Studies in the History and Culture of the Middle East are published as supplement to Der Islam founded in 1910 by Carl Heinrich Becker, an early practitioner of the modern study of Islam. Following Becker's lead, the mission of the series is the study of past societies of the Middle East, their belief systems, and their underlying social and economic relations, from the Iberian Peninsula to Central Asia, and from the Ukrainian steppes to the highlands of Yemen. Publications in (...) the series draw on the philological groundwork generated by the literary tradition, but in their aim to cover the entire spectrum of the historically oriented humanities and social sciences, also utilize textual sources as well as archival, material, and archaeological evidence. Its editors are Stefan Heidemann (Universit t Hamburg, editor-in-chief), Gottfried Hagen (University of Michigan), Andreas Kaplony (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universit t M nchen), and Rudi Matthee (University of Delaware). (shrink)

Alle Ideologie beruht auf Verdrängung der Gewalt; noch dort, wo sie Gewalt fetischisiert, bildet der blinde Fleck des Souveräns den Ursprung. Denn ausgeblendet wird ja nicht Gewalt als solche, sondern dass durch sie die Einheit der Gesellschaft erst Bestand hat. An diesem blinden Fleck tritt im Politischen selbst zutage, wie Aufklärung sich weigert, ihre eigenen Bedingungen zu begreifen – darin ist sie zunächst nichts anderes als die frühe Gestalt des Engagements. In dieser ›Dialektik des Leviathan‹, wie sie der erste Teil (...) des Buchs im Anschluss an die Dialektik der Aufklärung zu umreißen versucht, erhält die Gegenüberstellung von Hobbes und Spinoza eine Schlüsselrolle. Die These lautet, dass ein kritischer Begriff des Staats ohne die Kritik der spinozistischen Auffassung von Substanz nicht zu haben sei, deren problematische Aspekte nicht zufällig in der französischen (und italienischen) Linken (Althusser, Deleuze, Negri…) wiederkehrten. Umgekehrt war es gerade die Problematik dieses Substanzbegriffs, die es Marx erst ermöglichte – zusammen mit der Hegelschen Dialektik und zugleich gegen sie gerichtet – die Kritik der politischen Ökonomie zu entfalten. Wenn die neueste Ideologie der Linken wie der Rechten, in Frankreich wie in Deutschland, vielfach das Heideggersche »Sein« und den Carl Schmitt’schen »Begriff des Politischen« an die Stelle von Substanz und Souveränität setzt (Agamben, Badiou, Mouffe…), ist es mit jener ›Dialektik des Politischen‹ auf dem Boden der klassischen Metaphysik und Aufklärung nicht mehr getan. Dem heutigen Triumph Heideggers und Schmitts zu widersprechen, geht es im zweiten Teil des Buchs: Jean-Paul Sartres »Engagement gegen den Tod« und Jean Amérys Appell, den Leib zu »substantiieren« (wie das Manfred Dahlmann jüngst ausgedrückt hat), bedeuten einerseits Annäherung an die entscheidenden Fragen einer Philosophie nach Auschwitz – gerade auch, was die Frage des Souveräns betrifft. Andererseits verkehrte sich bei beiden regelmäßig die kritische Intention, sobald man den Gegenstand des Engagements mit der politischen Linken teilen und also Politik machen wollte. Dass sie vielmehr zu sabotieren sei, hat allerdings Améry – ohne sich dessen unbedingt bewusst zu sein – in seiner Parteinahme für Israel vorgeführt wie kaum ein anderer. Der von Adorno formulierte kategorische Imperativ, der zugleich das Politische als »Stand der Unfreiheit« begreift, erweist sich als die einzige Möglichkeit, dieser Sabotage auf den Grund zu gehen. Hier spannt sich aber auch der Bogen zum ersten Teil des Buchs zurück: Aus der Kritik an Spinozas Substanzbegriff lässt sich keine Kritik an Heideggers Sein zum Tode entwickeln, so wie auch der Gegensatz zwischen der Vernunft als Selbsterhaltung, die in der Dialektik der Aufklärung kritisiert wird, und der Vernichtung um der Vernichtung willen, die das Selbstopfer einschließt, dialektischer Vermittlung nicht mehr zugänglich ist, sondern zur Intervention nötigt. Davon legt jener Imperativ Zeugnis ab. Nur wer sich dabei jedoch die eigene Ohnmacht immer wieder eingesteht, die im notwendigen Engagement gegen den Antisemitismus so fatal wie nirgendwo hervortritt – spätestens dann, wenn der eben erst bezwungene Antisemit in neuer Gestalt wiederaufersteht –, wird auch die antisemitische bzw. antizionistische Gewalt nicht unterschätzen. (Diese Unterschätzung ist das Merkmal aller liberalen Anstrengungen, die Antisemiten zurückzudrängen.) Der dritte Teil schließlich versammelt – in Anlehnung an Adornos Engagement-Essay – Einzelstudien zur Kritik des politischen Engagements, wie sie sich an und in den Werken von Literatur und Essay, Musik und Film erschließt (Thomas Bernhard, Berthold Brecht, Hanns Eisler, Jean-Luc Godard, Elfriede Jelinek, Imre Kertész, Claude Lanzmann, Georg Lukács…). (shrink)

