Although the sunk‐cost effect is a well‐documented psychological phenomenon in monetary investments, existing literature investigating behavioral investments (e.g., time, effort) has not replicated this effect except when such investments relate to monetary values. The current explanation for this discrepancy proposes that purely behavioral sunk‐cost effects are unlikely to be observed because they are difficult to book, track, and balance in a mental account. Conversely, we argue that, through an effort‐justification mechanism, people account for the amount (...) of behavioral resources invested when selecting an alternative, in which case they may fall prey to purely behavioral sunk‐cost effects. The results of two experiments support this prediction. Because many decisions involve behavioral investments, behavioral sunk‐cost effects should be pervasive psychological phenomena. (shrink)

There is growing interest in whether and how sunk-cost effects for purely behavioral investments occur. In this article, we further discuss Cunha and Caldieraro’s (2009) Behavioral Investment Sunk Cost (BISC) model and reconcile Otto’s (2010) results with the BISC model predictions. We also report new data from two unpublished experiments that are consistent with the BISC model, and we discuss the conditions under which purely behavioral sunk-cost effects are likely to be observed.

Cunha and Caldieraro (2009) investigated whether sunk-cost effects, which are well documented in hypothetical situations involving monetary investments, also occur in choice situations with purely behavioral investments. Their results suggest that decision makers indeed fall prey to behavioral sunk-cost effects under certain circumstances. I have been unable to replicate their pattern of results in three separate investigations. In these studies, I attempted to recover the effect using two other behavioral effort manipulations in addition to the (...) manipulation used by Cunha and Caldieraro. This failure to replicate the pattern of results calls into question the robustness of the initial findings. (shrink)

Optimal foraging theory has been criticized for underestimating patch exploitation time. However, proper modeling of costs not only answers these criticisms, but it also explains apparently irrational behaviors like the sunk-cost effect. When a forager is sure to experience high initial costs repeatedly, the forager should devote more time to exploitation than searching in order to minimize the accumulation of said costs. Thus, increased recognition or reconnaissance costs lead to increased exploitation times in order to reduce the frequency of future (...) costs, and this result can be used to explain paradoxical human preference for higher costs. In fact, this result also provides an explanation for how continuing a very costly task indefinitely provides the optimal long-term rate of gain; the entry cost of each new task is so great that the forager avoids ever returning to search. In general, apparently irrational decisions may be optimal when considering the lifetime of a forager within a larger system. (shrink)

The all too common sunk cost effect is apparent when an investor influenced by what has been spent already persists in a venture, committing further resources or foregoing more profitable opportunities, when the economically rational action is to quit. Less common but arguably just as much a sunk cost effect is the mistake of giving up on a failed or failing venture too readily, sometimes out of nothing but pique at what has been lost, or perhaps through the more subtle (...) psychological forces posited by Kahneman, Tversky, Thaler and others within prospect theory and related work on ``mental budgeting''. Two case examples are considered, wherein decision makers dissatisfied with the results of their investments, and having lost money, appear to compound their losses by selling out at prices less than their own estimates of the remaining financial worth of the failed assets. These decisions are evaluated from the perspectives of both behavioral and prescriptive economics, and are found to have possible explanations in both. Their prescriptive rationale assumes a portfolio theory of investment decisions, and is demonstrated within both expected utility (economics) and mean-variance (finance) frameworks. (shrink)

The present study describes the mechanism of need regulation, which accompanies the so-called “biased” decisions. We hypothesized an unconscious urge for psychological need satisfaction as the trigger for cognitive biases. In an experimental study (N = 106), participants had the opportunity to win money in a functionality test. In the test, they could either use the solution they had developed (sunk cost) or an alternative solution that offered a higher probability of winning. The selection of the sunk-cost option was the (...) most chosen option, supporting the hypothesis of this study. The reason behind the majority of participants choosing the sunk-cost option seemed to be the satisfaction of psychological needs, despite a reduced chance of winning money. An intervention, which aimed at triggering self-reflection, had no impact on the decision. The findings of this study contribute to the discussion on the reasons for cognitive biases and their formation in the human mind. Moreover, it discusses the application of the label “irrational” for biased decisions and proposes reasons for instrumental rationality, which exist at an unconscious, need-regulative level. (shrink)

INCONTINENCE, HONOURING SUNK COSTS AND RATIONALITY According to a basic principle of rationality, the decision to engage in a course of action should be determined solely by the analysis of its consequences. Thus, considerations associated with previous use of resources should have no bearing on an agent’s decision-making process. Frequently, however, agents persist carrying on an activity they themselves judge to be nonoptimal under the circumstances because they have already allocated resources to that activity. When this is the case, agents (...) are said to be honouring sunk costs. Honouring sunk costs is thus typically viewed as irrational economic behaviour. Two striking findings of the psychological literature on the sunk cost effect are that it is, in general, not lessened by having taken previously courses in economics, and that agents who did take such courses and that do honour sunk costs seem to be frequently aware of a cognitive dissonance in their behaviour. Davidson’s account of the possibility conditions of incontinent action renders continent action materially unfeasible. The very idea of incontinent action becomes thus a hollow one. I’ll present an alternative description of these possibility conditions that renders continent action materially feasible, and both, continent and incontinent action, cognitively plausible. In a nutshell, my proposal rests upon the drawing of an essential cognitive contrast between explicit processes of deliberative reasoning and lower level heuristic procedures. I conclude the paper arguing that my redescription of incontinent action accounts for the above mentioned cognitive dissonance effect better than the alternatives and that viewing at least an important subset of behaviours of honouring sunk costs as incontinent actions will enable us to consider them as peculiar manifestations of a more general and meaningful pattern in human behaviour. (shrink)

