La tendance dominante de la philosophie moderne donne un sens aux grandes révolutions européennes du dernier demi-millénaire. Il est impossible de comprendre le fond de cette philosophie, si ce n'est à la lumière des revendications d'une liberté toujours plus étendue. Par ces révolutions, des monarchies héritées du Moyen Âge ont été balayées et l'autorité spirituelle de l'Église compromise. L'appel révolutionnaire à la liberté chrétienne de Luther, à la liberté de conscience de Cromwell, à la liberté politique de Robespierre, à la (...) liberté du besoin de Lénine, à la liberté face à la vérité du relativisme de nos jours, s'est révélé plus convaincant que le rappel de la liberté comme responsabilité, de la vérité qui nous rend libres (Jean, 8, 32). La surenchère dans la revendication d'une liberté toujours plus grande s'étend actuellement à la sphère des mœurs. Ce livre se limite à la critique intellectuelle et morale de la ligne aujourd'hui dominante, avec cet interrogatif : « Pourrons-nous vivre ce que nous prépare l'extraordinaire poussée de liberté qui, jusqu'à maintenant, s'est révélée gagnante, utile, crédible? ». (shrink)

The moving spotlight account (MS) is a view that combines an eternalist ontology and an A-theoretic metaphysics. The intuition underlying MS is that the present time is somehow privileged and experientially vivid, as if it were illuminated by a moving spotlight. According to MS-theorists, a key reason to prefer MS to B-theoretic eternalism is that our experience of time supports it. We argue that this is false. To this end, we formulate a new family of positions in the philosophy of (...) time, which differ from MS in that, intuitively, they admit a plurality of moving spotlights. We argue that these ‘deviant’ variants of MS cannot be dismissed as conceptually incoherent, and that they are as well-supported by our experience as is MS. One of these variants, however, is consistent with the B-theory. Thus, if our experience of time supports MS, then it supports the B-theory as well. (shrink)

Durante las primeras décadas de desenvolvimiento del interés arqueológico en el medio intelectual argentino, se suscitaron intercambios críticos entre los cultores de la novel ciencia antropológica. Estas polémicas constituyen una fuente particularmente interesante para el estudio, porque en ellas los autores a la vez que se esfuerzan por exponer con claridad sus puntos de vista, en sus referencias a los contrincantes ponen de manifiesto aspectos vinculados con la dinámica del campo científico. De esta manera, a partir de la lectura de (...) los textos, se definen en el presente trabajo un conjunto de problemas abordados en la etapa inicial de la arqueología, identificándose aquellos resultados obtenidos, y las vías que condujeron a los mismos. Del análisis crítico de las contribuciones y los debates, surge la noción de la elección por parte de los autores entre dos alternativas respecto de la labor disciplinar. Una que enfatiza el descubrimiento y la propuesta de nuevas ideas acerca del pasado; y otra que coloca el foco en el control riguroso de las bases empíricas que sostienen la plausibilidad de las afirmaciones. (shrink)

Open futurism is the indeterministic position according to which the future is ‘open’, i.e., there is now no fact of the matter as to what future contingent events will actually obtain. Many open futurists hold a branching conception of time, in which a variety of possible futures exist. This paper introduces two challenges to branching-time open futurism, which are similar in spirit to a challenge posed by Fine to tense realism. The paper argues that, to address the new challenges, open (...) futurists must adopt an objective, non-perspectival notion of actuality and subscribe to an A-theoretic, dynamic conception of reality. Moreover, given a natural understanding of “actual future”, it is perfectly sensible for open futurists to hold that a unique, objectively actual future exists, contrary to a common assumption in the current debate. The paper also contends that recognising the existence of a unique actual future helps open futurists to avoid potential misconceptions. (shrink)

This paper explores taste fragmentalism, a novel approach to matters of taste and faultless disagreement. The view is inspired by Kit Fine’s fragmentalism about time, according to which the temporal dimension can be constituted—in an absolute manner—by states that are pairwise incompatible, provided that they do not obtain together. In the present paper, we will apply this metaphysical framework to taste states. In our proposal, two incompatible taste states (such as the state of rhubarb’s being tasty and the state of (...) rhubarb’s being distasteful) can both constitute reality in an absolute manner, although no agent can have joint access to both states. We will then develop a formalised version of our view by means of an exact truthmaker semantics for taste assertions. Within this framework—we argue—our linguistic and inferential practices concerning cases of faultless disagreement are elegantly vindicated, thus suggesting that taste fragmentalism is worth of further consideration. (shrink)