Im Materialismusstreit der 1850er Jahre prallen die oft provokativ vorgetragenen Positionen des naturwissenschaftlich-weltanschaulichen Materialismus (vor allem Carl Vogts, Jacob Moleschotts und Ludwig Büchners) auf Positionen (insbesondere diejenige Rudolf Wagners), die die Naturwissenschaften mit den traditionellen religiösen Überzeugungen – etwa von der Unsterblichkeit der Seele, von der Gültigkeit der biblischen Weltchronologie oder von der Abstammung der Menschheit von einem einzigen Elternpaar – bruchlos verbinden zu können glauben. Mit den wissenschaftlichen Überzeugungen verbinden sich zudem politische Optionen. Jenseits aller lautstarken Polemik werden (...) in diesem Streit die Erklärungskompetenzen der Religion, der Philosophie und der Naturwissenschaften neu gegeneinander abgegrenzt – wobei der Philosophie (in ihren Vertretern I. H. Fichte und F. A. Lange) eine vermittelnde Rolle zufällt. (shrink)

Ultraviolet radiation is generally considered to have been discovered by Johann Wilhelm Ritter in 1801. In this article, we study the reception of Ritter’s experiment during the first decade after the event—Ritter’s remaining lifetime. Drawing on the attributional model of discovery, we are interested in whether the German physicists and chemists granted Ritter’s observation the status of a discovery and, if so, of what. Two things are remarkable concerning the early reception, and both have to do more with neglect than (...) with reception. Firstly, Ritter’s observation was sometimes accepted as a fact but, with the exception of C. J. B. Karsten’s theory of invisible light, it played almost no role in the lively debate about the nature of heat and light. We argue that it was the prevalent discourse based on the metaphysics of Stoffe that prevented a broader reception of Ritter’s invisible rays, not the fact that Ritter himself made his findings a part of his Naturphilosophie. Secondly, with the exception of C. E. Wünsch’s experiments on the visual spectrum, there was no experimental examination of the experiment. We argue that theorizing about ontological systems was more common than experimenting, because, given its social and institutional situation, this was the appropriate way of contributing to physics. Consequently, it was less clear in 1810 than in 1801 what, if anything, had been discovered by Ritter.Keywords: Johann Wilhelm Ritter; Carl Johann Bernhard Karsten; Christian Ernst Wünsch; Ultraviolet radiation; Conceptions of heat and light. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS new appreciation of his thought. The differences between thirteenth-century and Renaissance humanism complicate the problem, but a more accurate and sensitive understanding of Aquinas's thought is by no means impossible. It is high time that Protestants put the old division behind them, high time they reclaim this part of their heritage-and they can rightly claim Aquinas as part of their heritage, since he did live and work (...) in the context of a still undivided Christendom. He is one of the teachers we can ill afford to do without as we attempt to meet the challenges of our own day (p. 174).' Whether Professor Vos achieves this objective can only be judged by those to whom the work is primarily addressed. Many of the misperceptions pointed out can be traced to misuse of St. Thomas's works in the era when he was the mandated author for Roman Catholic studies in philosophy and theology. Those who value the genuine thought of St. Thomas and regret the continuation of these misrepresentations by so-called Catholic traditionalists will welcome the contribution made by this book. THOMAS c. O'BRIEN Chambersburg, Pennsylvania Christian Dogmatics. By CARL BRAATEN (editor), GERHARD 0. FORDE, PHILIP J. HEFNER, ROBERT \V. JENSEN (editor) HANS SCHWARZ, and PAUL R. SPONHEIM. Two Volumes. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984, xxii + 569 (Vol. 1) and xvii+ 621 (Vol. 2). Recent years have seen the proliferation among American Protestants of a seemingly odd genre: group dogmatics. For whatever reason, the present generation of' systematic theologians has not produced a dogmatics or systematic theology text that the theology teachers of' America seem to be happy with. So, a variety of' groups have banded together to divide all theology into so many parts,and as a team produce a usable theology text. The best known of' these group texts is Christian Theology: An Introduction to its Traditions and Tasks, edited by Peter G. Hodgson and Robert H. King (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982), but there have also been Methodist and Conservative Evangelical versions. Christian Dogmatics is the latest example of' the genre, and an ambitious one. While the authors are all teachers at American Lutheran seminaries, their audience is the entire Christian Church. Their goal is to produce a " complete dogmatics " which will serve as " a textbook in theological instruction and a resource for those who practice the arts of ministry." (!,xvii-xviii). The volumes are organized in twelve loci, where a locus is " a point at which the historic teachings and theological investigations of BOOK REVIEWS 153 the church are brought into focus" (I, xix) : Prolegomena to Christian Dogmatics (Braaten, 78 pp.), The Triune God (Jenson, 114 pp.), The Knowledge of God (Sponheim, 76 pp.), The Creation (Hefner, 94 pp.), Sin and Evil (Sponheim, 104 pp.), The Person of Jesus Christ (Braaten, 104 pp.), The Work of Christ (Forde, 100 pp.), The Holy Spirit (Jenson, 78 pp.), The Church (Hefner, 70 pp.), The Means of Grace (Schwarz and Jenson, 142 pp.), Christian Life (Forde, 80 pp), and Eschatology (Schwarz, 116 pp.). Each locus consists of 4 to 7 chapters, each chapter beginning with a few summarizing sentences. The authors sometimes organize the loci "systematically" (e.g., the knowledge of God is organized according to questions that parallel Aristotle's four causes); more often the author's combine the systematic and the historical, moving through Seriptures and tradition and modernity as well as providing a conceptual frame for their topic. A lengthy index of names and subjects in volume two (II,591-621) helps the reader track the overlap between these loci. A variety of threads tie the disparate contributions together. The six authors share a common outlook on contemporary theology, which might be called a theological version of "the radical middle." Decisive for this outlook is the conviction that there is a doctrinal core to the faith which it is the central task of dogmatics to explicate (I,5). Although the problems and conceptualities of the modern world are addressed throughout the text, they are not allowed to set the interpretative agenda. In keeping their eyes fixed on this interpretative task, the authors avoid both the left and right. Liberation theology, process... (shrink)

