Can animals, and especially cattle, be the subject ofmoral concern? Should we care about their well-being?Two competing ethical theories have addressed suchissues so far. A utilitarian theory which, inBentham's wake, extends moral consideration to everysentient being, and a theory of the rights orinterests of animals which follows Feinberg'sconceptions. This includes various positions rangingfrom the most radical (about animal liberation) tomore moderate ones (concerned with the well-being ofanimals). Notwithstanding their diversity, theseconceptions share some common flaws. First, as anextension of primarily anthropocentric (...) theories (aboututility or rights) they still participate in the flawsof the original setting. Second, extending them tonon-human beings raises the problem of the borderwhich is to be drawn between what can be included inthe purview of moral consideration and what is leftoutside. Third, such theories are not able to distinguishbetween an ethics of wildlife and an ethics ofdomestic life, which too often leads to preposterousstatements. We would like to argue (i) that we should distinguishbetween environmental ethics (concerned withpopulations, species, biotic communities) and animalethics (where animals are taken into consideration individually);(ii) that individualist animal ethics are not relevantfor animal rearing; (iii) that animal rearing is a hierarchicalrelationship which rules are to be found in the fiction of a domesticcontract.Hence, we would like to construct a new conception ofthe ethics of the relation between men and the cattlethey breed based on the idea of a domestic contract.Our main assumption is Mary Midgleys's anthropologicalassumption, according to which human communities,since the Neolithic age, have always included variousanimals, so that relations of sociability have alwaysexisted between human beings and animals within thedomestic community (a mixed community). In order tospecify the hierarchical and non-egalitarian, butinclusive reciprocal obligations and relations insidesuch a community, we will elaborate on the notion ofa ``domestic contract'', an implicitly assumedidea traced back to Lucretius and whichwe will follow up to the physiocrats and Adam Smith.We will show that such an idea relies upon theassumption of communication between cattle farmer andanimals, of shared experience and exchanges betweenthe two parties. We will then show how modern factory,or battery animal farming, can be seen as unilaterallybreaking this domestic contract, forsaking ourduties towards domestic animals. (shrink)

This paper explores and discusses the various meanings of the stewardship concept in the field of sustainability science. We highlight the increasing differences between alternative approaches to stewardship and propose a typology to enable scientists and practitioners to more precisely identify the basis and objectives of the concept of stewardship. We first present the two dimensions we used to map the diversity of stances concerning stewardship. Second, we analyse these positions in relation to the limits of the systemic approach, ideological (...) manipulation, responsibility, and solidarity. In the final section we explain how the concept of ecological solidarity, a core principal in recent French law on biodiversity conservation and national park governance can contribute to the underpinning of a specific form of social-ecological stewardship. (shrink)

Comment répondre à la crise environnementale et aux menaces qu’elle fait peser sur la poursuite de notre mode de vie? Devons-nous mobiliser nos forces pour lutter contre la crise, changer radicalement nos comportements? Ne faudrait-il pas plutôt veiller à nous adapter à une situation transformée? Ces deux pôles sont présents dans les politiques environnementales. Pour répondre au changement climatique on envisage à la fois des politiques d’atténuation (mitigation) des émissions de gaz à ef...

La dimension politique du scepticisme, considère-t-on souvent, c'est le conformisme. Mais la séparation entre le domaine intérieur et l'espace public n'a pas pour seule conséquence l'injonction de suivre la coutume. Elle est d'abord constitution du domaine privé, qui est un lieu de liberté, à l'écart de la foule et du pouvoir. Cela permet de mieux comprendre la position sceptique en politique: le conseil du prince, en secret et en retrait de l'éclat public. Cela permet surtout de comprendre ce qu'apporte le (...) scepticisme aux conceptions modernes de la liberté: un modèle social de la libre poursuite de la vérité. (shrink)

“Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life on Earth.” How can we understand Jonas’ “maxim”? Is it too anthropocentric to be of any interest for an environmental ethic? Is is too limited to survival to have a moral signification in a truly human ethic? One can argue first that it is not so much anti-Kantian than that it challenges the current prevailing “presentism” and obliges us to take into consideration not (...) only future generations, but also the context in which one anticipates these future generations to be living. Therefore, we can distinguish two different interpretations of Jonas’ maxim: in a first stage, that of sustainable development, it was understood as taking into consideration not only the needs but also the rights of future generations; in a second stage, that of an Anthropocene and ecological transition, it means that making sense of humanity implies connecting human beings to the Earth and other living beings far from opposing them. (shrink)

