At the phenomenal level, consciousness can be described as a singular, unified field of recursive self-awareness, consistently coherent in a particualr way; that of a subject located both spatially and temporally in an egocentrically-extended domain, such that conscious self-awareness is explicitly characterized by I-ness, now-ness and here-ness. The psychological mechanism underwriting this spatiotemporal self-locatedness and its recursive processing style involves an evolutionary elaboration of the basic orientative reference frame which consistently structures ongoing spatiotemporal self-location computations as i-here-now. Cognition computes action-output (...) in the midst of ongoing movement, and consequently requires a constant self-locating spatiotemporal reference frame as basis for these computations. Over time, constant evolutionary pressures for energy efficiency have encouraged both the proliferation of anticipative feedforward processing mechansims, and the elaboration, at the apex of the sensorimotor processing hierarchy, of self-activating, highly attenuated recursively-feedforward circuitry processing the basic orientational schema independent of external action output. As the primary reference frame of active waking cognition, this recursive i-here-now processing generates a zone of subjective self-awareness in terms of which it feels like something to be oneself here and now. This is consciousness. (shrink)

The mystery surrounding consciousness as subjectivity dissipates dramatically when understood in its biological context. The core characteristics of consciousness can be seen to derive from its functionality, and the fundamental function of cognition, given the equivalence of mental activity and brain process, is to advance the survival and thus the self-regulative capacity of the organism of which the brain is a part. These core elements of consciousness are comprised of a self-locational data structure which serves to configure ongoing experience in (...) terms of controllable spatial and temporal parameters, and a processing regime for this orientational schema which has evolved from the feedback architecture necessary for regulating behavior in relation to homeostatic needs. These two self-regulative constituents yield a primitive form of consciousness as subjectivity — simple reflexive awareness — which provides the basis for the subsequent development of metacognitive mechanisms which monitor and control the cognitive processes which regulate behavior in relation to metabolic requirements. (shrink)

The sense of supernatural agency constitutes a defining characteristic of the religious sphere of life. But what accounts for the continued cross-cultural recurrence of this psychological phenomenon over the course of human history? This paper reviews evidence indicating that the source of panhuman or universal cognitive patterns of thought and behaviour such as this lies in the common characteristics of the evolved human mind. Further, that the sense of the supernatural is constituted by a unique combination of commonly recurring cognitive (...) processes that together give rise to a panhuman conviction in the reality of supernatural agencies able and willing to assist each individual in situations deemed beyond the capacities of that individual. These cognitive processes are driven most acutely by existential anxiety in response to extrinsic physical, economic and social pressures indicating that religiosity is best understood as a social-psychological phenomenon. (shrink)

Cognition is not, and could not possibly be, entirely representational in character. There is also a phenomenal form of cognitive expression that registers the intrinsic properties of mental states themselves. Arguments against the reality of this intrinsic phenomenal dimension to mental experience have focused either on its supposed impossibility, or secondly, the non-appearance of any such qualities to introspection. This paper argues to the contrary, that the registration of cognitive state properties does take place independently of representational content; and necessarily (...) so, since it supports an independent function—self-management. Given the fact that unlike a computer, the brain must, of necessity, operate itself, it needs to be in touch with itself to do so. Intrinsic phenomenal forms of cognitive expression allow the brain to do just that by registering characteristics of the cognitive states themselves. Self-management might well prove to constitute the prime reason for the emergence of subjectivity itself. (shrink)

Sympathetic magic features strongly in virtually all religious traditions and in folk customs generally. Scholars agree that It is based on the association of ideas perceived as external, mind-independent causal realities, as connections mediating causal influence. Moreover, religious folk believe that this mediation involves forms of supernatural agency. From a psychological perspective, the key question revolves around the principles by which the cognitive system deems some of its content to reference the external world and other content to constitute internal mental (...) forms of activity like thoughts, feelings and attitudes. The paper proposes that the critical factor has to do with the balance between two distinctly different kinds of cognitive content: representations of things (mentation arising in the form of something other than itself), as distinct from registrations referencing the intrinsic phenomenal properties of the mental state itself. The balance between these two determines whether content is perceived as external worldly event or a form of internal mental content. (shrink)

Soul beliefs are universal among religious folk but vary tremendously from culture to culture, In fact, in tribal societies without formal religious dogmas, soul beliefs can vary from individual to individual. A review of notions regarding the soul (or souls) amongst tribal and post-tribal societies does evidence, nonetheless, a recurring pattern of focus on the soul envisaged as the vital life energy of the body and/or as encapsulating one of more mental faculties. Not surprisingly, theories as to the psychological basis (...) for soul belief vary as well, but a strong case can be advanced that at its core, soul belief is about the essence of the self, which involves the psychological process of ipseity. (shrink)

Of the many cognitive processes and data structures pro-posed to account for conscious awareness, only reflexivity or self-knowing occurs exclusively in the conscious state. However, the viability of reflexivity as the proper index or principal defining characteristic of consciousness has been been questioned on the basis that it is either implausible or merely subjective. The implausibility objection proves to be based on a mischaracterization of conscious reflexivity as either a form of introspection, reflective elaboration, or intentional representation. Closer examination shows (...) reflexivity to be none of the above, but rather a modal property of the cognitive state, and not a property of what is represented in the state. As for the objection that reflexivity is merely subjective, there are substantial objective warrants for each of its five properties which together support the contention that reflexivity has a basis in empirical fact and can be accounted the principal index of consciousness. (shrink)

