This volume explores the state of literary theory today, decades after the repeatedly proclaimed end of theory. It builds on the idea that theory is historically constituted as it is “always becoming something else” as Leslie Fiedler claimed in the 1950s, arguing that the historical constitution of theory relies on theory’s procedural nature. In order to assess theory’s procedural challenge to the fundamental notions that all the disciplines within an episteme have brought to the fore, it addresses these questions: What (...) are the procedures theory has relied on? Are they a secret to its resistance, or is resistance its primary procedure? And if so, a resistance to what? Secondly, if resistance were theory’s principal vehicle, at which point does resistance, conceptualized only procedurally (as resisting something, questioning anything, criticizing whatever), display hallmarks of a disciplinary closure that must call for new resistances, and perhaps for a fundamentally another kind? The book turns to what theory does in order to avoid a partial answer to what theory is. (shrink)

In trying to understand God and faith in a proper way, philosophy and theology could be very complementary. I would like to review and examine a few modern challenges and relationships between philosophy, theology and faith, seen also from important hints from history of these disciplines. I shall just take some points I consider as the most interesting. I would suggest that the most important relationship between philosophy and theology is threefold: pure philosophical works arguing for theistic conclusion; philosophical explications (...) of existing theological matters, and there is philosophical theology – mixed philosophical and theological components densely intertwined in texts. I give some examples of problems of interest for both disciplines and what significance the solutions, in general, can have for practical faith. (shrink)

No-free-lunch theorems are important theoretical result in the fields of machine learning and artificial intelligence. Researchers in this fields often claim that the theorems are based on Hume’s argument about induction and represent a formalisation of the argument. This paper argues that this is erroneous but that the theorems correspond to and formalise Goodman’s new riddle of induction. To demonstrate the correspondence among the theorems and Goodman’s argument, a formalisation of the latter in the spirit of the former is sketched.

This essay focuses on the logic of the aesthetic argument used in the eighteenth century as a conceptual tool for formulating the modern concept of “(fine) art(s).” The essay also examines the main developments in the history of the art of modernity which were initiated from the way the “nature” of art was conceived in early modern aesthetics. The author claims that the formulation of the “aesthetic nature” of art led to the process of the gradual disappearance of all of (...) the formal elements that had previously characterized the visual arts; the result was “emptiness” or “nothingness” as art. The author refers to this process in terms of “vanishing acts” that allow for the formulation of an aesthetics of absence in connection to twentieth-century art (complementing the Ästhetik der Absenz, formulated in German art theory). The author also briefly addresses the consequences that these processes have for the way contemporary art, and art world operate. (shrink)

For the purpose of enabling a dialogue between Martin Heidegger’s philosophy and Rudolf Steiner’s work, we start from Rainer Thurnher’s hypothesis that Heidegger’s “existentials”, Befindlichkeit, Verstehen and Rede, represent correlates of psychic phenomena in their traditional triple division into thinking, willing and feeling. To test this hypothesis, we analyze the temporal constitution of these psychic phenomena, that is, their existential correlates from the temporal dimensions of future, present, and past in Heidegger’s Being and Time and in some of Steiner’s lectures.

Mit der Arbeit will man die große Popularität des Films Joker von Tod Filips aus dem Jahr 2019 verstehen. Der Film und die Figur Joker wird im Rahmen der Philosophie, bzw. Ästhetik und Politik des Ressentiments interpretiert. Die Arbeit bietet den Schluss, dass der Film und die Figur Jokers das Gefühl der Ungleichheit als ein in der Welt verbreitetes Gefühl zwischen seiner Ästhetisierung und Politisierung wiederholen.