It is a commonplace in economics that we should disregard sunk costs. The sunk cost effect might be widespread, goes the conventional wisdom, but we would be better off if we could rid ourselves of it. In this paper, I argue against the orthodoxy by showing that the sunk cost effect is often beneficial. Drawing on discussions of related topics in dynamic choice theory, I show that, in a range of cases, being disposed to honor sunk costs allows an agent (...) to mimic a resolute chooser, someone who adopts the best plan at the outset of a decision problem and sticks with it, even when resoluteness is unfeasible. I discuss several kinds of cases in which honoring sunk costs coincides with resolute choice. (shrink)

In the WebSurf task, humans forage for videos paying costs in terms of wait times on a time-limited task. A variant of the task in which demands during the wait time were manipulated revealed the role of attention in susceptibility to sunk costs. Consistent with parallel tasks in rodents, previous studies have found that humans preferred shorter delays, but waited longer for more preferred videos, suggesting that they were treating the delays economically. In an Amazon Mechanical Turk sample, we replicated (...) these predicted economic behaviors for a majority of participants. In the lab, participants showed susceptibility to sunk costs in this task, basing their decisions in part on time they have already waited, which we also observed in the subset of the mTurk sample that behaved economically. In another version of the task, we added an attention check to the wait phase of the delay. While that attention check further increased the proportion of subjects with predicted economic behaviors, it also removed the susceptibility to sunk costs. These findings have important implications for understanding how cognitive processes, such as the deployment of attention, are key to driving re-evaluation and susceptibility to sunk costs. (shrink)

This study examines how the reference-point effect and sunk-cost fallacy interact with stakeholder theory and influence how investors evaluate corporate social performance. We propose that ex-ante (pre-IPO) corporate social performance influences ex-post (post-IPO) perceived riskiness and that this relationship is U-shaped. We also evaluate how CEO duality and company age moderate this U-shaped relationship. Using young and newly public entrepreneurial firms in China, and focusing on stock returns in the secondary market, empirical results and robustness tests provide strong support for (...) our hypotheses. (shrink)

When assessing the cost effectiveness of health care programmes, health economists typically presume that distant events should be given less weight than present events. This article examines the moral reasonableness of arguments advanced for positive discounting in cost-effectiveness analysis both from an intergenerational and an intrapersonal perspective and assesses if arguments are equally applicable to health and monetary outcomes. The article concludes that behavioral effects related to time preferences give little or no reason for why society at large (...) should favour the present over the future when making intergenerational choices regarding health. The strongest argument for discounting stems from the combined argument of diminishing marginal utility in the presence of growth. However, this hinges on the assumption of actual growth in the relevant good. Moreover, current modern democracy may be insufficiently sensitive to the concerns of future generations. The second part of the article categorises preference failures (which justify paternalistic responses) into two distinct groups, myopic and acratic. The existence of these types of preference failures makes elicited time preferences of little normative relevance when making decisions regarding the social discount rate, even in an intrapersonal context. As with intergenerational discounting, the combined arguments of growth and diminishing marginal utility offer the strongest arguments for discounting in the intrapersonal context. However, there is no prima facie reason to assume that this argument should apply equally to health and monetary values. To be sure, selecting an approach towards discounting health is a complex matter. However, the life-or-death implications of any approach require that the discussion not be downplayed to merely a technical matter for economists to settle. (shrink)

This paper develops a model of individual decision-making under bounded rationality in which discretionary cognitive adjustment creates a durable stock that complements choice of action. While it increases utility, adjustment also entails a cost, because focusing attention optimally is effortful and mental resources are scarce. Associated behavioral phenomena are categorized based on whether the operative motivation in adjusting is forward-looking utility maximization or justification of prior action. The theory is in line with prior conceptions of cognitive dissonance, but also (...) offers a more empirically consistent explanation of the endowment effect, persuasive advertising, and sunk-cost effects than existing accounts. (shrink)

