Results for 'Hallucinations and illusions. '

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  1. Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion.William Fish - 2009 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.
    In the first monograph in this exciting area since then, William Fish develops a comprehensive disjunctive theory, incorporating detailed accounts of the three ...
  2. Hallucinations and Illusions: A Study of the Fallacies of Perception.Edmund Parish - 1898 - Mind 7 (28):541-547.
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  3.  32
    Hallucinations and Illusions: A Study of the Fallacies of Perception.W. B. Pillsbury - 1898 - Philosophical Review 7 (2):219-220.
  4.  84
    Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion.Peter R. King - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (5):715-719.
  5. Perception, hallucination, and illusion: reply to my critics. [REVIEW]William Fish - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (1):57-66.
    This book provides the first full-length treatment of disjunctivism about visual experiences in the service of defending a naive realist theory of veridical visual perception. It includes detailed theories of hallucination and illusion that show how such states can be indistinguishable from veridical experiences without sharing any common character.
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  6. Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion, by William Fish.Anders Nes - 2011 - Mind 120 (479):856-859.
  7. Do the benefits of naïve realism outweigh the costs? Comments on fish, perception, hallucination and illusion.Adam Pautz - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (1):25-36.
  8. Getting acquainted with naïve realism: Critical notice of perception, hallucination, and illusion.Heather Logue - 2010 - Philosophical Books 51 (1):22-38.
  9. Illusion, hallucination and the problem of truth.Daya Krishna - 2003 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 20 (4):129-146.
     
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  10.  49
    Review of William fish, Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion[REVIEW]Matthew Kennedy - 2009 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (11).
  11.  7
    Review of Zur kritik des telepathischen beweismaterials and Hallucinations and Illusions, a study of the fallacies of perception. [REVIEW]No Authorship Indicated - 1897 - Psychological Review 4 (6):657-658.
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  12. Hallucination and Its Objects.Alex Byrne & Riccardo Manzotti - 2022 - Philosophical Review 131 (3):327-359.
    When one visually hallucinates, the object of one’s hallucination is not before one’s eyes. On the standard view, that is because the object of hallucination does not exist, and so is not anywhere. Many different defenses of the standard view are on offer; each have problems. This paper defends the view that there is always an object of hallucination—a physical object, sometimes with spatiotemporally scattered parts.
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  13. Mundane hallucinations and new wave relationalism.Jacob Beck - 2021 - Noûs 57 (2):391-413.
    Relationalism maintains that mind-independent objects are essential constituents of veridical perceptual experiences. According to the argument from hallucination, relationalism is undermined by perfect hallucinations, experiences that are introspectively indistinguishable from veridical perceptual experiences but lack an object. Recently, a new wave of relationalists have responded by questioning whether perfect hallucinations are possible: what seem to be perfect hallucinations may really be something else, such as illusions, veridical experiences of non-obvious objects, or experiences that are not genuinely possible. (...)
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  14. Synesthesia, Hallucination, and Autism.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2021 - Frontiers in Bioscience 26:797-809.
    Synesthesia literally means a “union of the senses” whereby two or more of the five senses that are normally experienced separately are involuntarily and automatically joined together in experience. For example, some synesthetes experience a color when they hear a sound, although many instances of synesthesia also occur entirely within the visual sense. In this paper, I first mainly engage critically with Sollberger’s view that there is reason to think that at least some synesthetic experiences can be viewed as truly (...)
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  15. Appearance and Illusion.James Genone - 2014 - Mind 123 (490):339-376.
    Recent debates between representational and relational theories of perceptual experience sometimes fail to clarify in what respect the two views differ. In this essay, I explain that the relational view rejects two related claims endorsed by most representationalists: the claim that perceptual experiences can be erroneous, and the claim that having the same representational content is what explains the indiscriminability of veridical perceptions and phenomenally matching illusions or hallucinations. I then show how the relational view can claim that errors (...)
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  16. Redefining Illusion and Hallucination in Light of New Cases.Fiona Macpherson & Clare Batty - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):263-296.
