In Metaphysics Delta 29 Aristotle distinguishes three classes of falsity and three corresponding senses of the ‘false’. The paper examines Aristotle’s arguments from a close-reading perspective, and analyses the meaning of false ‘as a thing’ , the significance of Aristotle’s dispute with Antisthenes on the subject of contradiction and verbal falsehood, and Aristotle’s conception of the false person. By paying attention to the precise order of Aristotle’s presentation, the paper raises the question about the manner in which the (...) three classes of falsity are related to one another and provides a tentative answer that could explain why the ‘false’ is included in the philosophical dictionary of the Metaphysics. On the proposed interpretation, Aristotle assumes that a fundamental difference operates in all cases of falsity , and that this difference is the outcome of the ontological determinacy of substance. Keywords: Aristotle; Metaphysics; falsity; factual falsity; propositional falsity; ethical falsity; Antisthenes; contradiction; substance; ontology; logic. (shrink)

In Philosophical Logic, the Liar Paradox has been used to motivate the introduction of both truth value gaps and truth value gluts. Moreover, in the light of “revenge Liar” arguments, also higher-order combinations of generalized truth values have been suggested to account for so-called hyper-contradictions. In the present paper, Graham Priest's treatment of generalized truth values is scrutinized and compared with another strategy of generalizing the set of classical truth values and defining an entailment relation on the resulting sets of (...) higher-order values. This method is based on the concept of a multilattice. If the method is applied to the set of truth values of Belnap's “useful four-valued logic”, one obtains a trilattice, and, more generally, structures here called Belnap-trilattices. As in Priest's case, it is shown that the generalized truth values motivated by hyper-contradictions have no effect on the logic. Whereas Priest's construction in terms of designated truth values always results in his Logic of Paradox, the present construction in terms of truth and falsity orderings always results in First Degree Entailment. However, it is observed that applying the multilattice-approach to Priest's initial set of truth values leads to an interesting algebraic structure of a “bi-and-a-half” lattice which determines seven-valued logics different from Priest's Logic of Paradox. (shrink)

The Fitzgerald-Lorentz contraction hypothesis, proposed as an explanation of the Michelson-Morley result, fails to account for the Kennedy-Thorndike result. Hence, Grünbaum argues, the hypothesis has been falsified. However, the contraction hypothesis as formulated by Lorentz is false for the very fundamental reason that it entails a contradiction, namely, the consequence that light waves must have a variable velocity along what by definition is taken to be a rest length. Furthermore, the attempt to resolve this contradiction by coupling the (...) Fitzgerald-Lorentz contraction with the hypothesis that clock rates are a function of velocity, is open to a sound, methodological objection. The Michelson-Morley result is fully satisfied, provided only that the lengths of the interferometer arms, in the longitudinal and transverse positions, are thought to be related to one another in a certain ratio, and this ratio may be interpreted as a contraction in both arms. Since this twofold contraction hypothesis suffices to explain both the Michelson-Morley and the Kennedy-Thorndike results, and since it entails no contradiction, there is no need to correct both the length of rods and the rate of clocks. Therefore, the combined clock-rod hypothesis, and with it the Fitzgerald-Lorentz contraction hypothesis, must be rejected. (shrink)

Despite the tendency to be otherwise, some non-classical logics are known to validate formulas that are invalid in classical logic. A subclass of such systems even possesses pairs of a formula and its negation as theorems, without becoming trivial. How should these provable contradictions be understood? The present paper aims to shed light on aspects of this phenomenon by taking as samples the constructive connexive logic C, which is obtained by a simple modification of a system of constructible falsity, (...) namely N4, as well as its non-constructive extension C3. For these systems, various observations concerning provable contradictions are made, using mainly a proof-theoretic approach. The topics covered in this paper include: how new contradictions are found from parts of provable contradictions; how to characterise provable contradictions in C3 that are constructive; how contradictions can be seen from the relative viewpoint of strong implication; and as an appendix an attempt at generating provable contradictions in C3. (shrink)

