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  1.  18
    Payment in challenge studies from an economics perspective.Sandro Ambuehl, Axel Ockenfels & Alvin E. Roth - 2020 - Journal of Medical Ethics 46 (12):831-832.
    We largely agree with Grimwade et al ’s1 conclusion that challenge trial participants may ethically be paid, including for risk. Here, we add further arguments, clarify some points from the perspective of economics and indicate areas where economists can support the development of a framework for ethically justifiable payment. Our arguments apply to carefully constructed and monitored controlled human infection model trials that have been appropriately reviewed and approved. Participants in medical studies perform a service. Outside the domain of research (...)
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  2.  9
    Behavioral market design.Axel Ockenfels - 2023 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 46:e171.
    When it comes to behavioral change, economic design and behavioral science are complements, not substitutes. Chater & Loewenstein give examples from policy design. In this commentary, I use examples, often from my own research, to show how behavioral insights inform the design of the rules that govern market transactions.
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  3.  24
    Trust among Internet Traders: A Behavioral Economics Approach.Gary E. Bolton, Elena Katok & Axel Ockenfels - 2004 - Analyse & Kritik 26 (1):185-202.
    Standard economic theory does not capture trust among anonymous Internet traders. But when traders are allowed to have social preferences, uncertainty about a seller’s morals opens t he door for trust, reward, exploitation and reputation building. We report experiments suggesting that sellers’ intrinsic motivations to be trustworthy are not sufficient to sustain trade when not complemented by a feedback system. We demonstrate that it is the interaction of social preferences and cleverly designed reputation mechanisms that solves to a large extent (...)
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  4.  33
    The Supply Side of Organ Allocation.Axel Ockenfels & Joachim Weimann - 2001 - Analyse & Kritik 23 (2):280-285.
    The benefits of a large organ pool accrue not only to the actual organ recipients themselves, but to others as well due to the insurance it provides against having to wait ‘too long’ for an organ transplant. We argue that this public good character of a large organ pool makes it economically and ethically justifiable to design a market mechanism that boosts the number of donors. Most importantly, such a mechanism has the potential to substantially alleviate the troubling equity and (...)
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  5.  93
    An Evolutionary Analysis of Buyer Insurance and Seller Reputation in Online Markets.Werner Güth, Friederike Mengel & Axel Ockenfels - 2007 - Theory and Decision 63 (3):265-282.
    Applying an evolutionary framework, we investigate how a reputation mechanism and a buyer insurance (as used on Internet market platforms such as eBay) interact to promote trustworthiness and trust in markets with moral hazard problems. Our analysis suggests that the costs involved in giving reliable feedback determine the gains from trade that can be obtained in equilibrium. Buyer insurance, on the other hand, can affect the trading dynamics and equilibrium selection. We find that, under reasonable conditions, buyer insurance crowds out (...)
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