Dans ce texte tiré d'un ouvrage , l'auteur décrit les transformations du champ. Face à la technologie et à la transnationalisation, les paradigmes anciens ne suffisent plus à décrire la communication. Celle-ci permet d'observer l'ensemble de la société, une fois abandonnés le médiacentrisme et les idéologies globalisantes. La responsabilité sociale et morale du spécialiste en communication devient alors fondamentale.This paper, taken from a book , describes the transformations in the field of communication sciences. Transformations in technology and transnationalisation mean old (...) paradigms no longer suffice to describe communication. Communication might be «the» vantage point from which society as a whole may be studied once mediacentrism and all-embracing claims have been discarded. Then the social and moral responsibility of the communication specialist is proven to become fundamental. (shrink)

La notion de «populaire» est saisie différemment en Amérique latine et en Europe, puisque là, le populaire est une forme d'hybridation des cultures indiennes, des programmes médiatiques et de la civilisation urbaine. Il s'agit d'abord de penser masse et populaire de manière autonome, en se gardant de tout discours de dénonciation, pour saisir en quoi les telenovelas, par exemple, produisent une oralité seconde porteuse d'une nouvelle dynamique culturelle pour le plus grand nombre. La culture populaire est ainsi un lieu de (...) réappropriation, dans un artisanat indien remodelé par le design mondialisé, autre exemple, où l'hétérogénéité des productions n'empêche pas une reconstruction identitaire qui retisse des liens avec un passé qu'il est indispensable de réinterpréter.The concept of "popular" is seized differently in Latin America and Europe, since there, the popular one is a form of hybridization of the Indian cultures, programs media and urban civilization. It is initially a question of thinking mass and popular in an autonomous way, while keeping itself of any speech of denunciation, to seize in what the telenovelas, for example, produce a second orality carrying a new cultural dynamics for the greatest number. The popular culture is thus a place of reappropriation, in an Indian craft industry reorganized by the mondialized design, another example, where the heterogeneity of the productions does not prevent an identity rebuilding which weaves new links with a past which it is essential to reinterpret. (shrink)

A whiteboard has been used during a philosophy lesson and afterwards deserted in the classroom. On the whiteboard the teacher has sketched a sort of brief history of philosophy of art, trying to answer the classical questions “What is an artwork?” and “How to distinguish an artwork from an ordinary object?”. The artist Mimmo Paladino found the whiteboard and decided to transform it in an artwork. How? By fastening on it his Giotto’s head. The whiteboard has hence changed its metaphysical (...) status: now it is a different kind of object from what it was before. (shrink)

A whiteboard has been used during a philosophy lesson and afterwards deserted in the classroom. On the whiteboard the teacher has sketched a sort of brief history of philosophy of art, trying to answer the classical questions “What is an artwork?” and “How to distinguish an artwork from an ordinary object?”. The artist Mimmo Paladino found the whiteboard and decided to transform it in an artwork. How? By fastening on it his Giotto’s head. The whiteboard has hence changed its metaphysical (...) status: now it is a different kind of object from what it was before. (shrink)

Carola Barbero | : Je m’intéresse dans cet article aux émotions que nous ressentons lorsque nous lisons une oeuvre de fiction. Certains philosophes pensent que notre implication émotionnelle dans la fiction constitue un paradoxe, et implique soit une forme d’irrationalité, soit la participation à un jeu de « faire semblant ». Ici, je soutiendrai qu’une Théorie de l’Objet à la Meinong, en défendant une approche réaliste des émotions liées la fiction, permet de résoudre adéquatement ce paradoxe de la fiction. (...) | : This essay concerns the emotions that we feel when reading a work of fiction. Some philosophers think that our emotional engagement with fiction gives rise to a paradox and involves either irrationality or participation in a game of make believe. The aim of this work is to show how the paradox of fiction can be dissolved by making use of an Object Theory in a Meinongian style. (shrink)

According to Paolo D’Angelo my Philosophy of Literature actually is an Analytical Philosophy of Literature. His main worry does not concern simply the title, but the fact of my having consciously excluded some authors just because, he maintains, they are not analytic philosophers. In this note I try to explain my reasons together with a defense of philosophy of literature in its own peculiarity distinguishing it from literary criticism, literature in philosophy and philosophy as literature.

