Through a close reading of Derrida’s recently published Adieu à EmmanueI Lévinas, the author undertakes to reflect on the significance of the expression “subject of the welcome,“ which Derrida retrieves from Levinas’s work. The author singles out four essential propositions which could define this hospitable subjcet: 1. The welcome of the other is a welcome of an infinite; 2. the welcome of the other is a genitive subjeetive; 3. the welcome is not a gathering; 4. the host is a guest. (...) Those four characteristics manifest a peculiar ex-propriation of the subject in Levinas’s work, on whieh the author reflects in two ways: first, by underlying Levinas’s reversal of the tradition of autonomous subjectivity; second, by attempting to think together the position and deposition of the subject through recourse to what Derrida calls the “ex-appropriation” of the subject.À partir d’une lecture de Adieu à Emmanuel Lévinas de Jaeques Derrida, l’auteur s’interroge sur la signification de l’expression “sujet de I’accueil”, une expression que Jaeques Derrida commente dans ce livre. L’auteur déploie quatre propositions qui pourraient cerner le sens de ce sujet hospitalier. 1. I’accueil de l’autre est l’accueil d’un infini; 2. l’accueil de l’autre est un subjectif génitif; 3. l’accueil n’est pas un recueil; 4. I’hôte est un invité. Ces quatre caractéristiques manifestent une singulière ex-propriation du sujet dans I’oeuvre d’Emanuel Lévinas, une ex-propriation sur laquelle l’auteur réfléchit de deux façons: premiérement, en relevant un renversement de la tradition de la subjcetivité autonome chez Lévinas; deuxièmement, en s’efforçant de penser enselnble la position et déposition du sujet à partir de ce que Jacques Derrida appelle “I”ex-appropriation” du sujet. (shrink)

Belgian sociologist Jean-Claude Paye has collected several of his recent essays about the suspension of the rule of law, the emergence of a permanent state of exception, abuses of authority, and the generalized condition of restriction of freedom in Western societies since 9/11 in a single volume, La fin de l'état de droit,1 now translated, updated, and published by Telos Press under the title Global War on Liberty. Paye's essays over the past five to six years have positioned him as (...) one of the leading critical voices of the post-9/11 era. His critique of the so-called democratic state—from the United…. (shrink)