Conçue à l’origine comme une discipline globale concernée par la survie des populations humaines dans un environnement global, la bioéthique a été finalement redéfinie comme une éthique biomédicale, particulièrement par les applications des biotechnologies aux humains. La bioéthique a-t-elle profité de ce resserrement anthropocentrique? Nous défendrons l’idée que ce n’est pas le cas après avoir examiné la question des frontières morales entre humains et non humains, celle des limites de l’application des biotechnologies aux humains pour en éviter la mécanisation, et (...) celle des définitions de la santé. (shrink)

“Actúa de manera tal que los efectos de tu acción sean compatibles con la permanencia de la vida humana genuina en la Tierra”. ¿Cómo podemos entender esta máxima de Jonas? ¿Es demasiado antropocéntrica como para ser interesante para la ética ambiental? ¿Está demasiado limitada a la supervivencia como para tener un significado moral en una ética verdaderamente humana? En primer lugar, podríamos argumentar que no es tan anti-kantiana como para desafiar el “presentismo” actual imperante y nos obliga a tener en (...) cuenta no solo las generaciones futuras, sino también el contexto en el que anticipamos que estas futuras generaciones vivirán. Por lo tanto, deberíamos distinguir dos interpretaciones diferentes de la máxima de Jonas. En una primera etapa, la del desarrollo sostenible, se entendió que considera no solo las necesidades sino también los derechos de las generaciones futuras. En una segunda etapa, la de un Antropoceno y una transición ecológica, significa que dar sentido a la humanidad implica conectar a los seres humanos con la Tierra y otros seres vivos en lugar de oponerse a ellos. (shrink)

« La liberté consiste à n'être soumis qu'aux lois»: cette idée, que Turgot attribue aux «écrivains républicains», a sans doute sa place dans la tradition républicaine. Il s'agit cependant d'une idée essentiellement moderne, et pas nécessairement républicaine, développée dans la critique de l'absolutisme: on en retient l'importance qu'il y a à faire la loi, tout en refusant que qui que ce soit puisse se placer au-dessus des lois. Montesquieu fait du gouvernement modéré, qui peut être une monarchie, le gouvernement de (...) la loi, celle-ci garantit à l'action rationnelle la prévisibilité et la constance dont elle a besoin. C'est Rousseau qui fait du gouvernement de la loi un thème républicain, en identifiant autogouvernement et autonomie. Lier la liberté à la loi, c'est insister sur l'existence politique des libertés: depuis Turgot, les libéraux y voient une menace pour les droits. (shrink)

Notre conception dualiste de la nature n’est ni universelle ni universalisable. Cependant, posant l’extériorité de ce qui est humain et de ce qui est naturel, ce dualisme s’est décliné en un certain nombre d’oppositions : nature/culture ; naturel/artificiel. On pourrait a priori considérer qu’il en est de même de l’opposition entre le sauvage et le domestique. Or, entre le sauvage et le domestique, il y a un entre-deux de milieux (ce que les Romains dénommaient le saltus ), qu’il s’agisse des (...) espaces pastoraux ou des peuplements forestiers qui ne sont plus exploités, ou encore, des friches industrielles et urbaines. C’est ce que l’on qualifie en France de « nature férale », résultat d’ensauvagements multiples. L’auteur plaide pour la libre évolution de ces milieux comme stratégie alternative de protection de la nature. (shrink)

La question de l’écologie est celle de la nature, mais que faut-il entendre par là? La réflexion sur ces questions a longtemps hésité entre une vision dualiste (qui définit la nature par opposition à l’homme) et une vision moniste (l’homme fait partie de la nature). L’idée générale de cet article est que l’on n’échappe pas aux impasses du dualisme en se ralliant au monisme. L’un et l’autre constituent les deux faces, difficilement séparables, du naturalisme moderne. On sort du dualisme par (...) le pluralisme : l’opposition du naturel et de l’artificiel et celle du naturel et du culturel (ou du social), que l’on confond souvent, sont distinctes. Nature, artéfact et société dessinent trois pôles, que multiplie la pluralité des cultures. C’est en les prenant tous en considération que l’on peut apprendre à bien se conduire dans la nature, sans pour autant y disparaitre. (shrink)