    In this paper, we present new cases of illusion and hallucination that have not heretofore been identified. We argue that such cases show that the traditional accounts of illusion and hallucination are incorrect because they do not identify all of the cases of non-veridical experience that they need to and they elide important differences between cases. In light of this, we present new and exhaustive definitions of illusion and hallucination. First, we explicate the traditional accounts of illusion and hallucination. We (...)
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  17. Naïve Realism and Illusion.Boyd Millar - 2015 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2:607-625.
    It is well-known that naïve realism has difficulty accommodating perceptual error. Recent discussion of the issue has focused on whether the naïve realist can accommodate hallucination by adopting disjunctivism. However, illusions are more difficult for the naïve realist to explain precisely because the disjunctivist solution is not available. I discuss what I take to be the two most plausible accounts of illusion available to the naïve realist. The first claims that illusions are cases in which you are prevented from perceiving (...)
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  18.  37
    The Sense of Deception: Illusion and Hallucination as Nullified, Invalid Perception.Andrea Cimino - 2019 - Husserl Studies 35 (1):27-49.
    The present study attempts to reconstruct Husserl’s account of empirical illusion and hallucination and disclose the significance of sense-deception in Husserl’s phenomenology. By clarifying the relation between the “leibhaftige presence” and “existence” of perceived objects, I shall be able to contend that illusion and hallucination are nullified, invalid perceptions. Non-existence or in-actuality is a form of invalidity: the Ungültigkeit of what demands its insertion in the totality of actual existence. Husserl elaborates an ex-negativo account of in-actuality, in which sensory deception (...)
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  19.  29
    Perception, illusion, and hallucination.Kazem Sadegh-Zadeh - 1982 - Metamedicine 3 (2):159-191.
    Patrick Suppes' set-theoretical approach to the analysis of theories, and Joseph D. Sneed's metatheory are briefly outlined. The notions of observation, illusion and hallucination are reconstructed according to these approaches. It is argued that the terms ‘perception’ and ‘truth’ are theoretical with respect to observation but nontheoretical with respect to illusion and hallucination. Hallucination is construed as a special kind of illusion.
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  20. Perception, illusion, and hallucination.Kazem Sadegh-Zadeh - 1982 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 3 (2):159-191.
    Patrick Suppes'' set-theoretical approach to the analysis of theories, and Joseph D. Sneed''s metatheory are briefly outlined. The notions of observation, illusion and hallucination are reconstructed according to these approaches. It is argued that the terms perception and truth are theoretical with respect to observation but nontheoretical with respect to illusion and hallucination. Hallucination is construed as a special kind of illusion.
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  21. Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology.Fiona Macpherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.) - 2013 - Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
    Scientific and philosophical perspectives on hallucination: essays that draw on empirical evidence from psychology, neuroscience, and cutting-edge philosophical theory.
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  22.  46
    Illusions and Hallucinations as Evidence for Sense Data.E. J. Lowe - 2008 - In Edmond Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia. MIT Press. pp. 59--72.
  23.  5
    Relationistic Explanation of Illusion and Hallucinations through Quantifying In. 이경근 - 2023 - Cheolhak-Korean Journal of Philosophy 154:113-134.
    전통적인 인식론에 따르면, 우리는 우리 정신 바깥의 외부 세계를 경험한다. 이러한 경험은 단순히 외부 대상을 사유하거나 추론하는 것을 넘어서, 감각적으로 보고 듣고 만지는 지각활동을 포함한다. 이 점에서 지각 활동은 우리 마음이 세계와 만나는 가장 직접적으로 만나는 접점이며, 외부 세계에 대한 추론에 그 근거를 제공한다. 그런데, 우리의 지각 활동이 오류 가능하다는 점은 그러한 근거를 의심스럽게 만든다. 대표적으로, 우리는 사물에 대해 왜곡된 표상을 지니는 착각(illusion), 그리고 지각에 떠오른 사물이 사실은 존재하지도 않는 환각(hallucination)을 경험한다. 이처럼 외부 사물에 대한 추론의 근거인 지각이 오류 가능하다면, (...)
