Proclus (c.412-485) once offered an argument that Christians took to stand against the Christian doctrine of creation ex nihilo based on the eternity of the world and God’s perfection. John Philoponus (c.490-570) objected to this on various grounds. Part of this discussion can shed light on contemporary issues in philosophical theology on divine perfection and creation. First I will examine Proclus’ dilemma and John Philoponus’ response. I will argue that Philoponus’ fails to rebut Proclus’ dilemma. The problem (...) is that presentism is incompatible with divine simplicity, timelessness, and a strong doctrine of immutability. From there I will look at how this discussion bears on contemporary understandings of divine perfection and creation, and argue that there are at least two possible ways contemporary philosophical theologians can try to get around the dilemma. One option is to adopt four-dimensional eternalism and maintain the traditional account of the divine perfections. I argue that this option suffers from difficulties that are not compatible with Christian belief. The other option is to keep presentism and modify the divine perfections. I argue that this option is possible and preferable since our understanding of the divine perfections must be modified in light of divine revelation and the incarnation. (shrink)

In recent years a number of arguments have been advanced to show that there are conceptual difficulties with a variety of divine attributes. Some have claimed that there is an inherent inconsistency in the notion of omnipotence, others that omnipotence was logically incompatible with omniscience or omnibenevolence, and yet others that omniscience is irreconcilable with immutuability.

Advocates of the traditional argument from evil assume that an omnipotent and morally perfect being, God, would create a world of the greatest value possible. They dispute that this world is such a world. It is difficult to disagree. They go on to conclude that this world could not have been created by God. It is, however, possible consistently both to agree that God could have guaranteed the existence of a better world than this world and to reject the conclusion (...) that this world could not have been created by God. Specifically, one may argue that this world is not a world of the greatest value God could guarantee, not because there is some other world which is, but because there is no such world. After all, it is plausible that for any possible world, no matter how good, there is another possible world which is even better, that the range of values for possible worlds has no upper limit. If this is correct, then for any world God creates there is a better world God could have created. So the argument from evil collapses, since it is logically impossible even for an omnipotent god to create a particular world which is the best or equal best possible world. God cannot act in accordance with the prescription ‘Create the best world possible!’, since there is no such thing. Nor can God act in accordance with the prescription ‘Create the best world you can!’, since from the perspective of an omnipotent being there is no such thing. This no best world defence has been advanced by Peter Forrest, John McHarry and George Schlesinger. (shrink)

A theistic study which rejects negative and purely analogical theology. An historical review of the traditional categories applied to the divine nature shows that God's perfection includes an infinity of possibles whose actualization is a matter of free but controlled selection. The argument does not always appear precise or inevitable, but it is suggestive.--A. R.

A theistic study which rejects negative and purely analogical theology. An historical review of the traditional categories applied to the divine nature shows that God's perfection includes an infinity of possibles whose actualization is a matter of free but controlled selection. The argument does not always appear precise or inevitable, but it is suggestive.--A. R.

Some have argued that unipersonal concepts of God collapse into incoherence, so that such a being is no more possible than a square circle, or at least that such theologies are, as non-trinitarian, significantly less probable than some trinitarian theologies. I discuss the general strategy and examine recent arguments by William Lane Craig, C. Stephen Layman, Thomas V. Morris, and Richard Swinburne based on divine love, flourishing, and glory. I show why none of these arguments is compelling, as each (...) has at least one weak premise. (shrink)

The free-will defence holds that the value of significant free will is so great that God is justified in creating significantly free creatures even if there is a risk or certainty that these creatures will sin. A difficulty for the FWD, developed carefully by Quentin Smith, is that God is unable to do evil, and yet surely lacks no genuinely valuable kind of freedom. Smith argues that the kind of freedom that God has can be had by creatures, without a (...) risk of creatures doing evil. I shall show that Smith's argument fails – the case of God is disanalogous to the case of creatures precisely because creatures are creatures. (shrink)

