Some followers of Christ claim that sports are pointless activities and even spiritually dangerous, given some of the values that are present within them. Other Christians look more favorably upon the value of sports. In this paper, I defend the latter view. I focus on the manner in which sports can provide a context for and be exercises in Christian spiritual formation. I then examine the practical implications this has for Christians who are athletes, coaches, and parents of children who (...) participate in sports, and conclude that sports can offer a unique way for us to glorify God. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Child's Play Adolescent Infatuation Flourishing Adulthood Midlife Crisis Pit Stop Unreflective Maturity Maturity Cycles to Sofia (No, Not the Bulgarian Capital) Old Age Re‐Cycling Notes.

Martha P. Nochimson _Screen Couple Chemistry: The Power of 2_ Austin: University of Texas Press, 2002 ISBN 0-292-75578-3 (hb) 0-292-75579-1 (pb) 394 pp.

Side effects are ubiquitous in medicine and they often play a role in treatment decisions for patients and clinicians alike. Philosophers and health researchers often use side effects to illustrate issues with contemporary medical research and practice. However, technical definitions of ‘side effect’ differ among health authorities. Thus, determining the side effects of an intervention can differ depending on whose definition we assume. Here I review some of the common definitions of side effect and highlight their issues. In response, I (...) offer an account of side effects as jointly (i) unintended and (ii) effects due to the causal capacities or invariances of an intervention. I discuss (i) by examining the intentions or reasons behind therapeutic interventions, and I discuss (ii) by appealing to a manipulationist model of causation. The analysis here highlights that side effects are conceptually distinct from related outcomes like adverse events, adverse drug reactions, and placebo effects. The analysis also allows for reflection on the utility of ‘side effect’ as a technical term in medical research and practice. (shrink)

Once a term used primarily by moral philosophers, “moral distress” is increasingly used by health professionals to name experiences of frustration and failure in fulfilling moral obligations inherent to their fiduciary relationship with the public. Although such challenges have always been present, as has discord regarding the right thing to do in particular situations, there is a radical change in the degree and intensity of moral distress being expressed. Has the plight of professionals in healthcare practice changed? “Plight” encompasses not (...) only the act of pledging, but that of predicament and peril. The author claims that health professionals are increasingly put in peril by healthcare reform that undermines their efficacy and jeopardizes ethical engagement with those in their care. The re-engineering of healthcare to give precedence to corporate and commercial values and strategies of commodification, service rationing, streamlining, and measuring of “efficiency,” is literally demoralizing health professionals. Healthcare practice needs to be grounded in a capacity for compassion and empathy, as is evident in standards of practice and codes of ethics, and in the understanding of what it means to be a professional. Such grounding allows for humane response to the availability of unprecedented advances in biotechnological treatments, for genuine dialogue and the raising of difficult, necessary ethical questions, and for the mutual support of health professionals themselves. If healthcare environments are not understood as moral communities but rather as simulated marketplaces, then health professionals’ moral agency is diminished and their vulnerability to moral distress is exacerbated. Research in moral distress and relational ethics is used to support this claim. (shrink)

Exploratory experiments are widely characterized as experiments that do not test hypotheses. Experiments that do test hypotheses are characterized as confirmatory experiments. Philosophers have pointed out that research programmes can be both confirmatory and exploratory. However, these definitions preclude single experiments being characterized as both exploratory and confirmatory; how can an experiment test and not test a hypothesis? Given the intuition that some experiments are exploratory, some are confirmatory, and some are both, a recharacterization of the relationship between exploratory and (...) confirmatory experimentation is needed. I discuss ‘phase IV’ trials to show what this recharacterization could look like. Phase IV trials can be exploratory and confirmatory insofar as they concurrently test hypotheses and explore for unforeseen phenomena. Even if it is uncontroversial that a single experiment can have multiple aims, the recharacterization of the relationship between exploratory and confirmatory experimentation is still required for these aims to be held together coherently. I offer an alternative characterization of the relationship between exploratory and confirmatory experimentation where the former remains a distinct kind of experimentation but is not characterized as non-hypothesis-testing. (shrink)