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  24. Wegner on hallucinations, inconsistency, and the illusion of free will. Some critical remarks.Gerben Meynen - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (3):359-372.
    Wegner’s argument on the illusory nature of conscious will, as developed in The Illusion of Conscious Will (2002) and other publications, has had major impact. Based on empirical data, he develops a theory of apparent mental causation in order to explain the occurrence of the illusion of conscious will. Part of the evidence for his argument is derived from a specific interpretation of the phenomenon of auditory verbal hallucinations as they may occur in schizophrenia. The aim of this paper (...)
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  25.  70
    Illusions and Hallucinations.Drakoulis Nikolinakos - 2011 - Philosophical Inquiry 35 (3-4):91-105.
  26.  7
    Cinema's bodily illusions: flying, floating, and hallucinating.Scott C. Richmond - 2016 - Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
    Do contemporary big-budget blockbuster films like Gravity move something in us that is fundamentally the same as what avant-garde and experimental films have done for more than a century? In a powerful challenge to mainstream film theory, Cinema's Bodily Illusions demonstrates that this is the case. Scott C. Richmond bridges genres and periods by focusing, most palpably, on cinema's power to evoke illusions: feeling like you're flying through space, experiencing 3D without glasses, or even hallucinating. He argues that cinema is, (...)
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  27. Hallucination, sense-data and direct realism.David Hilbert - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):185-191.
    Although it has been something of a fetish for philosophers to distinguish between hallucination and illusion, the enduring problems for philosophy of perception that both phenomena present are not essentially different. Hallucination, in its pure philosophical form, is just another example of the philosopher’s penchant for considering extreme and extremely idealized cases in order to understand the ordinary. The problem that has driven much philosophical thinking about perception is the problem of how to reconcile our evident direct perceptual contact with (...)
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  28. Measurements of illusions and hallucinations in normal life.C. E. Seashore - 1895 - Studies From the Yale Psychological Laboratory 3:1–67.
     
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  29. Illusions of Optimal Motion, Relationism, and Perceptual Content.Santiago Echeverri - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):146-173.
    Austere relationism rejects the orthodox analysis of hallucinations and illusions as incorrect perceptual representations. In this article, I argue that illusions of optimal motion present a serious challenge for this view. First, I submit that austere-relationist accounts of misleading experiences cannot be adapted to account for IOMs. Second, I show that any attempt at elucidating IOMs within an austere-relationist framework undermines the claim that perceptual experiences fundamentally involve relations to mind-independent objects. Third, I develop a representationalist model of IOMs. (...)
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  30. Of the perfect and the ordinary: Indistinguishability and hallucination.Shivam Patel - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    The claim that perfect hallucination is introspectively indistinguishable from perception has been a centrepiece of philosophical theorizing about sense experience. The most common interpretation of the indistinguishability claim is modal: that it is impossible to distinguish perfect hallucination from perception through introspection alone. I run through various models of introspection and show that none of them can accommodate the modal interpretation. Rejecting the modal interpretation opens up two alternative interpretations of the indistinguishability claim. According to the generic interpretation, hallucination is (...)
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  31.  39
    Looking at Animals Looking: Art, Illusion, and Power.I. Illusion - 1990 - In Frederick Burwick & Walter Pape (eds.), Aesthetic Illusion: Theoretical and Historical Approaches. W. De Gruyter. pp. 65.
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    In gnosticism, buddhism, and the matrix project.Worlds Of Illusion - 2005 - In Christopher Grau (ed.), Philosophers Explore the Matrix. Oxford University Press.
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    Imagery and memory illusions.Frédérique Robin - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (2):253-262.
    This article provides a summary of current knowledge about memory illusions. The memory illusions described here focus on the recall of imagined events that have never actually occurred. The purpose is to review theoretical ideas and empirical evidence about the reality-monitoring processes involved in memory illusions. Reality monitoring means deciding whether the memory has been perceptually derived or been self-generated (thought or imagined). A few key findings from the literature have been reported in this paper and these focus on internal (...)