$${{{\mathcal {F}}}}$$ -systems are useful digraphs to model sentences that predicate the falsity of other sentences. Paradoxes like the Liar and the one of Yablo can be analyzed with that tool to find graph-theoretic patterns. In this paper we studied this general model consisting of a set of sentences and the binary relation ‘ $$\ldots $$ affirms the falsity of $$\ldots $$ ’ among them. The possible existence of non-referential sentences was also considered. To model the sets of (...) all the sentences that can jointly be valued as true we introduced the notion of conglomerate, the existence of which guarantees the absence of paradox. Conglomerates also enabled us to characterize referential contradictions, i.e., sentences that can only be false under a classical valuation due to the interactions with other sentences in the model. A Kripke-style fixed-point characterization of groundedness was offered, and complete (meaning that every sentence is deemed either true or false) and consistent (meaning that no sentence is deemed true and false) fixed points were put in correspondence with conglomerates. Furthermore, argumentation frameworks are special cases of $$\mathcal{F}$$ -systems. We showed the relation between local conglomerates and admissible sets of arguments and argued about the usefulness of the concept for the argumentation theory. (shrink)

Stratified properties such as ‘happy unhappiness’, ‘ungrounded ground’, ‘fortunate misfortune’, and evidently ‘true falsity’ may generate dialetheias (true contradictions). The aim of the article is to show that if this is the case, then we will have a special, conjunctive, kind of dialetheia: a true state description of the form ‘Fa and not Fa’ (for some property F and object a), wherein the two conjuncts, separately taken, are to be held untrue. The particular focus of the article is on (...) happy unhappiness: people suffering from (or enjoying) happy unhappiness (if there is some situation or state of mind of this kind) cannot be truly said ‘happy’ or ‘unhappy’, but we can say they are both. In the first section three cases of conjunctive stratification are presented; in the second section the logic of stratified contradictions is explored. The last section focuses on eudemonistic ascriptions: stated that a is happy to be unhappy (or unhappy to be happy), should we say a is happy? unhappy? both? neither? (shrink)

Many people feel the pull of both creationism and evolution as explanations for the origin of species, despite the direct contradiction. Some respond by endorsing theistic evolution, integrating the scientific and religious explanations by positing that God initiated or guided the process of evolution. Others, however, simultaneously endorse both evolution and creationism despite the contradiction. Here, we illustrate this puzzling phenomenon with interviews with a diverse sample. This qualitative data reveals several approaches to coping with simultaneous inconsistent explanations. (...) For example, some people seem to manage this contradiction by separating out ideological claims, which prioritize identity expression, from fact claims, which prioritize truth. Fitting with this interpretation, ambivalent individuals tended to call explanations “beliefs”, avoid mention of truth or falsity, and ground one or both beliefs in identity and personal history. We conclude with a brief discussion of the affordances of this distinction. (shrink)

The duality of truth and falsity in a Boolean algebra of propositions is used to generate a duality of belief and disbelief. To each additive probability measure that represents belief there corresponds a dual additive measure that represents disbelief. The dual measure has its own peculiar calculus, in which, for example, measures are added when propositions are combined under conjunction. A Venn diagram of the measure has the contradiction as its total space. While additive measures are not self-dual, (...) the epistemic state of complete ignorance is represented by the unique, monotonic, non-additive measure that is self-dual in its contingent propositions. Convex sets of additive measures fail to represent complete ignorance since they are not self-dual. (shrink)

The paper provides a reconstruction of proof by contradiction in Kant’s pure general logic. A seemingly less-explored point of view on this topic is how apagogical proof can account for the formal truth of a judgement. Integrating the argument held by Kjosavik (2019), I intend to highlight how one can use proof by contradiction, conceived as a modus tollens, to establish the logical actuality (logical or formal truth) of a cognition. Although one might agree on the capacity of (...) the proof to prove formal falsity, the logical actuality of a judgement is assessable based on a logically grounded judgement and, as for transcendental logic, this cognitive operation has to presuppose the real possibility of an object. (shrink)

In this third installment of his series on key, underappreciated ideas in Ayn Rand's epistemology, the author discusses the nature of differentiation and integration as the functional essence of consciousness and applies that insight to various cognitive and noncognitive processes of awareness, with a special emphasis on logic and illogic. He offers an extended analysis of the fallacies of “Frozen Abstraction” and “False Alternative,” as well as critiques of a long-standing Objectivist conflation of falsity and contradiction and a (...) relatively more recent Objectivist error, the fallacy of “genuine awareness.”. (shrink)

