In the Philebus, Socrates argues that pleasures can be false in the same way that beliefs can be false. On the basis of Socrates' analysis of malicious pleasure, a mixed pleasure of the soul and a passion, I defend the view that, according to Socrates, pleasures can be false when they represent as pleasant something that is not worthy of our enjoyment, where that means that they represent as pleasant something that is not pleasant in its own right because it (...) is not fine. Since these pleasures misrepresent the value of their objects, they involve an evaluative error. In contrast, a pleasure is true when it correctly represents the actual value of things. (shrink)

In Nicomachean Ethics 7.7 (= Eudemian Ethics 6.7), Aristotle distinguishes softness (malakia) from lack of self-control (akrasia) and endurance (karteria) from self-control (enkrateia). This paper argues that unqualified softness consists of a disposition to give up acting to avoid the painful toil (ponos) required to execute practical resolutions, and (coincidentally) to enjoy the pleasures of rest and relaxation. The enduring person, in contrast, persists in her commitments despite the painful effort required to enact them. Along the way, I argue that (...) this interpretation qualifies our understanding of the pleasures and pains with which temperance and intemperance are concerned. (shrink)

In Quod animi mores, Galen says both that there is an identity between the capacities of the soul and the mixtures of the body, and that the soul’s capacities ‘follow upon’ the bodily mixtures. The seeming tension in this text can be resolved by noting that the soul’s capacities are constituted by, and hence are nothing over and above, bodily mixtures, but bodily mixtures explain the soul’s capacities and not the other way around. Galen’s proposal represents a distinctive position in (...) the Ancient debate on the relationship between soul and body. (shrink)

This paper argues that Aristotelian practical wisdom (phronêsis) is a state of conviction (pistis) in the goodness of our goals based on proper grounds. This state of conviction can only be achieved if rational arguments and principles agree with how things appear to us. Since, for Aristotle, passions influence appearances, they can support or undermine our conviction in the goodness of ends that are worth pursuing. For this reason, we cannot be practically wise without virtuous dispositions to experience appropriate passions. (...) Along the way, I argue that this reading allows us to explain the shortcomings of self-controlled and akratic agents. -/- . (shrink)

In the Phaedo, Socrates offers recommendations for living a philosophical life. We argue that those recommendations can be properly understood only in light of Socrates’ account of the soul’s true nature, considered separately from the body. Embodiment causes the soul to diverge from its proper end, the pursuit of knowledge. Bodily pleasures, pains, and desires divert the soul to other ends, distract its attention away from knowledge, and deceive it about what is true. Socrates’ recommended solutions to these obstacles are (...) diverse, reflecting the complexities of human psychology. He recommends avoidance of bodily experiences in many cases as well as reevaluation of the importance of the body, but he doesn’t recommend either the wholesale rejection or embrace of the bodily. We are our souls but, like it or not, we are temporarily embodied, and what happens to the body is thereby experienced by us. Socrates thus exhorts us to live in a way that recognizes both our temporary humanity and our lasting, true nature. Only so can we best pursue knowledge. (shrink)

In this paper I examine the moral psychology of the Phaedo and argue that the philosophical life in this dialogue is a temperate life, and that temperance consists in exercising epistemic discernment by actively withdrawing assent from incorrect evaluations the body inclines us to make. Philosophers deal with bodily affections by taking a correct epistemic stance. Exercising temperance thus understood is a necessary condition both for developing and strengthening rational capacities, and for fixing accurate beliefs about value. The purification philosophers (...) strive for, and the purifying role of philosophy, should then be understood as a clarificatory act consisting in making one’s thoughts clear and withdrawing assent from erroneous evaluative content in our desires and pleasures. Along the way, I argue that philosophers must neither avoid situations and activities that cause bodily affections as much as possible, nor ignore or care little about them. (shrink)

What are the passions? And what, if anything, do they have to do with our intellectual lives? I argue that, according to Aristotle, the passions are complex states that carry information about the value things have. More specifically, Aristotelian passions are constituted by fine-grained evaluative appearances—a kind of truth-apt, cognitive, yet non-rational representation that non-human animals also entertain. Given that the passions are representations of value, they can be the basis for coming to know and understand the peculiar value of (...) things. So, the passions can serve as grounds for intellectual achievements that are essential to a good life. In particular, I argue that, for Aristotle, the passions contribute substantively to three intellectual achievements that are required for a flourishing life: practical wisdom, certain instances of contemplation, and the appreciation of art. Since Aristotelian passions carry rich information and discriminate value, they are cognitive states that can shape and enrich not only our lives as agents, but also our lives as knowers. The passions can play an epistemic role by serving as warrant for intellectually discerning the normative features of the situations we inhabit, the kinds of characters that surround us, and what is good and fine in them and us. Furthermore, in virtue of their epistemic role, the passions can be the basis for the intellectual aspects of a moral education. (shrink)