This paper aims at understanding why Rousseau excluded women from citizenship. Citizenship, for Rousseau, is not a matter of right, not even a matter of behaviour (of how to behave individually to be a good citizen). It is a matter of social condition. How should society be constituted so that there can be citizens? The answer to this question is that there must be women in the private sphere so that there can be citizen in the public sphere. The paper (...) begins with Montesquieu's model of the republican condition of women, considers the way Rousseau updated this model, and concludes with the idea, that much more than the male figure of citizenship (which remains a stereotype), the woman, in Rousseau, is the true figure of modernity. (shrink)

Why Rousseau, this modern, has much more to say about nature than most of his contemporaries? And as he speaks it? This is what we investigate, taking the issue from three relationships: the humanity with nature (in its global dimension and a first approach, metaphysics), the human societies with nature, by the technique, and, finally, the lone hiker, the independent individual.

L’émergence de l’économique doit-elle être comprise comme l’émancipation des conduites privées de la tutelle politique, ou comme la promotion publique de conduites jusque-là simplement privées, ou particulières? Confrontant le récit classiquement libéral de l’auto-affirmation de l’individu à l’analyse de la recomposition des sphères sociales (famille, économie, État) à l’époque moderne, tout en s’appuyant sur la distinction entre économie formelle et économie substantielle, l’article argumente en faveur de l’étude des sphères qui permet non seulement de rendre compte de l’articulation de l’économique (...) et du politique, mais également du statut de l’individu. (shrink)

L’attention de Montesquieu pour la diversité empirique des institutions humaines ne se comprend pas seulement dans une perspective descriptive, visant à rendre compte des faits, elle est constitutive d’un effort pour penser une évaluation circonstanciée des institutions et des lois. En examinant la pluralité des États, la pluralité des pouvoirs et des puissances sociales qui constituent l’ordre politique, et la pluralité des hommes, on verra comment l’étude des rapports menée dans L’Esprit des lois vise un « savoir de la liberté (...) ». (shrink)

For approximately a quarter of a century, moral reflection has turned to a new object: the environment. Environmental ethics has emerged primarily in the United States out of considerations on Nature in the wild state - the wilderness - and the duty to preserve it. As such, it divides into two trends. The first seeks to develop a general theory of moral value, an abstract, universal principle qualifying individual entities, such that the intrinsic value of living entities deserves our respect. (...) The second, first formulated by an American forester, Aldo Leopold, is an ethics of the biotic community: how Nature can be a community of which we are members, and in within which it is possible for us to conduct ourselves well. (shrink)

In what constitutes the only English-language collection of essays ever dedicated to the analysis of Montesquieu's contributions to political science, the contributors review some of the most vexing controversies that have arisen in the interpretation of Montesquieu's thought. By paying careful attention to the historical, political, and philosophical contexts of Montesquieu's ideas, the contributors provide fresh readings of The Spirit of Laws, clarify the goals and ambitions of its author, and point out the pertinence of his thinking to the problems (...) of our world today. (shrink)

