The Best Thing in Life is Free: The Compatibility of Divine Freedom and God's Essential Moral Perfection
Abstract
A number of scholars have claimed that, on the assumption of incompati-
bilism, there is a con
ict between God's freedom and God's essential moral
perfection. Jesse Couenhoven is one such example; Couenhoven, a com-
patibilist, thinks that libertarian views of divine freedom are problematic
given God's essential moral perfection. He writes, \libertarian accounts of
God's freedom quickly run into a conceptual problem: their focus on con-
tingent choices undermines their ability to celebrate divine freedom with
regard to the essential divine nature. For an Augustinian [i.e., a compat-
ibilist], by contrast, God's freedom is not at odds with the necessities of
perfect love but ful lled by it."1 Others who argue for similar conclusions
include William Rowe and Wes Morriston. Michael Bergmann and Jan
Cover have recently argued that divine responsibility and moral perfection
are compatible with the absence of divine freedom. In this paper, I argue
that the arguments which hold that divine freedom con
icts with essen-
tial divine moral perfection fail. I develop an account of divine freedom
which not only doesn't con
ict with God's essential moral goodness but
shows that such goodness is a necessary part of perfected freedom. I then
show how this understanding of free will takes away a major motivation
for Bergmann and Cover's apparent willingness to reject divine freedom.