Human Evolution provides a comprehensive overview of hominid evolution, synthesising data and approaches from fields as diverse as physical anthropology, evolutionary biology, molecular biology, genetics, archaeology, psychology and philosophy. The book starts with chapters on evolution, population genetics, systematics, and the methods for constructing evolutionary trees. These are followed by a comprehensive review of the fossil history of human evolution since our divergence from the apes. Subsequent chapters cover more recent data, both fossil and molecular, relating to the evolution of (...) modern humans. A final section describes the evolution of culture, language, art, and morality. The authors are leading experts in two complementary fields of scholarship, physical anthropology and molecular evolution. Throughout the book they successfully integrate their expertise in evolutionary theory, phylogenetics, genomics, cultural evolution, language, aesthetics and morality to produce a cutting edge textbook, copiously illustrated and with an extensive and up-to-date bibliography. It will be suitable for both senior undergraduate and graduate level students taking courses on human evolution within departments of biology, anthropology, psychology and philosophy. The book will also appeal to a more general audience seeking a readable, up-to-date and inclusive treatment of human origins and evolution. (shrink)

Human Evolution provides a comprehensive overview of hominid evolution, synthesising data and approaches from fields as diverse as physical anthropology, evolutionary biology, molecular biology, genetics, archaeology, psychology and philosophy. The book starts with chapters on evolution, population genetics, systematics, and the methods for constructing evolutionary trees. These are followed by a comprehensive review of the fossil history of human evolution since our divergence from the apes. Subsequent chapters cover more recent data, both fossil and molecular, relating to the evolution of (...) modern humans. A final section describes the evolution of culture, language, art, and morality.The authors are leading experts in two complementary fields of scholarship, physical anthropology and molecular evolution. Throughout the book they successfully integrate their expertise in evolutionary theory, phylogenetics, genomics, cultural evolution, language, aesthetics and morality to produce a cutting edge textbook, copiously illustrated and with an extensive and up-to-date bibliography. It will be suitable for both senior undergraduate and graduate level students taking courses on human evolution within departments of biology, anthropology, psychology and philosophy. The book will also appeal to a more general audience seeking a readable, up-to-date and inclusive treatment of human origins and evolution. (shrink)

With the discovery of Australopithecus, the concepts of bipedalism, the emergence of the open savannas, and the separation of pongids and hominids (bipedal-savanna-cladogeny; the BSC model) were integrated in an attempt to interpret the keys to the emergence of man. However, palæoclimatology, palaeoecology, and the morphology of A. ramidus and A. afarensis show that early hominids were better adapted to the tropical forest. Consequently, the BSC model is no longer valid, even though the relationship between open savannas and bipedalism can (...) still be invoked to explain cladogeny between Paranthropus and Homo. That the BSC model is still thriving could be due to preconceived ideas as to what constitutes a human being — ideas that are projected into the past to explain our origins. (shrink)

The use of the computer metaphor has led to the proposal of mind architecture (Pylyshyn 1984; Newell 1990) as a model of the organization of the mind. The dualist computational model, however, has, since the earliest days of psychological functionalism, required that the concepts mind architecture and brain architecture be remote from each other. The development of both connectionism and neurocomputational science, has sought to dispense with this dualism and provide general models of consciousness – a uniform cognitive architecture –, (...) which is in general reductionist, but which retains the computer metaphor. This paper examines, in the first place, the concepts of mind architecture and brain architecture, in order to evaluate the syntheses which have recently been offered. It then moves on to show how modifications which have been made to classical functionalist mind architectures, with the aim of making them compatible with brain architectures, are unable to resolve some of the most serious problems of functionalism. Some suggestions are given as to why it is not possible to relate mind structures and brain structures by using neurocomputational approaches, and finally the question is raised of the validity of reductionism in a theory which sets out to unite mind and brain architectures. (shrink)

