Animal use in medical research is widely accepted on the basis that it may help to save human lives and improve their quality of life. Recently, however, objections have been made specifically to the use of animals in scientific investigation of human obesity. This paper discusses two arguments for the view that this form of animal use, unlike some other forms of animal-based medical research, cannot be defended. The first argument leans heavily on the notion that people themselves are responsible (...) for developing obesity and so-called ‘lifestyle’ diseases; the second involves the claim that animal studies of obesity's causes and therapies distract attention from preventive efforts. Drawing on both empirical data and moral reasoning, we argue that the relevant attributions of responsibility and claims about distraction are not plausible, and that, therefore, there is no reason to single out the use of animals in obesity research as especially problematic. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss the recent attempt of Axel Honneth of establishing a robust notion of progress through reference to recognitive structures. I claim that two strategies can be found in his writings for founding such a claim. On the one hand he tries to found the notion of progress on how differentiated the recognitive structures are. On the other hand he tries to found it on certain empirically revealed anthropological and psychological constants. I argue that both strategies (...) fail. The differentiation-strategy is too open, the psychological strategy is too narrow.I discuss in what sense Honneth’s reflections on the importance of recognitive structures still may be of value in critical discussions. Even though it may be granted that a certain notion of progress is inevitable in critical discussions, it does not follow that it has to be a robust notion. I suggest that recognitive structures may serve as a universal reference point that can be used to locate disagreement (recognitive structures are always at play), rather than a robust universal starting point that can be used solve disagreement (it is not given that we agree upon which recognitive structures should be furthered). (shrink)

When it comes to behavioral change, economic design and behavioral science are complements, not substitutes. Chater & Loewenstein give examples from policy design. In this commentary, I use examples, often from my own research, to show how behavioral insights inform the design of the rules that govern market transactions.

Traditional frameworks for evaluating scientific models have tended to downplay their exploratory function; instead they emphasize how models are inherently intended for specific phenomena and are to be judged by their ability to predict, reproduce, or explain empirical observations. By contrast, this paper argues that exploration should stand alongside explanation, prediction, and representation as a core function of scientific models. Thus, models often serve as starting points for future inquiry, as proofs of principle, as sources of potential explanations, and as (...) a tool for reassessing the suitability of the target system. This is illustrated by a case study of the varied career of reaction-diffusion models in the study of biological pattern formation, which was initiated by Alan Turing in a classic 1952 paper. Initially regarded as mathematically elegant, but biologically irrelevant, demonstrations of how, in principle, spontaneous pattern formation could occur in an organism, such Turing models have only recently rebounded, thanks to advances in experimental techniques and computational methods. The long-delayed vindication of Turing’s initial model, it is argued, is best explained by recognizing it as an exploratory tool. (shrink)

In his recent book, Recognition: A Chapter in the History of European ideas (2021), Honneth has explained how he understands the French concept of recognition. This article places Honneth's latest interpretation in the context of his long-standing and evolving engagement with French theory over several decades. Honneth acknowledges his significant debt to a French tendency to view recognition as a problem for self-realisation (and not an opportunity). Bourdieu's and Boltanski's account of how ambitions become limited by the availability of capital (...) and the internalisation of class was a major breakthrough in Honneth's intellectual development. Other formative French influences included the articulation of denigration in existentialist phenomenology, and the idea of regulative power in Foucault, with “deconstructive” asymmetrical care presented as productive but comparatively less important. The discussion also reveals why Honneth presents the “German” concept of recognition as having basic explanatory force (as an opportunity for self-realisation), and why he resists what he views as a French-influenced tendency (also present in some contemporary German critical theory) to depict recognition as ambivalent. The discussion reveals, on one hand, how working across perceived divides can be immensely productive, and, on the other hand, why a French-German divide remains entrenched in contemporary thinking. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 29, Issue 3, Page 581-591, September 2021.