Translated by Drew S. Burk and Anthony Paul Smith. Excerpted from Struggle and Utopia at the End Times of Philosophy , (Minneapolis: Univocal Publishing, 2012). THE END TIMES OF PHILOSOPHY The phrase “end times of philosophy” is not a new version of the “end of philosophy” or the “end of history,” themes which have become quite vulgar and nourish all hopes of revenge and powerlessness. Moreover, philosophy itself does not stop proclaiming its own death, admitting itself to be half dead (...) and doing nothing but providing ammunition for its adversaries. With our sights set on clearing up this nuance, we differentiate philosophy as an institutional entity, and the philosophizability of the World and History, of “thought-world,” which universalizes the narrow concept of philosophy and that of “capital.” We also give an eschatological and apocalyptical cause to this end, of “times” or “ages” rather than those of philosophical practice. Last but not least, it is the Future itself in the performativity of its ultimatum that determines this end times, reversing these times from the Identity the Future accorded to it, withdrawing the thought-world from the lie of its death. Why this style of axioms and oracles, these more or less subtle distinctions, old and debased, with an appeal to the ultimata , to end times and last words? We fight to give, parallel to the concept of Hell, its new theoretical position, for its philosophical return and its non-philosophical transformation. No more so than any other word, Hell is not a metaphor here, just the Principle of Sufficient World. Every man, no doubt, has his “hell” readily available, connivance, control, conformism, domestication, schooling, alienation, extermination, exploitation, oppression, anxiety, etc. We have our little list that the Contemporaries established in the previous century in the same way one used to construct lists of virtues and vices or honors and wealth. They invented it for us without knowing it, for us-the-Futures who have as our responsibility to invent its use. In the Christian and Gnostic tradition, the struggle of the End Times takes place “on earth.” The most sophisticated of believers have it taking place in Heaven as well, above all in Heaven. The various kinds of gnosis imagine infinite falls and vertiginous highs, the vertigo of salvation. On Earth as in Heaven, a hell is available. The Marxists have the law of profit and the control of production, the class struggle Capital imposes on man. The Nietzscheans, the dull grumble of the struggle in the foundations of World and History, the domestication of man, the society of control. The phenomenologists, the capture of being, the most superficial amongst them, the age of suspicion. But all of these “hells” are taken from World, History, Society, and Religion. What we call Hell is no longer of the order of these specific and total intra-worldly generalities, it is both more singular and more universal, no longer being at all of the same order, it is the determinant Identity of these small hells strung out through history but unified here in the name of the last Humaneity. It is even found within the French idiom for hell [ enfer ], en-fer literally means “in-irons.” We are as much “in-irons” as we are “alive” [ en-Vie ]. We believe in Hell but as non-philosophers and it is even because we are non-philosophers that we can believe in it outside of any sort of religion. Hell is less mythological than ideological, it combines philosophizability with universal capital. Under what form? A single term could work for them without being a metaphor or something they would participate in by analogy, a more innovative and conjectural term than control, more universal than profit. It would denote the growing and permanent extortion of a surplus-value of communication, of speed and of urgency in change, in productivity and in work, in the pressure of images and slogans. It would be worse than solicitation, more tenacious than capture, more active and persecutory than control, softer and more insidious than a frontal attack, just as perverse as questioning and accusation, less brutal and offensive than extermination, less ritualized than inquisition, it would be soft and dispersed, instantaneous and vicious, it would be a crime without declared violence. Collusion and conformism, it would be afraid to show itself. Related to rumor, from which it borrows its infinite and tortuous ways. It is harassment. As a modernized form of Hell, perhaps harassment has a long future in front of it, of innocent torture, slow assassination, in short the fall, but radical with no way of recovering and which tolerates only salvation. THE PHILOSOPHICAL PAST OF NON-PHILOSOPHY Non-philosophy is thus Man as the utopian identity of the philosophical form of the World, a utopia destined to transform it. We still have to understand these equations, in particular that of the being-uni-versed from Man, and this book adheres to this by re-exposing non-philosophy in a different way via one of its new possibilities. It uses this opportunity to once again take up formulations that lead to objections answering certain external critics, as well as revisiting diverging interpretations specific to non-philosophers. A portion of this book is devoted to going through these theories via a strict or “lengthy” presentation of non-philosophy, and its defense against more expeditious solutions. This work of rectification is the occasion, merely the occasion, for refocusing non-philosophy on Man (the “Man-in-person,” “Humaneity”), and in a more innovative manner, on its utopian vocation established since the book Future Christ . As for this “occasion,” it is quite obvious. A school of posture, not to say a school of thought, supposes a minimum of closure from the most liberating of knowledge, a heritage, its utilization, and its no less certain dispersal. Within its development, a variety of interpretations will no doubt appear, deviations that are as much normalizations, and a struggle against this multiplication of divergent tendencies. These are perhaps not inevitable evils, especially here, merely a normal development according to the twisting paths of history. But the problem is made worse by the fact that this school of non-philosophers is that of utopia. Not the former attempts devoted to commenting on the worst authoritarian and criminal forms of the past and the present, but utopia as the determinant principle for human life, or to put it another way, of the Future as an irreducible presupposition of (for) thinking the World and History. Non-philosophers are engaged in an aleatory navigation between the respect for the most rigorous utopia, whose rules are not that of the reproductive imagination but those from the Future determining imagination itself, as well as the temptations, diversions, and remorse of history. Little by little, we will begin to understand that the Future as we understand it no longer has any temporal consistency or positive content, without being an empty form or a nothingness, but that it is foreclosed to past and present History, just as it is foreclosed to the place of places, the World, and that it is the only method for establishing the practice of thinking in a non-imaginary instance. Because it is the World and History that are imaginary and have a terrible materiality, it is not necessarily utopia. We will overlap two objectives here: the defense of non-philosophy against the (non-) philosophers that we are, only occasionally, and the introduction of philosophy to a rigorous future. Together they set out to definitively render, without any possible return to philosophical conformism or towards the facilities of the past and present, the non-philosophical enterprise understood as utopia or uchronia. Imagination and speculation, left to themselves and thus undistinguished, are quite good for participating in the grand game of History but have little value or worse for the Future which is unimaginable and unintelligible and must be maintained as such. MAN-IN-PERSON AS SUSPENSION OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL CHORA The point where philosophical resistance