L’estetica, intesa come scienza della conoscenza sensibile e del bello naturale e artistico, ha indubbiamente a che fare con il giudizio di gusto. In base a che cosa infatti diciamo che un quadro è bello o che una rappresentazione teatrale ci ha colpito? In base al gusto, appunto: al richiamarsi a quel je ne sais quoi che fa sì che apprezziamo le opere d’arte, per esempio. Sarebbe tuttavia legittimo domandarsi che cosa siamo disposti a includere sotto la categoria di “opera (...) d’arte”. Sicuramen... (shrink)

«In un luogo molto lontano, in un tempo non troppo lontano, un artista dalla chioma bianca ha esposto in una galleria un oggetto particolare di nome Brillo Box. Brillo Box era un oggetto diverso da tutti gli altri. Non era una semplice scatola di spugnette abrasive come quelle che ci sono al supermercato. Infatti non era di cartone, bensì di legno, e aveva dimensioni differenti. Ma il punto non era, ovviamente, questo. Il punto era che Brillo Box doveva essere visto (...) come un’opera d’arte, anch... (shrink)

Nel giardino floreale dell’Isola Che Non C’è si scontrano Lafcadio e Termidoro, due strani tipi sempre preoccupati di farsi riconoscere e di fare accettare gli oggetti delle loro ricerche. Non sono come gli studiosi d’un tempo, impegnati a costruire grandi sistemi e a inventare nuovi modi di pensare e di parlare, loro fanno piccole ricerche su oggetti particolari, si chiedono se esistono o se non esistono, come sono costruiti, di quali elementi sono composti, di che cosa hanno bisogno per con...

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716), esprit universel et promoteur des sciences, est à la fois philosophe, mathématicien et diplomate. Passionné par le langage et le monde, il cherche en encyclopédiste à rendre compte de toutes les inventions et de tous les savoirs. Lors de son séjour à Paris - quatre années pendant lesquelles il rencontre Huygens et étudie Pascal -, il conçoit, en 1675, un projet original de création d'académies, plusieurs spectacles de divertissement. Imaginant des mises en scène ou cherchant à (...) régler la direction des casinos, le philosophe raisonne toujours en stratège. Pour lui, tout dans le monde est combinatoire. D'où son amour pour les jeux, qui associent signes et réseaux. Ainsi se dévoile une Europe savante et inventive qui anticipe notre monde relationnel et numérique. (shrink)

According to some, there is a problem concerning the emotions we feel toward fictional entities such as Anna Karenina, Werther and the like. We feel pity, fear, and sadness toward them, but how is that possible? “We are saddened, but how can we be? What are we sad about? How can we feel genuinely and involuntarily sad, and weep, as we do know that no one has suffered or died?” (Radford, in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1975). This is the (...) paradox of fiction which is based on the assumption that emotions, to be genuine and rational, should be directed toward existent beings. But if beliefs about existence are necessary for us to be rationally moved by something, and such beliefs are lacking when we are moved by fiction (because we do not believe fictional characters and events to be real), then our capacity for an emotional response to fiction is irrational. Consequently, our emotional attitude toward future generations should be considered as irrational as well. But is this really the case? Are there good arguments to consider future and fictional entities as similar from this point of view? Or would it be better to distinguish the two? Is there such a thing as a paradox of the future? If so, how does it relate to the more famous paradox of fiction? (shrink)

Team semantics is a highly general framework for logics which describe dependencies and independencies among variables. Typically, the dependencies considered in this context are properties of sets of configurations or data records. We show how team semantics can be further generalized to support languages for the discussion of interventionist counterfactuals and causal dependencies, such as those that arise in manipulationist theories of causation. We show that the “causal teams” we introduce in the present paper can be used for modelling some (...) classical counterfactual scenarios which are not captured by the usual causal models. We then analyse the basic properties of our counterfactual languages and discuss extensively the differences with respect to the Lewisian tradition. (shrink)

In this paper, we present some experimental findings whose best explanation, first of all, provides a positive answer to a philosophical question in ontology as to whether, in the overall domain of beings, there are fictional characters (_ficta_) over and above concrete individuals. Moreover, since such findings arise out of different comparisons between fictional characters and concrete individuals on the one hand and fictional characters again and non-items that do not belong at all to such an overall domain on the (...) other hand, they also suggest that _ficta_ are allowed as inhabiting a particular subrealm of that domain distinct from the one inhabited by concrete individuals, as previous findings in cognitive psychology had suggested. (shrink)