Abstract - Evolutionary, ecological and ethical studies are, at the same time, specific scientific disciplines and, from an historical point of view, structurally linked domains of research. In a context of environmental crisis, the need is increasingly emerging for a connecting epistemological framework able to express a common or convergent tendency of thought and practice aimed at building, among other things, an environmental policy management respectful of the planet’s biodiversity and its evolutionary potential. -/- Evolutionary biology, ecology and ethics: at (...) first glance, three different objects of research, three different worldviews and three different scientific communities. In reality, there are both structural and historical links between these disciplines. First, some topics are obviously common across the board. Second, the emerging need for environmental policy management has gradually but radically changed the relationship between these disciplines. Over the last decades in particular, there has emerged a need for an interconnecting meta-paradigm that integrates more strictly evolutionary studies, biodiversity studies and the ethical frameworks that are most appropriate for allowing a lasting co-evolution between natural and social systems. Today such a need is more than a mere luxury, it is an epistemological and practical necessity. -/- In short, the authors of this volume address some of the foundational themes that interconnect evolutionary studies, ecology and ethics. Here they have chosen to analyze a topic using one of these specific disciplines as a kind of epistemological platform with specific links to topics from one or both of the remaining disciplines. Michael Ruse’s chapter, for instance, elucidates some of the structural links between Darwinismand ethics. Ruse analyzes the Evolutionism vs. Creationism debate, emphasizing the risks run by scientists when they ideologize the scientific content of their studies. In the case of the contributions of Jean Gayon and Jean-Marc Drouin, which respectively deal with the disciplines of evolutionary biology and ecology, some central connections have been developed between these two disciplines, while reserving the option to consider in detail their topic in order to discover essential features ormeanings. Gayon analyzes the multilayered meanings of “chance” in evolutionary studies and the methodological implications that accompany such disparatemeanings. Froma similar analytical perspective, Drouin’s contribution focuses on the identification and critical evaluation of the different conceptions of time in ecology. Chance and time, factors of evolution in species and ecological systems, play a very important function in both disciplines, and these chapters help to capture their polysemous structure and development. Bryan Norton’s chapter, on adaptive environmental management, is set within an epistemological context where the Darwinian paradigm, ecological knowledge and ethical frameworks meet to give rise to practical, conservationist policies. In his contribution, Patrick Blandin pleads for the necessity of an eco-evolutionary ethics capable of fully encompassing humanity’s responsibility in the future determination of the biosphere’s evolutionary paths. Our value systems must recognize the predominant place that humanity has taken in the evolutionary history of the planet, and integrate the ethical ramifications of scientific advances in evolutionary and ecological studies. The chapter by J. Baird Callicott introduces us to a metaphorical ecological reversion with direct consequences for our moral conduct. If ecology showed that ecosystems are not organisms, recognizing organisms as a kind of ecosystem could be the basis for a new post-modern ecological ethics that lays the foundation for a better moral integration of humans with the environment. The contributions of Robin Attfield and Tom Regan delve into some of the classical issues in environmental ethics, situating them within a broader ecological and evolutionary context. Attfield’s chapter tackles the confrontation between individualistic and ecologically holistic perspectives, their different approaches to the issue of intrinsic value, and their tangled relation to monism and pluralism. Regan’s contribution ponders the criteria that allow individual beings, human and non-human, to own moral rights, the role of the struggle for existence in the relationship between species, and the logical difficulties involved in attributing intrinsic value to collective entities (species, ecosystems). Catherine Larrère’s chapter discusses the opposition between two environmental and ethical worldviews with very different philosophical centers of gravity: nature and technology. These opposing perspectives have direct consequences not only for the perception of the problems at hand and for what entities are deemed morally significant, but also for the proposed solutions. -/- To set out some foundational events in the history of evolutionary biology, ecology and environmental ethics is a first necessary step towards a clarification of their major epistemological orientations. On the basis of this inevitably nonexhaustive history, it will be possible to better position the work of the different contributors, and to build a meta-paradigm, i.e. a connecting epistemological framework resulting from one common or convergent tendency of thought and practice shared by different disciplines. (shrink)

À propos de : Catherine et Raphaël Larrère, Penser et agir avec la nature : Une enquête philosophique, Paris, La Découverte, 2015. -/- L’idée d’une nature sauvage à protéger des avancées techniques ne prend en compte ni la complexité des artefacts, ni ce qu’implique aujourd’hui la protection de la nature. En mettant l’accent sur la notion de biodiversité, C. et R. Larrère cherchent à donner un nouveau fondement à l’écologie politique.