is concentrated is without a doubt the invention of the Name-of-Man, first name, oracular as much as axiomatic, of the determining cause for the non-philosophical posture. And that which concentrates the differends is the style of non-philosophy as identity that possesses the dual aspect, of discipline and of the oeuvre, of the theorem and of the oracle. But the real difficulty in understanding the simplicity of non-philosophy is profoundly hidden in the depths of philosophy itself. Because philosophy, from Parmenides to Derrida, even Levinas, continues to be a divided gesture, without a veritable immanence, transforming its thematic contents of transcendence in also forgetting to transform the operative transcendence in the element from which the ontology of surface is established which we will call, in memory of Plato, the chorismos. The general effect of the chora literally gives place to philosophy, demanding binding and sutures to which we will once and for all “oppose” the Man-in-person, his power of cloning, and his future being. All philosophy contains a hinter-philosophy in which it deploys its operations and weaves its tradition like an understudy of a topographical nature and in the best of cases being itself topological. Philosophy as well consists of two levels, its pre-ontological operative conditions on the one hand, and its superficial theme on the other, it too has its presupposed, but is not aware of it or erases it within the unity of appearance named Logos. Rightly, the Logos, and its flash or lightning nature, possesses a “dark precursor,” the chora, which is as much a virtual image, and philosophy, dazzled by its own lightning flash, seems to completely forget about it at the same time it sets itself up within it. Non-philosophy risks taking this same path, of confusing what it believes to be the real with its phantom double, contenting itself to working on the thematic level of philosophy, not its surface objects and its idle chatter (we stopped talking about this a long time ago and in any case they are merely simple materials for inducing a work of transformation), but the transcendence-form of its objects. In the end it risks, through precipitation, taking back up the heritage of philosophy, a heritage of a misunderstood presupposed, even more profound than the play of transcendences. This is what the imperative of the radicality of immanence meant, to treat immanence in an immanent manner, not to make a new object out of it. And from here we get non- (philosophy) and its refusal of the Platonic chorismos , symbol of all abstraction, and thus all transcendental appearance. There are no illusions. The message will leave a heritage in tattered pieces and interpretations. But it was difficult not to dispute the differend to its core. There will be complete confusion of the multiple, possible, and necessary effectuations of non-philosophy with its interpretations. The non-philosophical or human freedom of philosophical effectuation and the philosophical freedom of interpretation. Effectuations demand non-philosophy to return to zero from the point of view of its philosophical material and thus also but within these limits the formulation of its axioms , but in no way providing from the outset divergent interpretations of the aforementioned axioms. They are divergent because they do not take into account the material from which these axioms are derived within non-philosophy, and because they do not see themselves as symptoms of another vision of the World. The utterances of non-philosophy are not mathematical theorems and pure axioms, they merely have a mathematical aspect . They are, by their extraction or origin, mathematical and transcendental. And by their determined function in-Real, within non-philosophy, they are identically in-the-last-Humaneity entities which have an aspect of an axiom and an aspect of interpretation (or an oracular aspect as we say) that attempts (sometimes it is ourselves who provide the occasion) to isolate and transform, in complete freedom of interpretation. There will be an opportunity to complain about the complex character of the language of non-philosophy, an idiom saturated with classical references, sophisticated in a contemporary way. Its freedom of decision up against the whole of philosophy demands these effects of “complication” and “privatization,” as the saying goes. But it also demands fighting against the drift [ dérive ] of the pedagogical-all and the mediatic-all that leads philosophy into the shallow depths of opinion, which is the site of its impossible death. The noble idealism of “pop-philosophy” has been consumed into a “philo-reality;” against this we propose philo-fiction. Parricide, which is at the bottom of these interpretations and which we can judge as being quite fertile, although it has informed tradition, only takes place once or within one lone meaning. In regards to Parmenides, it was possible; Plato introduced the Other as non-being and language, bringing into existence the philosophical system of the World, but is it possible to repeat it again with the same fecundity in regards to non-philosophy, this time in introducing (non) religion or (non) art, still mixing them without taking into account this mixture, alternatively as a philosophical or religious resentment? If philosophy begins via a crime, it is no doubt obliged to continue down similar pathways, to the effect that the crimes of philosophy, once the founding crime has been committed, are a reaction of self-defense. It is undoubtedly from this that we get Marx’s declaration that history begins by tragedy and repeats itself or ends in farce. The preservation of rigor and fecundity is, in every respect, a psychologically difficult task within a theory such as non-philosophy. Having posited an essential objective of liberation in regards to philosophy and its services, one has often understood this objective as an authorization of providing particular interpretations of its axioms and ends up obliterating their scope. This ends up confusing, on one hand, two kinds of freedoms in regards to non-philosophy, the freedom of its interpretations and the freedom of its effectuations. On the other hand, any defense of “principles” against precipitated interpretations is immediately taxed with a will to orthodoxy, a prohibitive objection when we are dealing with, as is the case here, a heretical theory of thought. Nevertheless, it is time to stop confusing heresy as the cause of thought with an ideology of heresies, which is certainly not at all our object, but rather a form of normalization. As for the “disciplinary” aspect, which is not the only aspect, it demands something other than philosophical “answers to objections,” a precision in the definition and use of its procedures in the formation of utterances, since non-philosophy is neither a supplementary doctrine interior to philosophy nor a vision of the world but one whose priority is a “vision of Man,” or rather Man as “vision” that implies a theory and a practice of philosophy. In the end, struggle is only one aspect of non-philosophy, not its whole or telos, struggle coming only from its materiality. In particular, if the discipline of non-philosophy is inseparable from struggle, it is not a question of reducing the monomaniacal obsession of its “marching orders.” This would reduce its complexity and kill its indivisibility, deploying it in a “long march” and a form of Maoization whose philosophical presuppositions no longer have any pertinence here, a case of the One and the Two, which are now cloned and no longer tied together. More generally, non-philosophy is a complex thought composed of a multitude of aspects, which is to say, unilateral interpretations, of a philosophical origin but reduced by their determination in-the-last-instance . The “liberalism” of non-philosophy is merely one of the aspects of which it is capable, not an essence. Similarly, it is only capable of having a “Maoist” aspect. Let us generalize. The weakness of non-philosophy is due to a specific cause, the determination-in-the-last-Humaneity of a subject for the World. Everything that has a right to the