El artículo tiene la finalidad de explicar las dificultades existentes cuando las interpretaciones filosóficas sobre los hechos del pasado se basan en marcos conceptuales contemporáneos. En especial, cuando la intención de los autores se centra en tratar encajar los acontecimientos del pasado a lenguajes políticos modernos. Para alcanzar tal fin, me sirvo de las narraciones filosóficas dedicadas a la independencia de la Nueva España; en especial, la que efectúa el filósofo Enrique Dussel en su libro Política de la liberación. Mi (...) intención es vislumbrar los problemas hermenéuticos profundos cuando la intención de los autores se centra en realizar lecturas políticas del pasado, en vez de tratar de comprender los mundos de la vida de épocas pretéritas. (shrink)

Die vorliegende Bildmonographie Eugen Finks (1905-1975) ruft die eindrucksvolle Gestalt des Freiburger Philosophen, Phänomenologen und Pädagogen in die Erinnerung zurück. Sie bietet zum ersten Male aufschlussreiche Einblicke in die nachgelassenen Bilddokumente, aus denen der Takt seines Lebenslaufes selbst vernommen werden kann. über die biographischen Schlaglichter hinaus führt sie den Leser schrittweise in die Werkstatt seiner nachgelassenen Manuskripte und Entwürfe, in ausgewählte Partien seines Briefwechsels, in die Akten und Urkunden hinein, die seinen beruflichen Werdegang dokumentieren. Auf diese Weise stellt sie nicht (...) nur die Gesamtausgabe der Werke Eugen Finks in ein umgreifendes Landschaftsbild hinein, sondern hebt zugleich die vielfältigen Motive und Beweggründe der phänomenologischen Bewegung hervor, als deren Vermittler und Bindeglied Eugen Fink weltweite Anerkennung zuteilde wurde. (shrink)

Much of Arnold Hauser’s work on the social history of art and the philosophy of art history is informed by a concern for the cognitive dimension of art. The present paper offers a reconstruction of this aspect of Hauser’s project and identifies areas of overlap with the sociology of knowledge—where the latter is to be understood as both a separate discipline and a going intellectual concern. Following a discussion of Hauser’s personal and intellectual background, as well as of the shifting (...) political and academic setting of his work, the paper addresses one of Hauser’s central questions, viz. how best to square a thoroughgoing commitment to the social nature of art with the reality of successive artistic styles, given that the latter seem to be characterizable on purely formal grounds. This is followed by a discussion of Hauser’s conflicted views on the relation between art, science, and technology. This injects a tension into Hauser’s work, due to his initial reluctance to explain just how the aesthetic and the cognitive realms relate. The final part of the paper, through a closer examination of the analogies and disanalogies that Hauser sees between art history and the history of science, attempts to give a positive answer—“on Hauser’s behalf”, as it were—to the question of whether art may be credited with a specific cognitive dimension of its own, and if so, what its contribution to our cognitive enterprise may consist in. (shrink)

In face of the postmodern ideal of a 'mutiple' subject, there has been talk at regular classical psychoanalysis's normative orientation toward intervals since the end of the the ego's capacity to cope consistently with reality may Second World War of psy seem obsolete. However, a psychoanalytic theory choanalysis being obsolete. which is revised in the light of object-relations theory, In these fields - where the integrationist social psychology, and an intersubjectivist notion is not just an ideolo account of the formation (...) of the drives can answer the gical weapon - this signifies postmodern challenge. According to this alternative the tendency of a growing psychoanalytic view, the goal of a 'healthy' development discrepancy said to have of personality is a state of an inner capacity for dialo opened up between the origue, able to account normatively for altering forms of ginal and the current socio-ego-identity under changing social conditions. (shrink)

In my contribution I ask whether the version of secular reason Jürgen Habermas characterises as “post-metaphysical” can really provide us children of modernity with a comprehensive self- and world-understanding. I begin by asking what it means to claim that secular reason is “post-metaphysical” (1). There are various possible ways of understanding this characterisation, some stronger than others; but there needs to be clarity on this issue to address my second question: What would secular reason really have to achieve in order (...) to make good on its claim that it can still provide us with a comprehensive understanding of our relation both to ourselves and to the world? I will split this question along two dimensions: from a theoretical standpoint we should explore how reality has to be understood in order to allow us to attain a consistent understanding of self and world; from a practical standpoint, we need to ask which attitudes we would actually have to adopt towards reality in order to find in it the kind of orientation that Habermas believes his version of secular reason holds in store (2). In a third step, I follow up on these practical considerations by asking whether, at the level of everyday praxis, an orienting conception of self and world in this day and age does not in fact demand more than Habermas seems to have in mind (3). Finally, and returning, albeit indirectly, to the meaning of “post-metaphysical”, I cast some doubt on the Habermasian thesis that secular reason can survive only in the form of a tradition that reaches back either to Kant or to Hume; I want to question whether this division is exhaustive and briefly bring a third alternative into play (4). (shrink)

An attempt to answer in some detail the questions and criticism brought up in a colloquium on my book on ‘Socialism’.

