individuals, they will each provide the same story as his on what the moral sentiment says about its own experience. In short, if presented with similar impulses or incentives to action, people's moral judgments will be similar. Concluding that Martineau's account is erroneous, Sidgwick adopts a view that (...) recognizes irreducible differences in people's moral judgments. (shrink)

Empirical philosophy, for Sidgwick, comprises those basic philosophical propositions espoused by Locke, Berkley, Hume, and Mill. He understands the theory to be, not a theory of being, but a theory of knowledge that sets out the criteria by which to distinguish true or real knowledge from merely apparent knowledge. According to Empiricism, all trustworthy cognitions are either immediate cognitions of particular facts or cognitions capable of being rationally inferred from these. On this understanding of empirical philosophy, Sidgwick maintains that he (...) is not an empiricist, as he finds it impossible to work out a coherent theory of the criteria of knowledge on an empirical basis. He concludes that it is possible to combine a complete trust in the method and results of empirical science with a complete distrust in the procedure and conclusions of empirical philosophy. (shrink)

Sidgwick reviews what he regards as a thorough, but ultimately unsuccessful, attempt by Leslie Stephen to establish an ethical doctrine that aligns with the theory of evolution. Stephen engages in discussions that fall under three categories. The first is subjective psychology; Stephen analyses from the individual's perspective the kind of consciousness that precedes and determines volition. The second is sociology; his aim here is to develop a positive morality understood as a property of the social organism. The third kind of (...) discussion falls under ethical theory; Stephen's purpose is to determine systematically the ideal code of morality. Although Stephen's work is to be praised for its abundance of pertinent observations and reflections, Sidgwick finds it lacking in ‘clearness of method and systematic arrangement.’. (shrink)

In his reply to Barratt's criticisms of his Methods of Ethics, Sidgwick states that Barratt misapprehends his position by overlooking the fact that he reviews various methods of ethics from a neutral and impartial standpoint. Following Butler, Sidgwick holds that reasonable self‐love and conscience are the two primary principles in human life. He differs from Butler on which precepts of conscience are reasonable, and maintains that the central formula of conscience holds that one ought not to prefer one's own good (...) to the greater good of another. To Barratt's challenge that this confutes the principle of Rational Egoism, Sidgwick replies that the principle is contradicted, not confuted. (shrink)

Sidgwick argues that Calderwood's criticisms of his view on Intuitionism presented in Methods of Ethics derive from a misunderstanding of Sidgwick's project. Sidgwick did not set out to criticize, from the outside, a particular school of thought, but rather to trace the phases and to estimate the scientific value of a specific method of reaching practical decisions. One phase in this process is intuitionism. According to Sidgwick, the only ultimately valid moral intuitions are those that provide the philosophical basis for (...) utilitarianism. (shrink)

In his writings on animal ethics, Spencer maintains that the ultimate end of human conduct as well as of animal conduct is the greatest length, breadth, and completeness of life; acts are good that are conducive to the preservation of offspring or the individual. In this article, Sidgwick considers Spencer's account of both ‘the law of sub‐human justice’ and ‘the law of human justice’. The former, which is recognized as being imperfect both in its general form and in its details, (...) involves the dictum that each individual shall receive the benefits and evils of its own nature and consequent conduct. The latter – the law of human justice – is seen by Spencer as an extension of sub‐human justice, and yet, the application of the law is modified by the condition of gregariousness in a way only faintly indicated in lower species. It is not obvious, says Sidgwick, that Spencer's principle is actually just since it is not the common sense view that justice requires a man to suffer for failures that do not result from wilful wrongdoing or neglect. Despite this, Sidgwick finds some truth in Spencer's account of the origin of the sentiment of justice, which begins with an egoistic sentiment of justice, and then introduces a fear of similar resentment and retaliation by others to create an altruistic sentiment of justice. (shrink)

This piece includes both Bradley's response to Sidgwick's critique of his Ethical Studies and Sidgwick's reply to that response. Bradley states that he has no pretension to solve the problem of the individual in general, and the origin of the Self in particular. Moreover, he says that he repudiates the doctrine that one's self‐realization is achieved when someone else brings about something one desires. To these and other defences, Sidgwick offers various replies: Bradley scarcely attempts to address the charge that (...) his exposition of the self lacks clarity and coherence; and Bradley misunderstands the position that the social organism of which the individual is said to be an essential part is a relative whole, not an absolute whole. (shrink)

Taking ‘what ought to be’ to include both what is commonly judged to be ‘good’ and what is commonly judged to be ‘right’, that is to say, ‘the duty’ of a person, Sidgwick observes that there is a rationally based recognition of the variation in people's duties. Given the failure of people on many occasions to do their duty, we must acknowledge that ‘what ought to be’ to a large degree ‘is not’, and that the former is independent of whether (...) it comes into being. Sidgwick asks if this distinction is ultimate and irreducible. He argues that, although no answer can be provided by considering moral judgements from a psychological or sociological viewpoint, adopting a philosophical or epistemological perspective may allow for the reduction between ‘what is’ and ‘what ought to be’, as this perspective takes both duty and facts to be objects of thought, or knowledge, that exhibit similar relations in thought, relations like that between the universal and the particular, and between inductive method and deductive method. (shrink)

Sidgwick discusses the dilemma confronting the ethical theorist whose first principles, as first principles, do not require a proof, and yet are rarely accepted without a defence. The solution lies in Aristotle's distinction between logical priority and priority in the mind of one person. While a proposition may be self‐evident, that is to say, cognizable without reference to other propositions, some rational process may be required to connect it to propositions already accepted in the mind of one individual.