philosophical city can be said about it in turn and in a retaliatory mode since Man contributes nothing of himself that Man takes from the World. We can consider non-philosophy as being pretentious, absurd, idealistic, empty, materialistic, formalistic, contradictory, modern, post-modern, Zen, Buddhist, Marxist; it endures or tolerates, perhaps “appeals” to, or at least renders possible, sarcasms, ironies, and insults without even talking about the misunderstandings, partly for the same reason as psychoanalysis. All of this goes beyond simple “deviations.” They are its aspects, which is to say, its “unilateral” philosophical interpretations in both senses of the word, being either sufficient coming from the mouth of philosophers, or reduced to their absolute dimension of sufficiency and totality in the mouths of non-philosophers, and both times due to the weakness and strength of Man-in-person as their determination only in-the-last-instance. The non-philosopher is certainly not a Saint Paul fantasizing about a new Church. The non-philosopher is either a (Saint) Sebastian whose flesh is pierced with as many arrows as there are Churches, or a Christ persecuted by a Saint Paul. What is engaged in here is the practice of retaliation. A negative rule of the non-philosophical ethics of outlawed discussion by way of argumentation (the sufficient is you, the orthodox one is always you, you are the fashionable one, and when a master you are someone else) that is founded on the confusion of effectuations of non-philosophy and of its overall interpretations. Retaliation is the law but as with any too-human law, it must acquire a dimension that displaces it, or rather emplaces it and takes away its authority but not all of its effectiveness. If the non-philosopher is only authorized by himself, which is to say by philosophy but limited by the Real-of-the-last-instance, its critique of other non-philosophers can merely be retaliatory under the same conditions, only by the Real limited in-the last-instance. THE TREE OF PHILOSOPHICAL SAINTLINESS The thematic horizon or material of these debates is in the relationships between philosophy, religion as gnosis, and non-philosophy. It is inevitable, regarding non-philosophers in general (whether they are non-philosophers by name or simply its neighbors) that we often end up evoking Marx’s Holy Family and imagining, arranged on the neighboring branches of the tree of philosophy and annexed, sometimes abusively, to non-philosophy, authors who would quite evidently and quite rightly refuse this label. So it is that we find, for example, a Saint Michel, a Saint Alain, a Saint Gilles 1 without even mentioning the youngest who aspire as well to the freedom of “saintliness” and who make their muted voices heard here. If there is a Holy Family of non-philosophers, it extends completely beyond these three, provided that the sectarian spirit can save us. This book is organized in the following manner: To begin, in order to recall the essential part of the problematic, we have organized a Summary of Non-Philosophy , a vade-mecum of notions and basic problems, in a classical style. Secondly, there is Clarifications On the Three Axioms of Non-Philosophy , designed to posit their proper use as much as to elucidate their meaning. Thirdly, an analysis of Philosophizability and Practicity , both being extreme constituents of philosophical material or the contents of the third axiom. Fourthly, the heart of this work: Let us Make a Tabula Rasa of the Future or of Utopia as Method . Fifthly, we have a theoretical outline of a non-institutional utopia, The International Organization of Non-Philosophy, L’Organisation Non-Philosophique Internationale, (ONPHI) already created in practice but under the conditions of possibility and functioning from which here we put into question “de jure,” thus not without a perplexity concerning “facts,” in any case, without the capability of “getting to the bottom of things.” Sixthly, an essay characterizing The Right and the Left of Non-Philosophy , a brief topology of several philosophizing and normalizing positions of proponents or tenants of this problematic. Seventhly, Rebel in the Soul: A Theory of Future Struggle , a systematic discussion starting from a confrontation of non-philosophical gnosis and non-religious gnosis to the extent that they pose, posed or perhaps still will pose themselves as rivals to non-philosophy in a mixture of fidelity and infidelity. Despite the fact that it can also be read as putting non-philosophy into perspective: it pits against a standard Platonism two contemporary appropriations of Gnosticism. On the basis of the paradigm of Man who never ceases to come as the Future-in-person, each one of these moments strives to reestablish not the “true” non-philosophy and its orthodoxy, but the minimal conditions to respect in order to allow for its maximum fecundity. And in order to bring about one of the last possibilities of its development, making explicit Humaneity as a utopia-for-the-World. In introducing these considerations in the form of a “testament” and “ultimatum,” we want to indicate two things: First, that this is the last time we will intervene in order to caution non-philosophers against the temptation of returning and looking backwards towards philosophy. Only a disillusioned nostalgia for the former World and its traditions barely remain permissible to us.… Secondly, that non-philosophy is also a sort of ultimatum for considering one’s life and transforming one’s thought from the perspective of a uni-version rather than a conversion. Man as future is this ultimatum in action, not an impatient self-proclaimed genius, and philosophy is his testament. It is obviously the ultimatum that determines this testament as “old” with a view towards a life that is, itself, non-testamentary. In and of itself, the “old” can never bear a veritable eschaton. Thus, this book intersects according to the logic of this paradigm, under the sign of the ultimate or “last” as future, philosophy as testament and cautionary note for maintaining the non-philosophical oeuvre as “future” or “utopian.” We will see that between these two dimensions it cradles a theory of struggle. In the end, this book envisions non-philosophers in multiple ways. It inevitably sees them as subjects of knowledge, most often academics insofar as life in the world demands, but above all as close relatives of three great human types. The analyst and political militant are quite obvious, for non-philosophy is close to psychoanalysis and Marxism insofar as it transforms the subject in transforming philosophy. Here again, one must have a sense not of certain nuances but of aspects (of the interpretations, albeit unilateralized) and not in order to construct a simple proletarization or militarization of thought as theory. To be rigorous, rather than authoritarian or spiteful, is its task. And lastly, non-philosophy is a close relative of the spiritual but definitely not the spiritualist. Those who are spiritual are not at all spiritualists, for the spiritual oscillate between fury and tranquil rage, they are great destroyers of the forces of Philosophy and the State, which are united under the name of Conformism. They haunt the margins of philosophy, gnosis, mysticism, science fiction and even religions. Spiritual types are not only abstract mystics and quietists; they are heretics for the World. The task is to bring their heresy to the capacity of utopia, and their utopia to the capacity of the paradigm. NOTES We will recognize allusions, and sometimes references, to closely related or distant themes, but which are related, in the work of Michel Henry, Alain Badiou and via the representative of “non-religious” gnosis of a Platonic origin, in Gilles Grelet. It goes without saying that these discussions are current and local, neither concerning the ensemble of doctrines nor prejudging the eventual evolution of certain amongst them. This concerns defining certain proximities with non-philosophy (rather than adversaries which in some sense they are) and typological and emblematic differends (rather than conflicts with a certain author). (shrink)

