This article analyzes one aspect of Bolzano’s metaphysics. It discusses the question of whether, according to Bolzano, substances are simple or not. In theopinion of some commentators, he accepts composed substances, that is, substances having substances as proper parts. However, it is easily possible to misinterpret his position. This paper first tries to reconstruct Bolzano’s definitions of the concept of substance and suggests that he should be able to agree with the following final definition: x is a substance if and (...) only if x is real and not a property. After this, it is shown that, according to Bolzano, every substance is simple in a fourfold sense: No substance has (1) adherences as parts, (2) substances as proper parts, (3) spatially extended parts, and (4) temporal parts. (shrink)

This article analyzes one aspect of Bolzano’s metaphysics. It discusses the question of whether, according to Bolzano, substances are simple or not. In theopinion of some commentators, he accepts composed substances, that is, substances having substances as proper parts. However, it is easily possible to misinterpret his position. This paper first tries to reconstruct Bolzano’s definitions of the concept of substance and suggests that he should be able to agree with the following final definition: x is a substance if and (...) only if x is real and not a property. After this, it is shown that, according to Bolzano, every substance is simple in a fourfold sense: No substance has (1) adherences as parts, (2) substances as proper parts, (3) spatially extended parts, and (4) temporal parts. (shrink)

The paper analyzes one important aspect of Bernard Bolzano's ontology, namely his concept of collections of substances. It deals first with his concept of substance and it examines the relation between substances and collections of substances. It discusses further his distinction between continuous and non-continuous collections of substances, especially his concept of material things. Finally, it treats his concept of the world. According to Bolzano, the world is the continuous collection of all dependent substances. The acceptance of a collection which (...) consists of this world and the independent substance – God – leads to difficulties. _German_ Der Beitrag analysiert einen wichtigen Aspekt der Ontologie Bernard Bolzanos, und zwar seinen Begriff des Inbegriffs von Substanzen. Zunächst widmet er sich Bolzanos Begriff der Substanz, anschließend dem Verhältnis von Substanzen und Inbegriffen von Substanzen. Ferner erörtert er Bolzanos Unterscheidung zwischen kontinuierlichen und nichtkontinuierlichen Inbegriffen von Substanzen und hierbei insbesondere den Begriff des Körpers. Abschließend wird der Begriff der Welt besprochen. Bolzano zufolge ist die Welt der kontinuierliche Inbegriff aller bedingten Substanzen. Als problematisch erweist sich die Annahme eines Inbegriffs, der aus dieser Welt und der einen unbedingten Substanz – Gott – besteht. (shrink)

In his Athanasia, the main source of his metaphysics, Bolzano deals with the problem of the freedom of the human will. This paper reconstructs two definitions of free will and focuses on Bolzano’s arguments and counter-arguments for and against the existence of free will. These arguments are confronted with some aspects of the modern discussion of this subject. The paper examines especially how far the so called principle of alternate possibilities is relevant for a better understanding of Bolzano’s arguments. Assuming (...) the reconstructed definitions of the freedom of the will, it turns out that a person has only free will if this person could have wanted otherwise. But, according to Bolzano’s view in the Athanasia, the possibility to want otherwise is not a necessary condition for moral responsibility. Finally, the paper shortly discusses whether, for Bolzano, people are free after death and whether God is free. (shrink)

This article examines one aspect of Thomas Aquinas' understanding of abstraction. It shows in which way, according to Aquinas, universal material objects and individual material objects are the starting point for mathematical objects. It comes to the conclusion that for Aquinas there are not only universal mathematical objects (circle, line), but also individual mathematical objects (this circle, that line). Universal mathematical objects are properties of universal material objects and individual mathematical objects are properties of individual material objects. One type of (...) abstractio formae leads from individual material objects to universal mathematical objects, a second type from universal material objects to universal mathematical objects, and a third type from individual material objects to individual mathematical objects. Therefore, the concept of abstractio formae is ambiguous. (shrink)

Nicholas of Autrecourt maintains in his second letter to Bernard of Arezzo that with the exception of the certitude of faith, there is no other certitude but the certitude of the law of non-contradiction, or the one that can be resolved to this law. The article examines this statement, which implies that natural theology is not possible. It comes to the conclusion that, in general, Nicholas in his letter seems to identify the relation "…can be resolved…" between two certain sentences (...) with the relation "…follows from…". This identification leads to problems which are discussed. Further, Nicholas says that in every valid inference the consequent is identical with the antecedent or is part of it. This can be understood in two ways. (shrink)

[Some Remarks to the “Natural Dogmatics“ by Bernard Bolzano].