The free-will defence (FWD) holds that the value of significant free will is so great that God is justified in creating significantly free creatures even if there is a risk or certainty that these creatures will sin. A difficulty for the FWD, developed carefully by Quentin Smith, is that God is unable to do evil, and yet surely lacks no genuinely valuable kind of freedom. Smith argues that the kind of freedom that God has can be had by creatures, without (...) a risk of creatures doing evil. I shall show that Smith's argument fails – the case of God is disanalogous to the case of creatures precisely because creatures are creatures. (shrink)

A concise set of speculations regarding principal divine attributes. Part I outlines these themes as treated by fourteen historical philosophers. Part II is a systematic reconsideration and reordering of such notions as infinity, form, and self-sufficiency, which Sontag considers central. Freedom of will, hence some degree of contingency, he concludes, must be allowed in a modern concept of God, thereby altering notions of God's unity, power, motion, etc. --W. L. M.

A concise set of speculations regarding principal divine attributes. Part I outlines these themes as treated by fourteen historical philosophers. Part II is a systematic reconsideration and reordering of such notions as infinity, form, and self-sufficiency, which Sontag considers central. Freedom of will, hence some degree of contingency, he concludes, must be allowed in a modern concept of God, thereby altering notions of God's unity, power, motion, etc. --W. L. M.

Many theists conceive of God as a perfect being, i.e., as that than which none greater is metaphysically possible. On this grand view of God, it seems plausible to think that such a supreme and maximally great being would not be subject to luck of any sort. Given the divine perfections, God is completely insulated from luck. However, I argue that the opposite is true: precisely because God is perfect, he is subject to a kind of luck called constitutive (...) luck. In this paper, first I provide an analysis of luck and then explain the concept of constitutive luck. I proceed to defend constitutive luck from charges of incoherence and examine a different approach to make sense of this luck. Furthermore, I distinguish between two kinds of constitutive luck and argue that even if God isn’t subject to one kind, evading the second kind is unsuccessful. I offer two ways that God is constitutively lucky and reach a surprising conclusion: a perfect being is the luckiest of all possible beings. (shrink)

Excerpt from The Names of God and Meditative Summaries of the Divine Perfections Hence following the example of St. Denis the Areopagite whose works have for fifty years ex ercised on me a most marvellous charm, I have resolved to explain very briefly the divine perfec tions or attributes ascribed to God by the Holy Books. In this short exposition I omitted de signedly the testimony of the Scriptures and the Fathers and also all theological proofs in order (...) that the reader may more readily form a clear idea of these divine attributes, excite in his heart affections worthy of such sublime considerations and by this exercise, as St. Denis says, make his soul deiform, or like unto God. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