Utjecajni Allgemeines Gelehrten-Lexicon Christiana Gottlieba Jöchera u svom trećem svesku sadržava natuknicu o filozofu Frani Petriću. Izuzevši dvojbe o mjestu rođenja, Jöcherovi su podaci točni, ali oskudni. Da bi se ustanovilo kojim je podacima raspolagao ili mogao raspolagati njemački leksikograf, proučeni su Jöcherovi izvori. Od njih devet, koje je Jöcher popisao na kraju svoje natuknice o Petriću, njemački se leksikograf poslužio samo djelom Les Eloges des hommes savans Antoinea Teissiera i drugim izdanjem rječnika Dictionaire historique et critique Pierra Baylea. Najstariji (...) i najmlađi među Jöcherovim izvorima, Elogia illustrium Belgii scriptorum Auberta Le Mirea i Mémoires Jean-Pierrea Nicerona, nemaju ni retka o Petriću. Ostalih pet Jöcherovih izvora sadržavaju vrijedne podatke o Petriću, ali se Jöcher njima nije poslužio.The third volume of the authoritative Allgemeines Gelehrten-Lexicon , compiled by Christian Gottlieb Jöcher, contains an entry on the philosopher Frane Petrić. Apart from Petrić’s obscure place of birth, Jöcher’s data, if scarce, are correct. In order to establish the information that had been or may have been available to the German lexicographer, Jöcher’s sources have been traced. Out of the nine sources Jöcher listed at the end of his entry on Petrić, the German lexicographer consulted only the work Les Eloges des hommes savans by Antoine Teissier and the second edition of the Dictionaire historique et critique by Pierre Bayle. The oldest and most recent among Jöcher’s sources, Elogia illustrium Belgii scriptorum by Aubert Le Mire and Mémoires by Jean-Pierre Niceron, make no reference to Petrić. Although the remaining five sources contain valuable information on Petrić, Jöcher failed to consult them. (shrink)

In eighteen chapters of the third book of his writings named The Book of the Art of Trade (1458) Croatian Renaissance philosopher Benedetto Cotrugli (c. 1416–1469) presented a list of ethical virtues a perfect merchant should possess. His ethical teaching was largely influenced by Aristotle’s thought. Hence, Cotrugli’s list of ethical virtues resembles the list Aristotle made in the seventh chapter of the second book of his Nicomachean Ethics. In this paper, their lists of ethical virtues were examined and compared, (...) thus providing insight into their differences and similarities, consequently revealing the extent of their accordance. Previous research has shown that Cotrugli and Aristotle had a corresponding understanding of the virtue of justice. However, the paper proves that another six out of thirteen ethical virtues (confidence, astuteness, integrity, liberality, modesty, and temperance) on Cotrugli’s list have their foundation in Aristotle’s ethics. (shrink)

This book consists of eleven new essays that provide new insights into classical and contemporary issues surrounding free will and human agency. They investigate topics such as the nature of practical knowledge and its role in intentional action; mental content and explanations of action; recent arguments for libertarianism; the situationist challenge to free will; freedom and a theory of narrative configuration; the moral responsibility of the psychopath; and free will and the indeterminism of quantum mechanics. Also tackling some historical precursors (...) of contemporary debates, taken together these essays demonstrate the need for an approach that recognizes the multifaceted nature of free will. This book provides essential reading for anyone interested in the current scholarship on free will. (shrink)

In this review article, I present and discuss some theories and arguments which we can find in Derek Matravers’s opinonated textbook on the philosophy of art. Texbook consists of an introduction and eight chapters, but only some of the most important claims are discussed: various theories and definitions of art, the notions of expression and value of art and artworks, as well as the question whether we can learn something from artworks, beside, of course, what is considered as artistic and (...) aesthetic. A little more emphasize I gave on the notions of forgeries and on the concept of beauty in connection with the artworks. (shrink)

From Curriculum Vitae parsing to web search and recommendation systems, Word2Vec and other word embedding techniques have an increasing presence in everyday interactions in human society. Biases, such as gender bias, have been thoroughly researched and evidenced to be present in word embeddings. Most of the research focuses on discovering and mitigating gender bias within the frames of the vector space itself. Nevertheless, whose bias is reflected in word embeddings has not yet been investigated. Besides discovering and mitigating gender bias, (...) it is also important to examine whether a feminine or a masculine-centric view is represented in the biases of word embeddings. This way, we will not only gain more insight into the origins of the before mentioned biases, but also present a novel approach to investigating biases in Natural Language Processing systems. Based on previous research in the social sciences and gender studies, we hypothesize that masculine-centric, otherwise known as androcentric, biases are dominant in word embeddings. To test this hypothesis we used the largest English word association test data set publicly available. We compare the distance of the responses of male and female participants to cue words in a word embedding vector space. We found that the word embedding is biased towards a masculine-centric viewpoint, predominantly reflecting the worldviews of the male participants in the word association test data set. Therefore, by conducting this research, we aimed to unravel another layer of bias to be considered when examining fairness in algorithms. (shrink)

