Conjectures for the text of three passages in Martial (5, 11, 1; 5, 20, 6-7; 5, 38, 3), with critical notes on the ‚new Gaius‘, inst. 3, 154a-b (P.S.I. XI, 1182, A14-B42).

A slow study of the letters written by Nietzsche in the last five years of his conscious life shows a suffering man who trans-values the sorrow of his body recognizing it as both a face and a mask. The subject fades within history, art, science, within the time that becomes eternal through the death and beyond it, through the speech that becomes the seal of the world. Despite every insufficient reading which underlines the pathological feature in Nietzsche’s last writings madness (...) has been a real fiction: it became the Great Health in which “it’s finished” and the ego multiplies and vanishes in “all the names of History”. (shrink)

Se l'attenzione maggiore degli studiosi si è da sempre concentrata sulle Dionisiache, non di meno negli ultimi vent'anni si assiste a un rinnovato interesse per l'altro poema esametrico attribuito a Nonno, la Parafrasi del Vangelo di Giovanni; ciò soprattutto per merito di Enrico Livrea e della sua scuola fiorentina, di cui anche l'autore di questo volume fa parte. Esso rappresenta una tappa ulteriore – dopo l'edizione del Canto I (De Stefani), del Canto II (Livrea), del Canto XVIII (Livrea) e (...) del Canto XX (Accorinti) – in quello che si annuncia come un progetto di edizione critica commentata di tutti canti del poema sacro nonniano: progetto certamente ambizioso ma indispensabile per fare luce piena su un momento fondamentale dell'epica tardoantica. Diversamente dalla poesia centonaria, Nonno, pur seguendo dappresso la Vorlage evangelica, volle fare opera in qualche misura originale e ci riuscì, pur con uno stile che non si potrebbe immaginare più contrastante rispetto alla austera sobrietà del dettato giovanneo. Il volume di Agosti, sostenuto da una ricchissima e pressocché completa bibliografia, si apre con una Introduzione assai ampia e decisamente pregevole per la capacità dimostrata dallo studioso di inquadrare il poema nonniano nell'ambito vasto dell'epica tardoantica non solo greca ma anche latina: da questo punto di vista illuminanti appaiono i raffronti con Giovenco, Aratore, Claudiano, Prudenzio, Commodiano, oltre che, naturalmente, con Gregorio Nazianzeno, Eudocia e gli Homerocentones. Convinto che il Nonno parafraste sia il medesimo autore delle Dionisiache, Agosti ritiene decisamente superata la tesi contraria, e intelligentemente si limita a rilevare la straordinaria affinità fra i due poemi non solo a livello stilistico, linguistico e metrico, ma anche – aspetto forse ancora più sorprendente – sotto il profilo concettuale: «Vi sono elementi di chiaro influsso cristiano nelle D. e d'altra parte la figura di Cristo tende ad assumere alcuni tratti bacchici nella P.» (p. 46). Una tesi, questa, che viene corroborata con numerosi raffronti puntuali nelle dense note di commento. Essendo gran parte del Canto Quinto, corrispondente al quinto capitolo del vangelo giovanneo, dedicato al miracolo del paralitico guarito nella piscina di Bethesda, viene affrontato il problema dello spazio dedicato ai miracoli di guarigione nel mondo pagano e cristiano del V secolo, in particolare nell'ambiente egizio dove Nonno visse e operò (ma molto cauto si mostra, a mio avviso saggiamente, l'Autore nei confronti di identificazioni troppo incerte, come quella che vorrebbe Nonno vescovo di Edessa). Il lettore deduce dalle sue considerazioni come nulla di sorprendente o di aberrante l'uomo tardoantico potesse scorgere nel racconto di Giovanni, che anzi non discorda da analoghe imprese attribuite ad Asclepio, il dio guaritore ϰατεξοχήν, ma anche a taumaturghi come Apollonio di Tiana: si trattava, se mai, di una sorta di concorrenza fra Cristo e i suoi omologhi e rivali pagani. Allo stesso modo, Agosti pensa che il pubblico della Parafrasi e quello delle Dionisiache fosse in sostanza il medesimo, forse con una percentuale cristiana maggiore nel primo caso e minore nel secondo. Ovviamente si rimane nel campo delle ipotesi, ma certo il sincretismo del tempo poteva forse spingersi tanto avanti da giustificare simile osmosi, anche se appare lecito dubitare che cristiani convinti giungessero a tollerare l'incredibile ampiezza del poema a gloria di Dioniso, e, viceversa, che a un pubblico pagano potesse veramente interessare il vangelo di Giovanni – di cui per altro Agosti segnala qualche risonanza in ambiente neoplatonico. Meritorie appaiono anche le osservazioni sul retroterra esegetico del poema sacro, «più vicino all'esegesi che alla parafrasi stricto sensu» (p. 111), con particolare riferimento al commento giovanneo di Cirillo d'Alessandria: una consonanza del resto già osservata da altri studiosi della Parafrasi. Nelle note l'Autore cita numerosi passi da Cirillo, non nascondendosi comunque la notevole libertà con cui Nonno – il cui intento primario non dovette certo essere teologico – se ne servì. Non meno interessanti le considerazioni su alcuni punti di contatto con la liturgia, tema di cui Agosti segnala la non secondaria importanza per una valutazione corretta e completa dell'epica cristiana. (shrink)

