This paper supplements an earlier one (Wassermann 1978b). Its views aim to reinforce those of Lewontin and other prominent evolutionists, but differ significantly from the opinions of some philosophers of science, notably Popper (1957) and Olding (1978). A basic distinction is made between 'laws' and 'theories of mechanisms'. The 'Theory of Evolution' is not characterized by laws, but is viewed here as a hypertheory which explains classifiable evolutionary phenomena in terms of subordinate classifiable theories of 'evolution-specific mechanisms' (ESMs), each of (...) which could apply to a host of species. Adaptations could result from ESMs that are rooted in molecular complementarities. The status of optimization theories that aim to predict best adapted states of organisms or populations is also discussed. (shrink)

According to the paradigm of adaptive rationality, successful inference and prediction methods tend to be local and frugal. As a complement to work within this paradigm, we investigate the problem of selecting an optimal combination of prediction methods from a given toolbox of such local methods, in the context of changing environments. These selection methods are called meta-inductive strategies, if they are based on the success-records of the toolbox-methods. No absolutely optimal MI strategy exists—a fact that we call the “revenge (...) of ecological rationality”. Nevertheless one can show that a certain MI strategy exists, called “AW”, which is universally long-run optimal, with provably small short-run losses, in comparison to any set of prediction methods that it can use as input. We call this property universal access-optimality. Local and short-run improvements over AW are possible, but only at the cost of forfeiting universal access-optimality. The last part of the paper includes an empirical study of MI strategies in application to an 8-year-long data set from the Monash University Footy Tipping Competition. (shrink)

Systems of logico-probabilistic reasoning characterize inference from conditional assertions that express high conditional probabilities. In this paper we investigate four prominent LP systems, the systems _O, P_, _Z_, and _QC_. These systems differ in the number of inferences they licence _. LP systems that license more inferences enjoy the possible reward of deriving more true and informative conclusions, but with this possible reward comes the risk of drawing more false or uninformative conclusions. In the first part of the paper, we (...) present the four systems and extend each of them by theorems that allow one to compute almost-tight lower-probability-bounds for the conclusion of an inference, given lower-probability-bounds for its premises. In the second part of the paper, we investigate by means of computer simulations which of the four systems provides the best balance of reward versus risk. Our results suggest that system _Z_ offers the best balance. (shrink)

This paper is intended as a contribution to a recent vigorous debate inThe Times, between the distinguished journalist Bernard Levin, the eminent Oxford economist Wilfred Beckerman and the Archbishop of York, John Habgood, among others. The debate concerns morality, ‘free will’ and determinism. As a former German Jew, who lost close relatives at Auschwitz and who suffered personally severely in my youth under daily virulent Nazi persecution, I obviously cannot remain strictly detached and neutral. Yet, I shall attempt to retain (...) as much neutrality as possible, since I think that the main rivals in this debate have all some very relevant, interesting and valid things to say. Let me also state other, probably very relevant, biases. I am an ardent Zionist. In addition, I am a diehard mechanistic materialist as regards basic philosophy, although I am tolerant of other people's religious feelings, because I realize that my materialism is as metaphysical as their religious views. With this as background let me return to the technical issues. Obviously, in a philosophical journal one can write at a level above that ofThe Times, where there is, perhaps, insufficient room to debate philosophical, biological, physical and other niceties in some depth. (shrink)

This work looks at how matter and mind inter-relate. It looks at the subject in terms of the philosophy of science, the philosophy of mind, thermodynamics, mechanistic materialism and psychological SETs. Rationality, relativism and Popper's views are taken into account.

This text deals with a number of topics in philosophy, philosophy of science and philosophy of mind. It includes essays on the laws of nature, biological aspects of the philosophy of mind, and the social aspects of rationality.

Calling for explanations to examples of evolutionary adaptation, this work presents the Darwinian TIMA theory. The adaptations are followed by a philosophical and scientific critique of creationism which shows that the theory of evolution is a hypothetico-deductive scientific theory.