In this article, the authors give an answer to the question of whether God would be worthy of worship had He created (or even permitted) a world where no human action was freely done. Presupposing God’s omnibenevolence in applying the doctrine of no responsibility for actions not freely done, we consider two possible answers to the question of why God would create such a deterministic world. Whichever of these answers proved to be true, we conclude that God would be worthy (...) of worship because He would provide the best outcome for everyone. (shrink)

In this article I defend Strong Agent-Causal Libertarianism in O’Connor’s version against several objections raised by David Widerker. More specifically, I try to show that we can overcome difficulties raised by the question whether an agent has a control over controlling doing action E, by objection of possible nomically sufficient condition for obtaining of E and by objection of possible logically or metaphysically sufficient condition for obtaining of E.U ovom članku branim tzv. jaki djelovateljsko-uzročni libertarijanizam u verziji koju je dao (...) O’Connor od prigovora koje je uputio David Widerker. Specifičnije, nastojim pokazati da se mogu svladati teškoće koje se tiču pitanja da li djelovatelj ima kontrolu nad kontroliranjem činjenja djelatnosti E, koje se tiču prigovora nomički dostatnog uvjeta da bi se dogodila djelatnost E i koje se tiču mogućih logički ili metafizički dostatnih uvjeta da bi se dogodila djelatnost E. (shrink)

In this article, the author examines two kinds of eliminativisms in the philosophy of mind – eliminative materialism and functional eliminativism. He shows that mature neuroscience has to explain phenomena which are denoted by the concepts »perception«, »mind« or »consciousness« and that these concepts are not introduced as explanations of something. Consciousness, for example, is a factual phenomenon that should be explained and cannot be eliminated, by eliminative materialism or by functional eliminativism, as an explanandum and as a fact.

In this article, the author examines two kinds of eliminativisms in the philosophy of mind – eliminative materialism and functional eliminativism. He shows that mature neuroscience has to explain phenomena which are denoted by the concepts »perception«, »mind« or »consciousness« and that these concepts are not introduced as explanations of something. Consciousness, for example, is a factual phenomenon that should be explained and cannot be eliminated, by eliminative materialism or by functional eliminativism, as an explanandum and as a fact.

In this article, I try to show that if we analyse causality in terms of perceiving regular succession of events in which one event is followed by another, and if we do not perceive further "necessity" by which these regular events be necessitated in the sense that they must always be as they are and how we perceive them, like David Hume did, then there is a possibility that there is no kind of necessity and that this analysis can be (...) used to support libertarianism concerning free will problem, and not as a support to compatibilism, which was held by Hume. I also try to show, contra Hume, that there are chance events and that under certain circumstances, similar causes can have very different effects.U ovom tekstu nastoji se pokazati da ukoliko se uzročnost analizira kao opažanje pravilnih i ponavljajućih sljedova događaja i neopažanje ikakve daljnje nužnosti koja bi "ponužnjivala" da ti sljedovi moraju uvijek biti takvi kakvi se događaju i kakvima ih opažamo, kao što je to učinio David Hume, onda je moguće da nikakva nužnost i ne postoji te da se takva analiza može uporabiti kao potpora libertarijanizmu što se tiče problema slobode volje a ne kompatibilizmu koji je zastupao Hume. Također se pokazuje da, suprotno Humeu, slučajnosti postoje i da pod određenim uvjetima vrlo slični uzroci mogu dovesti do vrlo različitih učinaka. (shrink)

Concerning the question about consciousness, Georges Rey argues that it does not exist from the success of computational theory of human mind. Everything that such a theory requires can be fulfilled by machines which do not have consciousness. So, according to theoretical parsimony, we do not have to attribute consciousness even to human beings. I wish to offer reasons why we should not doubt the existence of consciousness by showing that computational explanations can be explanations of just one part of (...) an aspect of the human mind. Consciousness is also an explanandum rather than an explanans, and the possible reference of “what it is like” expression. Epistemic situation regarding possible accesses to consciousness is also considered. (shrink)

In his book "Freedom of the Will: A Conditional Analysis", Ferenc Huoranszki tries to defend improved and amended version of the conditional analysis of free will. In my critical review, taking chapters 2 and 4 of his book as the most crucial for his theory, I try to show that incompatibilism is still more persuasive and that amended conditional analysis is not compatible with determinism. Despite my criticism, I consider this book as a significant contribution to the free will debate.