Introduction Social anxiety disorder (SAD) symptoms are maintained by cognitive biases, which are overestimations of the severity and likelihood of negative social events (cost/probability biases), and by sensitivity to rewards and punishments that are determined according to behavioral inhibition/behavioral activation systems (BIS/BAS). Cost/probability biases might activate the behavioral immune system and exacerbate the avoidance of social events. Earlier studies have proposed that low BIS or high BAS decrease SAD symptoms; BIS/BAS may even change the effects of (...) cognitive biases on SAD symptoms. Hence, the current study investigates the interaction effects of BIS/BAS and cost/probability biases on SAD symptoms. Method Seventy-six Japanese undergraduate students completed the Japanese version of the Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (LSAS), which comprises Fear and Avoidance subscales, the BIS/BAS Scale, and the Social Cost Probability Scale. Results A multiple regression analysis was performed to examine whether cost/probability biases, BIS/BAS, and their interactions affected SAD symptoms; following this, the main effects of cost bias and BIS were determined for LSAS-Fear (β =.64, p <.001; β =.33, p <.01) and LSAS-Avoidance (β =.49, p <.001; β =.35, p <.01). The interaction effect between cost bias and BAS was significant for LSAS-Avoidance (β = −.32, p <.05). Simple slope analysis showed that the slope of cost bias was significant for low-BAS individuals (β =.77, p <.001) but not for high-BAS individuals (β = −.21, n.s.). The interaction effect between probability bias and BAS was significant for LSAS-Avoidance (β =.40, p <.01) as well. Further, simple slope analysis revealed that the slope of probability bias was significant for low-BAS individuals (β = −.53, p <.05) but not for high-BAS individuals (β =.17, n.s.). Discussion The study found interesting results with respect to the avoidance of social events. Low-BAS individuals with high cost or low probability biases regarding social events may have a tendency to avoid social events. In contrast, if high-BAS individuals overestimate the cost of social events or underestimate the probability of social events, their anticipation of rewards might prevent them from avoiding social events. (shrink)

This research explores the harmful effects of negative workplace gossip (NWG) on targets and organizations, including its impacts on helping behavior and knowledge hiding. The mediating role of guanxi closeness and the moderating role of need for affiliation are also examined. The study, based on conservation of resources theory, collected data from 526 employees in the hospitality industry in China, using a three-wave survey design. Hierarchical multiple regression analysis was employed to test the hypotheses. The empirical results showed that (...) NWG was a strong predictor of reduced helping behavior and increased knowledge hiding; and that guanxi closeness mediated both the negative relationship between NWG and helping behavior, and the positive relationship between NWG and knowledge hiding. Additionally, need for affiliation was shown to act as a moderator between NWG and guanxi closeness: high need for affiliation amplified the negative impact of NWG on guanxi closeness, and then further affected employees’ helping behavior and knowledge hiding. This study therefore offers an important new perspective for interpreting the detrimental effects of negative gossip in organizations, providing not just theoretical advances but practical ways in which managers can proactively reduce these impacts. (shrink)

Early and automatic neuropsychological processes may be influenced by altered dopaminergic functions but cannot be fully explained by these or by altered reinforcement and extinction processes. The reinforcement-extinction model is excellent for understanding certain causal pathways of attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, but it can hardly explain the heterogeneous developmental trajectories of ADHD fully. It should be integrated into a multiple pathways model.

This paper presents a very simple model in which situational cues associated with a particular consumption good compel an agent—who may have otherwise been “thinking about” something else—to consider the decision to consume that good. Within this framework, it is shown how an endowment effect and a present bias can arise through a common mechanism. The analysis points to a novel, contributing role for inattention in understanding both of these behavioral anomalies while also speaking to evidence that they are (...) often cue-induced. (shrink)

We give a general method for producing various effective Null and Positivstellensätze, and getting new Positivstellensätze in algebraically closed valued fields and ordered groups. These various effective Nullstellensätze produce algebraic identities certifying that some geometric conditions cannot be simultaneously satisfied. We produce also constructive versions of abstract classical results of algebra based on Zorn's lemma in several cases where such constructive version did not exist. For example, the fact that a real field can be totally ordered, or the fact that (...) a field can be embedded in an algebraically closed field. Our results are based on the concepts we develop of dynamical proofs and simultaneous collapse. (shrink)

This paper investigates the determinants of cost-(in)effective giving to public goods. We conduct a pre-registered experiment to elucidate how factors at the institutional and individual levels shape individual contributions and the cost-effectiveness of those contributions in a novel public good game. In particular, we examine the role of consequential uncertainty over the value of public good contributions (institutional level) as well as individual characteristics like risk and ambiguity attitudes, giving type, and demographics (individual level). We find cost-ineffective contributions in all (...) institutions, but total contribution levels and the degree of cost-ineffectiveness are similar across institutions. Meanwhile, cost-effectiveness varies by giving type—which is a novel result that is consistent with hypotheses we generate from theory—but other individual characteristics have little influence on the cost-effectiveness of contributions. Our work has important positive and normative implications for charitable giving and public good provision in the real world, and it is particularly germane to emerging online crowdfunding and patronage platforms that confront users with a multitude of competing opportunities for giving. (shrink)