This paper is intended as a contribution to a recent vigorous debate inThe Times, between the distinguished journalist Bernard Levin, the eminent Oxford economist Wilfred Beckerman and the Archbishop of York, John Habgood, among others. The debate concerns morality, ‘free will’ and determinism. As a former German Jew, who lost close relatives at Auschwitz and who suffered personally severely in my youth under daily virulent Nazi persecution, I obviously cannot remain strictly detached and neutral. Yet, I shall attempt to retain (...) as much neutrality as possible, since I think that the main rivals in this debate have all some very relevant, interesting and valid things to say. Let me also state other, probably very relevant, biases. I am an ardent Zionist. In addition, I am a diehard mechanistic materialist as regards basic philosophy, although I am tolerant of other people's religious feelings, because I realize that my materialism is as metaphysical as their religious views. With this as background let me return to the technical issues. Obviously, in a philosophical journal one can write at a level above that ofThe Times, where there is, perhaps, insufficient room to debate philosophical, biological, physical and other niceties in some depth. (shrink)

This addendum presents results that confound some commonly made claims about the sorts of environments in which the performance of TTB exceeds that of Franklin's rule, and vice versa.

Systems of logico-probabilistic (LP) reasoning characterize inference from conditional assertions interpreted as expressing high conditional probabilities. In the present article, we investigate four prominent LP systems (namely, systems O, P, Z, and QC) by means of computer simulations. The results reported here extend our previous work in this area, and evaluate the four systems in terms of the expected utility of the dispositions to act that derive from the conclusions that the systems license. In addition to conforming to the dominant (...) paradigm for assessing the rationality of actions and decisions, our present evaluation complements our previous work, since our previous evaluation may have been too severe in its assessment of inferences to false and uninformative conclusions. In the end, our new results provide additional support for the conclusion that (of the four systems considered) inference by system Z offers the best balance of error avoidance and inferential power. Our new results also suggest that improved performance could be achieved by a modest strengthening of system Z. (shrink)

In previous work, we studied four well known systems of qualitative probabilistic inference, and presented data from computer simulations in an attempt to illustrate the performance of the systems. These simulations evaluated the four systems in terms of their tendency to license inference to accurate and informative conclusions, given incomplete information about a randomly selected probability distribution. In our earlier work, the procedure used in generating the unknown probability distribution (representing the true stochastic state of the world) tended to yield (...) probability distributions with moderately high entropy levels. In the present article, we present data charting the performance of the four systems when reasoning in environments of various entropy levels. The results illustrate variations in the performance of the respective reasoning systems that derive from the entropy of the environment, and allow for a more inclusive assessment of the reliability and robustness of the four systems. (shrink)

Meta-induction, in its various forms, is an imitative prediction method, where the prediction methods and the predictions of other agents are imitated to the extent that those methods or agents have proven successful in the past. In past work, Schurz demonstrated the optimality of meta-induction as a method for predicting unknown events and quantities. However, much recent discussion, along with formal and empirical work, on the Wisdom of Crowds has extolled the virtue of diverse and independent judgment as essential to (...) maintenance of 'wise crowds'. This suggests that meta-inductive prediction methods could undermine the wisdom of the crowd inasmuch these methods recommend that agents imitate the predictions of other agents. In this article, we evaluate meta-inductive methods with a focus on the impact on a group's performance that may result from including meta-inductivists among its members. In addition to considering cases of global accessibility (i.e., cases where the judgments of all members of the group are available to all of the group's members), we consider cases where agents only have access to the judgments of other agents within their own local neighborhoods. (shrink)

This article presents results from a simulation‐based study of inheritance inference, that is, inference from the typicality of a property among a “base” class to its typicality among a subclass of the class. The study aims to ascertain which kinds of inheritance inferences are reliable, with attention to the dependence of their reliability upon the type of environment in which inferences are made. For example, the study addresses whether inheritance inference is reliable in the case of “exceptional subclasses” (i.e., subclasses (...) that are known to be atypical in some respect) and attends to variations in reliability that result from variations in the entropy level of the environment. A further goal of the study is to show that the reliability of inheritance inference depends crucially on which sorts of base classes are used in making inferences. One approach to inheritance inference treats the extension of any atomic predicate as a suitable base class. A second approach identifies suitable base classes with the cells of a partition (of a preselected size k) of the domain of objects that satisfies the condition of maximizing the similarity of objects that are assigned to the same class. In addition to permitting more inferences, our study shows that the second approach results in inheritance inferences that are far more reliable, particularly in the case of exceptional subclasses. (shrink)

There are numerous formal systems that allow inference of new conditionals based on a conditional knowledge base. Many of these systems have been analysed theoretically and some have been tested against human reasoning in psychological studies, but experiments evaluating the performance of such systems are rare. In this article, we extend the experiments in [19] in order to evaluate the inferential properties of c-representations in comparison to the well-known Systems P and Z. Since it is known that System Z and (...) c-representations mainly differ in the sorts of inheritance inferences they allow, we discuss subclass inheritance and present experimental data for this type of inference in particular. (shrink)