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  34.  38
    VR and hallucination: a technoetic perspective.Diana Reed Slattery - 2008 - Technoetic Arts 6 (1):3-18.
    Virtual Reality (VR), especially in a technologically focused discourse, is defined by a class of hardware and software, among them head-mounted displays (HMD); navigation and pointing devices; and stereoscopic imaging. This presentation examines an experiential aspect of VR. Putting virtual in front of reality modifies the ontological status of a class of experience that of reality. Reality has also been modified (by artists, new media theorists, technologists and philosophers) as augmented, mixed, simulated, artificial, layered and enhanced. Modifications of reality are (...)
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    Scott C. Richmond (2016) Cinema's Bodily Illusions: Flying, Floating and Hallucinating.Joseph Jenner - 2019 - Film-Philosophy 23 (2):219-222.
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  36.  1
    A rating scale for psychotic symptoms (RSPS) part I: theoretical principles and subscale 1: perception symptoms (illusions and hallucinations).G. Chouinard & R. Miller - 1999 - Schizophrenia Research 38 (2-3):101-22.
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    Precis of the illusion of conscious will (and commentaries and reply).Daniel M. Wegner - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):649-659.
    The experience of conscious will is the feeling that we are doing things. This feeling occurs for many things we do, conveying to us again and again the sense that we consciously cause our actions. But the feeling may not be a true reading of what is happening in our minds, brains, and bodies as our actions are produced. The feeling of conscious will can be fooled. This happens in clinical disorders such as alien hand syndrome, dissociative identity disorder, and (...)
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  38. Hallucination as Perceptual Synecdoche.Jonathon VandenHombergh - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    Relationalism is the view that perception is partly constituted by external objects (McDowell 1994; Campbell 2002; Martin 2004). Faced with the hallucination argument, and unsatisfied with the standard disjunctivist reply, some ‘new wave’ relationalists explain away the possibility of hallucinations as mere illusions (Alston 1999; Watzl 2010; Ali 2018; Masrour 2020). In this paper, I argue that some of these illusions (as in Chalmers 2005; Ali 2018) are perceptions of internal objects which appear as external ones. Then, in response (...)
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  39. The immersive spatiotemporal hallucination model of dreaming.Jennifer M. Windt - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (2):295-316.
    The paper proposes a minimal definition of dreaming in terms of immersive spatiotemporal hallucination (ISTH) occurring in sleep or during sleep–wake transitions and under the assumption of reportability. I take these conditions to be both necessary and sufficient for dreaming to arise. While empirical research results may, in the future, allow for an extension of the concept of dreaming beyond sleep and possibly even independently of reportability, ISTH is part of any possible extension of this definition and thus is a (...)
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  40.  28
    Scott C. Richmond. Cinema’s Bodily Illusions: Flying, Floating, and Hallucinating. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2016. 232 pp. [REVIEW]Chang-Min Yu - 2017 - Critical Inquiry 44 (1):208-209.
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  41. Fiona Macpherson and Dimitris Platchias , Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology: MIT Press, 2013, 432 pages, ISBN 0262019205, $40.22. [REVIEW]Rami Ali - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (3):455-460.
    Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology is an edited MIT press collection that contributes to the philosophy of perception. This collection is a significant addition to the literature both for its excellent choice of texts, and its emphasis on the case of hallucinations. Dedicating a volume to hallucinatory phenomena may seem somewhat peculiar for those not entrenched in the analytic philosophy of perception, but it is easy enough to grasp their significance. Theories of perception aim to give a fundamental characterization of (...)
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  42. Perception and Its Objects.Bill Brewer - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Early modern empiricists thought that the nature of perceptual experience is given by citing the object presented to the mind in that experience. Hallucination and illusion suggest that this requires untenable mind-dependent objects. Current orthodoxy replaces the appeal to direct objects with the claim that perceptual experience is characterized instead by its representational content. This paper argues that the move to content is problematic, and reclaims the early modern empiricist insight as perfectly consistent, even in cases of illusion, with the (...)
