This book offers the first comprehensive introduction to wave scattering in nonstationary materials. G. F. Roach's aim is to provide an accessible, self-contained resource for newcomers to this important field of research that has applications across a broad range of areas, including radar, sonar, diagnostics in engineering and manufacturing, geophysical prospecting, and ultrasonic medicine such as sonograms. New methods in recent years have been developed to assess the structure and properties of materials and surfaces. When light, sound, or some (...) other wave energy is directed at the material in question, "imperfections" in the resulting echo can reveal a tremendous amount of valuable diagnostic information. The mathematics behind such analysis is sophisticated and complex. However, while problems involving stationary materials are quite well understood, there is still much to learn about those in which the material is moving or changes over time. These so-called non-autonomous problems are the subject of this fascinating book. Roach develops practical strategies, techniques, and solutions for mathematicians and applied scientists working in or seeking entry into the field of modern scattering theory and its applications. Wave Scattering by Time-Dependent Perturbations is destined to become a classic in this rapidly evolving area of inquiry. (shrink)

But a body of rigorous mathematical theory has also gradually developed, and this is the first book to present that theory.

Listening to someone from some distance in a crowded room you may experience the following phenomenon: when looking at them speak, you may both hear and see where the source of the sounds is; but when your eyes are turned elsewhere, you may no longer be able to detect exactly where the voice must be coming from. With your eyes again fixed on the speaker, and the movement of her lips a clear sense of the source of the sound will (...) return. This ‘ventriloquist’ effect reflects the ways in which visual cognition can dominate auditory perception. And this phenomenological observation is one what you can verify or disconfirm in your own case just by the slightest reflection on what it is like for you to listen to someone with or without visual contact with them. (shrink)

Does action always arise out of desire? G. F. Schueler examines this hotly debated topic in philosophy of action and moral philosophy, arguing that once two senses of "desire" are distinguished - roughly, genuine desires and pro attitudes - apparently plausible explanations of action in terms of the agent's desires can be seen to be mistaken. Desire probes a fundamental issue in philosophy of mind, the nature of desires and how, if at all, they motivate and justify our actions. At (...) least since Hume argued that reason "is and of right ought to be the slave of the passions," many philosophers have held that desires play an essential role both in practical reason and in the explanation of intentional action. G. F. Schueler looks at contemporary accounts of both roles in various belief-desire models of reasons and explanation and argues that the usual belief-desire accounts need to be replaced. Schueler contends that the plausibility of the standard belief-desire accounts rests largely on a failure to distinguish "desires proper," like a craving for sushi, from so-called "pro attitudes," which may take the form of beliefs and other cognitive states as well as desires proper. Schueler's "deliberative model" of practical reasoning suggests a different view of the place of desire in practical reason and the explanation of action. He holds that we can arrive at an intention to act by weighing the relevant considerations and that these may not include desires proper at all. (shrink)

People act for reasons. That is how we understand ourselves. But what is it to act for a reason? This is what Fred Schueler investigates. He rejects the dominant view that the beliefs and desires that constitute our reasons for acting simply cause us to act as we do, and argues instead for a view centred on practical deliberation--our ability to evaluate the reasons we accept. Schueler's account of 'reasons explanations' emphasizes the relation between reasons and purposes, and the fact (...) that the reasons for an action are not always good reasons. (shrink)

In the first part of this paper a logic is defined for propositions whose probability of being true may not be known. A speaker's beliefs about which propositions are true are still interesting in this case. The meaning of propositions is determined by the consequences of asserting them: in this logic there are debates which incur certain costs for the protagonists.The second part of the paper describes the mathematics of the resulting logic which displays several novel features.

In this paper I will argue that the latter group [of Non-Humeans] is correct. My argument focuses on practical deliberation and has two parts. I will discuss two different problems that arise for the Humean Theory and suggest that while taken individually each problem appears to have a solution, for each problem the solution Humeans offer precludes solving the other problem. I will suggest that to see these difficulties we must take seriously the thought that we can only understand an (...) agent’s reasons for her action by looking at her actual or possible practical deliberation. (shrink)

The present study investigated the effect of Parkinson’s disease (PD) on prospective memory (PM) tasks by varying the emotional content of the PM actions. Twenty-one older adults with PD and 25 healthy older adults took part in the present study. Participants performed three virtual days in the Virtual Week task. On each virtual day, participants performed actions with positive, negative or neutral content. Immediately following each virtual day, participants completed a recognition task to assess their retrospective memory for the various (...) prospective memory tasks. PD patients were less accurate than the control group at both PM accuracy and recognition task accuracy. The effect of emotional valence was also evident, indicating that all participants were more accurate on positive PM tasks than both negative and neutral. This study confirmed PM impairment in PD patients and extended previous research showing how positive emotional stimuli can influence PM performance. (shrink)

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

A prolonged professional interest in the problems of obsessional disorder has led me to a consideration of Professor Hare's arguments for prescriptivism. It is perhaps a tribute to the elegance of Hare's argument and the lucidity with which it is presented that the present paper is concerned with the exceptions he cites.