We describe a prediction method called "Attractivity Weighting" (AW). In the case of cue-based paired comparison tasks, AW's prediction is based on a weighted average of the cue values of the most successful cues. In many situations, AW's prediction is based on the cue value of the most successful cue, resulting in behavior similar to Take-the-Best (TTB). Unlike TTB, AW has a desirable characteristic called "access optimality": Its long-run success is guaranteed to be at least as great as the most (...) successful cue. While access optimality is a desirable characteristic, concerns may be raised about the short-term performance of AW. To evaluate such concerns, we here present a study of AW's short-term performance. The results suggest that there is little reason to worry about the short-run performance of AW. Our study also shows that, in random sequences of paired comparison tasks, the behavior of AW and TTB is nearly indiscernible. (shrink)

This article addresses the ability of Parallel Distributed Processing (PDP) networks to generate stagewise cognitive development in accordance with Piaget's theory of cognitive epigenesis. We carried out a replication study of the simulation experiments by McClelland (1989) and McClelland and Jenkins (1991) in which a PDP network learns to solve balance scale problems. In objective tests motivated from catastrophe theory, a mathematical theory of transitions in epigenetical systems, no evidence for stage transitions in network performance was found. It is concluded (...) that PDP networks lack the ability to recover the positive outcomes of analogous catastrophe analyses of real cognitive developmental data. In an attempt to further characterize the learning behaviour of PDP networks, we carried out a second simulation study using the discrimination‐shift paradigm. The results thus obtained indicate that PDP learning is compatible with the learning of stimulus‐response relationships, not with the acquisition of mediating rules such as conceived in (neo‐)Piagetian theory. In closing, we speculate about the feasibility of simulating stagewise development with alternative network architectures. (shrink)

Originally presented as the author's thesis, Bonn, 1978.

In diesem Beitrag werden zunächst die Begriffe "Norm”, "pädagogische Norm" und "Begründung” geklärt. Im Lichte dieser deflatorischen Präzisierungen wird herausgearbeitet, was die Philosophie zur Begründung pädagogischer Normen beitragen kann. Die Diskussion bezieht sich dabei auf meta-ethische Erörterungen, auf logische Klärungen, auf den Begriff der Gültigkeit von Normen sowie schließlich auf das sog. Zweck-Mittel-Denken Im Begründungszusammenhang erzieherisch gemeinter Sollensforderungen. Insgesamt wird damit auch zu zeigen versucht, was die Philosophie bei der Begründung pädagogischer Normen nicht zu leisten Imstande ist, d.h. welche Aufgaben (...) hiebei der Pädagogik selbst zufallen. (shrink)

This fourth part of the 'Materialien zur Geschichte der Ramanuja-Schule' is an attempt to trace in philological and historical terms the theologoumenon's development of the doctrine of the 'Inner Ruler' following the texts handed down to us and to prevent an expose of its theological substance. The doctrine is followed up in the work of Sankara (ca. 800 A.D.), in the Subalopanisad, in Bhaskara's Bhedabhedavada (about 900 A.D.) up to the adoption of Antaryami in the Brahma-doctrine of Ramanuja. Finally, after (...) the exposition of the influence of tantric thought, the doctrine of Antaryami is treated with regard to the late period of the Ramanuja-school. This investigation is of importance not only because of the collection of the relevant texts regarding this doctrine, but also in view of the necessity of examining the emergence and development of this school not only from the standpoint of the Vedantic Brahmadoctrine, but to evaluate this school as what it has become in the sense of 'Sitz im Leben', i.e. one of the significant 'religious traditions' of Vaisnavism, whose Brahma-doctrine has developped into a fully-fledged theological world view. (shrink)