Many philosophers have been attracted to the idea of using the logical form of a true sentence as a guide to the metaphysical grounds of the fact stated by that sentence. This paper looks at a particular instance of that idea: the widely accepted principle that disjunctions are grounded in their true disjuncts. I will argue that an unrestricted version of this principle has several problematic consequences and that it’s not obvious how the principle might be restricted in order to (...) avoid them. My suggestion is that, instead of trying to restrict the principle, we should distinguish between metaphysical and conceptual grounds and take the principle to apply exclusively to the latter. This suggestion, if correct, carries over to other prominent attempts at using logical form as a guide to ground. (shrink)

There are two intuitions about time. The first is that there's something special about the present that objectively differentiates it from the past and the future. Call this intuition Specialness. The second is that the time at which we happen to live is just one among many other times, all of which are ‘on a par’ when it comes to their forming part of reality. Call this other intuition Egalitarianism. Tradition has it that the so-called ‘A-theories of time’ fare well (...) at addressing the first intuition, but rather badly when it comes to the second. The goal of this article is to offer advice to A-theorists about how to reconcile their view with Egalitarianism. (shrink)

Solving the meta-problem of consciousness requires, among other things, explaining why we are so reluctant to endorse various forms of illusionism about the phenomenal. I will try to tackle this task in two steps. The first consists in clarifying how the concept of consciousness precludes the possibility of any distinction between 'appearance' and 'reality'. The second consists in spelling out our reasons for recognizing the existence of something that satisfies that concept.

The Decameron was written in the wake of the Black Death, a shattering epidemic which had shaken Florence's confident entrepreneurial society to its core. In a country villa outside the city, ten young noble men and women who have escaped the plague decide to tell each other stories. Boccaccio's skill as a dramatist is masterfully displayed in this virtuoso performance of one hundred tales, vivid portraits of people from all stations in life, with plots which revel in a bewildering variety (...) of human reactions. Themes are playfully restated from one story to another within an elegant and refined framework. One of Chaucer's most fruitful sources for the Canterbury Tales, Boccaccio's work artfully combines the essential ingredients of narrative: fate and desire, crises and quick-thinking. This new translation by Guido Waldman captures the exuberance and variety and tone of Boccaccio's masterpiece. ABOUT THE SERIES: For over 100 years Oxford World's Classics has made available the widest range of literature from around the globe. Each affordable volume reflects Oxford's commitment to scholarship, providing the most accurate text plus a wealth of other valuable features, including expert introductions by leading authorities, helpful notes to clarify the text, up-to-date bibliographies for further study, and much more. (shrink)

This paper defends the view that one's own mental states are metaphysically privileged vis-à-vis the mental states of others, even if only subjectively so. This is an instance of a more general view called Subjectivism, according to which reality is only subjectively the way it is. After characterizing Subjectivism in analogy to two relatively familiar views in the metaphysics of modality and time, I compare the Subjectivist View of the Mental with Egocentric Presentism, a version of Subjectivism recently advocated by (...) Caspar Hare. I argue that the Subjectivist View of the Mental goes a considerable way towards solving certain long-standing philosophical puzzles having to do with the unity of consciousness, the contents of self-awareness and the intransmissibility of experiential knowledge through testimony. (shrink)