Participants in the debate about whether simplicity is a guide to truth or merely pragmatically useful typically wrangle over two problems: (1) how to weigh simplicity against other virtues like strength and fitness and (2) whether there is a unique measure for simplicity that straps it to truth. I would like to put forth a third problem: (3) Even if problems (1) and (2) could be solved, it is far from clear whether the simplest theory out of an available class (...) of competitors would always be the one closest to the truth. (shrink)

There are two crucial problems for those who would take existence to be a ‘real’ property. (1) The predication of such a property of a thing appears insufficient to distinguish cases where the thing exists, on the one hand, from those where it does not exist on the other. That is, the property of existence does not add anythingto the concept of a thing. (2) If non-existent things are capable of having properties and identity – which is necessary to avoid (...) an objection made by A. J. Ayer – then the identity of all things with all other things appears to follow. However, if the concept of existence is explained as a primitive property manifest as resistance toontological contradiction then these problems can be solved. The pay-off for considering existence to be a first-order predicate is, therefore, an argument against existing ontological contradictions. (shrink)

This essay examines the contradictions often found in third wave feminist texts that function as strategic choices that may shape, foster, and enhance an individual's sense of agency. Many third wave feminists utilize contradiction as a way to understand emergent identities, to develop new ways of thinking, and to imagine new forms of social action. Agency, then, stems from the use of contradiction as a means of self-determination and identity, of transcendence of seemingly forced or dichotomous choices, and (...) counter-imaginations of a better future. (shrink)

The goals of this paper are two-fold: I wish to clarify the Aristotelian conception of the law of non-contradiction as a metaphysical rather than a semantic or logical principle, and to defend the truth of the principle in this sense. First I will explain what it in fact means that the law of non-contradiction is a metaphysical principle. The core idea is that the law of non-contradiction is a general principle derived from how things are in the (...) world. For example, there are certain constraints as to what kind of properties an object can have, and especially: some of these properties are mutually exclusive. Given this characterisation, I will advance to examine what kind of challenges the law of non-contradiction faces; the main opponent here is Graham Priest. I will consider these challenges and conclude that they do not threaten the truth of the law of non-contradiction understood as a metaphysical principle. (shrink)

A critical view of the alleged significance of Belnap four-valued logic for reasoning under inconsistent and incomplete information is provided. The difficulty lies in the confusion between truth-values and information states, when reasoning about Boolean propositions. So our critique is along the lines of previous debates on the relevance of many-valued logics and especially of the extension of the Boolean truth-tables to more than two values as a tool for reasoning about uncertainty. The critique also questions the significance of partial (...) logic. (shrink)

In the historical progress of nations, economic wealth plays an important role as well as prosperity in social and cultural make-up. When the entire Turkish history is considered, we come across with the institution of Akhism that is both related to the regulation of sociocultural life as well as to the operation of business life within the framework of certain principles and rules. Even though Akhism has aspects in parallel with today’s management philosophies, history has not been immutable and economical (...) activities have changed since the thirteenth-century establishment of Akhism. This theoretical study intends to introduce Akhism that stands as a turning point in Ottoman history in social, cultural and economical aspects. Then the purposes of the institution, its principles and historical progress will be outlined. Furthermore, Akhi associations as well as conflicts with total quality management, social responsibility and corporate culture will be diagnosed. (shrink)

Stockholder and stakeholder perspectives have been positioned in the literature as being in tension, and thus a potential source of innovation and change. However, researchers have overlooked a systematic examination of this presumption in theory and in practice. This study explores the ways that stockholder and stakeholder assumptions are presented by theorists and compares these with expressions of stockholder and stakeholder perspectives used by firms in practice. We argue that theoretical entrenchment dichotomizing these perspectives has disrupted the ability of researchers (...) to leverage this tension. While scholarship remains trapped in a vicious cycle, we also argue that firms in practice express only the acceptance dimension of a virtuous cycle. Our empirical research demonstrates that firms accept and accommodate the paradoxical tension between managing for stockholders versus balancing the interests of stakeholders. This is evidenced by strategies we identify as book‐ending, cadence, continuous and simultaneous co‐mingling, and hybridization. We find that in practice these tensions are more integrated whereas in theory they are treated as more distinct and, often, in conflict. We suggest ways in which both scholarship and practice can better leverage tension as paradoxical opportunity. (shrink)