The body of measures promulgated to deal with the emergency of the depression is frequently linked up with the idea of a planned economy. That emergency measures have little or no essential connection with planning is the central thesis of this essay.The author discusses the four most important premises of the emergency measures : the intensity of the depression, the degree of organization reached by the country in depression, its social stratification, and its political set-up. Two emergency methods are distinguished. (...) On the one hand, an attempt is made to set the price mechanism in operation by lowering production costs, principally wages but also interest rates, rents, etc. The same adaption is aimed at by measures of state intervention which try to boost prices particularly by restriction of production and of imports. The second method, which has been used in an unprecedented manner during the present depression, attempts to stop the cumulative deflationary process by credit and monetary measures, as well as by public works.The effects of the emergency measures in some of the more important countries are discussed briefly. The author believes that a major part of these measures was necessitated by the course of events, but that their effect will be conflicting and of only short duration.Le but du travail est d'indiquer les idées les plus importantes pour comprendre et juger la politique de crise et de montrer qu'il ne saurait être question de considérer aucune des mesures prises comme un véritable plan. Par politique de crise, on entend les mesures destinées à atténuer ou surmonter une crise économique existante, par opposition à une „politique de conjoncture“ qui tend à une économie sans crise.L'auteur analyse les quatre prémisses fondamentales d'une politique de crise : profondeur de la dépression, degré d'organisation économique, structure sociale et organisation politique du pays atteint par la crise. On distingue deux méthodes employées pour combattre la crise. La politique d'adaptation, sous sa forme libérale, cherche à renforcer l'automatisme du marché, en diminuant les frais de production, etc. Les procédés d'intervention, dans la politique d'adaptation, ont pour objet l'augmentation des prix, avant tout à l'aide de restrictions de production et d'importation. La deuxième méthode, appliquée dans la crise actuelle avec une ampleur jamais encore connue, tâche d'arrêter le processus de déflation par des mouvements contraires. Les moyens principaux sont des mesures qui concernent le crédit et la monnaie, et des travaux publics. L'action d'ensemble de la politique de crise dans quelques pays importants est rapidement étudiée, à la fin de l'article. Encore que l'auteur considère une grande partie des mesures prises contre la crise comme inévitables, il tient leur action pour contradictoire et à courte échéance. (shrink)