Im Auftrag des Friedrich-Meinecke-Instituts der Freien Universitäauml;t Berlin herausgegeben von Hans Herzfeld und Walther Hofer (Band 1-9). Füuuml;r Band 10 herausgegeben von Gisela Bock, Jürgen Kocka und Gerhard A. Ritter.

I provide a unified account of hope and fear as propositional attitudes. This “mirror account” is based on the historical idea that the only difference between hope and fear is the conative attitude involved, positive for hope and negative for fear. My analysis builds on a qualified version of the standard account of hope. The epistemic condition is formulated in terms of live possibility and the conative according to a non-reductive view on desire and aversion. The account demonstrates the theoretical (...) fruitfulness of accepting Jack M. C. Kwong’s distinction between hope and fear as propositional attitudes and experiential states. (shrink)

In order to prove the validity of logical rules, one has to assume these rules in the metalogic. However, rule-circular ‘justifications’ are demonstrably without epistemic value. Is a non-circular justification of a logical system possible? This question attains particular importance in view of lasting controversies about classical versus non-classical logics. In this paper the question is answered positively, based on meaning-preserving translations between logical systems. It is demonstrated that major systems of non-classical logic, including multi-valued, paraconsistent, intuitionistic and quantum logics, (...) can be translated into classical logic by introducing additional intensional operators into the language. Based on this result it is argued that classical logic is representationally optimal. In sec. 6 it is investigated whether non-classical logics can be likewise representationally optimal. The answer is predominantly negative but partially positive. Nevertheless the situation is not symmetric, because classical logic has important ceteris paribus advantages as a unifying metalogic. (shrink)

Emotion Review, Volume 14, Issue 1, Page 31-42, January 2022. This paper distinguishes collective emotions from other phenomena pertaining to the social and interactive nature of emotion and proposes a taxonomy of different types of collective emotion. First, it emphasizes the distinction between collective emotions as affective experiences and underpinning mechanisms. Second, it elaborates on other types of affective experience, namely the social sharing of emotion, group-based emotions, and joint emotions. Then, it proposes a working definition of collective emotion via (...) a minimal threshold and four structural features. Finally, it develops a taxonomy of five types of collective emotion: emotional sharing, emotional contagion, emotional matching, emotional segregation, and emotional fusion. (shrink)