Assuming a radical stance on embodied cognition, according to which the information ac- quired through basic cognitive processes is not contentful (Hutto and Myin, 2013), and as- suming that perception is a source of rationally grounded knowledge (Pritchard, 2012), a pluralistic account of perceptual knowledge is developed. The paper explains: (i) how the varieties of perceptual knowledge fall under the same broader category; (ii) how they are subject to the same kind of normative constraints; (iii) why there could not be (...) a conflict between the different varieties of perceptual knowledge; and (iv) why the traditional episte- mological inquiry is inclined to overestimate the role of propositional perceptual knowledge. (shrink)

Ecological-enactive approaches to cognition aim to explain cognition in terms of the dynamic coupling between agent and environment. Accordingly, cognition of one’s immediate environment (which is sometimes labeled “basic” cognition) depends on enaction and the picking up of affordances. However, ecological-enactive views supposedly fail to account for what is sometimes called “higher” cognition, i.e., cognition about potentially absent targets, which therefore can only be explained by postulating representational content. This challenge levelled against ecological-enactive approaches highlights a putative explanatory gap between (...) basic and higher cognition. In this paper, we examine scientific cognition—a paradigmatic case of higher cognition—and argue that it shares fundamental features with basic cognition, for enaction and affordance selection are central to the scientific enterprise. Our argument focuses on modeling, and on how models promote scientific understanding. We base our argument on a non-representational account of scientific understanding and on the material engagement theory, for models are hereby conceived as material objects designed for scientific engagements. Having done so, we conclude that the explanatory gap is significantly less threatening to the ecological-enactive approach than it might appear. (shrink)

Humanity’s self-ordained mandate to subdue and dominate nature is part of the cognitive foundation of the modern world—a perspective that remains deeply ingrained in science and technology. Marine biology has not been immune to this anthropocentric bias. But this needs to change, and the gaps between basic scientific disciplines and the global conservation imperatives of our time need to be bridged. In the face of a looming ecological and climate crisis, marine biologists must upgrade their values and professional standards and (...) help foster the radical transformation needed to avert a climate and ecological breakdown. To prevent some of the damage, they must cross the imaginary line that separates science from science-based activism and consciously pursue the health and durability of human and natural communities. To this end, they can (1) develop compelling narratives that engage human society, with emphasis on care for the wild living world; (2) move beyond marine conservation on paper and avoid self-serving complaisance; (3) advocate constructive changes in market and human behaviour, not only by documenting damage but also by clarifying how the extraction, production and consumption system can be steered away from practices that harm nature; (4) push for systemic change in politics through individual and collective efforts, supporting environmental activism and those who demand biosphere-saving policies; and (5) endorse a more ecocentric and holistic world vision, relinquishing contempt for spiritual wisdom and liaising with (or at least not dismissing) spiritual traditions that encourage equality, self-restraint and environmental sustainability. (shrink)

Kilimanjaro is an example of what some philosophers would call a ‘vague object’: it is only roughly 5895 m tall, its weight is not precise and its boundaries are fuzzy because some particles are neither determinately part of it nor determinately not part of it. It has been suggested that this vagueness arises as a result of semantic indecision: it is because we didn’t make up our mind what the expression “Kilimanjaro” applies to that we can truthfully say such things (...) as “It is indeterminate whether this particle is part of Kilimanjaro”. After reviewing some of the limitations of this approach, I will propose an alternative account, based on a new semantic relation—multiple reference—capable of holding in a one-many pattern between a term and several objects in the domain. I will explain how multiple reference works, what differentiates it from plural reference and how it might be used to accommodate at least some aspects of our ordinary discourse about vague objects. (shrink)