Monetary intelligence theory asserts that individuals apply their money attitude to frame critical concerns in the context and strategically select certain options to achieve financial goals and ultimate happiness. This study explores the dark side of monetary Intelligence and behavioral economics—dishonesty. Dishonesty, a risky prospect, involves cost–benefit analysis of self-interest. We frame good or bad barrels in the environmental context as a proxy of high or low probability of getting caught for dishonesty, respectively. We theorize: The magnitude and intensity (...) of the relationship between love of money and dishonest prospect may reveal how individuals frame dishonesty in the context of two levels of subjective norm—perceived corporate ethical values at the micro-level and Corruption Perceptions Index at the macro-level, collected from multiple sources. Based on 6382 managers in 31 geopolitical entities across six continents, our cross-level three-way interaction effect illustrates: As expected, managers in good barrels, mixed barrels, and bad barrels display low, medium, and high magnitude of dishonesty, respectively. With high CEV, the intensity is the same across cultures. With low CEV, the intensity of dishonesty is the highest in high CPI entities —the Enron Effect, but the lowest in low CPI entities. CPI has a strong impact on the magnitude of dishonesty, whereas CEV has a strong impact on the intensity of dishonesty. We demonstrate dishonesty in light of monetary values and two frames of social norm, revealing critical implications to the field of behavioral economics and business ethics. (shrink)

Physicians, scholars, and policymakers continue to be concerned about conflicts of interests among health care providers. At least two main types of objections to conflicts of interest exist. Conflicts of interests may be intrinsically troublesome if they violate providers’ fiduciary duties to their patients or they contribute to loss of trust in health care professionals and the health care system. Conflicts of interest may also be problematic in practice if they bias the decisions made by providers, adversely impacting patient outcomes (...) or wastefully increasing health care costs. This latter objection may be observed in differences in the prescriptions written, procedures performed, or costs billed by health care professionals who have conflicting interests, when compared to those that do not have such financial relationships. (shrink)

The objective of this study was to address the paradox of citizenship cost by hypothesizing an indirect rather than a direct effect of altruistic citizenship behavior on employee work–family conflict through coworker support. Data were gathered in a three-wave longitudinal survey of employees from private commercial banks. A multiple linear autoregressive longitudinal mediation model was analyzed with partial least squares structural equation modeling. The results indicate that rather than directly, ACB affects indirectly employee WFC through CWS. This indirect effect is (...) negative, which reflects that the costs of citizenship behavior are paradoxical. The present study contributes to the ongoing debate on the positive and negative outcomes of employee citizenship behavior by providing empirical evidence on the beneficial rather than harmful effect of performing such behavior. For organizational managers, promoting a culture of CWS by encouraging altruistic behaviors can be a most viable strategy to reduce WFC among their employees. The study discusses its limitations and provides future research directions. (shrink)

The spreading of reputational information about group members through gossip represents a widespread, efficient, and low-cost form of punishment. Research shows that negative arousal states motivate individuals to gossip about the transgressions of group members. By sharing information in this way groups are better able to promote cooperation and maintain social control and order.

A rule for the acceptance of scientific hypotheses called 'the principle of cost-benefit dominance' is shown to be more effective and efficient than the well-known principle of the maximization of expected utility. Harvey 's defense of his theory of the circulation of blood in animals is examined as a historical paradigm case of a successful defense of a scientific hypothesis and as an implicit application of the cost-benefit dominance rule advocated here. Finally, various concepts of 'dominance' are considered by means (...) of which the effectiveness of our rule may be increased. (shrink)

A rule for the acceptance of scientific hypotheses called ‘the principle of cost-benefit dominance’ is shown to be more effective and efficient than the well-known principle of the maximization of expected (epistemic) utility. Harvey's defense of his theory of the circulation of blood in animals is examined as a historical paradigm case of a successful defense of a scientific hypothesis and as an implicit application of the cost-benefit dominance rule advocated here. Finally, various concepts of ‘dominance’ are considered by means (...) of which the effectiveness of our rule may be increased. (shrink)

Decision theorists generally object to “honoring sunk costs” – that is, treating the fact that some cost has been incurred in the past as a reason for action, apart from the consideration of expected consequences. This paper critiques the doctrine that sunk costs should never be honored on three levels. As background, the rationale for the doctrine is explained. Then it is shown that if it is always irrational to honor sunk costs, then other common and uncontroversial practices are also (...) irrational. Second, it is argued that there is no satisfactory way to make a distinction between the two kinds of cases. Third, a proposal is developed which would explain how it could be rational, under certain circumstances, to honor sunk costs. (shrink)

Health behaviors such as tobacco use contribute significantly to poor health. It is widely recognized that efforts to prevent poor health outcomes should begin in early childhood. Biomedical enhancements, such as a nicotine vaccine, are now emerging and have potential to be used for primary prevention of common diseases. In anticipation of such enhancements, it is important that we begin to consider the ethical and policy appropriateness of their use with children. The main ethical concerns raised by enhancing children relate (...) to their impact on children’s well-being and autonomy. These concerns are significant, however they do not appear to apply in the case of the nicotine vaccine; indeed the vaccine could even further these goals for children. Nevertheless, concerns about broadly applying this enhancement may be more challenging. The vaccine may be less cost-effective than alternative public efforts to prevent tobacco use, utilizing it could distract from addressing the foundational causes of smoking and it might not be publically acceptable. Empirical research about these concerns is needed to ascertain their likelihood and impact as well as how they could be minimized. This research could help determine whether behavior-related enhancements hold promise for improving children’s health. (shrink)