This is a reproduction of a book published before 1923. This book may have occasional imperfections such as missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. that were either part of the original artifact, or were introduced by the scanning process. We believe this work is culturally important, and despite the imperfections, have elected to bring it back into print as part of our continuing commitment to the preservation of printed works worldwide. We appreciate your understanding of the imperfections (...) in the preservation process, and hope you enjoy this valuable book. ++++ The below data was compiled from various identification fields in the bibliographic record of this title. This data is provided as an additional tool in helping to ensure edition identification: ++++ Uber Den Psychologischen Ursprung Der Raumvorstellung Carl Stumpf S. Hirzel, 1873 Space perception. (shrink)

There has been considerable progress in investigating collective actions in the last decades. However, the real progress is different from what many scholars take it to be. It lies in the fact that there is by now a wealth of different approaches from a variety of fields. Each approach has carved out fruitful mechanisms for explaining collective action, but is also faced with limitations. Given that situation, we submit that the next step in investigating collective action is to acknowledge the (...) plurality of approaches and bring them into dialogue. With this aim in mind, the present article discusses the strengths and weaknesses of some of the to our mind most relevant approaches to collective action in current debates. We begin with the collective intentionality framework, the team reasoning approach, and social identity theory. Then, we move to ecological social psychology, participatory sense-making, and, through the lenses of those frameworks, dynamical systems theory. Finally, we discuss practice theory. Against this background, we provide a proposal for a synthesis of the successful explanatory mechanisms as they have been carved out by the different research programs. The suggestion is, roughly, to understand collective action as dynamical interaction of a self-organizing system with its environment, shaped by a process of collective sense-making. (shrink)

One persistent puzzle in the life sciences is the asymmetric lipid composition of the cellular plasma membrane: while the exoplasmic leaflet is enriched in lipids carrying predominantly saturated fatty acids, the cytoplasmic leaflet hosts preferentially lipids with (poly‐)unsaturated fatty acids. Given the high energy requirements necessary for cells to maintain this asymmetry, the question naturally arises regarding its inherent benefits. In this paper, we propose asymmetry to represent a potential solution for harmonizing two conflicting requirements for the plasma membrane: first, (...) the need to build a barrier for the uncontrolled influx or efflux of substances; and second, the need to form a fluid and dynamic two‐dimensional substrate for signaling processes. We hence view here the plasma membrane as a composite material, where the exoplasmic leaflet is mainly responsible for the functional integrity of the barrier and the cytoplasmic leaflet for fluidity. We reinforce the validity of the proposed mechanism by presenting quantitative data from the literature, along with multiple examples that bolster our model. (shrink)

The “return of the state” as an economic actor has left scholars at a lack of theoretical tools to capture the characteristics of state-dominated business systems. This is reflected in the fact that any type of state intervention in the economy is too easily qualified as a sign of “authoritarian capitalism,” which has led scholars to lump together countries as diverse as China, Singapore, and Norway under that heading. Rather than considering any type of state intervention in the economy as (...) authoritarian, we propose a more sophisticated conceptualization, which distinguishes two boundaries between the public and the private domains and conceives of the “return of the state” as the erosion of one or both of them. This conceptualization allows us to clearly distinguish a shift from an ideal-typical market-based “regulatory capitalism” to “state capitalism” or “authoritarian capitalism,” respectively. We use interview data with business leaders in an extreme case of the return of the state to identify the nature of the mechanisms by which an authoritarian government erodes these private-public divides. We argue that a focus on these constitutive mechanisms of the erosion of private-public divides allows us to define “authoritarian capitalism” in a way that makes it a useful tool to understand contexts beyond the Chinese case in which it first emerged. (shrink)

According to individualism about feelings, only individuals can experience feelings, because only individuals live under the condition of embodiment. Assuming a necessary link between emotions and feelings thus seems to justify doubt about the possibility of shared emotions. I challenge this line of argumentation by showing that feelings are best understood as enactments of a feeling body, which is a psycho-physically neutral expressive unity. Based on the body’s embeddedness into a world and connectedness with others, feelings are perceivable and shareable. (...) Accordingly, dynamics of mutual incorporation and interaffectivity are shown to be the ground for shared feelings. (shrink)

