This book offers a sympathetic explanation of the origin of the Theory of Forms that is true both to the dialogues and to Plato's place in history. The author's explanation makes the development of Plato's thought part of an intellectual and philosophical history that begins in the pre-Socratic period, extends through Socrates and the Sophists, and continues into the twentieth century. The explanation provides a unified reading of three passages that scholars have long recognized as keys to Plato's thought about (...) the Forms, but which have proved stubbornly resistant to interpretation, both individually and as a group: (i) the intellectual autobiography in the Phaedo; (ii) the discussion of the philosopher and the lover of spectacles in the Republic; and (iii) the discussion of starting points, the Receptacle, and the four kinds of stuff in the Timaeus. The book will be of special interest to scholars of ancient philosophy, it will also be of interest to philosophers in general, graduate students, and advanced undergraduate students. (shrink)

Beginning from an analysis of moral obligation's form that I defend in The Second-Person Standpoint as what we are answerable for as beings with the necessary capacities to enter into relations of mutual accountability, I argue that this analysis has implications for moral obligation's substance. Given what it is to take responsibility for oneself and hold oneself answerable, I argue, it follows that if there are any moral obligations at all, then there must exist a basic pro tanto (...) obligation not to undermine one another's moral autonomy. (shrink)

There are two possible ways to understand form and substance in legal reasoning. The first refers to the distinction between concepts and their applications, whereas the second concentrates on the difference between authoritative and non-authoritative reasons. These approaches refer to the formalistic and positivistic conceptions of the law, the latter being the author's point of departure. Nevertheless, they are both helpful means of analysis in legal interpretation. Interpretation is divided into formal and substantive justification. They have certain functions (...) and they are utilized in interaction. Authoritative reasons and formal reasoning constitute the necessary point of departure. However, substantive reasons are also necessary in order to justify choices included in interpretation. In addition to formal and substantive reasoning, the role of legal concepts is analysed. (shrink)

This article examines various models of legal interpretation and their implications for comparative law, drawing inspiration from Rodolfo Sacco’s early career theories. It contrasts the Tarskian Correspondence Model, which seeks objective reality in legal texts, with the Symphonic Model, which interprets legal language as a harmonious interplay of elements. The Tarskian model reflects classical legal thought’s search for fixed meanings, while the Symphonic model aligns with contemporary legal practice’s nuanced understanding. Further, the article explores Heraclitean Realism, acknowledging the fluidity of (...) language and meaning, and the Provocative Tapestry Model, which introduces paradox and tension in legal interpretation. These models are likened to narrative genres, offering varied approaches to understanding legal discourse: the Tarskian model as a detective novel, the Symphonic model as a comedy, the Living Tapestry model as a melodrama, and the Provocative Tapestry model as a tragedy. The article argues that these models of legal interpretation do not inherently carry a political essence; the political stance emerges from the choices of interpreters. It emphasizes the need for human agency in the application of legal norms and the responsibility of legal professionals to actively engage in the interpretation process. Comparative law is discussed as a discipline that benefits from understanding these diverse interpretative models, as it seeks to analyze legal systems across jurisdictions. The article concludes that while narrative styles in legal interpretation have political histories, they are not bound to specific ideologies, highlighting the versatility and subjectivity in the field of legal interpretation. (shrink)

Democratic societies are today characterized by a pervasive sense of crisis, fuelled by popular perception of widespread corruption among political elites. This.

H. Richard Uviller, Virtual Justice: The Flawed Prosecution of Crime in America, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996, xvii + 318 pp.

In On my own opinions, Galen claims to agree with Aristotle that the soul is the form of the body. But should we take this statement at face value? After all, Galen says that the substance of the soul is a bodily mixture, and that the soul is the form of the body in the sense that it is the principle of mixing of the elementary qualities (i.e., hot, cold, wet, and dry). As is well known, Aristotle (...) explicitly rejects this sort of materialist account of the soul. In De Anima, he tells us that the soul cannot be a harmonia of bodily elements, understood either as the proportion according to which the elements are mixed, or as the mixtures themselves (I.4, 407b32-408a2). In this chapter, I argue that Galen rejects a substantive version of hylomorphism, in favor of a view according to which the soul’s substance is nothing other than a bodily mixture. Galen’s position contains a veiled objection to some central Aristotelian views and reveals a general suspicion regarding the Aristotelian notion of form as a genuine metaphysical and explanatory category. (shrink)