The equation of consciousness with qualia, of wakeful awareness with awareness-of-cognitive content (perceptions, conceptions, emotions), while intuitivelyattractive, and formally referenced as the primary index of consciousness by many philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists, nevertheless has significant difficulties specifying precisely what it is that distinguishes conscious from non-conscious cognition. Moreover, there is a surprisingly robust congruence of evidence to the contrary, supporting the notion that consciousness, as a state of reflexive awareness, is distinct from the content one is aware of, that this (...) awareness/content amalgam is actually the product of an incorporation process of various intermittent, and constantly varying streams of content onto a pre-existing reflexively conscious state which is not reliant on these streams for its constitution as a reflexive state. Consciousness, the evidence strongly indicates, is not qualia, not the awareness of this or that perceptual, conceptual or emotional content, but reflexive, autonoetic awareness as such. (shrink)

Der Wiener Kreis gehört nicht zu den Strömungen des 20. Jahrhunderts, die heute für ihre Kulturphilosophie oder politische Philosophie bekannt sind. Tatsächlich war er aber in kulturellen und politischen Fragen seiner Zeit engagiert. Er wurde von vielen seiner Mitglieder als kulturelle Bewegung gedacht und wirkte in diesem Sinne auch auf andere. Beispielsweise hielten Mitglieder des Kreises Vorträge im Bauhaus und hatten Künstler die Zeitschrift Erkenntnis abonniert. - Der Sammelband soll das im Wiener Kreis bestehende Selbstverständnis hinsichtlich der Kultur und Politik (...) der eigenen Zeit näher in den Blick nehmen und klären, inwieweit die damit einhergehenden Fragen als etwas Sinnloses, als Nebenschauplatz, als Grundlage oder sogar Ziel des eigenen Wirkens gesehen wurden. In diesem Kontext stellen sich letztlich auch die Fragen, ob sich die Kulturphilosophie und politische Philosophie seiner Mitglieder rekonstruieren lässt und in welcher Beziehung deren Positionen diesbezüglich zueinander stehen. (shrink)

Within the philosophy of mind, consciousness is currently understood as the expression of one or other cognitive modality, either intentionality , transparency , subjectivity or reflexivity . However, neither intentionality, subjectivity nor transparency adequately distinguishes conscious from nonconscious cognition. Consequently, the only genuine index or defining characteristic of consciousness is reflexivity, the capacity for autonoetic or self-referring, self-monitoring awareness. But the identification of reflexivity as the principal index of consciousness raises a major challenge in relation to the cognitive mechanism responsible (...) for operationalizing such a reflexive state. Current reliance by higher-order and intrinsic self-representational theories on self-representing data structures to achieve reflexive self-awareness is highly problematic, suggesting a solution in terms of a self-referential processing regime. (shrink)

Analysis of the psychological processes involved in generating the sense of supernatural agency, as well as social scientific research into the factors most directly associated with the prevalence of religious belief and practice, both support a common finding: the direct correlation between levels of existential anxiety and the prevalence and intensity of religiosity. All functional elements of religion involve efforts to invoke, activate, and deploy supernatural causal agency of one sort or another. But religiosity varies throughout the world. This paper (...) reviews psychological evidence that existential anxiety is the core factor activating the intra-psychic mechanisms that give rise to and constitute the nature of religiosity, and that variations in physical and socio-cultural pressures impinging on the individual give rise to variations in anxiety. This combination of intrinsic psychological mechanisms driven though existential anxiety by extrinsic physical, economic, and social pressures indicates that religiosity is best understood as a social–psychological process: socio-cultural factors activating anxiety which in turn drives the intra-psychic mechanisms generating the sense of supernatural agency expressed in belief and practice. By the same token, for analytical purposes, religions are most effectively viewed as social–psychological organisms: social organisms driven by intra-psychic mechanisms that constitute religious convictions and practices in the way that we find them—dedicated to and engaged with supernatural agency in its various forms. (shrink)

In diesem Band sind die nachgelassenen Schriften Moritz Schlicks zur Ethik gesammelt, ediert und kommentiert. Die Beschäftigung mit ethischen Fragen war für Schlick während seines gesamten Lebens von hoher Relevanz, daher sind in diesem Band Schriften aus vier Jahrzehnten versammelt, die die Entwicklung seines ethischen Denkens veranschaulichen. Sie beginnen mit Vorarbeiten zu der „Lebensweisheit“, einem seiner ethischen Hauptwerke, welches bereits in MSGA I/3 erschienen ist. Im Laufe seiner akademischen Laufbahn in Rostock, Kiel und Wien hielt Schlick immer wieder Vorlesungen und (...) Vorträge zu ethischen Themen. Herausstechend sind hier sicherlich „Über Ästhetik und Ethik“, eine von sehr wenigen Schriften Schlicks zur Ästhetik, weiterhin die Dokumente zur Vorlesung „Ethik und Kulturphilosophie“ vom Wintersemester 1935/6 in Wien. Letztere legen nahe, dass Schlick eine Reihe von Publikationen plante, in denen er eine systematische Darstellung seiner Philosophie entwickeln wollte. In dieser sind Ethik und Kulturphilosophie Teile eines zusammenhängenden Ganzen, neben der Geschichte der Philosophie, Logik, Naturphilosophie und Erkenntnistheorie. (shrink)