According to Leibniz’s infinite-analysis account of contingency, any derivative truth is contingent if and only if it does not admit of a finite proof. Following a tradition that goes back at least as far as Bertrand Russell, several interpreters have been tempted to explain this biconditional in terms of two other principles: first, that a derivative truth is contingent if and only if it contains infinitely complex concepts and, second, that a derivative truth contains infinitely complex concepts if and only (...) if it does not admit of a finite proof. A consequence of this interpretation is that Leibniz’s infinite-analysis account of contingency falls prey to Robert Adams’s Problem of Lucky Proof. I will argue that this interpretation is mistaken and that, once it is properly understood how the idea of an infinite proof fits into Leibniz’s circle of modal notions, the problem of lucky proof simply disappears. (shrink)

It has been observed that, unlike other kinds of singular judgments, mental self-ascriptions are immune to error through misidentification: they may go wrong, but not as a result of mistaking someone else’s mental states for one’s own. Although recent years have witnessed increasing interest in this phenomenon, three basic questions about it remain without a satisfactory answer: what is exactly an error through misidentification? What does immunity to such errors consist in? And what does it take to explain the fact (...) that mental self-ascriptions exhibit this sort of immunity? The aim of this paper is to bring these questions into focus, propose some tentative answers and use them to show that one prominent attempt to explain the immunity to error through misidentification of mental self-ascriptions is unsuccessful. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that knowledge is dimly luminous. That is: if a person knows that p, she knows how she knows that p. The argument depends on a safety-based account of propositional knowledge, which is salient in Williamson’s critique of the ‘KK’ principle. I combine that account with non-intellectualism about knowledge-how – according to which, if a person knows how to φ, then in nearly all (if not all) nearby possible worlds in which she φes in the same (...) way as in the actual world, she only φes successfully. Thus, the possession of first-order propositional knowledge implies secondorder practical knowledge, and this can be iterated. Because of the assumed nonintellectualism about know-how, dim luminosity does not imply bright luminosity about knowledge, which is expressed by the traditional KK principle. I conclude by considering some potential counterexamples to the view that knowledge is dimly luminous. (shrink)

ABSTRACT I propose a middle-ground between a perceptual model of self-knowledge, according to which the objects of self-awareness are accessed through some kind of causal mechanism, and a rationalist model, according to which self-knowledge is constituted by one's rational agency. Through an analogy with the role of the exercises of sensorimotor abilities in rationally grounded perceptual knowledge, self-knowledge is construed as an exercise of action-oriented and action-orienting abilities. This view satisfies the privileged access condition usually associated with self-knowledge without entailing (...) an insurmountable gap between self- knowledge and knowledge of other minds. RESUMO Proponho um meio-termo entre um modelo perceptual de autoconhecimento, segundo o qual os objetos de autoconhecimento são acessadas mediante um tipo de mecanismo causal, e um modelo racionalista, segundo o qual o autoconhecimento é constituído pela agência racional. Por analogia ao papel que o exercício de habilidades sensório-motoras desempenham no conhecimento perceptual racionalmente fundado, autoconhecimento é entendido como um exercício de habilidades que são orientadas pela e orientam a ação. Essa imagem satisfaz a condição de acesso privilegiado que geralmente é associada ao autoconhecimento sem implicar uma lacuna intransponível entre autoconhecimento e conhecimento de outras mentes. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is two-fold: first, it is intended to articulate theses that are often assessed independently, thus showing that a strong version of epistemological disjunctivism about perceptual knowledge implies a transformative conception of rationality. This entails that individuals in skeptical scenarios could not entertain rational thoughts about their environment, for they would fail to have perceptual states. The secondary aim is to show that this consequence is not a sufficient reason to abandon the variety of disjunctivism presented. (...) The argument for this claim depends on the assessment of rationality attributions to subjects in plausible cases of illusion and some clinical cases of hallucination. RESUMO Este artigo tem dois objetivos: primeiramente, pretende-se articular teses que são frequentemente avaliadas independentemente, mostrando com isso que uma versão robusta do disjuntivismo epistemológico sobre conhecimento perceptual implica uma concepção transformativa da racionalidade. Uma consequência disso é que indivíduos em cenários céticos não poderiam entreter pensamentos racionais sobre o ambiente em que habitam, pois eles não possuiriam estados perceptuais. Em segundo lugar, argumenta-se que a consequência delineada acima não é uma razão suficiente para rejeitar o disjuntivismo tal como apresentado. Esse argumento depende da avaliação de atribuições de racionalidade a indivíduos em casos plausíveis de ilusão e em alguns casos clínicos de alucinação. (shrink)