Qu'est-ce qui explique l'unité d'une substance leibnizienne, au-dessus des attributs compris dans sa notion individuelle complète? C'est une question commune dans la littérature sur la notion de la substance chez Leibniz. Cet article soutient qu'elle n'admette pas de réponse consistante dans le système leibnizien. Premièrement, je discute la manière dans laquelle Leibniz a essayé de répondre à la question en „rehabillitant" a les formes substantielles des scholastiques. Puis je cherche à montrer que ça lui a ammené à une (...) conception composée de la nature de la substance, une position similaire de quelques façons à celle de Duns Scotus. Cette conception composée, cependant, n'est pas soutenable étant donné que Leibniz a rejeté la „distinction formelle" de Scotus. (shrink)

This book is a complete re-thinking of Aristotle's metaphysical theory of material substances. The view of the author is that the 'substances' are the living things, the organisms: chiefly, the animals. There are three main parts to the book: Part I, a treatment of the concepts of substance and nonsubstance in Aristotle's Categories; Part III, which discusses some important features of biological objects as Aristotelian substances, as analysed in Aristotle's biological treatises and the de Anima; and Part V, which (...) attempts to relate the conception of substance as interpreted so far to that of the Metaphysics itself. The main aim of the study is to recreate in modern imagination a vivid, intuitive understanding of Aristotle's concept of material substance: a certain distinctive concept of what an individual material object is. (shrink)

This book is a re-thinking of Aristotle's metaphysical theory of material substances. The view of the author is that the 'substances' are the living things, the organisms: chiefly, the animals. There are three main parts to the book: Part I, a treatment of the concepts of substance and nonsubstance in Aristotle's Categories; Part III, which discusses some important features of biological objects as Aristotelian substances, as analysed in Aristotle's biological treatises and the de Anima; and Part V, which attempts (...) to relate the conception of substance as interpreted so far to that of the Metaphysics itself. The main aim of the study is to recreate in modern imagination a vivid, intuitive understanding of Aristotle's concept of material substance: a certain distinctive concept of what an individual material object is. (shrink)

An attempt to make clear to the average reader some of the truths of Law & Jurisprudence.

This essay deals with Simon Evnine’s amorphic hylomorphism, and the bearings that considerations about modality might have on it. It is suggested that the assumption of amorphic hylomorphism makes an account of modality extensionally incorrect in the domain of natural, non-organic objects. It is further argued that, in the case of NNOs, the existence of real forms should be accepted and this conclusion is claimed to be consistent with scientific knowledge, on the basis of substance gradualism.

This inaugural lecture, delivered on 17 November 2021 at the University of Neuchâtel, addresses the question: Are material objects analyzable into more basic constituents and, if so, what are they? It might appear that this question is more appropriately settled by empirical means as utilized in the natural sciences. For example, we learn from physics and chemistry that water is composed of H2O-molecules and that hydrogen and oxygen atoms themselves are composed of smaller parts, such as protons, which are in (...) turn composed of yet smaller parts, such as quarks, and so on. While the question at the center of this lecture might thus appear to fall more appropriately into the empirical domain of natural science, I argue that metaphysics in fact has an important role to play in determining how best to answer the question before us. More concretely, I propose that the Aristotelian doctrine of hylomorphism, when appropriately interpreted, provides the best metaphysical answer to the question of whether and how material objects are analyzable into more basic constituents. Hylomorphism holds that those entities to which this doctrine applies are, in some sense, compounds of matter (“hylē”) and form (“morphē” or “eidos”). Thus, the title of this lecture, “Form, Matter, Substance”, refers to the claim that lies at the center of the doctrine of hylomorphism, as applied to the domain of material objects, namely that sensible substances are the result of combining matter and form in the right sort of way; or, for short, “form + matter = substance”. I begin in Section II by providing some historical background which brings out Aristotle’s motivations for proposing the doctrine of hylomorphism in the context of his analysis of change. Section III turns to some of the main features of the contemporary hylomorphic theory I have defended especially in Koslicki (2008) and Koslicki (2018). Section IV discusses some challenging questions concerning artifacts which arise for both hylomorphic and other approaches to the metaphysics of concrete particular objects. Section V concludes by summarizing why, as contemporary metaphysicians, we should prefer a hylomorphic theory over its competitors as an analysis of concrete particular objects that is compatible with our current scientific understanding of the world. (shrink)