We analyze the causal-observational languages that were introduced in Barbero and Sandu (2018), which allow discussing interventionist counterfactuals and functional dependencies in a unified framework. In particular, we systematically investigate the expressive power of these languages in causal team semantics, and we provide complete natural deduction calculi for each language. Furthermore, we introduce a generalized semantics which allows representing uncertainty about the causal laws, and we analyze the expressive power and proof theory of the causal-observational languages over this enriched (...) semantics. (shrink)

A dichotomy result of Sevenster (2014) [29] completely classified the quantifier prefixes of regular Independence-Friendly (IF) logic according to the patterns of quantifier dependence they contain. On one hand, prefixes that contain “Henkin” or “signalling” patterns were shown to characterize fragments of IF logic that capture NP-complete problems; all the remaining prefixes were shown instead to be essentially first-order. In the present paper we develop the machinery which is needed in order to extend the results of Sevenster to non-prenex, regular (...) IF sentences. This involves shifting attention from quantifier prefixes to a (rather general) class of syntactical tree prefixes. We partially classify the fragments of regular IF logic that are thus determined by syntactical trees; in particular, a) we identify four classes of tree prefixes that are neither signaling nor Henkin, and yet express NP-complete problems and other second-order concepts; and b) we give more general criteria for checking the first-orderness of an IF sentence. (shrink)

We analyze the expressive resources of \ logic that do not stem from Henkin quantification. When one restricts attention to regular \ sentences, this amounts to the study of the fragment of \ logic which is individuated by the game-theoretical property of action recall. We prove that the fragment of prenex AR sentences can express all existential second-order properties. We then show that the same can be achieved in the non-prenex fragment of AR, by using “signalling by disjunction” instead of (...) Henkin or signalling patterns. We also study irregular IF logic and analyze its correspondence to regular IF logic. By using new methods, we prove that the game-theoretical property of knowledge memory is a first-order syntactical constraint also for irregular sentences, and we identify another new first-order fragment. Finally we discover that irregular prefixes behave quite differently in finite and infinite models. In particular, we show that, over infinite structures, every irregular prefix is equivalent to a regular one; and we present an irregular prefix which is second order on finite models but collapses to a first-order prefix on infinite models. (shrink)

We analyze the behaviour of declarations of independence between existential quantifiers in quantifier prefixes of Independence-Friendly (IF) sentences; we give a syntactical criterion to decide whether a sentence beginning with such prefix exists, such that its truth values may be affected by removal of the declaration of independence. We extend the result also to equilibrium semantics values for undetermined IF sentences.

Disenchantment, disillusion and despair reign in a world where technical rationality and globalization create a market culture and the merchandise of audio-visual images to close the order of symbols and the hermeneutics of meaning. Techno-digital ignorance; the repression of sensitivity by an ideol..

María Egües (1917-2008) fue una investigadora y tecnóloga en el ámbito de los instrumentos ópticos; figura esencial para entender el desarrollo de la ingeniería óptica en las primeras décadas del franquismo. Partiendo de dos fotografías, hasta hace poco inéditas, que reflejan dos momentos cruciales de su vida profesional, este ensayo ofrece una reflexión sobre como una mujer como Egües se vio a sí misma en un tiempo en el que la mera presencia de una mujer en el sistema tecno-científico era, (...) en no pocas ocasiones, rechazada o ignorada. A partir del recurso metafórico de los periscopios submarinos, los cuales permiten ver sin ser vistos, aquella tecnóloga, cual submarino, pudo progresar en unas instituciones, el CSIC, la Universidad y el Ejército, auténticos resortes tecnológicos del Estado franquista, ante miradas hostiles o recelosas. Con todo, aquel régimen, que, parafraseando a Pedro Laín, con su «atroz desmoche», tanto había cercenado al árbol de la ciencia española, no podía permitirse despreciar la participación de algunas mujeres como Egües, imprescindibles en la reconstrucción de un sistema tecno-científico, tan necesario para la supervivencia del propio sistema, a pesar de ciertas retóricas atávicas. Así ocurrió con el desarrollo de una nada desdeñable industria de instrumentos ópticos, en especial, cómo no, aquellos de uso militar. Ámbito en el que María Egües, con forzada discreción y perseverante esfuerzo, alcanzaría uno de los más notables hitos: el diseño y fabricación de los primeros periscópios netamente españoles del siglo XX. (shrink)