I argue that there has been inadequate attention to and questioning of the dominance and normativity of whiteness in the cultural construction of bioethics in the United States. Therefore we risk reproducing white privilege and white supremacy in its theory, method, and practices. To make my argument, I define whiteness and trace its broader social and legal history in the United States. I then begin to mark whiteness in U.S. bioethics, recasting Renee Fox's sociological marking of its American-ness as an (...) important initial marking of its whiteness/WASP ethos. Furthermore, I consider the attempts of social scientists to highlight sociocultural diversity as a corrective in U.S. bioethics. I argue that because they fail to problematize white dominance and normativity and the white-other dualism when they describe the standpoints of African-American, Asian-American, and Native-American others, their work merely inoculates difference and creates or maintains minoritized spaces. Accordingly, the dominant white center of mainstream U.S. bioethics must be problematized and displaced for diversity research to make a difference. In conclusion, I give several examples of how we might advance the recommended endeavor of exploring our own ethnicity, class, and other social positioning and norms operating in U.S. bioethics, briefly highlighting "white talk" as one challenge. (shrink)

This volume brings together contributors from a wide variety of disciplines to take a critical, empirical look at bioethics around the globe, examining how it ...

Ethical reasoning and decision-making may be thought of as 9professional skills9, and in this sense are as relevant to efficient clinical practice as the biomedical and clinical sciences are to the diagnosis of a patient9s problem. Despite this, however, undergraduate medical programmes in ethics tend to focus on the teaching of bioethical theories, concepts and/or prominent ethical issues such as IVF and euthanasia, rather than the use of such ethics knowledge (theories, principles, concepts, rules) to clinical practice. Not surprisingly, many (...) students and clinicians experience considerable difficulty in using what they know about ethics to help them make competent ethical decisions in their day-to-day clinical practice. This paper describes the development of a seminar programme for teaching senior medical students a more systematic approach to ethical reasoning and analysis and clinical decision-making. (shrink)

In the last decade, the organization of pharmaceutical research on neglected tropical diseases has undergone transformative change. In a context of perceived “market failure,” the development of new medicines is increasingly handled by public-private partnerships. This shift toward hybrid organizational models depends on a particular form of exchange: the sharing of proprietary assets in general and of intellectual property rights in particular. This article explores the paradoxical role of private property in this new configuration of global health research and development. (...) Rather than a tool to block potential competitors, proprietary assets function as a lever to attract others into risky collaborative ventures; instead of demarcating public and private domains, the sharing of property rights is used to increase the porosity of that boundary. This reimagination of the value of property is connected to the peculiar timescape of global health drug development, a promissory orientation to the future that takes its clearest form in the centrality of “virtual” business models and the proliferation of strategies of deferral. Drawing on the anthropological literature on inalienable possessions, we reconsider property’s traditional exclusionary role and discuss the possibility that the new pharmaceutical “commons” proclaimed by contemporary global health partnerships might be the precursor of future enclosures. (shrink)

Smoking is frequently presented as being particularly problematic when the smoker is a pregnant woman because of the potential harm to the future child. This premise is used to justify targeting pregnant women with a unique approach to smoking cessation including policies such as the routine testing of all pregnant women for carbon monoxide at every antenatal appointment. This paper examines the evidence that such policies are justified by the aim of harm prevention and argues that targeting pregnant women in (...) this way is likely to do more harm than good. Routine carbon monoxide testing is particularly problematic as it sends a message to pregnant women that they cannot be trusted either to truthfully answer questions as to whether or not they smoke, or to make decisions in the best interests of themselves and their future children in the way that non-pregnant individuals are. Further, if the aim is to reduce rates of prenatal harm, the evidence suggests that adopting a supportive and empowering approach to prenatal care is the most effective way to achieve this, something that the current policies aimed at pregnant women are in conflict with. (shrink)

Smoking is frequently presented as being particularly problematic when the smoker is a pregnant woman because of the potential harm to the future child. This premise is used to justify targeting pregnant women with a unique approach to smoking cessation including policies such as the routine testing of all pregnant women for carbon monoxide at every antenatal appointment. This paper examines the evidence that such policies are justified by the aim of harm prevention and argues that targeting pregnant women in (...) this way is likely to do more harm than good. Routine carbon monoxide testing is particularly problematic as it sends a message to pregnant women that they cannot be trusted either to truthfully answer questions as to whether or not they smoke, or to make decisions in the best interests of themselves and their future children in the way that non-pregnant individuals are. Further, if the aim is to reduce rates of prenatal harm, the evidence suggests that adopting a supportive and empowering approach to prenatal care is the most effective way to achieve this, something that the current policies aimed at pregnant women are in conflict with. (shrink)