Business and Economic textbooks warn against committing the Sunk Cost Fallacy: you, rationally, shouldn't let unrecoverable costs influence your current decisions. In this paper, I argue that this isn't, in general, correct. Sometimes it's perfectly reasonable to wish to carry on with a project because of the resources you've already sunk into it. The reason? Given that we're social creatures, it's not unreasonable to care about wanting to act in such a way so that a plausible story can be told (...) about you according to which your diachronic behavior doesn't reveal that you've suffered, what I will call, diachronic misfortune. Acting so as to hide that you've suffered diachronic misfortune involves striving to make yourself easily understood while disguising any shortcomings that might damage your reputation as a desirable teammate. And making yourself easily understood to others while hiding your flaws will, sometimes, put pressure on you to honor sunk costs. (shrink)

The sunk cost fallacy is a well-established phenomenon where decision makers continue to commit resources, or escalate commitment, because of previously committed efforts, even when they have knowledge that their returns will not outweigh their investment. Most research on the sunk cost fallacy is done using hypothetical scenarios where participants make a single decision to continue with a project or to abandon it. This paradigm has several limitations and has resulted in a relatively limited understanding sunk cost behavior. To address (...) some of these limitations, we created a dynamic repeated choice paradigm where sunk costs are learned over time and opportunity costs are explicit. Over three experiments we show that the sunk cost fallacy depends on the relative a priori importance of the goal being invested in. We observed escalation of commitment only when the sunk cost domain is more important than alternatives, and participants showed de-escalation of commitment to the sunk costs domain otherwise. (shrink)

The unbridled positivity toward curiosity and creativity may be excessive. Both aid species survival through exploration and advancement. These beneficial effects are well documented. What remains is to understand their optimal levels and contexts for maximal achievement, health, and well-being. Every beneficial element to individuals and groups carries the potential for harm – curiosity and creativity included.

Suppose that you are trying to pursue a morally worthy goal, but cannot do so without incurring some moral costs. At the outset, you believed that achieving your goal was worth no more than a given moral cost. And suppose that, time having passed, you have wrought only harm and injustice, without advancing your cause. You can now reflect on whether to continue. Your goal is within reach. What's more, you believe you can achieve it by incurring—from this point forward—no (...) more cost than it warranted at the outset. If you now succeed, the total cost will exceed the upper bound marked at the beginning. But the additional cost from this point is below that upper bound. And the good you will achieve is undiminished. How do the moral costs you have already inflicted bear upon your decision now? (shrink)

Many find it reasonable to take our past actions into account when making choices for the future. In this paper, I address two important issues regarding taking past investments into account in prudential deliberation. The first is the charge that doing so commits the fallacy of honoring sunk costs. I argue that while it is indeed irrational to care about sunk costs, past investments are not sunk costs when we can change their teleological significance, roughly their contribution to our excellence (...) as temporally extended, reasons-responsive, and goal-directed agents. I suggest some general principles for evaluating such significance. Second, it’s a live issue whether we should care about the fate of our past projects, even if we can now affect it. I reject Dale Dorsey’s recent answer, and argue that the puzzle he addresses turns out to be merely apparent, if we take seriously the fact that we are temporally extended. (shrink)

The problem of moral sunk costs pervades decision-making with respect to war. In the terms of just war theory, it may seem that incurring a large moral cost results in permissiveness: if a just goal may be reached at a small cost beyond that which was deemed proportionate at the outset of war, how can it be reasonable to require cessation? On this view, moral costs already expended could have major implications for the ethics of conflict termination. Discussion of sunk (...) costs in moral theorizing about war has settled into four camps: Quota, Prospect, Addition, and Discount. In this paper, I offer a mathematical model that articulates each of these views. The purpose of the mathematisation is threefold. First, to unify the sunk costs problem. Second, to show that these views differ in the nature of their justifications: some are justified qualitatively and others quantitatively. Third, to clarify the differential force of qualitative and quantitative critiques of these four views. (shrink)

This project tackles the problem of analyzing a specific form of reasoning called ‘sunk costs’ in economics and ‘argument from waste’ in argumentation theory. The project is to build a normative structure representing the form of the argument, and then to apply this normative structure to actual cases in which the sunk costs argument has been used. The method is partly structural and partly empirical. The empirical part is carried out through the analysis of case studies of the sunk costs (...) argument found in business decision-making, as well as other areas like medical decision-making and everyday conversational argumentation. The structural part is carried out by using existing methods and techniques from argumentation theory, like argumentation schemes. The project has three especially significant findings. First, the sunk costs argument is not always fallacious, and in many cases it can be seen to be a rational precommitment strategy. Second, a formal model of argumentation, called practical reasoning, can be constructed that helps a rational critic to judge which sunk costs arguments are fallacious and which are not. Third, this formal model represents an alternative model of rationality to the cost-benefit model based on Bayesian calculation of probabilities. This alternative model is called the argumentation model, and it is based on interpersonal reasoning in dialogue as the model of rational thinking. This model in turn is based on the underlying notion of commitment in dialogue. (shrink)