Trieste Publishing has a massive catalogue of classic book titles. Our aim is to provide readers with the highest quality reproductions of fiction and non-fiction literature that has stood the test of time. The many thousands of books in our collection have been sourced from libraries and private collections around the world.The titles that Trieste Publishing has chosen to be part of the collection have been scanned to simulate the original. Our readers see the books the same way that their (...) first readers did decades or a hundred or more years ago. Books from that period are often spoiled by imperfections that did not exist in the original. Imperfections could be in the form of blurred text, photographs, or missing pages. It is highly unlikely that this would occur with one of our books. Our extensive quality control ensures that the readers of Trieste Publishing's books will be delighted with their purchase. Our staff has thoroughly reviewed every page of all the books in the collection, repairing, or if necessary, rejecting titles that are not of the highest quality. This process ensures that the reader of one of Trieste Publishing's titles receives a volume that faithfully reproduces the original, and to the maximum degree possible, gives them the experience of owning the original work.We pride ourselves on not only creating a pathway to an extensive reservoir of books of the finest quality, but also providing value to every one of our readers. Generally, Trieste books are purchased singly - on demand, however they may also be purchased in bulk. Readers interested in bulk purchases are invited to contact us directly to enquire about our tailored bulk rates. (shrink)

In this paper, I present a possible solution to the puzzle unveiled by Kornblith about the sources and the possibility of knowledge of epistemic norms. The puzzle is: if such norms cannot be discovered solely by reflection, and if there are correct ways of thinking and inferring, then such norms can only be discovered by investigating the world —a counterintuitive conclusion. To avoid skepticism about normativity, I argue that we create normative correctness and discover normative demands by investigating the world (...) and reflecting about our epistemic practices. This is done by an exposition of the method known as reflective equilibrium, which is defended against Kornblith’s thesis that the appeal to reflective equilibrium is doomed to failure because it implies reflection. (shrink)

Objet d'une captation indue par une certaine extrême gauche, l'écologie a été très souvent délaissée par la droite radicale européenne, dont la phobie envers l'écologauchisme l'a poussée à oublier une part pourtant essentielle de son propre héritage. Réunissant deux essais qui abordent la même problématique sous des angles différents, cet ouvrage est donc aussi une redécouverte d'un continent englouti. Dans le sillage de l'oeuvre de Julius Evola, Giovanni Monastra rappelle le caractère empathique et holistique de l'approche traditionnelle de la (...) nature, par opposition à l'approche moderne, exclusivement tournée vers l'utile et l'exploitable, et qui finit par considérer l'homme lui-même comme un cobaye. Il réaffirme, conformément à la parole d'Héraclite ("Il faut éteindre la démesure"), que la mentalité prométhéenne ou faustienne est foncièrement incompatible avec le païen "sens de la Terre" cher à Nietzsche. En tant qu'elle respecte certaines "limites", la véritable écologie relève fondamentalement de l'esprit de conservation et d'une forme de conservatisme, ainsi que s'attache à le démontrer Philippe Baillet dans une étude qui fait une très large place aux sources allemandes de l'écologie, du romantisme au biocentrisme de Ludwig Klages et de certains nationaux-socialistes, en passant par le mouvement völkisch et ses prolongements jusqu'à nos jours. Parce qu'il lie de manière indissociable défense de l'environnement, défense des espèces animales et défense du pays natal (Heimat), l'écologisme conservateur allemand s'est voulu, dès l'origine, identitaire. Il s'est agi ici de poser les premiers jalons théoriques, dans l'espace francophone, de la redéfinition d'une écologie profonde nourrie par l'immémoriale piété indo-européenne pour le cosmos. (shrink)

This handbook is currently in development, with individual articles publishing online in advance of print publication. At this time, we cannot add information about unpublished articles in this handbook, however the table of contents will continue to grow as additional articles pass through the review process and are added to the site. Please note that the online publication date for this handbook is the date that the first article in the title was published online.

The Italian Pragmatists were a group of philosophers in the early 20th century. They gathered around the journal _Leonardo_, which was published in Florence. This volume emphasizes what they all shared, as well as their value for philosophy and culture.