Some commentators have worried that Descartes‘s ontological proof is a kind ofafterthought, redundancy, or even embarrassment. Descartes has everythingneeded to establish God as the ground of certainty by Meditation Three, so whybother with yet another proof in Meditation Five? Some have even gone so far asto doubt his sincerity.1Past literature on this topic is of daunting variety andmagnitude, dating back to the seventeenth century.2The current discussion hasfocused on Descartes‘s premises in relation to the coherence of his concept ofGod.3I wish to (...) take up this issue from a somewhat different tack, showing that Descartes‘s ontological proof actually involves a subtle change in the direction ofhis argument from a reflective to a recollective theory of innateness. In the FifthMeditation, Descartes does not simply expand on his previous discussion of God,which arose out of reflection on his self; rather, the ontological proof depends ona kind of recollection of God‘s being that could only be based on the causalpositivity, or ―power,‖ of His existence. God is the structural cause of our idea ofhim and thereby restricts the way in which we may think of Him, in the sameway as the essence of a triangle structurally determines the ways we must thinkof it.4We are not free to construct such ideas in any way we want, so there mustbe a cause, or a reason, that restricts such construction.The specific argument of Meditation Five, however, must be understoodin its larger context, for part of the structurally determined idea of God containsnecessary existence, which Descartes interprets in terms of causal power. In theprocess of explaining this causal power, first to Caterus and, later to Arnauld,Descartes develops a way of interpreting God‘s causal relationship to himself, interms of a scholastic distinction between God as causa sui and ens a se, whichpreserves the universality of the causal principle and allows us to understand whyGod can be considered as the formal cause of His own being—the self-groundingground of all existence—an idea of subsequent importance to Malebranche andSpinoza, among others. Understanding this position on God and cause allows usto see a complementarity between Mediations III and V that has previously beenoverlooked.5While the principle of eminent causality found in Meditation Threeis central to the structural causation argument of Meditation Five, it is God‘spower, the positivity of His causal relationship to himself, that allows theargument from his effects to his existence in the first place.The dualistic structure to Descartes‘s arguments for God‘s existence inMeditations Three and Five mirrors Anselm‘s approach in the Monologion andthe Proslogion. Appreciating this stylistic debt is crucial for understandingDescartes‘s attempts to improve on Anselm‘s arguments, as well as his attempt totruly ground all knowledge in the certainty of God‘s existence. Yet whileAnselm‘s dual argument is ultimately based on a negative intuition of God‘sbeing, described in the Monologion as that without which the world cannot be,Descartes‘s dual argument in Meditations Three and Five is based on a positiveintuition or recollection of God‘s being as a necessary structural restriction on our concepts of the world. The ontological proof is primarily based on thisrecollective theory of innateness. It is God as causa sui, recollected as thenecessary ground of all things, that is the sole efficient cause of the existence ofevery finite, limited thing—especially human beings and their clear and distinctideas. (shrink)

Résumé Qu’est-ce qui fait, selon Leibniz, que notre monde peut être dit le meilleur possible? Plusieurs interprétations, qu’il n’est pas toujours possible de concilier, ont été proposées. Il serait le meilleur, parce qu’en lui les créatures raisonnables obtiendraient le plus de félicité, parce qu’il réaliserait la plus grande quantité d’être et de réalité au total, ou encore parce qu’il serait celui qui associe les lois les plus simples avec les phénomènes les plus riches et les plus variés. L’objet de cet (...) article est de montrer que le meilleur est à comprendre au sens de la méthode de Formis optimis, c’est-à-dire comme ce qui renvoie, dans un genre donné, à la forme la plus déterminée. Celle-ci est à la fois unique et la plus rationnelle. Ainsi, la perfection du monde ne vient pas de ce qu’il concentrerait la plus grande quantité d’essence et de bien (perfection quantitative), mais de ce qu’il constitue l’ordre le plus intelligible, où chaque chose, sans être forcément la plus parfaite en elle-même, contribue pourtant à l’harmonie universelle, cette unité d’une multiplicité qui remplit au mieux les fins divines (perfection qualitative ). (shrink)

I sympathetically explore the thesis that God literally forgets sins. I articulate some altruistic God might have for forgetting certain sins. If so, then God may have altruistic reasons to relinquish a great-making trait (omniscience). But according to traditional Anselmian perfect being theology, God is necessarily perfect and so incapable of acting on these altruistic reasons. More broadly, a God who necessarily has all the perfections is a God who is incapable of making a certain kind of sacrifice: God can (...) never make tradeoffs that diminish God’s overall greatness, even when those diminishments are relatively small (like forgetting a particular proposition) and the (altruistic) rewards of making the tradeoff substantial. I argue that God’s inability to make such tradeoffs is not a trivial cost for traditional perfect-being theologians who also believe that God is in loving relationships with creatures. Along the way, I explore the prospects for a less traditional form of perfect being theology, perfect being kenoticism, and different models for divine forgetting. (shrink)

Should we interpret God’s eternity as mere everlastingness or as timelessness? We are still confronted with an ongoing debate between the two positions. That God is timeless or completely outside time might be called ”the classical view of divine eternity’. But this view can be interpreted in various ways. In reverting to some of Aquinas’ texts I want to focus on the account of God’s timelessness as a perfection. In trying to defend this view I will not offer (...) any new arguments; I simply adopt the classical assessment of the meaning of the predicates we use when we speak about God. That God lives, loves, thinks, acts, etc., are claims which cannot be understood in the same way as when they are made of human persons. (shrink)

Resources the virtue of humility as an essential divine attribute through the works of Augustine, Barth, and Katherine Sonderegger.