In his book Beyond Art, Dominic McIver Lopes presents a multitude of arguments about main problems in the philosophy of art but centred on the problem of defining what is art and what is a work of art. He argues for “buck passing” theory of art. According to this theory, the task is passed to philosophical theories which, first, have to find necessary and sufficient conditions, or at least, some non-trivial conditions what makes each kind of art exactly that kind (...) of art. It has a form: “X is a work of art if and only if X is a work of K, where K is an art”. Lopes offers support for his theory through many arguments around problems of aesthetic appreciation, aesthetic properties, value, appreciative kinds and practices, media used in various artforms, etc. He tries to show that theory is more viable and more informative than its competitors. I present and critically assess some of the claims from the book; it seems that, according to a form of the theory, we can do without the concept of “art” altogether. (shrink)

From Physical World to Transcendent God(s): Mediatory Functions of Beauty in Plato, Dante and Rupa Gosvami -/- Dragana Jagušić -/- In various philosophical, religious and mystical traditions, beauty is often related to intellectual upliftment and spiritual ascent, which suggests that besides its common aesthetic value it may also acquire an epistemic, metaphysical and spiritual meaning or value. I will examine in detail three accounts in which beauty, at times inseparable from desire and love, mediates between physical, intellectual and spiritual levels (...) of existence. Since beauty, in all three accounts, takes on a mediatory role or function,1 I will name these mediations as follows: ancient Greek Eros-mediation or Beauty-mediation (Plato: ca. 429-347 BCE), late medieval Italian Beauty and Love-mediation (Dante Alighieri: 1265-1321) and pre-modern Indian Beauty and Love-mediation (Rūpa Gosvāmi: 1470/90-1564 CE).2 In the first section, I will analyse the stages of Eros or Beauty mediation in Plato; in the second section, I will turn to Dante’s Beauty and Love-mediation and compare it with Plato’s account. In the third section, I will analyse Rūpa’s account of Beauty and Love-mediation in comparison with both Plato and Dante. I will argue that there are certain patterns of mediation mutually shared if not between all three accounts, then at least between two of them. While Plato’s account clearly influenced Dante and was well integrated into Dante’s account, there is no mention or evidence of a pre-modern Bengali theologian influenced by ancient Greek and medieval Italian philosophy and mysticism. However, a strong convergence of elements of Beauty-mediations in Plato and Dante, as well as Beauty and Love-mediations in Dante and Rūpa Gosvāmi, confirms the universality of certain features of Beauty and Love-mediation and speaks in support of an all-inclusive account of them.3 -/- 1 By Beauty-mediation I mean an aesthetic, intellectual or spiritual reconciliation between opposites, such as human and divine, mortal and immortal, particular and universal, sexual and sacred and so on. 2 Rūpa Gosvāmi was an Indian theologian. More information about him is provided in section 3. 3 I am here applying transitivity: if Plato’s account (A) shares elements with Dante’s account (B) and if Dante’s account (B) shares those same elements with Rūpa’s account (C), then Plato’s (A) and Rūpa’s (C) accounts share some elements as well. Obviously, all accounts have some different elements not mutually shared, but I will not deal with them here. (shrink)

The present article is a critical assessment of the “Connection Principle” – the principle according to which the two key properties of mental states, intentionality and phenomenality, are necessarily co-instantiated. A theory of mind endorsing some version of this principle assumes that all intentional states are either conscious or otherwise potentially conscious. The Connection Principle, being a subject of much controversy in the past 15 years, has divided the community of philosophers of mind in two, as it were, irreconcilable camps. (...) What poses a special challenge to both friends and foes of the Connection Principle – albeit for different reasons – is a plausible explanation of intentional character of unconscious mental states. We want to point to and comment on certain weaknesses of Searle’s attempt to solve this problem – an attempt drawing on the idea that unconsciousmental states “retain” its “aspectual shape” while unconscious. Eventually, we will venture to show why the notion of aspectual shape cannot play the explanatory role assigned to it by Searle, and why a more restrictive and a more consistent criterion for ascribing intentionality to unconscious states is needed. This new criterion should be sensible to our folk-psychological intuition suggesting that there are dispositional states that play an indispensable causal role in our mental economy and, as such, build a genuine subset of all nconscious, i.e., purely neurophysiological states of our mind/brain. (shrink)