En el primer capítulo de su libro Duchesneau aborda la cuestión de lo que es una especie, algo de difícil solución porque el de especie es un concepto de una potencia heurística inmensa y, a la vez, está lleno de agujeros que se hacen patentes en cuanto se pretende hilar fino para definirlo. Las alternativas entre la especie como grupo reproductivo -la "especie biológica"- y como secuencia evolutiva -la "especie filogenética"-, con sus respectivas precisiones internas, están bien planteadas por el (...) autor. También lo está la más reciente "especie ecológica", de talante adaptacionista. Duchesneau no pretende argumentar en favor de uno u otro concepto, sino indicar que existen, y de su postura aséptica se deduce que, probablemente, es imposible reducir ninguno de esos conceptos al otro. Pero esa conclusión tropieza de inmediato con el asunto que aborda Duchesneau en el epígrafe siguiente de su libro: la taxonomía. Porque en algo coinciden al menos quienes emplean especies biológicas, filogenéticas y ecológicas: en darles un nombre. No es raro, pues, que la sistemática sea en estos momentos una de las disciplinas que tenga más interrogantes por resolver. (shrink)

La pregunta acerca de qué es un humano tiene una respuesta trivial: cualquier individuo perteneciente a la especie Homo sapiens. Pero si nos interrogamos por el sentido de lo que es un ser humano, cuáles son los rasgos distintivos respecto de otras especies, cómo evolucionaron y por qué, en qué medida los antecesores nuestros disponían de ellos y dónde y cuándo vivieron esos ancestros, entonces entramos en un terreno de difícil recorrido. En los últimos siete millones de años existieron varias (...) especies a las que cabe llamar «humanas» o, por lo menos, «homínidas». Es éste un repaso breve y muy sintético de lo que supuso tal panorama diverso y dinámico que conduciría, a la postre, a los humanos actuales. Nuestras propias características adquieren una nueva luz cuando se contemplan a lo largo del proceso de su filogénesis. (shrink)

In this book, I present the results of an investigation which began with an extended stay at Oxford's Balliol College during the first half of 1995. My visit to Oxford was made possible by a grant from the Spanish Ministerio de Educaci6n y Ciencia. My sincere thanks go to Joseph Raz who served as my supervisor in Oxford. For several points of the present study, conversations with Timothy Endicott in Oxford were also of great help. The book is part of (...) a larger project of investigation, directed by Albert Calsami glia, which is a joint effort of a group of legal philosophers from the Universitat Pom peu Fabra and the Universitat de Girona, and which also receives financial support from the Spanish Ministerio de Educaci6n y Ciencia. An earlier version of the manuscript was presented in June 1996 to the selection committee for a tenured professorship in Legal Philosophy at the Universitat de Girona. The members of the committee were Francisco Laporta, Albert Calsamiglia, Gregorio Peces-Barba, Camilo J. Cela Conde, and Francesca Puigpelat. I am grateful to all of them for their comments, which have been extremely useful in preparing the final ver sion of this book. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage montre ce qu'une réflexion historique et philosophique peut apporter à la vie politique. La France et l'Europe sont confrontées à des mutations, des crises et des risques de grande ampleur. 'Face à cela, on invoque la raison tous les jours et nous l'opposons à l'irrationnel' observe l'auteur, mais cette opposition binaire n'est pas féconde car 'il faut explorer les failles de la raison elle-même: celles des Lumières et du libéralisme; celles d'un système économique que les peuples ne (...) peuvent maîtriser ; celles de la géopolitique et de la prétention universaliste occidentale.' Philippe Herzog appelle à un profond renouvellement de la méthode en politique, reprenant la question que s'était posée Descartes pour bien guider notre raison et il la situe dans le contexte actuel. Recouvrer nos libertés de choix et nos responsabilités exige une révolution de l'éducation et la participation de chacun pour repenser les finalités et transformer les institutions. Alors que les risques de délitement de l'Union européenne et de guerre à l'échelle du monde sont avérés, notre Union doit se rendre non alignée afin de promouvoir des solidarités concrètes en son sein et avec toutes les régions du monde. Régénérer nos idéaux de paix et de développement avec l'ambition d'une conscience commune de l'humanité pour échapper au naufrage de la raison est au cœur de ce livre."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