In The Performance of Reading, Peter Kivy introduces, on a purely phenomenological basis, an interesting and potentially fruitful analogy between the experience of silently reading literary texts and the experience of silently reading musical scores. In Kivy’s view, both mental experiences involve a critical element of auditory mental imagery, consisting in having a performance “in the head” or the mind’s ear. This analogy might have significant implications for the ontological status of literary works, as well as for the theoretical relations (...) between music and language. Nevertheless, Kivy’s hypothesis has never been investigated and discussed in its empirical merits. In the present paper, we shall claim that neuroscience data support, at least in part, Kivy’s phenomenological observations about the relation between reading musical scores and reading texts. Despite being functionally and anatomically dissociated at the cognitive level, the two reading experiences both involve an auditory simulation of the content, which seems to be functionally critical for a deep and rich experience of literary texts and musical scores. (shrink)

El problema del valor cognitivo de las obras literarias ha recibido fundamentalmente dos tipos de respuesta, la cognitivista y la anti-cognitivista, la primera sostiene que la literatura es vehículo de verdades universales y la segunda mantiene que no transmite nada salvo falsedades y trivialidades. Entre estas posiciones opuestas, este ensayo defiende una forma de cognitivismo débil afirmando por una parte, con los cognitivistas, la idea de que aprendemos de la literatura, y por otra parte, con los anti-cognitivistas, la intuición de (...) que la literatura no nos transmite verdades sobre nosotros mismos o sobre el mundo. La idea es que una solución basada en dos niveles, de acuerdo con lo que aprendemos de la literatura, se deriva de una combinación de knowing that y knowing what. En primer lugar, para aprender algo de la literatura necesitamos comprender, y por tanto saber, de qué hablan los textos literarios, tenemos que ser capaces de aferrar el estado de cosas descrito. Este es el primer nivel, relativo a la verdad literaria y al knowing that. En un segundo nivel, nuestro aprendizaje a partir de los textos literarios tiene que ver con imaginar cómo es ser esos personajes involucrados en esos eventos, por lo tanto, knowing what es como vivir una vida diferente de la propia. En este nivel aprendemos de la literatura del mismo modo en que aprendemos de los experimentos mentales, ejemplos o contraejemplos. Esto es lo que Hilary Putnam ha llamado “conocimiento conceptual de vidas posibles. (shrink)

In the literature on logics of imperfect information it is often stated, incorrectly, that the Game-Theoretical Semantics of Independence-Friendly quantifiers captures the idea that the players of semantical games are forced to make some moves without knowledge of the moves of other players. We survey here the alternative semantics for IF logic that have been suggested in order to enforce this “epistemic reading” of sentences. We introduce some new proposals, and a more general logical language which distinguishes between “independence from (...) actions” and “independence from strategies”. New semantics for IF logic can be obtained by choosing embeddings of the set of IF sentences into this larger language. We compare all the semantics proposed and their purported game-theoretical justifications, and disprove a few claims that have been made in the literature. (shrink)

This study described the relationships between academic class and student moral sensitivity and reasoning and between curriculum design components for ethics education and student moral sensitivity and reasoning. The data were collected from freshman (n = 506) and senior students (n = 440) in eight baccalaureate nursing programs in South Korea by survey; the survey consisted of the Korean Moral Sensitivity Questionnaire and the Korean Defining Issues Test. The results showed that moral sensitivity scores in patient-oriented care and conflict were (...) higher in senior students than in freshman students. Furthermore, more hours of ethics content were associated with higher principled thinking scores of senior students. Nursing education in South Korea may have an impact on developing student moral sensitivity. Planned ethics content in nursing curricula is necessary to improve moral sensitivity and moral reasoning of students. (shrink)

Nonostante Don Chisciotte e Madame Bovary si siano rovinati (letteralmente) la vita a forza di leggere romanzi, è opinione condivisa che le opere letterarie possano essere molto importanti, se non addirittura fondamentali, quale fonte di conoscenza. Non è quindi per caso che si comincino a leggere le storie ai bambini piccoli, che se ne richieda la lettura ai ragazzi a scuola e si cerchi di sensibilizzare il più possibile al mondo dei libri, perché, come diceva Umberto Eco, «[…] la nostra (...) ric... (shrink)

Dopo Per un’estetica del cibo (2006) e L’altro gusto (2008), Nicola Perullo torna sul tema, tanto interessante quanto spesso trascurato, della filosofia della gastronomia, prendendo questa volta in esame l’esperienza del gusto. Superato brillantemente il pregiudizio secondo il quale sarebbe meglio non occuparsi degli oggetti gastronomici in quanto “meramente empirici”, Nicola Perullo entra nel vivo dell’indagine domandandosi che cosa propriamente sia implicato dall’atto di gustare, che cosa s...

