Current health care standards, in many countries, Australia included, are regrettably poor. Surprisingly, practitioners and treating teams alike in mental health and disability sectors, in particular, make far too many basic care-related mistakes, in addition to the already abundant diagnostic mistakes that cause and amplify great harm. In part, too many practitioners also fail to distinguish adverse effects for what they are and all too often treat adverse effects, instead, as comorbidities. Diagnostic failures are dangerous, the result of which generates (...) and perpetuates harms that are extremely costly in terms of patient welfare, in addition to the financial burden placed on everyone. In this essay, I contend that the authority bestowed upon psychiatry is misplaced. Subsequently, this misplaced authority affects the governing and investigatory institutions reliant and informed by psychiatry. The examination process undertaken in this investigation traces the metaphysics of psychiatric disorders relative to the Diagnostic-Statistical-Manual (DSM) in all its iterations and to the epistemological construction process that serves to underpin the fundamentals of psychiatric practice. There exists a crisis of confidence in psychiatric practice and I urge drastic reform be undertaken to arrest the damage. (shrink)

In this Introduction we lay out the context of a ‘Continental philosophy of biology’ and suggest why Georges Canguilhem’s place in such a philosophy is important. There is not one single program for Continental philosophy of biology, but Canguilhem’s vision, which he referred to at one stage as ‘biological philosophy’, is a significant one, located in between the classic holism-reductionism tensions, significantly overlapping with philosophy of medicine, philosophy of technology and other themes moving away from the more common existential and (...) phenomenological motifs of post-war European thought. Chapters examine (among other themes) his relation to Lebensphilosophie, to authors such as Kant, Nietzsche and Marjorie Grene, and to current theoretical biology. (shrink)

This volume illustrates both theoretically and empirically the differences between religious diversity and religious pluralism. It highlights how the factual situation of cultural and religious diversity may lead to individual, social and political choices of organized and recognized pluralism. In the process, both individual and collective identities are redefined, incessantly moving along the continuum that ranges from exclusion to inclusion. The book starts by first detailing general issues related to religious pluralism. It makes the case for keeping the empirical, the (...) normative, the regulatory and the interactive dimensions of religious pluralism analytically distinct while recognizing that, in practice, they often overlap. It also underlines the importance of seeking connections between religious pluralism and other pluralisms. Next, the book explores how religious diversity can operate to contribute to legal pluralism and examines the different types of church-state relations: eradication, monopoly, oligopoly and pluralism. The second half of the book features case studies that provide a more specific look at the general issues, from ways to map and assess the religious diversity of a whole country to a comparison between Belgian-French views of religious and philosophical diversity, from religious pluralism in Italy to the shifting approach to ethnic and religious diversity in America, and from a sociological and historical perspective of religious plurality in Japan to an exploration of Brazilian religions, old and new. The transition from religious diversity to religious pluralism is one of the most important challenges that will reshape the role of religion in contemporary society. This book provides readers with insights that will help them better understand and interpret this unprecedented transition. (shrink)

In one of his last writings, Life: Experience and Science, Michel Foucault argued that twentieth-century French philosophy could be read as dividing itself into two divergent lines: on the one hand, we have a philosophical stream which takes individual experience as its point of departure, conceiving it as irreducible to science. On the other hand, we have an analysis of knowledge which takes into account the concrete productions of the mind, as are found in science and human practices. In order (...) to account for this division, Foucault opposed epistemologists such as Cavaillès and Canguilhem to phenomenologists such as Merleau-Ponty and Sartre but, also, and more particularly, he opposed Poincaré to Bergson. The latter was presented by Foucault as being the key-figure of the ?philosophy of experience? at the beginning of the twentieth century. Fifteen years later, in his Deleuze and in the Logics of Worlds, Alain Badiou again uses this dual structure in his interpretation of the past hundred years of French thought. He employs a series of oppositional couples: himself and Deleuze, Lautmann and Sartre, and, finally, Brunschvicg and Bergson. On the one hand a ?mathematical Platonism? and on the other a ?philosophy of vital interiority.? This Manichean reading of philosophy, and the strategic use of the figure of Bergson has, itself, a long tradition. It was also proposed by Althusser who, following Bachelard, opposed his standpoint to any form of ?empiricism.? Althusser developed his thought from a tradition of Marxist thinkers and ideologists, which included Politzer's and Nizan's critique of bourgeois philosophy and, even before that, neo-Kantians such as the philosophers of the Revue de métaphysique et de morale. The aim of this essay is to deconstruct and to put into its precise context of production this series of genealogies which entails the mobilization of Bergsonism and of the name ?Bergson.? By doing so, I hope to weight the importance of Bergsonism in twentieth-century French philosophy, in both its ?positive? and its ?negative? aspect. The essay will proceed regressively, taking into account figures such as Althusser, Badiou, Deleuze, Foucault, Canguilhem, Cavaillès, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, but also Polizer, Brunschvicg and Alain. The conclusion of the essay is an attempt at reading the ?Bergson renaissance? in the light of new discoveries in genetics and the cognitive sciences and to tie it to the renewal of studies in the history of French philosophy. (shrink)

