A logic for propositions with indefinite truth values

Studia Logica 41 (2-3):197-226 (1982)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In the first part of this paper a logic is defined for propositions whose probability of being true may not be known. A speaker's beliefs about which propositions are true are still interesting in this case. The meaning of propositions is determined by the consequences of asserting them: in this logic there are debates which incur certain costs for the protagonists.The second part of the paper describes the mathematics of the resulting logic which displays several novel features

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Contingency and Divine Knowledge in Ockham.Michael J. Cholbi - 2003 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 77 (1):81-91.
The Metalogic of Quantum Logic.Peter Mittelstaedt - 1978 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1978:249 - 256.
Propositional logic.Kevin C. Klement - 2004 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
64 (#247,828)

6 months
8 (#342,364)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references