The present article is a critical assessment of the “Connection Principle” – the principle according to which the two key properties of mental states, intentionality and phenomenality , are necessarily co-instantiated. A theory of mind endorsing some version of this principle assumes that all intentional states are either conscious or otherwise potentially conscious. The Connection Principle, being a subject of much controversy in the past 15 years, has divided the community of philosophers of mind in two, as it were, irreconcilable (...) camps. What poses a special challenge to both friends and foes of the Connection Principle – albeit for different reasons – is a plausible explanation of intentional character of unconscious mental states. We want to point to and comment on certain weaknesses of Searle’s attempt to solve this problem – an attempt drawing on the idea that unconsciousmental states “retain” its “aspectual shape” while unconscious. Eventually, we will venture to show why the notion of aspectual shape cannot play the explanatory role assigned to it by Searle, and why a more restrictive and a more consistent criterion for ascribing intentionality to unconscious states is needed. This new criterion should be sensible to our folk-psychological intuition suggesting that there are dispositional states that play an indispensable causal role inour mental economy and, as such, build a genuine subset of all nconscious, i.e., purely neurophysiological states of our mind/brain.U tekstu se želimo kritički osvrnuti na Searleovo “načelovezanosti” – načelo prema kojemu su svojstvo intencionalnosti i svojstvo fenomenalnosti nužno koinstancirana. Svaka teorija uma koja uključuje neku varijantu tog načela polazi od pretpostavke da su sva intencionalna stanja ili svjesna ili potencijalno svjesna. Riječ je o stajalištu koje je polariziralo filozofe uma i u posljednjih petnaestak godina bilo predmetom zanimljivih rasprava. Moglo bi se reći da se prema stavu – bilo eksplicitnom bilo implicitnom – koji neki filozof uma zauzima prema načelu vezanosti može prepoznati opći istraživački program kojemu pripada. I za zagovornike i za protivnike načela vezanosti – doduše iz različitih razloga – osobiti izazov predstavlja objašnjenje intencionalnosti nesvjesnih mentalnih stanja. Cilj nam je ukazati na neke nedostatke Searleova pokušaja da riješi taj problem – pokušaja kojemu u osnovi leži zamisao da nesvjesna mentalna stanja zadržavaju svoju aspektualnost dok su nesvjesna. Konkretno, pokazat ćemo zašto pojam aspektualnosti ne može igrati eksplanatornu ulogu koju mu je Searle namijenio te zašto bi trebalo pronaći neki drugi, restriktivniji i konzistentniji kriterij pripisivanja intencionalnosti potencijalno svjesnim stanjima. Taj bi kriterij, prema našem shvaćanju, trebao biti kompatibilan s pučkopsihološkom intuicijom o postojanju dispozicijskih stanja koja igraju neizostavnu kauzalnu ulogu u našemmentalnom funkcioniranju i koja, kao takva, čine autentičan podskup svih nesvjesnih stanja našeg mozga/uma. (shrink)

Does art need to be beautiful? Can humour be beautiful? What is the relationship between beauty and mimetic behaviour? What does literature have to do with beauty? What are the limitations of neuroscientific approaches to beauty? Are the experience of beauty and the production of â oeartâ confined to anatomically modern humans? Is the experience of beauty confined to humans at all? These are just some of the questions discussed in this volume. It gathers together authors from different areas of (...) research, including philosophy, history of philosophy, history of ideas, cognitive biology, neuroscience, anthropology and paleoanthropology, in order to investigate some of the most debated aspects of the problem of beauty and aesthetic experience. The volume will appeal to both the general reader and the specialist in the humanities, social sciences and the natural sciences. (shrink)