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  43. The Illusion Confusion.Clare Batty - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5:1-11.
    In "What the Nose Doesn't Know", I argue that there are no olfactory illusions. Central to the traditional notions of illusion and hallucination is a notion of object-failure—the failure of an experience to represent particular objects. Because there are no presented objects in the case of olfactory experience, I argue that the traditional ways of categorizing non-veridical experience do not apply to the olfactory case. In their place, I propose a novel notion of non-veridical experience for the olfactory case. In (...)
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  44. Object‐Dependent Thought Without Illusion.Solveig Aasen - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (1):68-84.
    When unknowingly experiencing a perceptual hallucination, a subject can attempt to think specifically about what is, as far as he or she can tell, the perceived object. Is the subject then deceived about his or her cognitive situation? I answer negatively. Moreover, I argue that this answer is compatible with holding that thought specifically about a certain object – singular thought – is object-dependent. By contrast, both critics and advocates of the view that singular thought is object-dependent have assumed this (...)
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  45.  27
    Explaining the illusion of independent agency in imagined persons with a theory of practice.Jim Davies - 2023 - Philosophical Psychology 36 (2):337-355.
    Many mental phenomena involve thinking about people who do not exist. Imagined characters appear in planning, dreams, fantasizing, imaginary companions, bereavement hallucinations, auditory verbal hallucinations, and as characters created in fictional narratives by authors. Sometimes these imagined persons are felt to be completely under our control, as when one fantasizes about having a great time at a party. Other times, characters feel as though they are outside of our conscious control. Dream characters, for example, are experienced by dreamers (...)
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  46. Précis of the illusion of conscious will.Daniel M. Wegner - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):649-659.
    The experience of conscious will is the feeling that we are doing things. This feeling occurs for many things we do, conveying to us again and again the sense that we consciously cause our actions. But the feeling may not be a true reading of what is happening in our minds, brains, and bodies as our actions are produced. The feeling of conscious will can be fooled. This happens in clinical disorders such as alien hand syndrome, dissociative identity disorder, and (...)
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  47. How to account for illusion.Bill Brewer - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: perception, action, knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 168-180.
    The question how to account for illusion has had a prominent role in shaping theories of perception throughout the history of philosophy. Prevailing philosophical wisdom today has it that phenomena of illusion force us to choose between the following two options. First, reject altogether the early modern empiricist idea that the core subjective character of perceptual experience is to be given simply by citing the object presented in that experience. Instead we must characterize perceptual experience entirely in terms of its (...)
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  48. The argument from illusion.Steven L. Reynolds - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):604-621.
    In an attempt to revive discussion of the argument from illusion this paper amends the classic version of the argument to avoid Austin's main objection. It then develops and defends a version of the intentional object reply to the argument, arguing that an "unendorsed story" account of reports of dreams and hallucinations avoids commitment to nonexistent objects.
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  49. Naïve Realism and the Colors of Afterimages.Vivian Mizrahi - 2021 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1:1-21.
    Along with hallucinations and illusions, afterimages have shaped the philosophical debate about the nature of perception. Often referred to as optical or visual illusions, experiences of afterimages have been abundantly exploited by philosophers to argue against naïve realism. This paper offers an alternative account to this traditional view by providing a tentative account of the colors of the afterimages from an objectivist perspective. Contrary to the widespread approach to afterimages, this paper explores the possibility that the colors of afterimages (...)
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  50. Perceptual Links: Attention, Experience, and Demonstrative Thought.Michael Barkasi - 2015 - Dissertation, Rice University
    Perception is conscious: perceiving involves a first-person experience of what’s perceived. It’s widely held that these perceptual experiences are independent of what's perceived. Viewing two visually indiscriminable #2 pencils would involve the same experience, despite viewing different objects. It’s also widely held that conscious perception enables thinking about what's perceiving. When you see one of those pencils you can think, THAT is a pencil. Some philosophers, including John McDowell and John Campbell, have suggested that these two features engender a puzzle: (...)
     
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