Accidents involving autonomous vehicles raise difficult ethical dilemmas and legal issues. It has been argued that self-driving cars should be programmed to kill, that is, they should be equipped with pre-programmed approaches to the choice of what lives to sacrifice when losses are inevitable. Here we shall explore a different approach, namely, giving the user/passenger the task of deciding what ethical approach should be taken by AVs in unavoidable accident scenarios. We thus assume that AVs are equipped with what we (...) call an “Ethical Knob”, a device enabling passengers to ethically customise their AVs, namely, to choose between different settings corresponding to different moral approaches or principles. Accordingly, AVs would be entrusted with implementing users’ ethical choices, while manufacturers/programmers would be tasked with enabling the user’s choice and ensuring implementation by the AV. (shrink)

So-called Locke's thesis is the view that no two things of the same kind may coincide, that is, may be completely in the same place at the same time. A number of counter-examples to this view have been proposed. In this paper, some new and arguably more convincing counter-examples to Locke's thesis are presented. In these counter-examples, a particular entity (a string, a rope, a net, or similar) is interwoven to obtain what appears to be a distinct, thicker entity of (...) the same kind. It is argued that anyone who subscribes to certain standard metaphysical arguments, which are generally taken for granted in the debate about Locke's thesis, is virtually compelled to accept the counter-examples. (shrink)

This paper presents a systematic discussion, mainly for non-economists, on economic approaches to the concept of sustainable development. As a first step, the concept of sustainability is extensively discussed. As a second step, the argument that it is not possible to consider sustainability only from an economic or ecological point of view is defended; issues such as economic-ecological integration, inter-generational and intra-generational equity are considered of fundamental importance. Two different economic approaches to environmental issues, i.e. neo-classical environmental economics and ecological (...) economics, are compared. Some key differences such as weak versus strong sustainability, commensurability versus incommensurability and ethical neutrality versus different values acceptance are pointed out. (shrink)

This Research Topic aimed at deepening our understanding of the levels and explanations that are of interest for cognitive sci- entists, neuroscientists, psychologists, behavioral scientists, and philosophers of science. Indeed, contemporary developments in neuroscience and psy- chology suggest that scientists are likely to deal with a multiplicity of levels, where each of the different levels entails laws of behavior appropriate to that level (Berntson et al., 2012). Also, gathering and modeling data at the different levels of analysis is not suffi- (...) cient: the integration of information across levels of analysis is a crucial issue. Given such state of affairs, a number of interesting questions arise. How can the autonomy of explanatory levels be properly understood in behavioral explanation? Is reductionism a satis- factory strategy? How can high-level and low-level models be constrained in order to be actually explanatory of both behav- ioral and neurological or molecular evidence? What is the kind of relationship between those models? (shrink)

There is wide support in logic, philosophy, and psychology for the hypothesis that the probability of the indicative conditional of natural language, P(if A then B), is the conditional probability of B given A, P(B|A). We identify a conditional which is such that P(if A then B)=P(B|A) with de Finetti's conditional event, B|A. An objection to making this identification in the past was that it appeared unclear how to form compounds and iterations of conditional events. In this paper, we illustrate (...) how to overcome this objection with a probabilistic analysis, based on coherence, of these compounds and iterations. We interpret the compounds and iterations as conditional random quantities which, given some logical dependencies, may reduce to conditional events. We show how the inference to B|A from A and B can be extended to compounds and iterations of both conditional events and biconditional events. Moreover, we determine the respective uncertainty propagation rules. Finally, we make some comments on extending our analysis to counterfactuals. (shrink)

CHAPTER Structure and function In physical systems made by a large number of basic constituents one can observe collective properties which find their ...