Hunter-gatherer punishment involves costs and benefits to individuals and groups, but the costs do not necessarily fit with the assumptions made in models that consider punishment to be altruistic – which brings in the free-rider problem and the problem of second-order free-riders. In this commentary, I present foragers' capital punishment patterns ethnographically, in the interest of establishing whether such punishment is likely to be costly; and I suggest that in many cases abstentions from punishment that might be taken as defections (...) by free-riders are actually caused by social-structural considerations rather than being an effect of free-rider genes. This presentation of data supplements the ethnographic analysis provided by Guala. (shrink)

If you are more likely to continue a course of action in virtue of having previously invested in that course of action, then you tend to honor sunk costs. It is widely thought both that (i) individuals often do give some weight to sunk costs in their decision-making and that (ii) it is irrational for them to do so. In this paper I attempt to cast doubt on the conventional wisdom about sunk costs, understood as the conjunction of these two (...) claims. (shrink)

This article raises serious concerns regarding the widespread use of unproven interventions with juveniles who sexually offend and suggests innovative methods for addressing these concerns. Dominant interventions (i.e., cognitive-behavioral group treatments with an emphasis on relapse prevention) typically fail to address the multiple determinants of juvenile sexual offending and could result in iatrogenic outcomes. Methodologically sophisticated research studies (i.e., randomized clinical trials) are needed to examine the clinical and cost-effectiveness of cognitive-behavioral group interventions, especially those delivered in residential (...) settings. The moral and ethical mandate for such research is evident when considering the alternative, in which clinicians and society are willing to live in ignorance regarding the etiology and treatment of juvenile sexual offending and to consign offending youths to the potential harm of untested interventions. Encouraging signs of a changing ethical climate include recent federal funding of a randomized clinical trial examining treatment effectiveness with sexually offending youths and the introduction of separate (i.e., developmentally informed) clinical and legal interventions for juvenile versus adult sexual offenders. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy called 'sunk cost'. In economics, a sunk cost is an investment that can never be recovered. Prime examples include money spent on research and development or advertising for a product. However, there is a way to think of cost in terms of time, energy, and even emotion. The way to avoid this fallacy is to not allow the fear of losing what was already invested in something to influence (...) one's rational, objective decision about a present or future investment. In Eric Nielsen's words, when making any decision, economic or otherwise, it “makes no sense to factor in sunk costs precisely because they are sunk; no present action can change them. No matter what happens, the sunk costs are always there”. (shrink)

Although vaccines are considered an efficient public health tool by medical experts, in different countries, people’s confidence in them has been decreasing. COVID-19 has elevated medical scientists’ and practitioners’ social reputation, and it may have reduced global vaccination hesitancy. Still, this alone will not altogether remove the existent frictions that prevent people from complying with vaccination schedules. This paper will review the common causes behind vaccination hesitancy. It will also explore different types of public policy interventions that health experts in (...) governments and institutions employ to fight vaccine hesitancy and non-compliance. The main objective of this article is to argue that, considering the nature of the issue (vaccine hesitancy and its causes), among the various possibilities, policies based on behavioral insights can provide an effective instrument to remove those frictions. Among them, special attention will be devoted to nudges which promise efficiency while avoiding some of the ethical and political costs of other interventions, thanks to their libertarian paternalistic frame. The article concludes by suggesting that public health policymakers should consider the libertarian paternalistic approach of nudges when deploying interventions that aim at changing people’s attitudes and behavior. (shrink)

I focus on two challenges that processing-based theories of language must confront: the need to explain why language has the particular properties that it does, and the need to explain why processing pressures are manifested in the particular way that they are. I discuss these matters with reference to two illustrative phenomena: proximity effects in word order and a constraint on contraction.

Using U.S. listed firms during the period from 1971 to 2010, this paper investigates the effect of religion on corporate cost behavior. We find that religion mitigates cost stickiness induced by agency or behavioral biases of managers. This result holds for several robustness tests that address endogeneity concerns. The mitigating effect of religion on cost stickiness is through the channel of reducing top managers’ overconfidence and optimistic bias regarding future demand change and promoting managers’ adherence to fiduciary responsibilities and (...) consideration of shareholder benefits. Further evidence shows that the reduction in cost stickiness caused by religion increases firm value. Overall, our findings suggest that religion reduces the wedge between a firm’s actual and optimal resource commitments, which helps to improve firm value and resource allocation efficiency. (shrink)

Using U.S. listed firms during the period from 1971 to 2010, this paper investigates the effect of religion on corporate cost behavior. We find that religion mitigates cost stickiness induced by agency or behavioral biases of managers. This result holds for several robustness tests that address endogeneity concerns. The mitigating effect of religion on cost stickiness is through the channel of reducing top managers’ overconfidence and optimistic bias regarding future demand change and promoting managers’ adherence to fiduciary responsibilities and (...) consideration of shareholder benefits. Further evidence shows that the reduction in cost stickiness caused by religion increases firm value. Overall, our findings suggest that religion reduces the wedge between a firm’s actual and optimal resource commitments, which helps to improve firm value and resource allocation efficiency. (shrink)