_Material Falsity and Error in Descartes’s Meditations _approaches Descartes’s Meditations as an intellectual journey, wherein Descartes’s views develop and change as he makes new discoveries about self, God and matter. The first book to focus closely on Descartes’s notion of material falsity, it shows how Descartes’s account of material falsity – and correspondingly his account of crucial notions such as truth, falsehood and error – evolves according to the epistemic advances in the Meditations. It also offers important (...) new insights on the crucial role of Descartes’s Third Meditation discussion of material falsity in advancing many subsequent arguments in the Meditations. This book is essential reading for those working on Descartes and early modern philosophy. It presents an independent reading on issues of perennial interest, such as Descartes’s views on error, truth and falsehood. It also makes important contributions to topics that have been the focus of much recent scholarship, such as Descartes’s ethics and his theodicy. Those working on the interface between medieval and modern philosophy will find the discussions on Descartes’s debt to predecessors like Suárez and Augustine invaluable. (shrink)

Towards the end of Analysis, Knowledge, and Valuation, C. I. Lewis remarks that when a Cyrenaic espouses his philosophy of life, “Have no concern for the future,” he contradicts himself. Lewis hastens to add that the contradiction is not formal but “pragmatic.”.

From the Editors [of Voprosy filosofii]: Recently the prominent Soviet philosopher, specialist in problems of dialectics, theory of knowledge, the history of philosophy, and esthetics Igor Sergeevich Narskii marked his sixtieth birthday. The editorial board and staff of Voprosy filosofii wish to extend their congratulations to him and wish him good health, happiness in his personal life, and continued success in his work.

_Material Falsity and Error in Descartes’s Meditations _approaches Descartes’s Meditations as an intellectual journey, wherein Descartes’s views develop and change as he makes new discoveries about self, God and matter. The first book to focus closely on Descartes’s notion of material falsity, it shows how Descartes’s account of material falsity – and correspondingly his account of crucial notions such as truth, falsehood and error – evolves according to the epistemic advances in the Meditations. It also offers important (...) new insights on the crucial role of Descartes’s Third Meditation discussion of material falsity in advancing many subsequent arguments in the Meditations. This book is essential reading for those working on Descartes and early modern philosophy. It presents an independent reading on issues of perennial interest, such as Descartes’s views on error, truth and falsehood. It also makes important contributions to topics that have been the focus of much recent scholarship, such as Descartes’s ethics and his theodicy. Those working on the interface between medieval and modern philosophy will find the discussions on Descartes’s debt to predecessors like Suárez and Augustine invaluable. (shrink)

I offer here a critical assessment of Beall and Ficara’s most recent take on Hegelian contradictions. By interpreting differently some key passages of Hegel’s work, I favor, unlike them, a no-gaps approach which leads to a different logic.

The article discusses the V.V. Tselishchev’s original and unique systematic study of the specific and extremely complicated problems of Gödel results regarding the question of artificial intelligence essence. Tselishchev argues that the reflexive property should be considered not only as an advantage of human reasoning, but also as an objective internal limitation that appears in case of adding Gödel sentence to a theory to build a new theory. The article analyzes so-called mentalistic Gödel’s argument for fundamental superiority of human intelligence (...) over machine one and the non-algorithmic nature of natural thinking. The discussion about the Gödel argument is not entirely speculative, but contains new knowledge. An example of such knowledge are the results of R. Smullyan levels of computers “awareness,” which are may be interpreted in a psychophysical sense. The concept of “zero level of intelligence” is proposed for such a reflexive property as “awareness of selfconsciousness.” Reflexive ranks below the awareness of self-consciousness can be considered negative levels of thinking in the sense that the intelligence, being reduced to them, significantly loses its completeness. Even self-consciousness turns out to be a negative level of thinking, since, according to Smullyan, the subject of self-consciousness is unaware of the type of thought to which he belongs. A thought experiment is proposed that allows us to establish the distribution of the properties of Smullyan stability and normality and to answer the question “Does an intuitive belief in the truth of a formal proof affect the truth of a proposition being proved?” According to intuitionism, the most unpleasant epistemic property is instability: beliefs that are not based on deep intuitions have no value. According to the constructivist philosophy of mathematics, instability is a less negative property than abnormality: the fact that high-ranking beliefs cannot be immersed to the very foundations is not significant because violation of truth due to lowering the rank of reflection is not critical. (shrink)