In _Form, Matter, Substance_, Kathrin Koslicki defends a hylomorphic analysis of concrete particular objects (e.g., living organisms). The Aristotelian doctrine of hylomorphism holds that those entities that fall under it are compounds of matter (hulē) and form (morphē or eidos). Koslicki argues that a hylomorphic analysis of concrete particular objects is well-equipped to compete with alternative approaches when measured against a wide range of criteria of success. A successful application of the doctrine of hylomorphism to the special case of (...) concrete particular objects, however, hinges on how hylomorphists conceive of the matter composing a concrete particular object, its form, and the hylomorphic relations which hold between a matter-form compound, its matter and its form. Through the detailed answers to these questions Koslicki develops in this book, matter-form compounds, despite their metaphysical complexity, emerge as occupying the privileged ontological status traditionally associated with substances, due in particular to their high degree of unity. (shrink)

Robert S. Summers is a distinguished legal theorist whose work has had significant influence in Europe as well as the United States. The study of form and substance in law, the theme of this collection, marks many of his most distinctive contributions to law and legal philosophy over four decades.

This paper examines Della Rocca’s critique of Aristotle’s conception of substance. The key point of the paper is that Aristotle’s homonymy principle and concept of enformed matter undermine Della Rocca’s claim that Aristotle is subject to a John Wayne moment. (To undergo a John Wayne moment is to propose an unilluminating or empty explanation, as in Wayne’s statement ‘A man’s gotta do what a man’s gotta do’.).

In this book, which thoroughly revises and greatly expands his classic work Sameness and Substance, David Wiggins retrieves and refurbishes in the light of twentieth-century logic and logical theory certain conceptions of identity, of substance and of persistence through change that philosophy inherits from its past. In this new version, he vindicates the absoluteness, necessity, determinateness and all or nothing character of identity against rival conceptions. He defends a form of essentialism that he calls individuative essentialism, and (...) then a form of realism that he calls conceptualist realism. In a final chapter he advocates a human being-based conception of the identity and individuation of persons, arguing that any satisfactory account of personal memory must make reference to the life of the rememberer himself. This important book will appeal to a wide range of readers in metaphysics, philosophical logic, and analytic philosophy. (shrink)

This book offers an original new account of one of Aristotle's central doctrines. Freudenthal He recreates from Aristotle's writings a more complete theory of material substance which is able to explain the problematical areas of the way matter organizes itself and the persistence of matter, to show that the hitherto ignored concept of vital heat is as central in explaining material substance as soul or form.

Aristotle's criticism of Platonic Forms in the Metaphysics has been a major source for the understanding and developments of the theory of Forms in later Antiquity. One of the cases in point is Aristotle's argument, in Metaphysics I 9, 990b22-991a2, against Forms of non-substances. In this paper, I will first provide a careful analysis of this passage. Next, I will discuss how the argument has been interpreted - and refuted - by the fifth-century Neoplatonists Syrianus and Proclus. This interpretation has (...) played an important role in the broader context of the Neoplatonic debates on the range of Plato's theory of Forms, which was one of the traditional problems discussed about the Forms in later Platonism. (shrink)

Aristotelian notions such as matter, form and substance should be used carefully; not only is the rich tradition in their background marked by variety of interpretation, even Aristotle's own use of these concepts is far from uniform. In his different works, matter, form and substance display contents that do not always agree. There is reason for believing that in the Metaphysics Zeta the notion of form embodies essence, and that accordingly something without essence does not (...) qualify as substance. This cannot be generalized or regarded as Aristotle's standard view, however, for in the Physics there are contexts in which the form is not conceived as essence. There, “the form or shape” is the arrangement of the substance's parts, or the object's shape, in addition to either all or some of its qualities. Outside the Metaphysics, substance, too, seems to be a less distinguished entity. In the Physics, and especially in the Categories, substance is anything capable of independent existence, any particular concrete thing that is a bearer of attributes. To the extent that our modern “object” corresponds to Aristotle's primary substance, it has a similar polysemy. While in some contexts it will mean an articulated object belonging to a specific kind, in others it will denote bodies without organized structure, that is, it will have as extension the particular bits and pieces that fill the world. A similar diversity applies to matter. When understood, for example, as a chunk out of which an artist casts her statue, matter is an object, a body, itself endowed with a boundary and a multitude of properties. But matter can be much simpler than that; it can be a plain homoeomere, a mere element, or as in prime matter, may lack every actual attribute. When in my “Matter and Objecthood” I criticized Henry Laycock's views propounded in “Some Questions of Ontology” I found comparable ambiguities transposed to contemporary discourse. In the paper just cited, Laycock examines the ontic status of matter, contrasting it with objects as particular concrete things; throughout his discussion no radical distinction is made between articulated objects and unorganized bodies. In my criticism I employed ‘object’ in the same inclusive sense. (shrink)