In Sect. 1 it is argued that systems of logic are exceptional, but not a priori necessary. Logics are exceptional because they can neither be demonstrated as valid nor be confirmed by observation without entering a circle, and their motivation based on intuition is unreliable. On the other hand, logics do not express a priori necessities of thinking because alternative non-classical logics have been developed. Section 2 reflects the controversies about four major kinds of non-classical logics—multi-valued, intuitionistic, paraconsistent and quantum (...) logics. Its purpose is to show that there is no particular domain or reason that demands the use of a non-classical logic; the particular reasons given for the non-classical logic can also be handled within classical logic. The result of Sect. 2 is substantiated in Sect. 3, where it is shown (referring to other work) that all four kinds of non-classical logics can be translated into classical logic in a meaning-preserving way. Based on this fact a justification of classical logic is developed in Sect. 4 that is based on its representational optimality. It is pointed out that not many but a few non-classical logics can be likewise representationally optimal. However, the situation is not symmetric: classical logic has ceteris paribus advantages as a unifying metalogic, while non-classical logics can have local simplicity advantages. (shrink)

In diesem Beitrag werden zunächst die Begriffe "Norm”, "pädagogische Norm" und "Begründung” geklärt. Im Lichte dieser deflatorischen Präzisierungen wird herausgearbeitet, was die Philosophie zur Begründung pädagogischer Normen beitragen kann. Die Diskussion bezieht sich dabei auf meta-ethische Erörterungen, auf logische Klärungen, auf den Begriff der Gültigkeit von Normen sowie schließlich auf das sog. Zweck-Mittel-Denken Im Begründungszusammenhang erzieherisch gemeinter Sollensforderungen. Insgesamt wird damit auch zu zeigen versucht, was die Philosophie bei der Begründung pädagogischer Normen nicht zu leisten Imstande ist, d.h. welche Aufgaben (...) hiebei der Pädagogik selbst zufallen. (shrink)

Public “upstream engagement” and other approaches to the social control of technology are currently receiving international attention in policy discourses around emerging technologies such as nanotechnology. To the extent that such approaches hold implications for research and development (R&D) activities, the distinct participation of scientists and engineers is required. The capacity of technoscientists to broaden the influences on R&D activities, however, implies that they conduct R&D differently. This article discusses the possibility for more reflexive participation by scientists and engineers in (...) the internal governance of technology development. It reviews various historical attempts to govern technoscience and introduces the concept of midstream modulation, through which scientists and engineers, ideally in concert with others, bring societal considerations to bear on their work. (shrink)

The current debate on shared or collective emotions has seen a rediscovery of Max Scheler. In this debate, Scheler’s work is mostly read independent from its historic context. In particular, the influence of crowd psychology on Scheler’s thought has not been taken into consideration, despite Scheler’s explicit references to Le Bon’s (1895) The Crowd. In this paper, I show that Scheler’s understanding of emotional contagion is deeply indebted to Le Bon’s mass psychology. Against this background, I critically discuss Scheler’s distinction (...) of emotional contagion (Gefühlsansteckung) and feeling-with-one-another (Miteinanderfühlen). This leads to the conclusion that, at least in the formulation provided by Scheler, this distinction hinders rather than enhances research on emotional sharing. (shrink)

In recent years, it has become commonplace among the Global Burden of Disease study authors to regard the disability-adjusted life year primarily as a descriptive health metric. During the first phase of the GBD, it was widely acknowledged that the DALY had built-in evaluative assumptions. However, from the publication of the 2010 GBD and onwards, two central evaluative practices—time discounting and age-weighting—have been omitted from the DALY model. After this substantial revision, the emerging view now appears to be that the (...) DALY is primarily a descriptive measure. Our aim in this article is to argue that the DALY, despite changes, remains largely evaluative. Our analysis focuses on the understanding of the DALY by comparing the DALY as a measure of disease burden in the two most significant phases of GBD publications, from their beginning to the most recent releases. We identify numerous assumptions underlying the DALY and group them as descriptive or evaluative. We conclude that while the DALY model arguably has become more descriptive, it remains, by necessity, largely evaluative. (shrink)

Bernard Stiegler’s contributions to political philosophy in the presence of technology are honored and complemented by imagining an encounter with the thought of Leo Strauss. The concept of sovereignty is taken as pivotal. Notions of sovereignty find expression not only in nation state politics but also in engineering and technology. Pierre Manent calls attention to further roots in Christian theology. The complexities and challenges of this interweaving point suggest the need for a “Tractatus Politico-Technologicus.”.

Es war im Herbst 1970, als ich an der Universität Graz mit dem Studium der Philosophie und Mathematik begann. Schnell verlagerte sich mein Interesse fast vollständig auf die Philosophie, hatte doch das damalige Institut für alle, die sich von grundlegenden Fragestellungen bedrängt fühlten, einiges zu bieten.