The article attempts to show that Hegel’s concept of “civil society” is characterised by a deep ambivalence regarding the value of the new market economy. On the one hand, Hegel believed that the economic system represented by “civil society” succeeded like no other in simultaneously giving free reign to the desires of individual subjects and integrating them into a stable structural framework (I). On the other hand, Hegel’s reflections are increasingly overtaken by doubts as to whether, in the light of (...) its self-destructive tendencies, the market system can be as successful in guaranteeing individual freedom as he first envisaged it tobe (II). In the course of this essay, it will ultimately become clear that Hegel’s attempt to redefine “civil society” reveals considerably more conceptual indecision and inner conflict than one might have suspected from the great system builder. (shrink)

The article attempts to show that Hegel’s concept of “civil society” is characterized by a deep ambivalence about the value of the new market economy. On the one side, Hegel believed that the economic system represented by “civil society” succeeded like no other in simultaneously giving free reign to the desires of individual subjects and integrating them into a stable structural framework. On the other side, Hegel’s reflections are growingly overtaken by doubts as to whether, in light of its self-destructive (...) tendencies, the market system can be as successful in guaranteeing individual freedom as he first envisaged it to be. In the course of this essay, it will ultimately become clear that Hegel’s attempt to redefine “civil society” reveals considerably more conceptual indecision and inner conflict than one might have suspected from the great system builder. (shrink)

While positive appraisals of testimonial knowledge by Enlightenment thinkers have recently begun to receive more attention, such discussions often operate at a very general level, leaving out much of the context and dynamics of specific types of testimonial interactions. Drawing on extended passages from Georg Friedrich Meier and Immanuel Kant, the present paper looks at the specific case of scholarly testimony and the various epistemic dangers that can befall the interaction between scholars (or, in modern parlance, ‘experts’) and lay audiences. (...) While Kant recognises the imperfections of many expert testifiers (and pays special attention to the figure of the ‘pedant’), he is keenly aware of the – greater – risk of what may be called ‘epistemic populism’, which seeks ‘to make imperceptible the blatantly obvious inequality between loquacious ignorance and thorough science’ (AA, XI, 141). Furthermore, Kant suggests, those with superior epistemic authority can justifiably disengage from interactions with those who, as laypersons, arrogate to themselves equal epistemic standing and are unwilling to appreciate the rational force of evidence and argumentation. Prolonging interaction in such a scenario would be futile and may well be ‘contrary to the dignity of reason’ (AA, XI, 143). (shrink)

In dem Aufsatz wird vorgeschlagen, die Kritik der gesellschaftlichen Arbeitsverhältnisse nicht länger an irgendwelchen intrinsischen Werten oder Normen der Arbeitshandlung selbst zu orientieren; als aussichtsreicher erscheint vielmehr die Strategie, sich auf die normativen Bedingungen des marktvermittelten Leistungsaustauschs zu besinnen, um darin die Maßstäbe einer solchen Kritik ausfindig zu machen. Im Anschluss an Hegel und Durkheim wird hier der Weg umrissen, der angeschlagen werden müsste, um im Ausgang von dieser Idee noch einmal das Projekt einer Kritik der kapitalistischen Arbeitsverhältnisse in Angriff (...) zu nehmen. (shrink)

Distributional fairness of corporate distributions is an important social issue linked to accounting for equality. Value added and the information contained in the value added statement can conceptually be regarded as a reflection of how the company is managed for all stakeholders. We investigate value added information published in sustainability reports to determine if the information provided is useful for assessing distributional fairness between stakeholders. We find that the value added information disclosed lack conciseness, comparability and understandability. The divergence is (...) considerable and the explanations of the disclosed information so limited that the usefulness of the value added disclosures must be questioned. Our results suggest several obfuscating techniques in the disclosure of value added information, including disclosing information that is conceptually compromised, resulting in comparability issues and disclosing information that can’t be verified by reconciling back to the financial statements. Our findings have clear ethical and moral implications as they stress the societal issue of distributional fairness. It seems that companies are either reluctant to provide value added information that is useful, or deliberately use value added disclosures to obfuscate. Information reflecting distributional fairness is therefore compromised. (shrink)