This article reports on a historical investigation carried out on the conical object MIN000-3519 preserved in the mineralogy collections of the Muséum National d'Histoire Naturelle at Paris (France). The mineralogist René-Just Haüy (1743-1822) included this object, cut in a single pyrite (FeS2) crystal, in his working collection with the references ‘Sulphured iron, mirror of the Incas, of Peru, M. de Jussieu’. All of the research lines followed lead the author to Joseph de Jussieu (1704-1779) and his shipments of botanical specimens (...) and various other samples from South America. As a member of the Godin-La Condamine-Bouguer geodesic expedition on the equator (1735-1743), he returned to France only after 36 years (1771), ill, exhausted and dispossessed of the scientific product of his Andean collections. This pyrite mirror is important because, in addition to appearing to be the only archaeological object that can be linked to Joseph's peregrinations in America, it resembles other specimens found at sites of the Cañaris culture (500-1500 AD) in Ecuador. Preserved within the de Jussieu family, this object would presumably have been given to Haüy by Joseph's heirs, his nephews Antoine-Laurent (1748-1836) or Laurent-Pierre (1792-1866), with whom he had close ties. (shrink)

From an evolutionary perspective, both atavism and somatic evolution/convergent evolution theories can account for the consistent occurrence, and astounding attributes of cancers: being able to evolve from a single cell to a complex organized system, and malignant transformations showing significant similarities across organs, individuals, and species. Here, we first provide an overview of these two hypotheses, including the possibility of them not being mutually exclusive, but rather potentially representing the two extremes of a continuum in which the diversity of cancers (...) can emerge. In reviewing the current literature, we also discuss the criteria that should be applied to discriminate between the two competing theories and to determine their relevant contributions to oncogenesis and cancer progression. Finally, we deliberate on the potential applications of this conceptual framework in developing novel treatment strategies. (shrink)

