La ciencia abierta constituye una transformación radical en la manera de llevar a cabo la investigación científica. Se trata de un nuevo modelo de hacer ciencia que se basa en el trabajo colaborativo entre personas de la academia y también en la apertura y la transparencia de todas las fases de la investigación. La ciencia abierta tiene sus antecedentes en el uso de las Tecnologías de la Información y la Comunicación por quienes investigan y en la consolidación del acceso abierto (...) a las publicaciones. Por otro lado, en su desarrollo también ha contado con tres elementos facilitadores: su conexión con los valores clásicos de la ciencia, la acción de responsables políticos con capacidad resolutiva en sus organizaciones, y el apoyo institucional, en especial de la Comisión Europea y de diversas agencias de financiación de la investigación. En el artículo se analizan diversas definiciones de ciencia abierta para destacar sus características fundamentales: apertura, transparencia y reutilización de contenidos. Se considera la ciencia abierta como un término «paraguas» que agrupa diversas piezas o elementos como el acceso abierto, los datos abiertos, la revisión abierta, el uso de preprints, la ciencia ciudadana y los nuevos modelos de evaluación. A pesar de que existe discrepancia sobre cuáles son esas piezas elementales, el artículo se centra en los seis elementos mencionados, repasa la situación actual de cada uno de ellos, y pone especial énfasis en su grado de desarrollo y en lo que aportan a la ciencia abierta. Se constata una notable diversidad en el desarrollo de cada una de las piezas y también la ausencia de una acción coordinada, lo que podría suponer una ralentización de las prácticas de ciencia abierta. A pesar de los destacados avances en acceso abierto, de la notable compartición de datos de investigación y de un respetable uso de preprints, se ha avanzado muy poco en el establecimiento de nuevas métricas y de nuevos modelos de evaluación, aun cuando estos son un elemento clave para incentivar la expansión de la ciencia abierta en todas las disciplinas. (shrink)

En una carta publicada hace seis meses, pocas semanas después de que la Agencia Española de Evaluación se adhiriera a la declaración dora, hacíamos un llamamiento a las autoridades científicas españolas para que abandonaran las políticas de evaluación de la investigación basadas en un uso excesivo e indiscriminado de los indicadores bibliométricos —especialmente el Journal Impact Factor —, para valorar el desempeño individual de los académicos. En concreto se les animaba a «que suscriban y cumplan con la dora y sigan (...) las recomendaciones en el uso de indicadores bibliométricos señalados en el Manifiesto Leiden». Una mesa redonda organizada en el mes de julio con participación de distintos agentes del sistema español de i+d+i coincidía en la necesidad de afrontar ese cambio de forma urgente. (shrink)

In this book, Ernest Sosa explains the nature of knowledge through an approach originated by him years ago, known as virtue epistemology. Here he provides the first comprehensive account of his views on epistemic normativity as a form of performance normativity on two levels. On a first level is found the normativity of the apt performance, whose success manifests the performer's competence. On a higher level is found the normativity of the meta-apt performance, which manifests not necessarily first-order skill (...) or competence but rather the reflective good judgment required for proper risk assessment. Sosa develops this bi-level account in multiple ways, by applying it to issues much disputed in recent epistemology: epistemic agency, how knowledge is normatively related to action, the knowledge norm of assertion, and the Meno problem as to how knowledge exceeds merely true belief. A full chapter is devoted to how experience should be understood if it is to figure in the epistemic competence that must be manifest in the truth of any belief apt enough to constitute knowledge. Another takes up the epistemology of testimony from the performance-theoretic perspective. Two other chapters are dedicated to comparisons with ostensibly rival views, such as classical internalist foundationalism, a knowledge-first view, and attributor contextualism. The book concludes with a defense of the epistemic circularity inherent in meta-aptness and thereby in the full aptness of knowing full well. (shrink)

Ernest Sosa presents a new approach to the problems of knowledge and scepticism. He argues for two levels of knowledge, the animal and the reflective, each viewed as a distinctive human accomplishment. Sosa's virtue epistemology illuminates different varieties of scepticism, the nature and status of intuitions, and epistemic normativity.

THE INDICATIVE CONDITIONAL. A PROBABILISTIC CRITERION OF SOUNDNESS FOR DEDUCTIVE INFERENCES Our objective in this section is to establish a prima facie case ...