On the basis of neuropsychological evidence, it is clear that attention should be given a role in any model of consciousness. What is known about the many instances of dissociation between explicit and implicit knowledge after brain damage suggests that conscious experience might not be linked to a restricted area of the brain. Even if it were true that there is a single brain area devoted to consciousness, the subicular area would seem to be an unlikely possibility.

In the literature there are two well-established but opposite readings of Arendt: as an agonistic theorist and as a deliberative one. In between these two positions a smaller number of scholars have argued that in Arendt these two dimensions can to a large extent be reconciled. This paper follows this third path but tries to bring it one step further. In particular, it defends the idea that those scholars who have proposed this third reading of Arendt have fallen short of (...) revealing the degree to which deliberation and agonism are, for her, interwoven. Through an original reading of Arendt’s views on judgment, persuasion, distinction and Eichmann’s banality, the paper clarifies why, for her, agonism and deliberation are not only compatible but actually mutually dependent. In other words, it clarifies why she believes that there can be no deliberation without agonism and no agonism without deliberation. (shrink)

1. It is a fact that developing a good proof theory for modal logics is a difficult task. The problem is not in having deductive systems. In fact, all the main modal logics enjoy an axiomatic prese...

Nel pensiero politico di Ralf Dahrendorf un tema ricorre costantemente, sia che si tratti di liberalismo sia della democrazia rappresentativa: le costituzioni politiche sono radicate nelle strutture sociali, stato politico e stato sociale sono mutualmente interdipendenti. In assenza di specifiche strutture sociali, la democrazia rappresentativa non può divenire effettiva, e quindi corrispondere a una realtà evidente perfettamente valutabile. Ancora. Le strutture sociali pongono limiti molto ristretti all’effettività delle forme politiche. Esistono, in altri termini, precisi elementi strutturali che permettono l’oggettivazione della (...) democrazia liberale, e non altri. Si tratta certo di una concezione che deve molto a Tocqueville, la sua immagine illumina il pensiero dahrendorfiano sulla democrazia. Pur tuttavia non è l’unico elemento ricorrente. Ideale e reale qui si confrontano. L’idea di democrazia, infatti, si misura con la realtà sul terreno della prassi politica. Non a caso Ralf Dahrendorf è presente in quattro diversi parlamenti in cui ha visto all’opera il cambiamento senza violenza, l’argomentazione razionale, l’espressione della maggioranza e il controllo del governo. Non si tratta solo dei princìpi fondamentali della teoria politica democratica, ma anche della sua formula politica, con la quale interpreta i cambiamenti negli spazi politici globali. Si tratta di spazi nei quali il potere è libero da vincoli, si misura sulla base di rapporti di forza, non conosce regole e procedure se non quelle dell’economicismo, della tecnica, della finanziarizzazione. Tuttavia lo Stato nazionale e la democrazia parlamentare sono ancora decisivi. Proprio perché pensa questo, egli crede che nello spazio globale i principi della democrazia rappresentativa devono essere tradotti in realtà. Certo, Dahrendorf non è in grado di indicare nuove soluzioni, ma si limita a mostrare delle semplici proposte per gestire il dibattito pubblico nel passaggio da una democrazia classica ad una «nuova democrazia». (shrink)

La morte dell'uomo come metafora dello sradicamento ontologico -- Partecipazione e sradicamento : la morte come rottura della comunione intersoggettiva -- L'amore come apertura alla dimensione partecipativa : in cammino verso la salvezza.

Coherent-ambiguity aversion is defined within the smooth-ambiguity model as the combination of choice-ambiguity and value-ambiguity aversion. Five ambiguous decision tasks are analyzed theoretically, where an individual faces two-stage lotteries with binomial, uniform, or unknown second-order probabilities. Theoretical predictions are then tested through a 10-task experiment. In tasks 1–5, risk aversion is elicited through both a portfolio choice method and a BDM mechanism. In tasks 6–10, choice-ambiguity aversion is elicited through the portfolio choice method, while value-ambiguity aversion comes about through the (...) BDM mechanism. The behavior of over 75 % of classified subjects is in line with the KMM model in all tasks 6–10, independent of their degree of risk aversion. Furthermore, the percentage of coherent-ambiguity-averse subjects is lower in the binomial than in the uniform and in the unknown treatments, with only the latter difference being significant. The most part of coherent-ambiguity-loving subjects show a high risk aversion. (shrink)