In this article we introduce and study the notion of operational closure: a transitive set d is called operationally closed iff it contains all constants of OST and any operation f∈d applied to an element a∈d yields an element fa∈d, provided that f applied to a has a value at all. We will show that there is a direct relationship between operational closure and stability in the sense that operationally closed sets behave like Σ1 substructures of the universe. This leads (...) to our final result that OST plus the axiom , claiming that any set is element of an operationally closed set, is proof-theoretically equivalent to the system KP+ of Kripke–Platek set theory with infinity and Σ1 separation. We also characterize the system OST plus the existence of one operationally closed set in terms of Kripke–Platek set theory with infinity and a parameter-free version of Σ1 separation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Reply to Ellin Gerhard Streminger Professor Ellin's very interesting and stimulating comments may be summarized in the following four points: 1. Hume's opposition to religion is even more far-reaching than I had acknowledged, since there is "no evidence" that any form of 'true religion' is to be found in Hume. According to Ellin, the discussion on 'religion and morality' in the second halfofPart XII ofthe Dialogues is (...) "not about true religion at all," since by using the term 'true religion' Philo means nothing but philosophy ("being whatever reason can tell us about the question ofthe originofthe universe") and morality("being the set ofprinciples ultimately founded on inclination and the natural motives of justice and benevolence"). Therefore, "there are not four things: philosophy, morality, true religion, and false religion; but only three," and my remarks on 'true religion' are "a distortion of Hume's views, based on a misreading of Hume's text." I will try to show that there are slightly more things in Hume than 'empirical philosophy, morality and false religion' by collecting some relevant passages in Part XII ofthe Dialogues.1 Philo: But in proportion to my veneration for true religion, is my abhorrence ofvulgar superstitions. (D 219) Cleanthes: Theproper office ofreligion is to regulate the heart ofmen, humanize theirconduct, infuse the spiritoftemperance, order, and obedience; and as its operation is silent, and only enforces the motives ofmortality andjustice, it is in danger of being overlooked, and confounded with these other motives. When it distinguishes itself, and acts as a separate principle over men, it has departed from its proper sphere, and has become only a cover to faction and ambition. (D 220) Philo: And so will all religion... except the philosophical and rational kind. (D 220) Philo: the vulgar... are utterly incapable ofso pure a religion as represents the Deity to be pleased with nothing but virtue in human behaviour. The recommendations to the Divinity are generally supposed to be either frivohus observances, or rapturous ecstasies, or a bigoted credulity... Amongst ourselves, Volume XV Number 2 301 GERHARD STREMINGER some have beenguilty ofthat atrociousness... ofdeclaiming, in express terms, against morality, and representing it as a sure forfeiture ofthe divine favour. (D 221-2) Philo: True religion, Iallow, has no suchpernicious consequences : But we must treat ofreligion, as it has commonly [Editor: commonly for always] been found in the world. (D 223) Cleanthes: Take care, PHILO... take care: Push not matters too far:Allow not your zeal against false religion to undermine your veneration for the true... The most agreeable reflection, which it is possible for human imagination to suggest, is that ofgenuine theism, which represents us as the workmanship of a Being perfectlygood, wise, andpowerful. (D 224) Philo: These appearances... are most engaging and alluring; and with regard to the true philosopher, they are more than appearances. (D 224) Philo: These fine models of religion are the mere product of philosophy. (D 225) Philo: It is an absurdity to believe that the Deity has human passions, and one ofthe lowest of human passions, a restless appetite for applause. It is an inconsistency to believe, that, since theDeity has this humanpassion, he has not others also; and, in particular, a disregard to the opinions ofcreatures so much inferior. (D 226) Philo: To know God, says Seneca, is to worship him. All other worship is indeed absurd, superstitious, and even impious... Yet is this impiety the smallest ofwhich superstition is guilty. Commonly, it depresses the Deityfar below the condition ofmankind; and represents him as a capricious Daemon, who exercises hispower without reason and without humanity! [But] philosophical theists... entertain, or rather indeed endeavour to entertain, suitable notions ofhis divine perfections. (D 226-7) I believe that these passages reveal a semi-serious discussion between Philo and Cleanthes on 'true religion' (after Demea, the orthodox, is gone), and if one adds to this collection other passages in Hume's work, it seems to be probable that there is a form of religion Hume considered to be worthy of being called 'true' (although he did 302Hume Studies A REPLY TO ELLIN not adhere to it). With some reservations, 'true religion' may be characterized in the following way... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Religion a Threat to Morality: An Attempt to Throw Some New Light on Hume's Philosophy of Religion* Gerhard Streminger At the beginning ofhis Natural History ofReligion Hume writes that two questions in particular... challenge our attention, to wit, that concerning its foundation in reason, and that concerning its origin in human nature. The first challenge is taken up by Hume in the Dialogues ConcerningNatural Religion, and the second (...) in hisNatural History ofReligion. In this paper I will try to show that there is a third fundamental problem discussed by Hume with regard to religion, namely its relationship to and influence on morality. Although he never wrote on this topic in as systematic a way as on the above-mentioned two questions inparticular, I am convinced that his thoughts about it were not just casual. The passages in Hume relevant to this third central question about religion are to be found in "Of Superstition and Enthusiasm," in Essays Moral, Political, and Literary; in section 11 ofAn Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding; in Appendix 4 and "A Dialogue," in An Enquiry Concerning the Principles ofMorals; in the History ofEngland; in Part XII of the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion ; and, in particular, in the Natural History ofReligion. Why Hume never wrote about the relationship between religion and morality in a more systematic way is not entirely clear. He may have decided not to provoke the orthodox any further than he already had. That Hume changed the title ofsection 11 ofhis first Enquiry from the original "Of the Practical Consequences of Natural Religion" to the rather non-committal "Of a Particular Providence and of a Future