According to dispositionalism about modality, a proposition <p> is possible just in case something has, or some things have, a power or disposition for its truth; and <p> is necessary just in case nothing has a power for its falsity. But are there enough powers to go around? In Yates (2015) I argued that in the case of mathematical truths such as <2+2=4>, nothing has the power to bring about their falsity or their truth, which means they come (...) out both necessary and not possible. Combining this with axiom (T), it is easy to derive a contradiction. I suggested that dispositionalists ought to retreat a little and say that <p> is possible just in case either p, or there is a power to bring it about that p, grounding the possibility of mathematical propositions in their truth rather than in powers. Vetter’s (2015) has the resources to provide a response to my argument, and in her (2018) she explicitly addresses it by arguing for a plenitude of powers, based on the idea that dispositions come in degrees, with necessary properties a limiting case of dispositionality. On this view there is a power for <2+2=4>, without there being a power to bring about its truth. In this paper I argue that Vetter’s case for plenitude does not work. However, I suggest, if we are prepared to accept metaphysical causation, a case can be made that there is indeed a power for <2+2=4>. (shrink)

According to the principle of bivalence, truth and falsity are jointly exhaustive and mutually exclusive options for a statement. It is either true or false, and not both, even in a borderline case. That highly controversial claim is central to the epistemic theory of vagueness, which holds that borderline cases are distinguished by a special kind of obstacle to knowing the truth-value of the statement. But this paper is not a defence of the epistemic theory. If bivalence holds, it (...) presumably does so as a consequence of what truth and falsity separately are. One may therefore expect bivalence to be derivable from a combination of some principles characterizing truth and other principles characterizing falsity. Indeed, such derivations are easily found. Their form will of course depend on the initial characterizations of truth and falsity, and not all such characterizations will permit bivalence to be derived. In this paper we focus on the relation between its derivability and some principles about truth and falsity. We will use borderline cases for vague expressions as primary examples of an urgent.. (shrink)

This book argues that the meaning of negation, perhaps the most important logical constant, cannot be defined within the framework of the most comprehensive theory of proof-theoretic semantics, as formulated in the influential work of Michael Dummett and Dag Prawitz. Nils Kürbis examines three approaches that have attempted to solve the problem - defining negation in terms of metaphysical incompatibility; treating negation as an undefinable primitive; and defining negation in terms of a speech act of denial - and concludes that (...) they cannot adequately do so. He argues that whereas proof-theoretic semantics usually only appeals to a notion of truth, it also needs to appeal to a notion of falsity, and proposes a system of natural deduction in which both are incorporated. Offering new perspectives on negation, denial and falsity, his book will be important for readers working on logic, metaphysics and the philosophy of language. (shrink)

In §1 I explain that my rejection of possible states of affairs as a basis for an account of falsity is not part of a general rejection of modal notions but is a rejection of possible and impossible entities of any sort. I then show that my account of senses and of propositions is indeed a modal account. In §2 I examine some of Wittgenstein’s ideas about falsity, as presented by Luiz Carlos, in relation to my account of (...) falsity and negation. In §3 I discuss the modal aspects of identification for propositions. (shrink)

Archaeological theory -- Philosophy and archaeology -- Critical realism as critique of Western philosophy -- Critical realism as philosophical underlabourer -- Diversity and impasse in current archaeological theorising -- The contradictions of archaeological theory -- The material in archaeological theory -- Critical realism, the material, and absence -- Time, scale, and the ontology of the material -- Conclusions, implications, and further research.