In this Introduction we lay out the context of a ‘Continental philosophy of biology’ and suggest why Georges Canguilhem’s place in such a philosophy is important. There is not one single program for Continental philosophy of biology, but Canguilhem’s vision, which he referred to at one stage as ‘biological philosophy’, is a significant one, located in between the classic holism-reductionism tensions, significantly overlapping with philosophy of medicine, philosophy of technology and other themes moving away from the more common existential and (...) phenomenological motifs of post-war European thought. Chapters examine (among other themes) his relation to Lebensphilosophie, to authors such as Kant, Nietzsche and Marjorie Grene, and to current theoretical biology. (shrink)

We analyze selected iterated conditionals in the framework of conditional random quantities. We point out that it is instructive to examine Lewis's triviality result, which shows the conditions a conditional must satisfy for its probability to be the conditional probability. In our approach, however, we avoid triviality because the import-export principle is invalid. We then analyze an example of reasoning under partial knowledge where, given a conditional if A then Cas information, the probability of A should intuitively increase. We explain (...) this intuition by making some implicit background information explicit. We consider several iterated conditionals, which allow us to formalize different kinds of latent information. We verify that for these iterated conditionals the prevision is greater than or equal to the probability of A. We also investigate the lower and upper bounds of the Affirmation of the Consequent inference. We conclude our study with some remarks on the supposed "independence" of two conditionals, and we interpret this property as uncorrelation between two random quantities. 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. (shrink)

Notwithstanding the recent prominence of the term “problem” in the humanities, few scholars have analysed its history. This essay tries to partially fill that lack, principally covering the period from late modernity through to the 1960s, in order to understand the role that the term plays in “Continental” philosophy, with special emphasis on the writings of Gilles Deleuze. This analysis focuses on the strategies employed by different agents to define “philosophical” problems, or “philosophical” ways of posing problems. The term, originally (...) used in antiquity by knowledge-producers located in an autonomous position, implied an idea of cognition oscillating between production and reproduction. Once the term escaped the context of geometry, it was involved in symbolic struggles that radicalized during modernity. The Kantians placed “philosophy” in a supposedly neutral position of science treating “the problem of all the problems” and invented a new genre, the “history of philosophy,” focusing on the analysis of “philosophical problems.” This approach had great institutional success in the German and French universities and clashed, during the twentieth century, with another usage of philosophy as a practice of “dissolution of problems,” developed in the United Kingdom and the Austro-Habsburg Empire. (shrink)

This study investigates the acquisition of integrated object manipulation and categorization abilities through a series of experiments in which human adults and artificial agents were asked to learn to manipulate two-dimensional objects that varied in shape, color, weight, and color intensity. The analysis of the obtained results and the comparison of the behavior displayed by human and artificial agents allowed us to identify the key role played by features affecting the agent/environment interaction, the relation between category and action development, and (...) the role of cognitive biases originating from previous knowledge. (shrink)

The difficulties of relativistic particle theories formulated by means of canonical quantization, such as those of Klein–Gordon and Dirac, ultimately led theoretical physicists to turn to quantum field theory to model elementary particle physics. In order to overcome these difficulties, the theories of the present approach are developed deductively from the physical principles that specify the system, without making use of canonical quantization. For a free particle these starting assumptions are invariance of the theory and covariance of position with respect (...) to Poincaré transformations. In pursuing the approach, the effectiveness of group theoretical methods is exploited. The coherent development of our program has shown that robust classes of representations of the Poincaré group, discarded by the known particle theories, can in fact be taken as bases for perfectly consistent theories. For massive spin zero particles, six inequivalent theories have been determined, two of which do not correspond to any of the current ones; all of these theories overcome the difficulties of Klein–Gordon one. The present lack of the explicit transformation properties of position with respect to boosts prevents the complete determination of non zero spin particle theories. In the past a particular form of these transformation properties was adopted by Jordan and Mukunda. We check its consistency within the present approach and find that for spin \ particles there is only one consistent theory, which is unitarily related to Dirac’s; yet, once again, it requires classes of irreducible representations previously discarded. (shrink)