In this chapter, Sidgwick analyses the position of Thomas Reid, who appeals to Common Sense to argue that the mere ridiculousness of Hume's conclusions provides good reason to dismiss them. In defending Reid against Kant's condemnation, Sidgwick undertakes to present his own philosophy of common sense, which greatly influenced what came be known as the ‘Cambridge School of Philosophy’.

Here Sidgwick presents his position on how ethical theory differs from the then new enterprise of sociology. After discussing the contributions made to the latter discipline by Comte and Spencer, Sidgwick analyses the claim that sociology absorbs ethical theory, reducing it to a subordinate branch of sociology. He argues that although these disciplines can and should be harmonized, it is not possible to bring together two such different lines of thought. Whereas ethical theory is a normative endeavour, sociology is inherently (...) descriptive. (shrink)

In this brief presentation of his version of utilitarianism, also known as universal hedonism, Sidgwick endeavours to eliminate the vagueness surrounding this view by distinguishing between the ethical theory utilitarianism and those theories within psychology that are sometimes classified under utilitarianism. As Sidgwick maintains, it does not follow from the fact that each person pursues her own happiness that she ought to seek the happiness of others. In distinguishing universal hedonism from egoistic hedonism, Sidgwick presents utilitarianism as providing a principle (...) and method for determining the objective rightness of an action. (shrink)

Here Sidgwick examines the nature of unreasonable action, that is, action that is contrary to reason or the subjective practical judgment of the agent. He undertakes his discussion from a psychological as opposed to an ethical standpoint, seeking to pin down the nature of the mental process involved in unreasonable action by a sane person in apparently normal conditions. Sidgwick notes that, on the one hand, an action may oppose the individual's moral sentiment without being unreasonable, and, on the other (...) hand, it may be unreasonable and yet align with her moral sentiments about what ought to be done. (shrink)

So considered, Hume is viewed as a naturalist, whose project in the first three parts of the first book of the Treatise is to provide an account of the ...

Archaeology of Empire in Achaemenid Egypt. By Henry P. Colburn. Edinburgh Studies in Ancient Persia. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2020. Pp. xvii + 318, illus. $130. [Distributed by Oxford University Press].

We are often justified in acting on the basis of evidential confirmation. I argue that such evidence supports belief in non-quantificational generic generalizations, rather than universally quantified generalizations. I show how this account supports, rather than undermines, a Bayesian account of confirmation. Induction from confirming instances of a generalization to belief in the corresponding generic is part of a reasoning instinct that is typically (but not always) correct, and allows us to approximate the predictions that formal epistemology would make.

This book examines an important area of Aristotle's philosophy: the generation of substances. While other changes presuppose the existence of a substance (Socrates grows taller), substantial generation results in something genuinely new that did not exist before (Socrates himself). The central argument of this book is that Aristotle defends a 'hylomorphic' model of substantial generation. In its most complete formulation, this model says that substantial generation involves three principles: (1) matter, which is the subject from which the change proceeds; (2) (...) form, which is the end towards which the process advances; and (3) an efficient cause, which directs the process towards that form. By examining the development of this model across Aristotle's works, Devin Henry seeks to deepen our grasp on how the doctrine of hylomorphism - understood as a blueprint for thinking about the world - informs our understanding of the process by which new substances come into being. (shrink)

How seriously should we take the idea that the mind employs mental files? Goodman and Gray (2022) argue that mental filing – a thinker rationally treating her cognitive states as being about the same thing – can be explained without files. Instead, they argue that the standard commitments of mental file theory, as represented by Recanati’s indexical model, are better seen in terms of a relational representational feature of object representations, which in turn is based on the epistemic links a (...) thinker bears to objects. This paper argues that this revision is misguided. Neither the representational property nor any basic role for epistemic links are needed for an adequate explanatory theory that makes use of the image of a mental filing system. A better alternative to the indexical model does posit files, albeit as causal-functional entities. This makes additional representational features redundant, and shows that epistemic links play a secondary role. (shrink)