State" may support this conjecture. Before going into more detail as to Hume's view on the relationship between religion and morality, I want to make a few remarks about Hume's opinion of religion in general. Hume made a distinction between one 'true' and two forms of 'false' religion. His most explicit description of true religion is to be found in a preface to the second volume of his History ofEngland: Volume XV Number 2 277 GERHARD STREMINGER Theproper Office ofReligion, Hume wrote in terms which have a Quakerish flavour, is to reform Men's Lives, to purify their Hearts, to inforce all moralDuties, & to secure Obedience to the Laws & civil Magistrate. While it pursues these useful Purposes, its Operations, tho' infinitely valuable, are secret & silent; andseldom come under the Cognizance ofHistory... The Idea ofan Infinite Mind, the Author ofthe Universe seems... to require a Worship absolutely pure, simple, unadorned; without Rites, Institutions, Ceremonies; even without Temples, Priests, or verbal Prayer & Supplication. This preface, however, was not printed in the words quoted above. Instead it was reduced by Hume to a footnote at the end of the second volume of his History of England in a shortened and toned-down version. Even this footnote was removed in later editions ofthe History ofEngland. But in the Dialogues Hume repeated his idea of the effect of true religion on morality almost verbatim: The proper office of religion is to regulate the heart of men, humanize their conduct, infuse the spirit oftemperance, order, and obedience; and as its operation is silent, and only enforces the motives of mortality and justice, it is in danger of being overlooked, and confounded with these other motives. This form ofreligion, however, although without anypernicious consequences with regard to society (D 223), is extremely rare. Religion, as it has commonly been found in the world (D 223), is a threat to morality. The corruptions of true religion, namely superstition and enthusiasm, are the popular forms of religious worship. Whenever Hume talks about religion without qualifications, he has this false religion in mind. Coming back to my original thesis, Hume, I think, sees three main negative influences of false religion: (1) The clergy has an interest in setting bounds to human knowledge; (2) The God offalse religion is no moral authority; (3) False religion corrupts the natural moral sentiments and promotes an 'artificial, affected' life. I. False Religion and Human Knowledge To see the force of Hume's argument concerning the threat of false religion to morality, one has to take into account some general assumptions of Hume... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Religion a Threat to Morality: An Attempt to Throw Some New Light on Hume's Philosophy of Religion* Gerhard Streminger At the beginning ofhis Natural History ofReligion Hume writes that two questions in particular... challenge our attention, to wit, that concerning its foundation in reason, and that concerning its origin in human nature. The first challenge is taken up by Hume in the Dialogues ConcerningNatural Religion, and the second (...) in hisNatural History ofReligion. In this paper I will try to show that there is a third fundamental problem discussed by Hume with regard to religion, namely its relationship to and influence on morality. Although he never wrote on this topic in as systematic a way as on the above-mentioned two questions inparticular, I am convinced that his thoughts about it were not just casual. The passages in Hume relevant to this third central question about religion are to be found in "Of Superstition and Enthusiasm," in Essays Moral, Political, and Literary; in section 11 ofAn Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding; in Appendix 4 and "A Dialogue," in An Enquiry Concerning the Principles ofMorals; in the History ofEngland; in Part XII of the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion ; and, in particular, in the Natural History ofReligion. Why Hume never wrote about the relationship between religion and morality in a more systematic way is not entirely clear. He may have decided not to provoke the orthodox any further than he already had. That Hume changed the title ofsection 11 ofhis first Enquiry from the original "Of the Practical Consequences of Natural Religion" to the rather non-committal "Of a Particular Providence and of a Future State" may support this conjecture. Before going into more detail as to Hume's view on the relationship between religion and morality, I want to make a few remarks about Hume's opinion of religion in general. Hume made a distinction between one 'true' and two forms of 'false' religion. His most explicit description of true religion is to be found in a preface to the second volume of his History ofEngland: Volume XV Number 2 277 GERHARD STREMINGER Theproper Office ofReligion, Hume wrote in terms which have a Quakerish flavour, is to reform Men's Lives, to purify their Hearts, to inforce all moralDuties, & to secure Obedience to the Laws & civil Magistrate. While it pursues these useful Purposes, its Operations, tho' infinitely valuable, are secret & silent; andseldom come under the Cognizance ofHistory... The Idea ofan Infinite Mind, the Author ofthe Universe seems... to require a Worship absolutely pure, simple, unadorned; without Rites, Institutions, Ceremonies; even without Temples, Priests, or verbal Prayer & Supplication. This preface, however, was not printed in the words quoted above. Instead it was reduced by Hume to a footnote at the end of the second volume of his History of England in a shortened and toned-down version. Even this footnote was removed in later editions ofthe History ofEngland. But in the Dialogues Hume repeated his idea of the effect of true religion on morality almost verbatim: The proper office of religion is to regulate the heart of men, humanize their conduct, infuse the spirit oftemperance, order, and obedience; and as its operation is silent, and only enforces the motives of mortality and justice, it is in danger of being overlooked, and confounded with these other motives. This form ofreligion, however, although without anypernicious consequences with regard to society (D 223), is extremely rare. Religion, as it has commonly been found in the world (D 223), is a threat to morality. The corruptions of true religion, namely superstition and enthusiasm, are the popular forms of religious worship. Whenever Hume talks about religion without qualifications, he has this false religion in mind. Coming back to my original thesis, Hume, I think, sees three main negative influences of false religion: (1) The clergy has an interest in setting bounds to human knowledge; (2) The God offalse religion is no moral authority; (3) False religion corrupts the natural moral sentiments and promotes an 'artificial, affected' life. I. False Religion and Human Knowledge To see the force of Hume's argument concerning the threat of false religion to morality, one has to take into account some general assumptions of Hume... (shrink)