As it is well known, Jan Lukasiewicz invented his three-valued logic as a result of philosophical considerations concerning the problem of determinism and the status of future contingent sentences. In the article I critically analyse the thesis that the sentential calculus introduced by Lukasiewicz himself actually fulfills his philosophical assumptions. I point out that there are some counterintuitive features of Lukasiewicz three-valued logic. Firstly, there is no clear explanation for adopting specific truth-tables for logical connectives, such as conjunction, disjunction and (...) first of all implication. Secondly, it is by no means clear, why certain classical logical principles should be invalid for future contingents. And thirly, I show that within Lukasiewicz logic it is possible to construct a „paradoxical” sentence, namely a conditional which changes in time its logical value from truth to falsity. This fact obviously contradicts Lukasiewicz's philosophical reading of his three truth values, according to which true sentences are already positively determined, false sentences are negatively determined, and possible sentences are neither positively, nor negatively determined. Above-mentioned facts justify in my opinion the thesis that Lukasiewicz's three-valued logic does not satisfy his philosophical intuitions. For this purpose more appropriate seems to be sentential calculus based on the so-called supervaluation. It is three-valued, non-extentional calculus, which nevertheless preserves all tautologies of the classical logic. At the end of the article I consider the possibility of introducing to this calculus modal operators. (shrink)

Arnauld's criticisms as "a model of confusion confounded.” In a review of Wilson's book, R. McRae refers to "the difficult and not too coherent subject of material falsity. '' J. Cottingham describes the Descartes-Arnauld debate on the material falsity of adventitious ideas as "an involved and rather inconclusive exchange " and claims that the example of the material falsity of such ideas espoused by Descartes in Meditation III is "needlessly complicated. " A. Kenny, in turn, notes that (...) several things are "confusing in Descartes' account of false ideas. " Later reference is made to the fact that "Descartes appears confused. [...] and that "Descartes, it seems, cannot give a consistent answer. '' As will become clear, I take issue with each of these assessments. When Descartes' position on material falsity is understood in the light of late Scholastic sources, especially Suarez, whence it draws its strength and inspiration, the alleged confusion and incoherency vanishes. .. (shrink)

Arguments by Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta for evidence of a Self that is one and the same as the Great Lord Śiva are interpreted. The views of these authors are clarified and the contradictory relationship between the limited individual subject and the recognition of the true Self is shown. With the help of Utpaladeva's distinction between "seeing" and "noticing," a further interpretation is attempted. Some remarks are made concerning practical meditation and the theoretical presuppositions of this way of thinking in order (...) to find starting points for a comparison with Western philosophy. (shrink)

This article draws on the free‐text commentaries from trans‐Tasman studies that used the MISSCARE questionnaire to explore the reasons why nurses miss care. In this paper, we examine the idea that nurses perpetuate a self‐effacing approach to care, at the expense of patient care and professional accountability, using what they describe as the art of nursing to frame their claims of both nursing care and missed nursing care. We use historical dialogue alongside a paradigmatic analysis to examine why nurses allow (...) themselves to continue working within settings that put their professional/personal selves aside in an attempt to deliver care within constraints that make completing care an impossible task. The findings suggest an ambivalence and conflict confront nurses attempting to provide care within the New Public Management environment. This can be seen in the tensions that draw a line between care as an art, and care as a financial target, juxtaposed with the inherent clash of values arising from the way nursing care is conceptualised within two contradictory paradigms. (shrink)