In this paper, we explore the extent to which mountain huts and rules imposed on their users can provide metaphoric inspiration to the exploration of issues of an intergenerational justice. We indicate features made salient by the metaphor. We focus in particular on the content of an intergenerational golden rule and on cleronomic justice. We also explain why the absence of a warden matters. Other absent features make salient other dimensions that are central to intergenerational justice. Special attention is granted (...) to two of them: the “genesis” relationship among successive generations and the problem of population change across generations. (shrink)

The idea of workplace democracy is not on the political agenda. And yet, democratic firms exist in various forms in today's economy. The idea and the practice is not only economically and philosophically challenging. The worries to which it responds are not bew either. This is well illustrated by John Stuart Mill's conjecture of the end of the wage-earner system, dating back to more than one century ago.

Is Plato’s philosophy still relevant for current issues in politics and political science? In order to answer this question, the contributions to this volume endeavour to re-read the Platonic dialogues and to interpret them in terms of textual hermeneutics on the one hand. On the other hand, they refer to Plato from a systematic point of view and apply his philosophy, in particular the method of Socratic dialogue, to discussions on contemporary political issues. The volume is dedicated to Barbara Zehnpfennig, (...) whose works aim at making Socratic–Platonic philosophy fruitful for the present on the basis of a new interpretation of Plato’s philosophy. With contributions by Anke Adamik, Sarah Al-Taher, Viktoria Bachmann, Philip Breuer, Johanna Falk-Seifert, Bettina Fröhlich, Benjamin A. Hahn, Hendrik Hansen, Thomas Haslböck, Raul Heimann, Johannes Frank Hoerlin, Vanessa Jansche, Peter Kainz, Christina Kast, Eva-Maria Kaufmann, Ulrich Kühn, Laura Martena, Julian Obenauer, Victor Peneff und Thomas Wimmer. (shrink)

The juxtaposition of strong and weak critique, which is so common today, represents the somewhat fruitless attempt to bring to a head a multifaceted discussion. For years now—in fact, since the end of Marxism as an autonomous theory—there has been a question regarding the possibility of finding an appropriate standpoint for a probing critical examination of the underlying assumptions of liberal-democratic society without relying upon a philosophy of history. On the one hand, material questions play a large role in the (...) discussion since it is difficult to envision alternatives to the institutional framework of highly developed societies of the West that are both desirable and efficient. On the other hand, philosophical questions play an eminent role in this debate, and these philosophical questions are often of a methodological nature. Specifically, at the center of the debate stands the problem of how to describe and justify a standpoint from which one can fruitfully critique society and its institutional practices. (shrink)

Este artículo propone la reconstrucción del punto de vista moral sobre la base de una compleja teoría del reconocimiento mutuo. Su punto de partida consiste en la comprensión del Hegel temprano de la lucha por el reconocimiento como el proceso dinámico de establecer distintas formas de afirmación mutua de la propia identidad en las relaciones de amor, respeto legal y moral, y estima social. Su punto de llegada es la afirmación de diferentes tipos de obligaciones en los diferentes contextos sociales, (...) a saber, deberes asimétricos de cuidar de los demás en sus necesidades y deseos individuales, deberes recíprocos de tratar igualitariamente a cada persona, y deberes de demostrar solidaridad y estimar a los demás en su particularidad. (shrink)

While there has been extensive work on the textual realizations of climate change in the media, there has been little on the way such discourses are realized and promoted visually. This article addresses this using Multimodal Critical Discourse Analysis to examine a new collection of images from the globally operating Getty Images intended for use in promotions, advertisements and editorials. Getty is promoting this collection in terms of Green Issues being a `marketing opportunity'. In this article we consider the results (...) of these issues being recontextualized through this process, where they are shaped to fit the culture of branding. Analysis is of the images and the search terms where Getty lay out what can be said with the images. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Internationales Jahrbuch für philosophische Anthropologie Jahrgang: 5 Heft: 1 Seiten: 113-130.