We present a syntactical cut-elimination proof for an extended sequent calculus covering the classical modal logics in the \(\mathsf{K}\), \(\mathsf{D}\), \(\mathsf{T}\), \(\mathsf{K4}\), \(\mathsf{D4}\) and \(\mathsf{S4}\) spectrum. We design the systems uniformly since they all share the same set of rules. Different logics are obtained by “tuning” a single parameter, namely a constraint on the applicability of the cut rule and on the (left and right, respectively) rules for \(\Box\) and \(\Diamond\). Starting points for this research are 2-sequents and indexed-based calculi (...) (sequents and tableaux). By extending and modifying existing proposals, we show how to achieve a syntactical proof of the cut-elimination theorem that is as close as possible to the one for first-order classical logic. In doing this, we implicitly show how small is the proof-theoretical distance between classical logic and the systems under consideration. (shrink)

Notwithstanding the recent prominence of the term “problem” in the humanities, few scholars have analysed its history. This essay tries to partially fill that lack, principally covering the period from late modernity through to the 1960s, in order to understand the role that the term plays in “Continental” philosophy, with special emphasis on the writings of Gilles Deleuze. This analysis focuses on the strategies employed by different agents to define “philosophical” problems, or “philosophical” ways of posing problems. The term, originally (...) used in antiquity by knowledge-producers located in an autonomous position, implied an idea of cognition oscillating between production and reproduction. Once the term escaped the context of geometry, it was involved in symbolic struggles that radicalized during modernity. The Kantians placed “philosophy” in a supposedly neutral position of science treating “the problem of all the problems” and invented a new genre, the “history of philosophy,” focusing on the analysis of “philosophical problems.” This approach had great institutional success in the German and French universities and clashed, during the twentieth century, with another usage of philosophy as a practice of “dissolution of problems,” developed in the United Kingdom and the Austro-Habsburg Empire. (shrink)

Speakers retrieve words to use them in sentences. Errors in incorporating words into sentential frames are revealing with respect to the lexical units as well as the lexical retrieval mechanism; hence they constrain theories of lexical access. We present a reanalysis of a corpus of spontaneously occurring lexical exchange errors that highlights the contact points between lexical and sentential processes.

We analyze the results from three different risk attitude elicitation methods. First, the broadly used test by Holt and Laury, HL, second, the lottery-panel task by Sabater-Grande and Georgantzis, SG, and third, responses to a survey question on self-assessment of general attitude towards risk. The first and the second task are implemented with real monetary incentives, while the third concerns all domains in life in general. Like in previous studies, the correlation of decisions across tasks is low and usually statistically (...) non-significant. However, when we consider only subjects whose behavior across the panels of the SG task is compatible with constant relative risk aversion, the correlation between HL and self-assessed risk attitude becomes significant. Furthermore, the correlation between HL and SG also increases for CRRA-compatible subjects, although it remains statistically non-significant. (shrink)

This paper presents the collective reflection of a temporary community of inquiry (COI) created during an international workshop at the 20th biennial ICPIC conference--“Philosophy In And Beyond the Classroom: P4wc Across Cultural, Social, and Political Differences”-- and the suggestions emerging from that event. The workshop, entitled “Pedagojazz—improvising and inquiring, community interplay”, was conducted via Zoom, but participants were both online and present in person. The topic focused on the pedagojazz perspective, and the short activities proposed were aimed at involving the (...) (temporary) COI in a collective discussion about how it would be possible to transform a community of inquiry into an inquiring-jazzing community. Three premises were introduced as common background on which to develop our reflections: the pedagojazz perspective; the connection between pedagojazz idioms and the different roles of the facilitator in P4wC; and the idea that jazz, and collective improvisation in particular, can inform COI development. The principles and practices of pedagojazz and collective improvisation are presented in detail here. During the workshop, Zoom chat and the Wooclap site were used to involve all participants and to gather their contributions and suggestions. A word cloud and three tables were produced and are presented here. Interesting themes, questions and perspectives emerged that can help us reflect in a more complex way on the education of P4wC facilitators across cultural, social and political differences. (shrink)