Mushkil al-Qur’ān is a science of the Qur’ān in which the verses that are considered contradictory at first glance and what ways/methods are used in reconciling them. From the point of view of a commentator or even a believer, the ishkal (contradiction) cannot be attributed to the Qur’ān proper, and the supposed contradictions between verses do not appear in the Qur’ān but the mind of the subject. Therefore, in this science, it can be seen that both the recognition of (...) contradictions and the elimination of contradictions are related to the interpretive context of the tafsīr methodology. This science has emerged on a dynamic ground and has a characteristic feature that determines the interpreter’s ability to interpret. The aspect of the Mushkil al-Qur’ān that distinguishes it from other Qurʾānic Sciences relates to the practical dimension of the tafsīr rather than general determinations and statistical information about the Qur’ān. For this reason, the scope of the Mushkil al-Qur’ān may change depending on the time, culture, perspective of the commentator, knowledge, and school preferences. The fact that disciplines define the concept of mushkil in different ways, and the change in the scope of the subject in the independent works written in the early period and the Qurʾānic Sciences literature written after al-Zarkashī requires a terminological-chronological-methodological analysis of the nature and content of the Mushkil al-Qur’ān scholarship. With its pre-Zarkashī structure, Mushkil al-Qur’ān science differs from its structure that emerged in the later period, both in terms of its target audience and its content. If we look at the works of names such as Ibn Qutaybah, it becomes clear that this science is mandated to cater to the religionless. However, especially with the scope and methods in which it has been dealt with in the recent period, the Mushkil al-Qur’ān is based on the internal dynamics of the shari'a sciences. Therefore, it can be said that al-Zarkashī defined the science of Mushkil al-Qur’ān, which had a comprehensive content in the early period, with a different name and a narrowing of its content as a field fed by the internal dynamics of the tafsīr, and that this science acquired a unified form after al-Suyūṭī. This process brought about some changes in the subject matter and content of the science of the Mushkil al-Qur'ān. For the Mushkil al-Qur’ān, which in the early days had the purpose of answering the doubts and objections of the deniers of the Qur’ān, developed after al-Zarkashī into a field mainly concerned with removing the difficulties of understanding. Within this framework, the methods and classifications presented in this science with the structure defined by al-Zarkashī are the products of the effort to make sense of the Word of God. The systematization of this effort to make sense under the umbrella of shāri‘ sciences in a terminological and theoretical framework opens the science of Mushkil al-Qur'ān to the fields of kalam and fiqh/method. In the works written on Mushkil al-Qur’ān and in the literature on fiqh, the reasons for the contradictions between the verses and the ways to eliminate them are given. What these ways depend on the context in which the contradiction is dealt with. Those who treat the contradiction in a way that includes the ambiguities in the words while eliminating these ambiguities resort to other pieces of evidence such as narratives, style of expression/context, truth metaphor, reason, analogy, and custom. In case of an apparent contradiction, methods like cem‘ (gathering), preference, naskh, renunciation are used. Despite the differences in the school’s preferences as to which of these methods was used first in the classical period, there is almost a consensus as to the ways followed in eliminating contradictions between verses. In the modern period, some scholars claim that one of these methods, abrogation, is directly related to the Mushkil al-Qur’ān, and they explain that naskh is applied when the contradictions between the verses cannot be interpreted. This assertion, made in modern times, that naskh is a method that scholars resort to when they cannot remove the impression of contradictions between verses, is closely related to the definition, essence, and content of the Mushkil al-Qur’ān. In this context, it is crucial where the ways/methods used to follow the nature-content pendulum while eliminating the counterparts of the terms and the impressions of contradiction. This is because the acceptance of naskh as a contradiction solution stems from the fact that it is one of the ways to prove that there is no contradiction in the Qur’ān from the perspective of fiqh, and naskh means that two contradictory provisions were valid at different times. The contradiction arises when it is claimed that these two provisions are valid at the same time. (shrink)

Anti-realistic conceptions of truth and falsity are usually epistemic or inferentialist. Truth is regarded as knowability, or provability, or warranted assertability, and the falsity of a statement or formula is identified with the truth of its negation. In this paper, a non-inferentialist but nevertheless anti-realistic conception of logical truth and falsity is developed. According to this conception, a formula (or a declarative sentence) A is logically true if and only if no matter what is told about what (...) is told about the truth or falsity of atomic sentences, A always receives the top-element of a certain partial order on non-ontic semantic values as its value. The ordering in question is a told-true order. Analogously, a formula A is logically false just in case no matter what is told about what is told about the truth or falsity of atomic sentences, A always receives the top-element of a certain told-false order as its value. Here, truth and falsity are pari passu , and it is the treatment of truth and falsity as independent of each other that leads to an informational interpretation of these notions in terms of a certain kind of higher-level information. (shrink)