Numismatique François de Callatay et Caroline Mattheeuws, À propos d'une série exceptionnelle de grands bronzes thasiens (fin ive- début me siècle) p. 481-490 L'acquisition par le Cabinet des Médailles de Bruxelles d'un lot de trente-cinq grands bronzes thasiens aux types «Tête de Déméter/Bustes des Dioscures» permet d'affiner la connaissance de cette émission exceptionnelle. Tous les exemplaires sont contremarques et beaucoup présentent des traces de surfrappe. L'étude du style combinée à celle des poids permet de déceler une manipulation monétaire qui avait (...) échappé jusqu'à présent. Avant de réaliser cette émission en surfrappant une émission existante au type de l'Héraclès imberbe, on s'était d'abord servi de nouveaux flans d'un poids lourd (ca 13 g). L'étude du contexte archéologique confirme d'autre part pour ces bronzes, sans toutefois qu'il soit permis de les situer à l'année près, une datation à l'extrême fin du ive s. av. J.-C. (shrink)

Exigence de justice sociale et aspirations de l'individualité sont-elles compatibles? C'est cette question de philosophie politique que développent ici trois sociologues, loin des propos catastrophistes concernant l'individualisme contemporain. Mais chacun le fait avec des orientations propres. Jacques Ion se centre sur les engagements militants. François de Singly dessine un " socialisme individualiste " plus réformiste. Et Philippe Corcuff une " social-démocratie libertaire " plus radicale. Ces synthèses font apparaître les avancées émancipatrices comme les difficultés générées par l'individualisme contemporain. De (...) la consolidation de l'autonomie individuelle et de la place de l'intimité au mal-être identitaire. Ils en tirent alors des conséquences pour la réinvention, contre le néolibéralisme économique, d'une politique émancipatrice pour le XXIè siècle. (shrink)

Fénelon may be the most neglected of all the major early modern philosophers. His political masterwork was the most-read book in eighteenth-century France after the Bible, yet today even specialists rarely engage his work directly. This problem is particularly acute in the Anglophone world, for while Fénelon's works have been published in several excellent modern French editions, only the smallest fraction of his vast and influential corpus has appeared in modern English translation. This volume aims to help remedy this by (...) bringing to English-language audiences the first collection of his moral and political writings in translation. By so doing it hopes to make more widely available the riches of one of the leading voices of resistance to the absolutism of Louis XIV. Fénelon's political thought will thus be of particular interest to students and scholars of French history, as well as to those today engaged in questions of political resistance and reform. But Fénelon's reach also extends to fields well beyond politics and ethics. In the Enlightenment, Fénelon came to be celebrated not only as a humanitarian political reformer but also as a pioneering theorist of education, a prescient student of economics and international relations, and a key voice in contemporary philosophical debates-not to mention his fame as one of the seventeenth-century's most preeminent theologians and spiritualists and masters of French prose. As such, his work will be of interest to students and scholars in fields ranging from philosophy and political science to economics, education, literature, French history, and religion. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:East-West ExchangeFr. Pierre-François de BéthuneThe European Commissions together organized the tenth spiritual East-West Exchange held June 3–28, 2005. Invited by the Institute for Zen Studies of Hanazono University, nine nuns and monks (from England, Scotland, France, the Low Countries, Norway, Portugal, and the United States) spent some time in Zen monasteries in Japan.As a conclusion to these visits there were two days of evaluation and reflection at the university (...) itself. The bishop of Kyöto, Paul Otsuka, was present, together with a large number of masters and professors. Two monks who are living in Japan came to participate at this symposium: Fr. Kieran Nolan, from the Benedictine monastery of Fushimi, and Fr. David Lavich, chaplain of the Trappist monastery of Nasu. The Reverend Töga Masataka, general secretary of the Institute for Zen Studies, gave the first presentation of these initiatives of dialogue. This was followed by a celebration in memory of Pope John Paul II, presided successively by the rector of the university, for the Buddhist part, and by the Right Rev. Otsuka, who celebrated the Eucharist.Finally, two lectures recalled the history of the ten spiritual exchanges, which started in 1979. The Reverend Yasunaga Södö described the Japanese approach and Fr. Pierre-François de Béthune presented the history of this dialogue from the European point of view.Fr. Pierre-François de BéthuneMonastère de Clerlande (Belgium)Copyright © 2006 The University of Hawai'i Press... (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the "public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

I argue that immunity to error through misidentification primarily characterizes thoughts that are 'implicitly' de se, as opposed to thoughts that involve an explicit self-identification. Thoughts that are implicitly de se involve no reference to the self at the level of content: what makes them de se is simply the fact that the content of the thought is evaluated with respect to the thinking subject. Or, to put it in familiar terms : the content of the thought is a property (...) which the thinking subject self-ascribes (as in the Loar/Lewis/Chisholm analysis). After answering an objection (to the effect that immunity can affect explicit de se thoughts), I extend the analysis to demonstrative thoughts, which also exhibit the property of immunity to error through misidentification. (shrink)

Contribution au numéro spécial de la Revue Internationale de Philosophie sur John Searle.

This paper — a sequel to my 'Open Quotation' (Mind 2001) — is my reaction to the articles discussing open quotation in the special issue of the Belgian Journal of Linguistics edited by P. De Brabanter in 2005.

La notion de passage n’a pas été conceptualisée en linguistique ; cependant, elle se révèle utile dans des domaines d’application aussi divers que la thématique, la recherche d’information ou la représentation des connaissances.En s’appuyant sur l’expérience de la sémantique de corpus, cette étude précise la notion de passage par l’examen des rapports de sémiosis entre contenu et expression du passage, comme par l’étude des rapports contextuels au sein du passage et entre passages. Tenant compte des rapports entre fonds et formes (...) sémantiques, puis des transformations entre passages, l’investigation conduit à préciser des phénomènes qui intéressent tant la textualité que l’intertextualité, de la citation à la traduction. (shrink)

BĪRŪNĪ, ABŪ RAYḤĀN MOḤAMMAD b. Aḥmad (362/973- after 442/1050), scholar and polymath of the period of the late Samanids and early Ghaznavids and one of the two greatest intellectual figures of his time in the eastern lands of the Muslim world, the other being Ebn Sīnā.