Artefacts do not always do what they are supposed to, due to a variety of reasons, including manufacturing problems, poor maintenance, and normal wear-and-tear. Since software is an artefact, it should be subject to malfunctioning in the same sense in which other artefacts can malfunction. Yet, whether software is on a par with other artefacts when it comes to malfunctioning crucially depends on the abstraction used in the analysis. We distinguish between “negative” and “positive” notions of malfunction. A negative malfunction, (...) or dysfunction, occurs when an artefact token either does not or cannot do what it is supposed to. A positive malfunction, or misfunction, occurs when an artefact token may do what is supposed to but, at least occasionally, it also yields some unintended and undesirable effects. We argue that software, understood as type, may misfunction in some limited sense, but cannot dysfunction. Accordingly, one should distinguish software from other technical artefacts, in view of their design that makes dysfunction impossible for the former, while possible for the latter. (shrink)

Even more than for other treatments, great importance must be given to informed consent in the case of electroconvulsive therapy. In a percentage of cases, the symbolic connotation of the treatment, even if mostly and intrinsically negative, may actually be a determining factor in the patient’s motives for giving consent. On an ethical and medicolegal level, the most critical point is that concerning consent to the treatment by a psychotic subject with a severely compromised ability to comprehend the nature and (...) objective of the proposed therapy, but who nonetheless expresses his consent, for reasons derived from delusional thoughts. In fact, this situation necessarily brings to light the contradiction between an explicit expression of consent, a necessary formality for the commencement of therapy, and the validity of this consent, which may be severely compromised due to the patient’s inability to comprehend reality and therefore to accept the proposal of treatment, which is intrinsic to this reality. With the use of an electric current, the symbolic experience associated with anaesthesia, and the connection to convulsions, ECT enters the collective consciousness. In relation to this, ECT is symbolic of these three factors and hooks on to the thoughts, fears, feelings and expectations of delusional patients. These are often exemplified in the violent intervention of the persecutor in the patient with schizophrenia, the expected punishment for the ’error’ committed for which the depressed patient blames himself and the social repression of the maniacal patient’s affirmation of his inflated self-esteem. (shrink)

The moving spotlight account (MS) is a view that combines an eternalist ontology and an A-theoretic metaphysics. The intuition underlying MS is that the present time is somehow privileged and experientially vivid, as if it were illuminated by a moving spotlight. According to MS-theorists, a key reason to prefer MS to B-theoretic eternalism is that our experience of time supports it. We argue that this is false. To this end, we formulate a new family of positions in the philosophy of (...) time, which differ from MS in that, intuitively, they admit a plurality of moving spotlights. We argue that these ‘deviant’ variants of MS cannot be dismissed as conceptually incoherent, and that they are as well-supported by our experience as is MS. One of these variants, however, is consistent with the B-theory. Thus, if our experience of time supports MS, then it supports the B-theory as well. (shrink)

In this paper Giuseppe Bianco analyzes the ideological and epistemological coordinates and the space of possibilities proper to the cluster of philosophy students of which Tournier was part between 1943 and 1948; to do so he reconstructs their evolution in a context dominated by the currents of Neo-Scholasticism, Personalism, phenomenology, Marxism, and Existentialism. Finally, he focuses on the importance of Jean-Paul Sartre for these young people, underlining their particular interpretation of his work.

This article will attempt to show that from the beginning of the letter of Eusebius of Nicodemia to Paulinus of Tyre, the meaning of ὁμοούσιος should be sought in the opposition on the part of the Council of Nicea to the divisive doctrine of hypostases by Arius and his followers. The assertion of the similarity or identity of nature or ousia between the Father and the Son that ὁμοούσιος suggests is traceable to the teaching of Alexander of Alexandria, but also (...) of Eusthatius of Antioch, so that it could be thought that in Nicea a convergence between the two major opponents of Arius could have taken place, in the same way in which it had occurred over the Antiochene formula of 325. Analysis of the doctrine of ὁμοούσιος by Athanasius confirms that the term was opposed to the divisive interpretation of the hypostases within Arianism. The second part of the article, takes into consideration the study on the interpretation of the Nicene ὁμοούσιος proposed by P. F. Beatrice. The Author argues that Beatrice’s thesis, which attempts to trace the introduction of the term in the Nicene Creed back exclusively to Constantine, with the agreement of Eusebius of Caesarea, is not backed by the documentation at our disposal. (shrink)

This study intends to show how the essential elements in the debate over the divinity of the Son provoked by Arianism are already present within the Alessandrian Church during the first decades of the 3rd century. From the works of Origen it becomes apparent that his teaching on the eternity of the Logos intends to oppose those who asserted a temporal beginning thus separating the Logos from the divinity of the Father, which allows us to define them as radical supporters (...) of the theology of the Logos. Against this doctrine, there is an identified opposition which probably utilized the term ὁμοούσιος to indicate to the contrary the divinity of the Son; nevertheless Origen, while proposing that the Son is generated from the ousia of the Father, does not share this teaching because in his theology the Son remains subordinate to the Father. (shrink)