El debate sobre el fin del arte o del arte en el fin del siglo, pasa por las contradicciones de una modernidad impregnada aún de componentes premodemos, lo cual ha desembocado en un desordenamiento cultural que se revela en la composición híbrida de la sociedad, así como en el intento de entender cómo se constituyeron las diferencias sociales y los elementos de inclusión y exclusión que distinguen lo culto de lo popular y a ambos de lo masivo. Este desordenamiento cultural (...) se manifiestó por medio de la relación cada vez más estrecha de los modos de simbolización y de ritualización del lazo social con la red comunicacional y el flujo audiovisual. (shrink)

1 Il Brillo Box Alla Galleria Stable di New York, nel 1964, è stata esposta per la prima volta l’opera di Andy Warhol, Brillo Box. Secondo Arthur Danto, la ragione per la quale non si tratta di una semplice scatola di spugnette abrasive (al di là del fatto che quella di Warhol è di dimensioni differenti, non è di cartone, bensì di legno, e poi, ovviamente, non contiene il prodotto pubblicizzato all’esterno) è che tale oggetto deve essere letto (per non (...) dire “visto”) alla luce di una determina... (shrink)

Moving to the discipline of political sociology, we will articulate certain contributions of the critical Argentine Marxists, Silvio Frondizi and José Aricó, whose primary writings spanned the decades of 1960s to the 1990s.As a hypothesis, we will consider that these contributions can be productively linked to the themes of the “translatability of scientific and philosophical languages” and of “constitutionalism”, referred to by Antonio Gramsci at different moments of his political-intellectual trajectory, but fundamentally in his already legendary Prison Notebooks.In the period (...) from the Cuban Revolution of 1959 to the transitions to democracy in Latin America in the last decades of the 20th century, what Frondizi and Aricó have set out to develop is the full potential of the notion of popular sovereignty. (shrink)

There are some others whom we will never have the chance to meet because they do not exist: Emma Bovary, Anna Karenina and Nana, for instance. The reason they are something different from us may seem obvious; they are, after all, fictional entities. But what does it mean when we say that they do not exist? That they are nothing at all, or that they are simply different from us? By assuming a realist ontological perspective we will explain what sort (...) of things fictional literary entities are, comparing them both to existing and to non-existing entities that resemble them in some respects (what is the difference between the historical Napoleon and the Napoleon in War and Peace? Are there similarities between fictional entities as created entities and other artifacts?). Finally, we will determine which theory gives the best account of fictional entities as things other than ourselves. (shrink)

1 What is literature? One could naïvely answer: any kind of written work could be considered literature, just think about its Latin origin, “littera” (letter). Nonetheless nowadays we tend to adopt a more restrictive use of the term literature as referring to those written accounts somehow showing literary, aesthetic merit. According to this more restrictive use, we say that Crime and Punishment written by Fëdor Dostoevskij and In Search of Lost Time by Marcel Proust are good examples of lite...

“Naturalismo” è una parola che si dice in molti modi, almeno tanti quanti nella storia della filosofia e nel sentire comune sono i modi in cui si è parlato di “natura” e di espressioni simili. Oggi, il tema del naturalismo in filosofia e della cosiddetta naturalizzazione che una filosofia dovrebbe eventualmente attrezzare determinate nozioni e teorie è tornato prepotentemente alla ribalta della riflessione filosofica, sulla scia dei successi provenienti dalle scienze cognitive (linguistica, n...

C’è una domanda che sorge spontaneamente: perché mai dovremmo essere interessati a generi di opere quali il terrore e la tragedia? Com’è possibile che questi generi continuino a persistere? Come possiamo spiegare la loro stessa esistenza? O meglio, perché mai qualcuno dovrebbe voler provare emozioni negative quali la paura, il terrore e la tristezza? Poi, come funziona, che più c’è da soffrire e più gli spettatori sono contenti? Si ammetterà che, se le cose stanno davvero così, si tratta di u...

“Naturalismo” è una parola che si dice in molti modi, almeno tanti quanti nella storia della filosofia e nel sentire comune sono i modi in cui si è parlato di “natura” e di espressioni simili. Oggi, il tema del naturalismo in filosofia e della cosiddetta naturalizzazione che una filosofia dovrebbe eventualmente attrezzare determinate nozioni e teorie è tornato prepotentemente alla ribalta della riflessione filosofica, sulla scia dei successi provenienti dalle scienze cognitive (linguistica, n...