The orthodox definition of hope suffers from an exclusion problem: it is unable to exclude subjects without hope. In fact, the orthodox definition even allows for despair to be falsely classified as hope. This problem suggests two basic desiderata for a successful analysis of hope: it should solve the exclusion problem, and it should have the resources to explain why, in a given situation, a subject does or does not form a hope. Bearing these desiderata in mind, I assess two (...) recent hope‐accounts offered by Jack M. C. Kwong and Cheshire Calhoun. I then offer my own view, which is based on the Jamesian notion of a “live possibility”. I suggest that a possibility needs to reach a certain probability threshold in order to count as live, and according to my account, to hope is to desire the truth of such a live possibility. This view is well‐equipped to solve the exclusion problem, and it can explain why a subject does or does not hope. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper aims to show that intuitionistic Kripke models are a powerful tool for interpreting Kant’s ‘Critical Philosophy’. Part I reviews some old work of mine that applies these models to provide a reading of Kant’s second antinomy about the divisibility of matter and to answer several attacks on Kant’s antinomies. But it also points out three shortcomings of that original application. First, the reading fails to account for Kant’s second antinomy claim that matter is divisible ‘ad infinitum’ and (...) his first antinomy claim that empirical space extends only ‘ad indefinitum’. Secondly, in conformity with the ‘assertability’ heuristics for Kripke models, it attributes an assertability semantics to Kant. In fact, it attributes a pair of assertability semantics to Kant, but neither of these accords with modern assertabilism. And finally, one must wonder the propriety of using contemporary assertability and contemporary formal logic to save an eighteenth-century text. Part II goes historical to solve the problems about assertability. It outlines the Descartes–Leibniz dialectic about the infinite/indefinite distinction and demonstrates how each position reflects larger philosophical positions. It then demonstrates that Kant’s two versions of assertability and his version of the infinite/indefinite dichotomy emerge naturally from his attempts to resolve a tension in Leibniz’s philosophy. In light of this demonstration, Part III adapts the Kripke model interpretation so that it does reflect that dichotomy. It then refines the Kripke semantics in order to model some of Kant’s signature critical doctrines, and it shows how Kant’s critical version of the infinite/indefinite distinction differs from all those of his predecessors and from his own pre-critical version. It also addresses the question of using contemporary logical machinery to interpret Kant. Part IV turns the tables and uses what we have learned about Kant and modern semantics in order to address a pair of issues in the contemporary critical foundations of logic. (shrink)

In this paper, the contributions to the account of meta-induction (Schurz 2019) collected in this volume are critically discussed and thereby, new insights are developed. How broad and expandable the program of meta-induction is can be learned from Ortner’s contribution. New insights about the transition from the a priori justification of meta-induction to the a posteriori justification of object-induction emerge from the reflection of Shogenji’s paper. How meta-induction may be applied also to religious prophecies and that their meta-inductive justification does (...) not fail for a priori reasons but because of missing evidence for predictive success is learned from the discussion of Pitts’ contribution. That meta-induction does not rely on a particular prior distribution, while the no free lunch theorem depends implicitly on a uniform prior, is the major conclusion drawn from the discussion of Wolpert’s article. How the problem of induction is treated in different versions of the Bayesian account is learned from the discussion of Willliamson’s paper. That meta-induction can also be employed for abduction, and that abductive theory-revision can offer meta-inductive aggregation methods is a new insight emerging from the reflection of Aliseda’s contribution. (shrink)

In the first section, five major attempts to solve the problem of induction and their failures are discussed. In the second section, an account of meta-induction is introduced. It offers a novel solution to the problem of induction, based on mathematical theorems about the predictive optimality of attractivity-weighted meta-induction. In the third section, how the a priori justification of meta-induction provides a non-circular a posteriori justification of object-induction, based on its superior track record, is explained. In the fourth section, four (...) important extensions and refinements of the method of meta-induction are presented. The final section, summarizes the major impacts of the program of meta-induction for epistemology, the philosophy of science and cognitive science. (shrink)