Can we solve the problem of the essential indexical, and account for de se belief, by appealing to 'relativized propositions' (functions from rich indices to truth-values)? According to John Perry, we cannot. This paper offers a detailed examination and a critique of Perry's argument.

Le sujet qui perçoit, ressent, se remémore, ou imagine a conscience de son activité mentale, et notamment du mode — perceptif, mnésique ou autre — de ses états. Le mode des états expérientiels va de pair avec une relation spécifique (variable selon le mode) du sujet à ce que l'état représente. Par exemple, le sujet qui se remémore se trouve (normalement) dans une certaine relation à la scène remémorée : il a perçu celle-ci dans le passé. La thèse principale de (...) l'article est que le sujet conscient d'être dans un état donné s'auto-attribue implicitement cette relation avec ce que l'état représente. Cette auto-attribution implicite (immunisée aux erreurs d'identification) constitue la présence du sujet «comme sujet » dans le contenu de ses expériences, distincte de sa présence « comme objet » lorsqu'il fait lui-même partie de la scène représentée. [English abstract] The subject who perceives, feels, remembers or imagines is conscious of his or her experiential states and, in particular, of their ‘mode'. The mode is what enables us to classify experiential states into types such as perceptions, memories, etc., quite independent of the content of the state (what is perceived, remembered, etc.). It is argued that the mode M of an experience determines that (if all goes well) a certain relation RM holds between the subject of the experience and what the experience represents. For example, the subject who remembers a scene normally stands in a certain relation to the scene in question, that of having perceived it in the past. The article's main thesis is that the subject of an experiential state implicitly self-ascribes the relevant relation to what the state represents. This implicit self-ascription (which is immune to error through misidentification) corresponds to the presence of the subject « as subject » in the content of his or her experience. (shrink)

L’auteur de cet article se propose de travailler sur les mouvements transférentiels et contre-transférentiels opérant dans la cure d’une de ses patientes qui, ayant révélé son homosexualité manifeste en analyse, exprime dans l’après-coup un désir de parentalité sans renier pour autant son choix d’objet sexuel. Ce texte fait état de l’univers d’images susceptibles d’enfermer l’analyste dans des frontières morales ou éthiques. Il montre comment l’identité de l’analyste peut se trouver momentanément troublée et comment il opère cependant pour que sa patiente (...) reste l’ordonnatrice de son propre destin. (shrink)

Professionalization of the engineer, from the perspective of sociology of technology, registrant in the statements of principle and Canadian standards of accreditation of university engineering programs. The question of the development of technologies (production, dissemination and appropriation) is attached in all respects with personal and social qualities of which refer engineer schools of engineering and regulatory bodies. The engineering profession s’roots from elsewhere in industrial ans social sectors increasingly sensitive to the social dimensions of technology, considering the new dynamics that (...) s’are attached with regard to the technology impacts on society and businesses. (shrink)

Les auteurs de cet ouvrage se sont donné pour tâche de relire l'œuvre de Giorgio Agamben en refusant de la convertir en simple objet d'analyse. Ils essayent plutôt d'entendre " l'héritage de la puissance " à laquelle la littérature comme phénomène semble nous engager, en retraçant un chemin dont les haltes se situent au cœur de la méditation agambenienne sur notre époque : l'avènement possible d'un sujet qui descendrait d'une " puissance pure ", irréductible à l'identification, dépouillé de toute substance, (...) sinon du mouvement par lequel il s'approprie lui-même en tant que puissance sans objet. Chacun des auteurs tente ainsi de potentialiser certaines propositions d'Agamben à partir de ce qu'on appelle " littérature ". Comment, à l'heure où celle-ci semble faire l'épreuve d'une neutralisation de son destin historique, penser sa relation au temps messianique? Au moment où plusieurs œuvres se vouent au recueillement de l'innommé, de l'insignifiant et des heures mortes comme au seul territoire qui leur serait préservé, comment penser l'articulation philologique entre le reste et la résistance? Pourrait-on conférer à la littérature un statut d'exception politique, voire de zone d'anomie constitutive du politique? Avec la participation de Guillaume Asselin, Etienne Beaulieu, Jean-François Bourgeault, Georges- Leroux, Eric Méchoulan, Pierre Ouellet, Sarah Rocheville, Lionel Ruffel, Sylvano Santini et Jean-Pierre Vidal. (shrink)

El concepto de mal, en cuanto intentamos acotar sus determinaciones, constatamos que no es sencillo: es tan amplio como el de bien, o como los conceptos de vida y muerte. Es cierto, además, que no es un concepto secundario, sino que va unido a su contrario y se presenta como alternativa a él: elige tu camino, el bien o el mal... Pero, ¿qué bien? ¿Qué mal? La cuestión existencial es vital: ¿qué escoger para nutrirse y no envenenarse, para protegerse u (...) orientarse? ¿Qué dirección, qué camino tomar? (shrink)