Order is a value highly treasured and deeply embedded in the Westernworldview. Since the archaic Greeks gazed up at the night sky andnoted the reliable, stable movements of the heavens, order hasremained a cherished commodity in the lives of gods and humans. This paper traces the history of that beloved value and then places in question the worth of its rigorous, changeless solidity in the lives of living beings.

I use Plotinus to present absolute divine simplicity as the consequence of principles about metaphysical and explanatory priority to which most theists are already committed. I employ Phil Corkum’s account of ontological independence as independent status to present a new interpretation of Plotinus on the dependence of everything on the One. On this reading, if something else (whether an internal part or something external) makes you what you are, then you are ontologically dependent on it. I show that this (...) account supports Plotinus’s claim that any entity with parts cannot be fully independent. In particular, I lay out Plotinus’s case for thinking that even a divine self-understanding intellect cannot be fully independent. I then argue that a weaker version of simplicity is not enough for the theist since priority monism meets the conditions of a moderate version of ontological independence just as well as a transcendent but complex ultimate being. (shrink)

This paper employs tools and critiques from analytic feminist scholarship in order to show how particular values commonly on display in analytic theology have served both to marginalize certain voices from the realm of analytic theological debate and to reinforce a particular conception of the divine—one which, despite its historical roots, is not inevitable. I claim that a particular conception of what constitutes a “rational, objective, analytic thinker” often displays certain affinities with those infinite or maximal properties that analytic (...) theologians have taken to be most relevant or essential to their theological conceptions of the divine, and I explore what thinking differently about the former might mean for how we think about the latter and vice versa. (shrink)

Au moment où il entreprend d'élaborer une preuve de l'existence de Dieu dont la force soit susceptible d'entraîner l'adhésion de tout esprit qui entend le sens des mots utilisés, s. Anselme veut faire appel à une notion de Dieu admise par tout le monde. Que signifie en effet ce mot Dieu, sinon, ce par rapport à quoi on ne saurait rien concevoir de plus parfait? La notion de Dieu et celle de la perfection la plus grande possible sont done, (...) à ses yeux, si intimement unies qu'on peut les employer l'une pour l'autre. Penser Dieu et penser 1'être le plus parfait possible, ce serait une seule et même chose. (shrink)

A number of scholars have claimed that, on the assumption of incompati- bilism, there is a con ict between God's freedom and God's essential moral perfection. Jesse Couenhoven is one such example; Couenhoven, a com- patibilist, thinks that libertarian views of divine freedom are problematic given God's essential moral perfection. He writes, \libertarian accounts of God's freedom quickly run into a conceptual problem: their focus on con- tingent choices undermines their ability to celebrate divine freedom with (...) regard to the essential divine nature. For an Augustinian [i.e., a compat- ibilist], by contrast, God's freedom is not at odds with the necessities of perfect love but ful lled by it."1 Others who argue for similar conclusions include William Rowe and Wes Morriston. Michael Bergmann and Jan Cover have recently argued that divine responsibility and moral perfection are compatible with the absence of divine freedom. In this paper, I argue that the arguments which hold that divine freedom con icts with essen- tial divine moral perfection fail. I develop an account of divine freedom which not only doesn't con ict with God's essential moral goodness but shows that such goodness is a necessary part of perfected freedom. I then show how this understanding of free will takes away a major motivation for Bergmann and Cover's apparent willingness to reject divine freedom. (shrink)