The notion of conceptual space, proposed by Gärdenfors as a framework for the representation of concepts and knowledge, has been highly influential over the last decade or so. One of the main theses involved in this approach is that the conceptual regions associated with properties, concepts, verbs, etc. are convex. The aim of this paper is to show that such a constraint—that of the convexity of the geometry of conceptual regions—is problematic; both from a theoretical perspective and with regard to (...) the inner workings of the theory itself. On the one hand, all the arguments provided in favor of the convexity of conceptual regions rest on controversial assumptions. Additionally, his argument in support of a Euclidean metric, based on the integral character of conceptual dimensions, is weak, and under non-Euclidean metrics the structure of regions may be non-convex. Furthermore, even if the metric were Euclidean, the convexity constraint could be not satisfied if concepts were differentially weighted. On the other hand, Gärdenfors’ convexity constraint is brought into question by the own inner workings of conceptual spaces because: some of the allegedly convex properties of concepts are not convex; the conceptual regions resulting from the combination of convex properties can be non-convex; convex regions may co-vary in non-convex ways; and his definition of verbs is incompatible with a definition of properties in terms of convex regions. Therefore, the mandatory character of the convexity requirement for regions in a conceptual space theory should be reconsidered. (shrink)

As James Caesar highlights in Reconstructing America, the word “globalization” seems sometimes to be synonymous with “Americanization” or “Americanism,” evoking negative images. Globalization may bring indigenous cultures to their death and cause national individualism to disappear into a shapeless muddle. On Americanism, Heidegger declared that it was “the future monstrosity of modern times.” This would be homogenization, the rubbing out of cultural specificity, life in one universe, one dimension. Extremists like Alexandre Kohève take it further still. It would be the (...) end of history. Third world nations, particularly the Caribbean countries, would be predesignated victims of such an order, without power in political or economic realms, only making the front page of newspapers during cataclysm and natural catastrophes like Hugo, George, and Mitch. The tiny island of Montserrat, never before known to the West, rose to international fame when its volcano La Soufrière began to erupt. Rwanda would be known for genocide, and the Congo for a civil war and the assassination of its leader. (shrink)

Recently, Casasanto and Lupyan (2015) have asserted that there are no context-independent concepts: all concepts are constructed ad hoc when they are instantiated. My aim is to show that the ad hoc cognition framework can be characterized by a similarity-based theory of concepts, and that two different notions of concept should be distinguished —which may be identified with two distinct stages of their life cycle (storage and instantiation). This approach brings together virtues from opposing views: (a) invariantist: stored concepts are (...) stable enough to collect new information; (b) contextualist: instantiated concepts are context-dependent, what explains our adaptive ability to changing environments. (shrink)

El objetivo fundamental de este artículo está dirigido a valorar las funciones de la intertextualidad en la construcción del espacio insular caribeño en WideSargasso Sea, de la escritora dominiquesa Jean Rhys. Por tal motivo se analizaron las relaciones intertextuales entre Jean Eyre, de Charlotte Brontë, y Wide Sargasso Sea, de Jea Rhys, con énfasis en la isla en tanto espacio literario presentado de manera explícita. Como resultado se pudo constatar que la principal función de la intertextualidad en dicho texto responde (...) a la intención calibanesca y desmitificadora de desmonte de los arquetipos en los que la imagen del otro ha sido construida en el discurso del poder. De igual manera, el presente análisis permite develar la riqueza de las connotaciones otorgadas en el texto al espacio isla y a sus significados añadidos. La red de significaciones encontradas refuerza su identidad cultural caribeña. (shrink)

In this article the author presents Husserl’s analysis of the problem of time-consciousness in the C-Manuscripts (1929-1934). He tries to discuss the reasons why Husserl introduces the concept of “living present” and the necessity of distinguishing the originary temporalizing flux of absolute consciousness and the immanent time where acts are placed when they become object of an act of reflection. Another important issue is the introduction of a Ur-Ich, which works anonymously and temporalizes itself. It will be also studied why (...) Husserl considers at the end that temporalization is an non-intentional passive process that works at the deepest level of consciousness. (shrink)