Nel 1856 Madame Bovary esce a puntate sulla «Revue de Paris» (1° ottobre - 15 dicembre), per comparire poi in versione integrale un anno dopo – in seguito all’assoluzione di Gustave Flaubert, avvenuta il 7 febbraio – presso l’editore Lévy. Il titolo dell’opera, molto semplice, è decisamente in linea con il realismo: l’autore si mette da parte, rinunciando alla propria voce e alla propria opinione, per fare parlare direttamente i personaggi e gli eventi che li riguardano. Infatti il titolo non...

“Naturalismo” è una parola che si dice in molti modi, almeno tanti quanti nella storia della filosofia e nel sentire comune sono i modi in cui si è parlato di “natura” e di espressioni simili. Oggi, il tema del naturalismo in filosofia e della cosiddetta naturalizzazione che una filosofia dovrebbe eventualmente attrezzare determinate nozioni e teorie è tornato prepotentemente alla ribalta della riflessione filosofica, sulla scia dei successi provenienti dalle scienze cognitive (linguistica, n...

Reading starts with the act of perception and rapidly moves into an area concerning the recognition of written words. Word recognition consists of two aspects (functioning simultaneously and working in parallel): the phonological—converting groups of letters into sounds—and the lexical— giving access to a mental dictionary of the meaning of words. But what does the act of reading consist of? According to Peter Kivy, there is a parallel between reading texts and reading scores. And what about the reasons for reading? (...) When we read, we are not just interested in understanding what the signs stand for, but we also activate memory, perception, problem-solving, and reasoning, and our attention is also devoted to identifying those characteristics of texts which help categorize them as works of a specific genre. Readers play a central role: without them and their activity, there would be nothing but a page of black spots. As they read and understand, readers propositionally imagine what is written and, at a further level, they may also imagine objectually and simulatively. These objects come into being thanks to the words that we imagine are similar to what Roman Ingarden sees as a skeleton, needing the experience of reading to be appropriately concretized. (shrink)

Il cosiddetto “paradosso della finzione” nasce dal tentativo di spiegare quale tipo di emozioni proviamo verso quegli oggetti che troviamo nei romanzi e nei film e che sappiamo perfettamente essere fittizi. Si tratta di un paradosso classico, tornato alla ribalta nel 1975 dopo la pubblicazione di un articolo di Colin Radford che partiva precisamente dall’interrogativo riguardante le lacrime che versiamo per ciò che non è reale (come un personaggio fittizio, appunto). Perché ci commuoviamo per il suicidio di Anna Karenina se (...) sappiamo che non esiste? Che differenza c’è tra piangere per Anna Karenina, piangere per una bugia, piangere per la depressione e fare finta di piangere perché si vuol fare credere a chi ci guarda che siamo sinceramente commossi? In Piangere e ridere davvero (2009) Maurizio Ferraris offre un’interessante proposta teorica per dissolvere il paradosso in questione e si sofferma su alcune distinzioni fondamentali riguardanti le nostre reazioni emotive a stimoli reali e fittizi. In questo saggio si prende spunto dalla teoria di Ferraris e ci si propone di chiarire che cosa significhi fare finta di rispondere emotivamente a qualcosa nella vita di tutti i giorni e quale sia la differenza tra queste “finte” emozioni e quelle che invece proviamo durante la fruizione di opere che sappiamo essere di finzione. Saranno scelti come esempi paradigmatici il caso Fenaroli (al centro della cronaca italiana alla fine degli anni Cinquanta), Il vedovo di Dino Risi e Scusate il ritardo di Massimo Troisi. (shrink)

We analyse the two definitions of generalized quantifiers for logics of dependence and independence that have been proposed by F. Engström, comparing them with a more general, higher order definition of team quantifier. We show that Engström’s definitions can be identified, by means of appropriate lifts, with special classes of team quantifiers. We point out that the new team quantifiers express a quantitative and a qualitative component, while Engström’s quantifiers only range over the latter. We further argue that Engström’s definitions (...) are just embeddings of the first-order generalized quantifiers into team semantics, and fail to capture an adequate notion of team-theoretical generalized quantifier, save for the special cases in which the quantifiers are applied to flat formulas. We also raise several doubts concerning the meaningfulness of the monotone/nonmonotone distinction in this context. In the appendix we develop some proof theory for Engström’s quantifiers. (shrink)