It is widely held that there are important differences between indicative conditionals (e.g. “If the authors are linguists, they have written a linguistics paper”) and subjunctive conditionals (e.g. “If the authors had been linguists, they would have written a linguistics paper”). A central difference is that indicatives and subjunctives convey different stances towards the truth of their antecedents. Indicatives (often) convey neutrality: for example, about whether the authors in question are linguists. Subjunctives (often) convey the falsity of the antecedent: (...) for example, that the authors in question are not linguists. This paper tests prominent accounts of how these different stances are conveyed: whether by presupposition or conversational implicature. Experiment 1 tests the presupposition account by investigating whether the stances project – remain constant – when embedded under operators like negations, possibility modals, and interrogatives, a key characteristic of presuppositions. Experiment 2 tests the conversational-implicature account by investigating whether the stances can be cancelled without producing a contradiction, a key characteristic of implicatures. The results provide evidence that both stances – neutrality about the antecedent in indicatives and the falsity of the antecedent in subjunctives – are conveyed by conversational implicatures. (shrink)

The second messenger function of inositol 1,4,5‐ trisphosphate (InsP3) is now well‐defined – it mobilizes Ca2+ from intracellular stores so that cytosolic Ca2+ increases. However, the function of inositol 1,3,4,5‐ tetrakisphosphate (InsP4) has proved much more difficult to fathom, as it has been reported to exert a wide variety of effects in a collection of experimental systems. In this review, a proposed molecular mechanism for InsP4 actions is discussed; it is suggested that InsP4 is the second messenger that controls Ca2+ (...) entry into cells, and that it does so by binding to a receptor which itself interacts, directly or Indirectly, with the receptor for InsP3 It is proposed that this is InsP4's true physiological function, but the mechanism by which it exerts this function has led to confusing data concerning its action, and also to some misconceptions about how inositol phosphates control Ca2+ entry. (shrink)

Kant’s most prominent formulation of the Categorical Imperative, known as the Formula of Universal Law (FUL), is generally thought to demand that one act only on maxims that one can will as universal laws without this generating a contradiction. Kant's view is standardly summarized as requiring the 'universalizability' of one's maxims and described in terms of the distinction between 'contradictions in conception' and 'contradictions in the will'. Focusing on the underappreciated significance of the simultaneity condition included in the FUL, (...) I argue, by contrast, that the principle is better read as requiring that one be able to will two things simultaneously without self-contradiction, namely, that a maxim be one's own and that it be a universal law. This amounts to a new interpretation of the FUL with significant interpretive and philosophical advantages. (shrink)

De Interpretatione is among Aristotle's most influential and widely read writings; C. W. A. Whitaker presents the first systematic study of this work, and offers a radical new view of its aims, its structure, and its place in Aristotle's system. He shows that De Interpretatione is not a disjointed essay on ill-connected subjects, as traditionally thought, but a highly organized and systematic treatise on logic, argument, and dialectic.

Coastal protection is crucial to human development since the ocean has many values associated with the economy, ecosystem, and culture. However, most ocean protecting efforts are currently ineffective due to the burdens of finance, lack of appropriate management, and international cooperation regimes. For aiding bottom-up initiatives for ocean protection support, this study employed the Mindsponge Theory to examine how the public’s perceived economic and cultural values influence their willingness to support actions to protect the ocean. Analyzing the European-Union-Horizon-2020-funded dataset of (...) 709 respondents from 42 countries, we discovered that perceived economic values have negative effects on the tendency of ocean protection supports (i.e., food, transportation, renewable energy, oil and gas, and recreation). In contrast, certain perceived cultural values can help increase the willingness to do so (i.e., mental well-being and sense of identity). However, the effects of perceived cultural values are only moderately reliable. These findings suggest that designing cultural information delivery campaigns can help promote coastal reserve supports, such as fundraisings and preserving the oceans from the community. (shrink)

Does lying require objective falsity? Given that consistency with ordinary language is a desideratum of a philosophical definition of lying, empirical evidence plays an important role. A literature review reveals that studies employing a simple question-and-response format, such as “Did the speaker lie? [Yes/No]”, favour the subjective view of lying, according to which objective falsity is not required. However, it has recently been claimed that the rate of lie attributions found in those studies is artificially inflated due to (...) perspective taking; and that if measures are applied to avoid this problem, the results actually support the objective view of lying. This paper presents three experiments that challenge this claim by showing that the findings used to support the objective view have been misinterpreted. It is thus concluded that the folk concept of lying does not require objective falsity, which is consistent with the dominant view in the philosophical literature. (shrink)