In this paper, a two-level green supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a retailer is taken as the background. Considering the consumer’s double consumption preference and the manufacturer’s green product R&D investment, a differential game model of the green supply chain under the government cost subsidy strategy is constructed. Firstly, the equilibrium points of the system are solved and their stability is discussed and analyzed. Secondly, the dynamic evolution process of Nash equilibrium under the parameters of green degree, green (...) preference coefficient, retail channel preference coefficient, coefficient of the sensitivity of price, and adjustment speed are described by numerical simulation. The results show that the two ways of a system entering chaos are Flip bifurcation and N-S bifurcation, respectively, by 2D bifurcation graph, and it is also verified in 1D bifurcation diagram. When the bifurcation parameters are small, the system maintains Nash equilibrium stability. If the green degree of products is increased, the green preference coefficient will also increase; on the contrary, the retail preference coefficient will decrease. Research and development cost subsidy policy can effectively improve the green degree of products and increase the sales volume of products, so as to improve the profit of supply chain members. (shrink)

Few moral theorists would disagree that the fundamental principle of morality – perhaps of practical rationality itself – is “ Do good and avoid evil. ” Yet along with such an uncontroversial principle comes a major question: Can you fulfi l both halves satisfactorily across your life as a moral agent? We all have opportunities to perform acts that do good with no accompanying evil, but these are not as common as we might think. We can avoid evil by doing (...) nothing, but doing nothing implies doing no good either. Clearly the fundamental principle does not require that you go about your life doing good on any and every possible occasion any more than that you sit on your hands and abstain from action out of fear of doing evil. The principle tells us to avoid evil, not to refrain from ever causing it. And the simple fact is that the complexities of life make it inevitable that, much of the time when we go about doing good, we will also be doing evil. Further, they are such that sometimes we can avoid evil only at the cost of not performing a good act which reasonable people would regard as at least permissible, if not sometimes obligatory. So how, as rational, morally responsible agents, are we to satisfy the fundamental principle in an adequate, harmonious fashion, given life ’ s exigencies? This is where the so - called ‘ doctrine of double effect ’ comes into play. Some call it a doctrine, infl uenced by the fact that Catholic ethicists and moral theologians have, since the Middle Ages, codifi ed and ratifi ed it as something akin to a doctrine of Catholic moral philosophy. Others call it the ‘ principle of double effect, ’ though it breaks down into a set of principles unifi ed by a common idea. Yet other writers see it simply as a kind of reasoning about certain types of hard case in ethics. Whatever the preferred nomenclature, the DDE, as I will call it here, is – for all its critics and the diffi culties it faces – a keystone of sound moral thinking, without which the fundamental principle would remain nothing but a high ideal with little consistent applicability. So consider a simple example.. (shrink)

BackgroundComorbidity between diabetes mellitus and depression is highly prevalent. The risk of depression in a person with diabetes is approximately twice that of a person without this disease. Depression has a major impact on patient well-being and control of diabetes. However, despite the availability of effective and specific therapeutic interventions for the treatment of depression in people with diabetes, 50% of patients do not receive psychological treatment due to insufficient and difficult accessibility to psychological therapies in health systems. The use (...) of information and communication technologies has therefore been proposed as a useful tool for the delivery of psychological interventions, but it continues to be a field in which scientific evidence is recent and controversial. This systematic review aims to update the available information on the efficacy of psychological interventions delivered through ICTs to improve depressive symptomatology in patients with diabetes.MethodsA systematic review of the literature was performed following the PRISMA guidelines and using MEDLINE, Embase, PubMed, Web of Science, PsycINFO, Scopus, and Cochrane Library databases to search for randomized clinical trials of eHealth treatments for patients with diabetes and comorbid depression from 1995 through 2020. In addition, studies related to follow-up appointments were identified. Inclusion criteria were as follows: randomized clinical trials ; patients with type 1 and type 2 diabetes; adult population over 18 years of age; presence of depressive symptomatology assessed with standardized instruments; treatments for depression based on established psychotherapeutic techniques and principles; delivered through eHealth technologies. We did not limit severity of depressive symptomatology, delivery setting or comparison group. Two coauthors independently reviewed the publications identified for inclusion and extracted data from the included studies. A third reviewer was involved to discuss discrepancies found. The PEDro scale was used to assess the quality of the RCTs. No meta-analysis of the results was performed. The protocol used for this review is available in PROSPERO.ResultsThe initial search identified 427 relevant scientific publications. After removing duplicates and ineligible citations, a total of 201 articles were analyzed in full text. Ten articles met the criteria of this review and were included, obtaining very good scientific quality after evaluation with the PEDro scale. The main results show that the eHealth psychological intervention for depression in patients with diabetes showed beneficial effects both at the end of treatment and in the short and long term for the improvement of depressive symptomatology. The methodology used was very heterogeneous. However, all studies were based on cognitive-behavioral tools and used standardized assessment instruments to evaluate depressive symptomatology or diagnosis of MDD. Glycemic control was assessed by glycosylated hemoglobin, but no benefits were found in improving glycemic control. Only four studies included psychoeducational content on diabetes and depression, but none used tools to improve or enhance adherence to medical prescriptions or diabetes self-care.ConclusionsICT-based psychological interventions for the treatment of depression in people with diabetes appear to be effective in reducing depressive symptomatology but do not appear to provide significant results with regard to glycemic control. Nonetheless, the scientific evidence reported to date is still very limited and the methodology very diverse. In addition, no studies have implemented these systems in routine clinical practice, and no studies are available on the economic analysis of these interventions. Future research should focus on studying and including new tools to ensure improvements in diabetes outcomes and not only on psychological well-being in order to advance knowledge about these treatments. Economic evaluations should also be undertaken to analyze whether these treatment programs implemented using eHealth technologies are cost-effective. (shrink)