This paper argues that Aristotelian thumos is a non-reducible mental phenomenon that plays a central role in Aristotle’s theory of the mind, motivation, and action. For Aristotle, thumos is not primarily, as others have argued, a desire for the noble, social appraisal, or retaliation; rather, it is an inner drive or impulse to act. More precisely, it is an executory urge to implement or enact one’s ends or goals, whatever they are. Thumos accounts for someone’s proneness to spring into action (...) and can contribute to bringing about rational or non-rational, first-order desires. It is a second-order motivation, which both human and non-human animals have and that comes in degrees: we can be more or less thumotic, which amounts to being more or less disposed to making first-order desires effective so that they issue in actions. Aristotelian thumos, then, anticipates features of the modern notion of the will. Along the way, I argue that thumos is key to Aristotle’s efforts to differentiate and hierarchically organize species, characters, genders, and peoples. (shrink)

In On my own opinions, Galen claims to agree with Aristotle that the soul is the form of the body. But should we take this statement at face value? After all, Galen says that the substance of the soul is a bodily mixture, and that the soul is the form of the body in the sense that it is the principle of mixing of the elementary qualities (i.e., hot, cold, wet, and dry). As is well known, Aristotle explicitly rejects this (...) sort of materialist account of the soul. In De Anima, he tells us that the soul cannot be a harmonia of bodily elements, understood either as the proportion according to which the elements are mixed, or as the mixtures themselves (I.4, 407b32-408a2). In this chapter, I argue that Galen rejects a substantive version of hylomorphism, in favor of a view according to which the soul’s substance is nothing other than a bodily mixture. Galen’s position contains a veiled objection to some central Aristotelian views and reveals a general suspicion regarding the Aristotelian notion of form as a genuine metaphysical and explanatory category. (shrink)

This paper argues that Book 3 of Porphyry’s De abstinentia contains an overlooked argument in favor of vegetarianism for the sake of non-human animals themselves. The argument runs as follows: animals are essentially sentient creatures. Sentience (αἴσθησις) allows them to discern what is good for their survival and what is destructive to them, so that they can pursue the former and avoid the latter. As a result, animals (human and non-human) have preferences, desires, and hopes. Having purposeful strivings that can (...) be promoted or frustrated makes them recipients of justice and injustice. This means, for Porphyry, that animals, unlike plants, can be wronged since they are creatures that discern, and purposefully pursue, what is good or bad for them. This reading stands against interpretations that argue that Porphyry advocates vegetarianism only for our benefit, and not for the animals’ own sake. (shrink)

In De usu partium, Galen argues that the parts of the human body are designed to fulfill functions that contribute to the continued existence and well-being of the organism as a whole. Synthesizing Plato’s and Aristotle’s views on teleology, Galen highlights the importance of a functional framework for anatomical research. For Galen, teleology is as much a method for anatomical inquiry as it is a metaphysical commitment. In particular, teleology guides the main tool of anatomical investigation: dissection. According to Galen, (...) the success of medical research and practice requires classifying, individuating, and explaining anatomical parts in light of their functional contributions. (shrink)

In this paper, I provide an interpretation of Plato’s repeated claims in Republic V that women are “weaker” (asthenestera) than men. Specifically, I argue that Plato thinks women have a psychological propensity to get easily dispirited, which makes them less effective in implementing and executing their rational decisions. This interpretation achieves several things. It qualifies Plato’s position regarding women and their position in the polis. It provides the background against which we can interpret Aristotle’s claim in Politics I that women (...) possess a deliberative capacity that is not authoritative (akuron). It expands our understanding of the nature and role of spirit (thumos) in these authors. And, finally, it gives us insight into a kind of moral-psychological success that Plato and Aristotle consider central to both personal and political agency. (shrink)

In 'Mastery, Dependence, and the Ethics of Authority', Aaron Stalnaker argues that dependence on the right authorities is essential to living a good, virtuous life. Relinquishing autonomy to experts early in life can allow us, in time, to become fully autonomous. For the Rú, a good life requires virtues such as ritual and wisdom. Insofar as these virtues involve skill, they are trained by experts. Understanding virtue as a form of skilled behavior or practical mastery, Stalnaker argues, allows us to (...) see why it is important to subject oneself to, and obey, the (right) authorities: we become virtuous only if we are trained by the right people, follow these experts' guidance and example, and (at least in the beginning) obey their commands. Eventually, this results in an internalized sense of what is correct and incorrect, and so we become ready to act virtuously on our own and apply what we have learned to novel situations. Furthermore, we come to enjoy acting virtuously for its own sake, and we become able to articulate why this is the right action in these circumstances, and challenge our leaders if we think they have deviated from the virtuous path. -/- In this piece, I question the view that ethical virtue can be trained in the same way that skills like carpentry or archery can, and I argue that this sort of training by itself cannot result in autonomous agents. If our sense of what is good and bad is deeply molded by others, we cannot come to realize that the practices in which we were trained are actually not good, so as to exercise appropriate remonstration. Furthermore, repeating actions of a certain kind under the guidance of others is not sufficient to make someone enjoy doing what is right because it is right. (shrink)