Nouvelle édition critique et traduction française annotée de la _Lettre à Marcella_ de Porphyre. Le philosophe néoplatonicien Porphyre (234-305) y adresse à sa femme un témoignage unique sur la manière dont une vie philosophique peut être conduite et se préserver. This book presents a new annotated and translated edition of neoplatonist 3rd-century Greek philosopher Porphyrius’ _Letter to Marcella_. This letter, adressed to his wife, gives a unique account on the ways and principles along which a philosophical life should be led (...) so as to perpetuate itself. (shrink)

La tête A 148 du Musée de Ténos, trouvée à Kionia, site du sanctuaire de Poséidon et d'Amphitrite, a été identifiée, au début du siècle, comme un portrait de Domitia. Ce portrait représente en réalité Agrippine l'ancienne, comme le montre la comparaison avec les répliques déjà connues du même type, dit « du Capitole ». La tête de Ténos, qui date du règne de Claude, se rattache au courant classicisant de la sculpture impériale de Grèce propre.

Après avoir interrogé la philosophie sur le peu de cas qu’elle fait de son propre langage, on cherche à définir si elle possède un domaine sémantique propre. Une analyse de la constitution de la terminologie propre à l’ontologie met en relief le rôle éminent de la substantivation des particules grammaticales, qui, indépendantes de tout domaine sémantique déterminé, assurent à cette terminologie son ubiquité. On interroge enfin la textualité philosophique et les récits abstraits qu’elle met en œuvre, pour reposer la question (...) des rapports entre mythe et philosophie. (shrink)

Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics rests largely on the concept of the classical. According to Gadamer, the classical stands for the continuity and the truth claim of the tradition, as transmitted by the written word. The normative character of the classical is directed against the neutrality and relativism of historicism: understanding does not occur primarily through distancing or methodological reconstruction but through belongingness to, and participation in, the past. The article shows how, given the central importance of dialogue and otherness in Gadamer's (...) theory, the philosopher does not seem to fully do justice to the critical intention of its own dialogical and philological dimensions. On the other hand, it shows also how Gadamer's hermeneutical practice, notably in his rehabilitation of Plato, stresses the learning from otherness more explicitly than does his own theory, thus correcting, as it were, the latter. The article aims, finally, at demonstrating how, by unduly emphasizing the continuity in the encounter between past and present, Gadamer's theory undermines the importance of reconstructing the otherness and specificity of the classical text. /// A hermenêutica filosófica de Gadamer, entendida como uma defesa das humanidades, assenta essencialmente sobre o conceito de clássico. Segundo Gadamer, o clássico representa a continuidade e a pretensão à verdade da tradição tal como nos é transmitida pela palavra escrita. O carácter normativo do clássico em Gadamer constitui assim uma resposta crítica à neutralidade e ao relativismo do historicismo: a compreensão não acontece primariamente graças a um processo de distanciação ou reconstrução metódica, mas sim pelo facto de, desde logo, reconhecermos que temos pertença activa no passado. O presente artigo demonstra como, dada a importância central do diálogo e da alteridade na teoria de Gadamer, ofilósofo acaba por não fazer inteiramente justiça à intenção crítica inerente à dimensão dialógica e filológica do seu próprio pensamento. Mostra-se também, por outro lado, até que ponto a práctica hermenêutica de Gadamer, nomeadamente no que se refere à sua reabilitação de Platão, acaba por sublinhar a nossa aprendizagem da alteridade de uma forma muito mais explícita do que a sua própria teoria parece capaz de fazer. O artigo mostra ainda como, ao sublinhar de forma indevida a continuidade e, com ela, a identidade no encontro entre opassado e opresente, a teoria de Gadamer parece comprometer a importância que se deve dar ao esforço de reconstrucção da alteridade e especificidade do próprio texto clássico. (shrink)

Ce bel ouvrage, clair, aéré et spacieux, se caractérise à la fois par sa volonté de simplicité d’accès, et son ambition, puisqu’on y trouve notamment une démonstration de la complétude d’un certain système déductif S1 pour la logique classique des prédicats, ainsi qu’une version synoptique du théorème de Gödel, selon lequel toute théorie du premier ordre complète axiomatisable est décidable, d’où il s’ensuit que l’arithmétique, c’est-à-dire l’ensemble des énoncés du premier ordre vrais dans, n’est pas axiomatisable; ce qu’on exprime souvent (...) en disant que tout système formel pour l’arithmétique est incomplet, au sens où il y a des énoncés vrais qui ne sont pas des théorèmes du système. (shrink)

Cécile Laborde, philosophe française établie au Royaume-Uni, est déjà l'auteure d'une œuvre fournie et essentielle. Elle s'est, dans un premier temps, inscrite au sein de la philosophie républicaine, en publiant notamment Français, encore un effort pour être républicains! (2010), ouvrage en français adapté d'un livre précédemment publié en anglais, Critical Republicanism: The Hijab Controversy and Political Philosophy (2008). En partant des controverses liées à la loi de 2004 interdisant le...