Antisocial behavior and prosocial behavior in the condition of inequality have long been observed in daily life. Understanding the neurological mechanisms and brain regions associated with antisocial and prosocial behavior and the development of new interventions are important for reducing violence and inequality. Fortunately, neurocognitive research and brain imaging research have found a correlation between antisocial or prosocial behavior and the prefrontal cortex. Recent brain stimulation research adopting transcranial direct current stimulation or transcranial magnetic stimulation has shown a causal relationship (...) between brain regions and behaviors, but the findings are mixed. In the present study, we aimed to study whether stimulation of the DLPFC can change participants’ antisocial and prosocial behavior in the condition of inequality. We integrated antisocial and prosocial behavior in a unified paradigm. Based on this paradigm, we discussed costly and cost-free antisocial and prosocial behavior. In addition, we also measured participants’ disadvantageous and advantageous inequality aversion. The current study revealed an asymmetric effect of bilateral stimulation over the DLPFC on costly antisocial behavior, while such an effect of antisocial behavior without cost and prosocial behavior with and without cost were not observed. Moreover, costly antisocial behavior exhibited by men increased after receiving right anodal/left cathodal stimulation and decreased after receiving right cathodal anodal/left anodal stimulation compared with the behavior observed under sham stimulation. However, subjects’ inequality aversion was not influenced by tDCS. (shrink)

Despite changes in their representation and visibility, there are still serious concerns about the inclusion and day-to-day workplace challenges various groups face (e.g., women, ethnic and cultural minorities, LGBTQ+, people as they age, and those dealing with physical or mental disabilities). Men are also underrepresented in specific work fields, in particular those in HEED (Health care, Elementary Education and the Domestic sphere). Previous literature has shown that group stereotypes play an important role in maintaining these inequalities. We outline how insights (...) from research on stigma, social-identity, and self-regulation together increase our understanding of how targets are affected by and regulate negative stereotypes in the workplace. This approach starts from the basis that members of negatively-stereotyped groups are not just passive recipients of negative attitudes, stereotypes, and behaviors, but are active individuals pursuing multiple goals, such as goals for belonging and achievement. We argue that it is only by understanding stigma from the target’s perspective (e.g., how targets are affected and respond) that we can successfully address workplace inequality. Key in this understanding is that stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination have taken on much more subtle forms, with consequences for the way members of stigmatized-groups cope. These insights lead us to propose an approach to understanding barriers to workplace equality that highlights four key aspects: a) the different (often subtle) potential triggers of identity-threat in the workplace for members of stigmatized-groups, b) the ways in which members of stigmatized-groups cope with these threats, c) the role of supportive factors that mitigate potential threats and affect self-regulation, and d) potential hidden costs for the self or others of what appears at first to be effective self-regulation. The focus on threats, coping, support, and potential hidden costs helps us understand why current diversity efforts are not always successful in increasing and maintaining members of stigmatized-groups in organizations, and provides insight into how we can aid efforts to effectively lower barriers to workplace equality. (shrink)

Cost‐effectiveness analysis (CEA) raises questions that are too important to be left to policy analysts and economists. Those who utilize CEA should acknowledge its inherent value system and adapt it to a more ethical usage.

The COVID-19 pandemic has deeply influenced the tourism and hospitality industry, and it has also reshaped people’s travel preferences and related behaviors. As a result, how prospective travelers perceive travel constraints and their effects on future travel behaviors may have changed to some extent. Besides, such perception arguably varies across gender. Therefore, this research examines the interplay between travel constraints, gender, and travel intentions for facilitating robust tourism recovery by revisiting the Leisure Constraints Model from a gender perspective. Data (...) were collected through a survey from 357 Malaysian prospective travelers. By conducting path analysis and multigroup analysis, it is found that structural and interpersonal constraints impose indirect effects on travel intentions, and gender moderating the effect of structural cost on intrapersonal constraints and effect of intrapersonal constraints on travel intentions. Based on these findings, this research provides theoretical and practical implications into how to adjust their marketing strategies and travel products during the era of “new normal” for tourism policy makers, destination marketers, and related businesses. (shrink)