_Epistemology and Inference _ was first published in 1983. Minnesota Archive Editions uses digital technology to make long-unavailable books once again accessible, and are published unaltered from the original University of Minnesota Press editions. Henry Kyburg has developed an original and important perspective on probabilistic and statistical inference. Unlike much contemporary writing by philosophers on these topics, Kyburg's work is informed by issues that have arisen in statistical theory and practice as well as issues familiar to professional philosophers. In (...) two major books and many articles, Kyberg has elaborated his technical proposals and explained their ramifications for epistemology, decision-making, and scientific inquiry. In this collection of published and unpublished essays, Kyburg presents his novel ideas and their applications in a manner that makes them accessible to philosophers and provides specialists in probability and induction with a concise exposition of his system. (shrink)

BackgroundBiobanks have recently been established in several low- and middle-income countries in the Arab region of the Middle East. We aimed to explore the views of biobank managers regarding the challenges, ethical issues, and governance arrangements of their biobanks.MethodsIn-depth semi-structured qualitative interviews were conducted with a purposive sample of eight biobank managers from Egypt, Jordan, and Sudan. Interviews were performed either face-to-face, by phone, or via Zoom and lasted approximately 45–75 min. After verbal consent, interviews were recorded and then transcribed. (...) The authors performed a thematic analysis of the transcripts independently and then integrated the themes via a consensus process.ResultsBiobank managers discussed the main challenges in establishing their biobanks. These included the staff’s lack of experience and training, limited funds, deficit awareness of biobanks, obtaining funding from different sources. Only four reported they were active in distributing biospecimens and health data to researchers. Six biobanks used a broad consent model, one used tiered consent, and another allowed participants to opt-out of being recontacted. Five managers avoided partnerships with pharmaceutical companies due to concerns with unfavorable reactions from the community. Five managers did not have clear policies for returning research results to the donors. Five expressed challenges with sample and data sharing with international collaborators; all five used material transfer agreements. The biobank managers revealed variable governance arrangements and activities with community involving awareness and educational efforts rather than active engagement. Several expressed the importance of transparency with the operations of their biobanks and gaining the trust of their stakeholders.ConclusionManagers of biobanks in LMICs in the Arab Middle East encounter financial, operational, and social challenges toward their sustainability efforts. Discussions with key stakeholders are warranted to manage ethical issues involving informed consent, privacy, data sharing, and the return of results. We recommend that biobank managers in the Arab Middle East form collaborative networks within the region and internationally, develop trusting governance relationships with their stakeholders, and pursue engagement activities with their communities to enhance trust. (shrink)

ArgumentIt is argued that the sensorium of God was introduced into theQuaestionesadded to the end of Newton’sOptice(1706) as a way of answering objections that Newton had failed to provide a causal account of gravity in thePrincipia. The discussion of God’s sensorium indicated that gravity must be caused by God’s will. Newton did not leave it there, however, but went on to show how God’s will created active principles as secondary causes of gravity. There was nothing unusual in assuming that God, (...) acting as the First Cause, operated in nature by means of secondary causes; but it was unusual to devote as much time to discussing God’s precise role as to discussing the secondary causes themselves. It is contended that Newton felt the need to do this to persuade readers that what might seem like a second cause that could not possibly work could be made to work by the omnipotent God. (shrink)

THE Concluding Unscientific Postscript is generally regarded as the most philosophically significant of Kierkegaard's works. In terms of a subjectivistic orientation it seems to present both an elaborate critique of the pretensions of the Hegelian philosophy and an existential analysis which points to the Christian faith as the only solution to the "human predicament." Furthermore, on the basis of such a straightforward reading of the text, Kierkegaard has been both vilified as an irrationalist and praised as a profound existential thinker (...) who has uncovered the only legitimate starting point for a philosophical analysis of the religious life and a Christian apologetic. (shrink)

Population-based genomics studies have proven successful in identifying genetic variants associated with diseases. High-quality biospecimens linked with informative health data from diverse segments of the population have made such research possible. However, the success of biobank research depends on the willingness of the public to participate in this type of research. We aimed to explore the factors associated with the willingness of the public to participate in biobank research from four low- and middle-income countries in the Arab region (Egypt, Jordan, (...) Morocco, and Sudan). We used a previously validated questionnaire to assess several constructs that included the public’s perceptions, attitudes, and willingness to participate in biobank research. We recruited 967 participants. More than half did not have prior awareness of biobanks. Participants’ willingness to donate biospecimens and health data was less than 10%. Our results also showed that participants harbored concerns with trust, privacy, and with data-sharing involving international researchers. Predictors of willingness to participate in biobank research included no previous involvement in research and positive attitudes toward biobanks. Finally, our study showed several differences between the four countries regarding several of the investigated constructs. We conclude there should be additional efforts to raise public awareness and enhance perceptions of the public in biobanking research to enhance trust. We further recommend qualitative research to explore the underlying factors that contribute to the public’s concerns with international data sharing that would enhance global health. (shrink)

In her reply to Gershom Scholem’s criticism of Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, Hannah Arendt writes.