The standard use of the propositional calculus ('P.C.?) in analyzing the validity of inferences involving conditionals leads to fallacies, and the problem is to determine where P.C. may be ?safely? used. An alternative analysis of criteria of reasonableness of inferences in terms of conditions of justification rather than truth of statements is proposed. It is argued, under certain restrictions, that P. C. may be safely used, except in inferences whose conclusions are conditionals whose antecedents are incompatible with the premises in (...) the sense that if the antecedent became known, some of the previously asserted premises would have to be withdrawn. (shrink)

This book is meant to be a primer, that is, an introduction, to probability logic, a subject that appears to be in its infancy. Probability logic is a subject envisioned by Hans Reichenbach and largely created by Adams. It treats conditionals as bearers of conditional probabilities and discusses an appropriate sense of validity for arguments such conditionals, as well as ordinary statements as premisses. This is a clear well-written text on the subject of probability logic, suitable for advanced undergraduates or (...) graduates, but also of interest to professional philosophers. There are well-thought-out exercises, and a number of advanced topics treated in appendices, while some are brought up in exercises and some are alluded to only in footnotes. By this means, it is hoped that the reader will at least be made aware of most of the important ramifications of the subject and its tie-ins with current research, and will have some indications concerning recent and relevant literature. (shrink)

The purpose of this note is to dispute Michael Ayers' claim that "there is no special problem of subjunctive conditionals".

This paper is a response to the four critics of A Virtue Epistemology. It responds to Claudia Lorena García, Miguel Ángel Fernández, Jonathan Kvanvig, and Ram Neta, in that order. Este artículo es una respuesta a los cuatro críticos de A Virtue Epistemology. Ofrece respuestas a Claudia Lorena García, Miguel Ángel Fernández, Jonathan Kvanvig, y Ram Neta, en ese orden.

In “Tracking, Competence, and Knowledge,” Ernest Sosa notes that in attempting to account for the conditions for knowledge, externalists have proposed that the justification condition be replaced or supplemented by the requirement that a certain modal relation be obtained between a fact and a subject's belief concerning that fact. While assessing attempts to identify such a relation, he focuses on an account labeled “Cartesian‐tracking”, which accounts for the relation in the form of two conditionals. If a person S believes (...) a proposition P → P P → S believes P. Sosa suggests that be abandoned as a requirement, and that, equipped with his modifications, can offer promising results in connection with skepticism. He argues that modified coupled with the requirement that S's belief be “virtuous” can illuminate the nature of propositional knowledge. (shrink)

This paper compares the relative merits of perceptual beliefs and introspective beliefs in the context of dream arguments for skepticism. It is argued that introspective beliefs are not epistemically privileged over perceptual beliefs.

This book collects cutting edge essays on epistemic agency and related topics by distinguished senior contributors to epistemology, as well as rising figures in the field. The assembly of scholars is impressive, as is reflected by the quality and range of their contributions.

Formas diferentes de externalismo epistemológico são discutidas. O conceito de rastreamento é analisado, e o papel do conceito de virtude epistêmica é investigado.In this paper different forms of epistemological externalism are discussed. The concept of tracking is analyzed, and the role of the concept of epistemic virtue is investi-gated.

Different inferences in probabilistic logics of conditionals 'preserve' the probabilities of their premisses to different degrees. Some preserve certainty, some high probability, some positive probability, and some minimum probability. In the first case conclusions must have probability I when premisses have probability 1, though they might have probability 0 when their premisses have any lower probability. In the second case, roughly speaking, if premisses are highly probable though not certain then conclusions must also be highly probable. In the third case (...) conclusions must have positive probability when premisses do, and in the last case conclusions must be at least as probable as their least probable premisses. Precise definitions and well known examples are given for each of these properties, characteristic principles are shown to be valid and complete for deriving conclusions of each of these kinds, and simple trivalent truthtable 'tests' are described for determining which properties are possessed by any given inference. Brief comments are made on the application of these results to certain modal inferences such as "Jones may own a car, and if he does he will have a driver's license. Therefore, he may have a driver's license.". (shrink)

This book is less about disjunction than about the English word ‘or’, and it is less for than against formal logicians—more exactly, against those who maintain that formal logic can be applied in certain ways to the evaluation of reasoning formulated in ordinary English. Nevertheless, there are many things to interest such of those persons who are willing to overlook the frequent animadversions directed against their kind in the book, and this review will concentrate on them.

Modifications of current theories of ordinal, interval and extensive measurement are presented, which aim to accomodate the empirical fact that perfectly exact measurement is not possible (which is inconsistent with current theories). The modification consists in dropping the assumption that equality (in measure) is observable, but continuing to assume that inequality (greater or lesser) can be observed. The modifications are formulated mathematically, and the central problems of formal measurement theory--the existence and uniqueness of numerical measures consistent with data--are re-examined. Some (...) results also are given on a problem which does not arise in current theories: namely that of determining limits of accuracy attainable on the basis of observations. (shrink)