Das Buch enthält die Einführung in die Lektüre sowie den Textkommentar zu den der Analyse der Grundsätze der Modalität gewidmeten "Postulaten des empirischen Denkens überhaupt". Untersucht wird Kants gesamte Theorie der Modalbegriffe (Möglichkeit - Unmöglichkeit, Dasein - Nichtsein, Notwendigkeit - Zufälligkeit) seit Mitte der 1750er Jahre bis zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Die Postulate sind nach Kant nicht objektiv, sondern subjektiv-synthetisch: Der Gegenstand der Erfahrung, welcher zunächst anhand der objektiv-synthetischen Funktionen der Quantität, Qualität und Relation bestimmt wird, lässt sich nun (...) in seinem Verhältnis zum setzenden Subjekt betrachten. Die Postulate thematisieren jedoch nicht - hier liegt die konstitutive Charakteristik dieser synthetischen Urteile a priori - das Subjekt selbst, sondern das Objekt als solches und die Objektivität überhaupt. Wie diese Untersuchung zeigt, antwortet Kant erst hier - nicht in den viel diskutierten Deduktionskapiteln oder in den anderen Grundsatzkapiteln - auf die Frage "Was ist ein Objekt?" und bezieht zugleich Stellung gegenüber anderen philosophischen Theorien der Objektivität des 18. Jahrhunderts: Rationalismus, Empirismus, Idealismus, Skeptizismus. (shrink)

The paper considers sentences in which “now” occurs in initial position and shows that the meaning they convey differs from the meaning of sentences that are otherwise identical except for “now” occurring in final position. We argue that the occurrence of “now” in initial position triggers a particular kind of modal reading for the sentence to which the adverb is prefixed. A general notion of modal forcing is proposed to provide a uniform account of this kind of reading. Armed with (...) this account, we offer a solution to two tense-modal puzzles, which have to do with fatalism and the possibility of a changing past. (shrink)

Giuseppe Gallis konsequentes Streben nach einer angemessenen Berücksichtigung beider Pole, des Subjektpols ebenso wie des Objektpols, sowohl in der Forschung als auch in allen Bereichen des menschlichen Lebens kommt im vorliegenden Sammelband in allen Arbeiten zum Tragen. Galli eröffnet damit auch neue Felder f8r die gestalttheoretische Forschungs- und Anwendungspraxis. Er erschließt Themen, die nicht zuletzt auch f8r die medizinischen, philosophischen, psychologischen und psychotherapeutischen Aufgabenstellungen zentral sind. Er plädiert nicht nur allgemein für einen dialogischen Ansatz in der zwischenmenschlichen Begegnung, er (...) führt in einer Reihe von Aufsätzen in diesem Sammelband auch sehr konkret die Fruchtbarkeit eines solchen Dialogs mit der Gedankenwelt eines Norbert Elias, Szvetan Todorovic und Paul Ricoeur für eine Bereicherung und Weiterentwicklung der Gestalttheorie vor Augen. (shrink)

None of the emendations proposed so far is satisfactory. As Keydell reminds us, Ap. Rhod. I. 1205 makes Nonnus' untouchable, and thereby disposes of all the conjectures which would alter these words; consequently, the corruption must be hiding in the impossible.

Retracing the primary common aspects between anthropological and psychoanalytic thought, in this article, we will further discuss the main common points between the notions of the unconscious according to Carl Gustav Jung and Claude Lévi-Strauss, taking into account the thought of Erich Neumann. On the basis of very simple elementary logic considerations centered around the basic notion of the separation of opposites, our observations might be useful for speculations on the possible origins of rational thought and hence on the origins (...) of consciousness. (shrink)

Henri Bergson (1859–1940), the most prominent member of nineteenth-century French spiritualism, is the first philosopher who explicitly defined philosophy as a practice which consists in posing problems anew and in creating concepts. In this article, I will try to reconstruct the progressive importance acquired by the terms ‘problem’ and ‘concept’ in nineteenth-century French philosophy and how they combined in Bergson’s theories about creativity, invention and novelty. I will argue that Bergson’s conception of philosophy as a creative intellectual practice was the (...) result of a negotiation, inside a pre-existent spiritualist framework, between, on the one hand, neo-Kantianism and, on the other hand, evolutionism which strongly influenced empirical psychology and the emerging social sciences. Bergson’s solution, influenced by the evolution of mathematics and literary theory, was just one of the possible options, and the main alternative to a new form of transcendental philosophy. (shrink)