Fortunately, there is heat; and Freudenthal is keen to promote it as an overlooked central factor in Aristotle’s theory of material substance. He begins in agreement with the many scholars who argue that Aristotle’s theory of the four elements underdetermines the plain fact that there are organic substances which exhibit both synchronic and diachronic unity. He goes further than most, however, by arguing that left unaugmented Aristotle’s account of the four basic elements would positively preclude the existence of these (...) forms of unity. For Aristotle embraces the Presocratic picture of the four elements as engaged in “endemic strife”, so constituted that their natural propensities lead them to separate and dissolve rather than to unite and synthesize. Thus, for example, each of the four elements has a natural direction, which ought to result in fire and air ever moving upward and away from earth and water, which will move downward if unimpeded. Hence, as Aristotle himself recognizes, some agent force is required to hold the four elements together when they are mixed. (shrink)

In Form, Matter, Substance, Kathrin Koslicki articulates and defends her preferred brand of hylomorphism, weighing in on how we should conceive of the matter and the form of such compounds, and on how they can qualify as fundamental “substances” despite being ontologically dependent on their components. I review Koslicki’s principal claims and conclusions (§1), and then raise some concerns about her master argument for “individual forms” (§2) and her criticism of standard essentialist accounts of artifacts (§3).

이 논문은 라이프니츠의 초기 신학적 저작에서 성체 변화와 실체적 합일에 관한 논증에 나타난 물체와 실체 개념에 관한 연구이다. 청년기 라이프니츠의 주요 철학 저작은 자연 신학의 형태로 제시된 자연 철학으로 제시되었고 여기서 정신, 물체, 실체는 논증을 구성하는 주요 개념으로 등장한다. 나는 이 논문에서 라이프니츠가 기계론의 물체 개념을 비판적으로 수용하였고 그 물체 개념과 아리스토텔레스의 실체적 형상 개념을 조화시켜 성체 변화와 실체적 합일을 증명했다는 것을 밝힌다. 기계론 철학은 비물체적 존재를 가정하지 않고 기하학적 성질인 연장과 물리적 성질인 불가입성으로만 물체를 설명하고 ‘공간에 존재하는 것’으로 정의한다. (...) 라이프니츠는 이 기계론의 물체 개념을 한편으로는 비판하지만 다른 한편으로 성체 변화와 실체적 합일 같은 신학적 문제에 대해서 논증할 수 있는 장점으로 여긴다. 그 논증에서 그는 물체의 실체를 ‘동반하는 정신과의 합일’이라고 주장한다. 라이프니츠의 정의에 따르면, 실체는 활동의 원리, 물체에게는 운동의 원리를 포함하는 것이기 때문이다. 즉 물체 그 자체는 운동의 원리를 포함하고 있지 않은 물질적인 것이기 때문에 활동의 원리를 포함하고 있는 실체인 정신과의 합일을 통해서 운동을 부여받아야 한다는 것이다. 그리고 라이프니츠는 이런 물체의 실체 개념을 통해서 아리스토텔레스의 실체적 형상이 플라톤의 이데아와 조화롭게 이해될 수 있다고 생각했다. 결론적으로 기계론의 물체 개념과 형이상학적 물체의 실체 개념은 이 당시 청년 라이프니츠가 형성한 물체에 대한 두 관점이며, 이 두 관점은 물체 현상론과 물체적 실체라는 주장으로 이후에도 계속해서 이어진다. (shrink)

