Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1:1-21 (2021)
AbstractAlong with hallucinations and illusions, afterimages have shaped the philosophical debate about the nature of perception. Often referred to as optical or visual illusions, experiences of afterimages have been abundantly exploited by philosophers to argue against naïve realism. This paper offers an alternative account to this traditional view by providing a tentative account of the colors of the afterimages from an objectivist perspective. Contrary to the widespread approach to afterimages, this paper explores the possibility that the colors of afterimages are not ontologically different from “ordinary” colors and that experiences of afterimages fail to provide a motivation for rejecting naïve realism.
Similar books and articles
What’s so Naïve About Naïve Realism?Carlo Raineri - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (11):3637-3657.
Naïve Realism and Illusion.Boyd Millar - 2015 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2:607-625.
Naive Realism and the Scientific Narration of Perception.Andrea Bucci - 2018 - Brainfactor:01-05.
How Can the Logic of Colour Concepts Apply to Aferimage Colours?Jonathan Westphal - 2010 - In Jonathan D. Cohen & Mohan Matthen (eds.), Color Ontology and Color Science. MIT Press. pp. 245.
The Intuitive Case for Naïve Realism.Harold Langsam - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (1):106-122.
The Value of Perception.Keith Allen - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):633-656.
Naïve Realism and Phenomenal Similarity.Sam Clarke & Alfonso Anaya - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-18.
Naïve Realism and Phenomenological Directness: Reply to Millar.Erhan Demircioglu - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1897-1910.
Naive Realism and the Science of (Some) Illusions.Ian Phillips - 2016 - Philosophical Topics 44 (2):353-380.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
No citations found.