I. INTRODUCTIONIs Jesus the perfect human being? An affirmative response seems unavoidable for classical Christology. Indeed, at the Council of Chalcedon in 451, the gathered bishops and representatives of the church across Africa, Asia, and Europe agreed that Jesus Christ was “perfect in divinity and perfect in humanity”: teleion…en Theótæti kai teleion…en anthropótæti.Theologians and patristics scholars alike often sort through the second part of this formula in the way that the remainder of the conciliar definition itself seems to indicate, interpreting (...) it to mean that nothing that belongs to the humanity we share can be lacking in the humanity of Jesus, and nothing belongs to Him that would compromise the human form. He does not, for instance, have a body animated by a divine spirit in place of a human will, or a superhuman ability to translocate. This is theologically appropriate as far as it goes, but it does not go far enough. (shrink)

Some versions of the doctrine of divine simplicity imply that God lacks really differentiated parts. I present a new argument against these views based on divine beauty. The argument proceeds as follows: God is beautiful. If God is beautiful, then this beauty arises from some structure. If God’s beauty arises from a structure, then God possesses really differentiated parts. If these premises are true, then divine simplicity is false. I argue for each of the argument’s premises and (...) defend it against objections, including an objection based on analogical predication, and an objection that supposes that God is simple while appearing complex. (shrink)

In the 1970s, Alvin Plantinga made use of the Anselmian concept of God to develop a modal version of Anselm's ontological argument for God's existence. His definition describes the God of perfect-being theology as one that exists necessarily and is essentially omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect, and this definition has become standard in discussions about the nature and existence of the God of western theism. Hence, these discussions operate with a relatively thin conception of God, since many of the key (...) terms in the definition, including essential moral perfection, remain undefined. Philosophers find this attractive in some ways, since it permits an a priori approach to explicating the divine perfections. One drawback for the minimalist approach, however, is that it can impede the effort to connect philosophical theology with religious faith. This article discusses three major ways of modelling divine moral perfection and considers some of the major objections to the claim that God is necessarily morally perfect. (shrink)

The success of the atheistic hiddenness argument depends on the “consciousness constraint” it imposes on the divine-human loving relationship: namely, that this relationship requires human conscious awareness of being in the relationship with God. I challenge the truth of this proposition by introducing the concept of a physical relationship with God that is not subject to this constraint. I argue, first, that a physical relationship with God is metaphysically possible; second, that its plausibility is supported by natural theology; and (...) third, that a perfectly loving God would prefer physical relationships with human beings over consciousness-constrained relationships, because a perfectly loving God would prefer to preserve the integrity of human freedom of participation and allow inclusion of all people regardless of their natural cognitive capabilities. I also offer an interpretation of apparent divine hiddenness in the light of the idea of God’s openness for physical relationships. (shrink)

That being than which a greater cannot be conceived.' This was the way in which the living God of biblical tradition was described by the great Medieval philosophers such as Augustine, Anselm and Aquinas.Contemporary philosophers find much to question, criticise and reject in the traditional analysis of that description. Some hold that the attributes traditionally ascribed to God - simplicity, necessity, immutability, eternity, omniscience, omnipotence, creativity and goodness - are inherently incoherent individually, or mutually inconsistent. Others argue that the divinity (...) described by philosophers cannot be the same as the providential God of revelation.In Perfect Being Theology Katherin A. Rogers defends the traditional approach, considering contemporary criticisms but concluding that the most adequate account of the nature of God should build upon the foundation laid by the Medieval philosophers.Written in a lively and accessible style and offering an important historical perspective, this book covers key areas of contention and many of the major ideas and thinkers from all sides of the debate are included. (shrink)

In “Divine Freedom,” I argue that morally significant incompatibilist freedom is a great good. So God possesses morally incompatibilist freedom. So, God can do wrong or at least can do worse than the best action He can do. So, God is not essentially morally perfect. After careful consideration of numerous objections, I conclude that this argument is undefeated.

God is typically conceived as perfectly good and necessarily so, in two senses: in terms of always performing the best possible act and in terms of having maximal moral worth. Yet any being that freely performs the best act she can must be accorded greater moral worth for any such action than a being that does so necessarily. I conclude that any being that performs the best possible act of necessity cannot also have maximal moral worth, making the concept of (...) God’s perfect goodness incoherent. (shrink)