The introduction to this book begins with the claim that it will provide new perspectives on the relationships between form and matter in Aristotle's thought, identifying as a point of departure the "basic level" where they interact, namely, in the coming-to-be of composite material substances, notably living things, and in their stable persistence, both at the level of the individual and of the species. Central to this interaction, it is claimed, is vital heat, the significance of which has not (...) been fully appreciated. Aristotle nowhere offers a systematic theory of vital heat, but the author attempts to recover such a thing from scattered discussions; in so doing, he argues for its unitary explanatory role in relation to all the soul's functions, makes some suggestions concerning its origin in Presocratic thought, and suggests its likely provenance in Aristotle's early theological cosmology. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Some Metaphysical Preliminaries The Introduction of Matter and Form The Hierarchy of Form and Matter Matter and Potentiality, Form and Actuality; the Teleological Conception of Matter Form, Matter, and the “Unity of Substance” Prime Matter Entrapment and the Homonymy of the Body and Its Organs Note Bibliography.

_Substance use disorders belong to the class of externalizing behaviours that are generally more common among men than women. Those women who do have substance disorders therefore deviate more from the norms of society compared with men, tend to live in an environment characterized by high risk of violence and other forms of abuse, and tend to be survivors of childhood trauma. In terms of seeking treatment, women often have difficulty acknowledging their problems with substance use disorders, and (...) professionals are reluctant to ask women about drug or alcohol use. Even when they do seek treatment, women in many countries face practical and financial barriers to access treatment. For women who do enter treatment, outcomes are generally comparable to outcomes for men, suggesting that facilitating entry into treatment can yield substantial benefits for women with addictions._. (shrink)

An ontological extension of dispositional essentialism is proposed, whereby what is necessary and sufficient for the dispositional causation of events is interpreted realistically, and postulated to exist. This ‘generative realism’ leads to a general concept of ‘substance’ as constituted by its more fundamental powers or propensities appearing in the form of some structure or field. This neo Aristotelian view is reviewed historically, and in respect to quantum physics.

The first unquestionably big idea in the history of philosophy was the idea of form. The idea of course belonged to Plato, and was then domesticated at the hands of Aristotle, who paired form with matter as the two chief principles of his metaphysics and natural philosophy. In the medieval period, it was Aristotle’s conception of form and matter that generally dominated. This was true for both the Islamic and the Christian tradition, once the entire Aristotelian corpus (...) became available. For this reason, although there is much to say about the fate of Platonic Forms in medieval thought, the present chapter will focus on the Aristotelian tradition.1 Aristotelian commentators have been puzzled by form and matter for as long as there have been Aristotelian commentators. Indeed, it would not be too much to say that these are topics about which Aristotelians have never formed a very clear conception, and that their failure to do so was the principal reason why Aristotelianism ceased to be a flourishing research program from the seventeenth century onward. For those who aspire to a modern revival of Aristotelianism, the concepts of form and matter can easily take on the aspect of a kind of Holy Grail, such that if only we could get these ideas clearly in focus, we could see our way forward on any number of philosophical fronts, such as the union of mind and body, the coherence and endurance of substances, the nature of causality, and so on. The historical record, however, suggests that this hope is a snare and delusion, insofar as there has never been any such thing as the theory of form and matter. Although medieval philosophers of all kinds used this terminology incessantly, it had no more of a fixed meaning than does the ubiquitous contemporary philosophical talk of “properties.” Hence, the most a general survey of the topic can do is consider some of the more important areas of agreement and disagreement. (shrink)

Structural realism as developed by John Worrall and others can claim philosophical roots as far back as the late 19th century, though the discussion at that time does not unambiguously favor the contemporary form, or even its realism. After a critical examination of some aspects of the historical background some severe critical challenges to both Worrall's and Ladyman's versions are highlighted, and an alternative empiricist structuralism proposed. Support for this empiricist version is provided in part by the different way (...) in which we can do justice to Worrall's original demands and in part by the viewpoint it provides (in contrast to e.g. Michael Friedman's) on the stability maintained through scientific theory change. Planck against the heretics 1.1 Poincaré on the meaning of Maxwell's equations 1.2 Two responses: reification and structuralism On the road to structuralism 2.1 The microscope 2.2 Mathematization of the world picture 2.3 The 18th–20th century The new structural realism 3.1 From scientific realism to structuralism 3.2 The Ladyman variant: objectivity and invariance 3.3 How is structural realism supported? An empiricist structuralism 4.1 Royal succession in science 4.2 Defence of the empiricist version 4.3 Structure: an empiricist view. (shrink)