PLEASE NOTE: This is the corrected 2nd eBook edition, 2021. ●●●●● _Critique of Impure Reason_ has now also been published in a printed edition. To reduce the otherwise high price of this scholarly, technical book of nearly 900 pages and make it more widely available beyond university libraries to individual readers, the non-profit publisher and the author have agreed to issue the printed edition at cost. ●●●●● The printed edition was released on September 1, 2021 and is now available through (...) all booksellers, including Barnes & Noble, Amazon, and brick-and-mortar bookstores under ISBN 978-0-578-88646-6. ●●●●● In light of the length of this book, readers who would like to have a more detailed description of the book's objectives and method may find it helpful to read the detailed and clearly written Wikipedia entry about this work: From the Wikipedia search page, use the search phrase "Critique of Impure Reason". At least at the time of this writing (11/29/2021), the Wikipedia entry is well-researched and accurate. ●●●●● In addition, a "Primer on Bartlett's CRITIQUE OF IMPURE REASON" has been made available by the author. It is available under its title through PhilPapers and other philosophy online archives. ●●●●● COMMENDATIONS OF THIS WORK, from the back cover of the published edition: ●●●●● “I admire its range of philosophical vision.” – Nicholas Rescher, Distinguished University Professor of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh, author of more than 100 books. ●●●●● “Bartlett’s _Critique of Impure Reason_ is an impressive, bold, and ambitious work. Careful scholarship is balanced by original analyses that lead the reader to recognize the limits of meaning, knowledge, and conceptual possibility. The work addresses a host of traditional philosophical problems, among them the nature of space, time, causality, consciousness, the self, other minds, ontology, free will and determinism, and others. The book culminates in a fascinating and profound new understanding of relativity physics and quantum theory.” – Gerhard Preyer, Professor of Philosophy, Goethe-University, Frankfurt am Main, Germany, author of many books including _Concepts of Meaning_, _Beyond Semantics and Pragmatics_, _Intention and Practical Thought_, and _Contextualism in Philosophy_. ●●●●● “[This work’s] goal is of a unique and difficult species: Dr. Bartlett seeks to develop a formal logical calculus on the basis of transcendental philosophical arguments; in fact, he hopes that this calculus will be the formal expression of the transcendental foundation of knowledge.... I consider Dr. Bartlett’s work soundly conceived and executed with great skill.” – C. F. von Weizsäcker, philosopher and physicist, former Director, Max-Planck-Institute, Starnberg, Germany. ●●●●● “Bartlett has written an American “Prolegomena to All Future Metaphysics.” He aims rigorously to eliminate meaningless assertions, reach bedrock, and place philosophy on a firm foundation that will enable it, like science and mathematics, to produce lasting results that generations to come can build on. This is a great book, the fruit of a lifetime of research and reflection, and it deserves serious attention.” — Martin X. Moleski, former Professor, Canisius College, Buffalo, NY, studies of scientific method, the presuppositions of thought, and the self-referential nature of epistemology. ●●●●● “Bartlett has written a book on what might be called the underpinnings of philosophy. It has fascinating depth and breadth, and is all the more striking due to its unifying perspective based on the concepts of reference and self-reference.” – Don Perlis, Professor of Computer Science, University of Maryland, author of numerous publications on self-adjusting autonomous systems and philosophical issues concerning self-reference, mind, and consciousness. ●●●●● ●●●●● The _Critique of Impure Reason: Horizons of Possibility and Meaning_ comprises a major and important contribution to philosophy. Thanks to the generosity of its publisher, this massive 885-page volume has been published as a free open access eBook (3.75MB) as well as an open access printed edition. It inaugurates a revolutionary paradigm shift in philosophical thought by providing compelling and long-sought-for solutions to a wide range of philosophical problems. In the process, the work fundamentally transforms the way in which the concepts of reference, meaning, and possibility are understood. The book includes a Foreword by the celebrated German philosopher and physicist Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker. ●●●●● In Kant’s _Critique of Pure Reason_ we find an analysis of the preconditions of experience and of knowledge. In contrast, but yet in parallel, the new _Critique_ focuses upon the ways—unfortunately very widespread and often unselfconsciously habitual—in which many of the concepts that we employ _conflict_ with the very preconditions of meaning and of knowledge. ●●●●● This is a book about the boundaries of frameworks and about the unrecognized conceptual confusions in which we become entangled when we attempt to transgress beyond the limits of the possible and meaningful. We tend either not to recognize or not to accept that we all-too-often attempt to trespass beyond the boundaries of the frameworks that make knowledge possible and the world meaningful. ●●●●● The _Critique of Impure Reason_ proposes a bold, ground-breaking, and startling thesis: that a great many of the major philosophical problems of the past can be solved through the recognition of a viciously deceptive form of thinking to which philosophers as well as non-philosophers commonly fall victim. For the first time, the book advances and justifies the criticism that a substantial number of the questions that have occupied philosophers fall into the category of “impure reason,” violating the very conditions of their possible meaningfulness. ●●●●● The purpose of the study is twofold: first, to enable us to recognize the boundaries of what is referentially forbidden—the limits beyond which reference becomes meaningless—and second, to avoid falling victims to a certain broad class of conceptual confusions that lie at the heart of many major philosophical problems. As a consequence, the boundaries of _possible meaning_ are determined. ●●●●● Bartlett, the author or editor of more than 20 books, is responsible for identifying this widespread and delusion-inducing variety of error, _metalogical projection_. It is a previously unrecognized and insidious form of erroneous thinking that undermines its own possibility of meaning. It comes about as a result of the pervasive human compulsion to seek to transcend the limits of possible reference and meaning. ●●●●● Based on original research and rigorous analysis combined with extensive scholarship, the _Critique of Impure Reason_ develops a self-validating method that makes it possible to recognize, correct, and eliminate this major and pervasive form of fallacious thinking. In so doing, the book provides at last provable and constructive solutions to a wide range of major philosophical problems. ●●●●● CONTENTS AT A GLANCE ▪▪▪▪▪ Preface ▪▪▪▪▪ Foreword by Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker ▪▪▪▪▪ Acknowledgments ▪▪▪▪▪ Avant-propos: A philosopher’s rallying call ▪▪▪▪▪ Introduction ▪▪▪▪▪ A note to the reader ▪▪▪▪▪ A note on conventions ▪▪▪▪▪ ▪▪▪▪▪ ▪▪▪▪▪ PART I ▪▪▪▪▪ ▪▪▪▪▪ WHY PHILOSOPHY HAS MADE NO PROGRESS AND HOW IT CAN ▪▪▪▪▪ 1 Philosophical-psychological prelude ▪▪▪▪▪ 2 Putting belief in its place: Its psychology and a needed polemic ▪▪▪▪▪ 3 Turning away from the linguistic turn: From theory of reference to metalogic of reference ▪▪▪▪▪ 4 The stepladder to maximum theoretical generality ▪▪▪▪▪ ▪▪▪▪▪ ▪▪▪▪▪ PART II ▪▪▪▪▪ THE METALOGIC OF REFERENCE ▪▪▪▪▪ A New Approach to Deductive, Transcendental Philosophy ▪▪▪▪▪ 5 Reference, identity, and identification ▪▪▪▪▪ 6 Self-referential argument and the metalogic of reference ▪▪▪▪▪ 7 Possibility theory ▪▪▪▪▪ 8 Presupposition logic, reference, and identification ▪▪▪▪▪ 9 Transcendental argumentation and the metalogic of reference ▪▪▪▪▪ 10 Framework relativity ▪▪▪▪▪ 11 The metalogic of meaning ▪▪▪▪▪ 12 The problem of putative meaning and the logic of meaninglessness ▪▪▪▪▪ 13 Projection ▪▪▪▪▪ 14 Horizons ▪▪▪▪▪ 15 De-projection ▪▪▪▪▪ 16 Self-validation ▪▪▪▪▪ 17 Rationality: Rules of admissibility ▪▪▪▪▪ ▪▪▪▪▪ ▪▪▪▪▪ PART III ▪▪▪▪▪ PHILOSOPHICAL APPLICATIONS OF THE METALOGIC OF REFERENCE ▪▪▪▪▪ Major Problems and Questions of Philosophy and the Philosophy of Science ▪▪▪▪▪ 18 Ontology and the metalogic of reference ▪▪▪▪▪ 19 Discovery or invention in general problem-solving, mathematics, and physics ▪▪▪▪▪ 20 The conceptually unreachable: “The far side” ▪▪▪▪▪ 21 The projections of the external world, things-in-themselves, other minds, realism, and idealism ▪▪▪▪▪ 22 The projections of time, space, and space-time ▪▪▪▪▪ 23 The projections of causality, determinism, and free will ▪▪▪▪▪ 24 Projections of the self and of solipsism ▪▪▪▪▪ 25 Non-relational, agentless reference and referential fields ▪▪▪▪▪ 26 Relativity physics as seen through the lens of the metalogic of reference ▪▪▪▪▪ 27 Quantum theory as seen through the lens of the metalogic of reference ▪▪▪▪▪ 28 Epistemological lessons learned from and applicable to relativity physics and quantum theory ▪▪▪▪▪ ▪▪▪▪▪ PART IV ▪▪▪▪▪ HORIZONS ▪▪▪▪▪ 29 Beyond belief ▪▪▪▪▪ 30 _Critique of Impure Reason_: Its results in retrospect ▪▪▪▪▪ ▪▪▪▪▪ SUPPLEMENT ▪▪▪▪▪ The Formal Structure of the Metalogic of Reference ▪▪▪▪▪ APPENDIX I ▪▪▪▪▪ The Concept of Horizon in the Work of Other Philosophers ▪▪▪▪▪ APPENDIX II ▪▪▪▪▪ Epistemological Intelligence ▪▪▪▪▪ References ▪▪▪▪▪ Index ▪▪▪▪▪ About the author. 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