The underreporting of suspected adverse drug reactions hinders pharmacovigilance. Solutions to underreporting are oftentimes directed at clinicians and health care professionals. However, given the recent rise of public inclusion in medical science, solutions may soon begin more actively involving patients. I aim to offer an evaluative framework for future possible proposals that would engage patients with the aim of mitigating underreporting. The framework may also have value in evaluating current reporting practices. The offered framework is composed of three criteria that (...) are bioethical, social-epistemic, and pragmatic: (i) patients should not be exposed to undue harms, e.g., nocebo effects; (ii) data should be collected, analyzed, and communicated prioritizing pharmacovigilance’s aims, i.e., free from industry bias; and (iii) proposals should account for existing and foreseeable pragmatic constraints like clinician ‘buy in’ and existing reporting infrastructure. Proposals to engage patients in pharmacovigilance that fulfil or address these criteria are preferable to those that do not. (shrink)

Climate change is a wicked problem with causes and consequences overlapping with other wicked problems and no single solution (Hulme 2015). For example, the frequent droughts associated with climate change exacerbate another major problem facing humanity as we enter the Anthropocene: how to produce adequate food to feed a growing population without increasing pollution or “more food with low pollution (MoFoLoPo)” (Davidson et al. 2015). Soils represent an intersection of these two wicked problems, because they are integral to food production (...) through agriculture and also are an important component of global climate models. Recent focus in the field of soil carbon cycling has facilitated a transformation in our understanding of the processes that control this important resource. This understanding is critical to responding to both wicked problems. (shrink)

y title links together kings, war, and the economy, and the linkage is deliberate. I do not of course wish to suggest that Hellenistic kings did nothing but fight wars, that they were responsible for all the wars in the period, that royal wars were nothing but a form of economic activity, or that the economy of the kings was dependent purely on the fruits of military success, though there would be an element of truth in all these propositions. But (...) I wish to react against the frequent tendency to separate topics that are related, the tendency to treat notions relating to what kings were or should be as something distinct from what they actually did, and the tendency to treat political and military history on the one hand as something separate from economic and social history on the other. A number of provisos should be made at the outset. The title promises more than the paper can deliver; in particular, more will be said about kings and war than about kings and the economy. The subject is handled at a probably excessive level of generalization and abstraction. I talk about Hellenistic kings in general, but in practice it would obviously be necessary to draw distinctions between different dynasties, different times and places, and individual rulers, and some of those distinctions I shall indicate. Conclusions are provisional and subject to modification and considerable expansion in detail. Finally, two points of terminology. I use the word ‘Hellenistic’ for no better reason than out of the force of acquired habit, but of course the word and the concept are modern inventions that were unknown to the ancient world. (shrink)

βριс φυτεει τραννον βριс κτλ. Thus the MSS, Schol. and Stobaeus 4.8. 11 . βριν φυτεει τυραννον βριс κτλ. Thus Blaydes, followed recently by R. P. Winnington-Ingram, JHS 91 , 126 = Sophocles. An interpretation , p. 192 ; R. D. Dawe, Sophoclis Tragoediae , i. 156 and Sophocles. Oedipus Rex , pp. 18, 61,182 f. ; R. W. B. Burton, The Chorus in Sophocles' Tragedies , p. 164 ; J. Diggle, CRn.s. 32, 14.

Abstract In Restoring the Lost Constitution, Randy Barnett defends the idea that judges should interpret the U.S. Constitution according to its original public meaning, for in his view the Constitution, rightly understood, satisfies the appropriate normative criterion for determining when a constitution is legitimate and should be followed. As it turns out, however, even if the Constitution did mean what Barnett says it does, it would not meet his criterion of legitimacy, and therefore should not be followed. Moreover, Barnett is (...) just as guilty of reading certain clauses out of the Constitution as are his critics. Given the lack of a persuasive reason to follow the original Constitution consistently, judges must turn to sources of authority other than the Constitution in deciding constitutional cases. (shrink)

Side effects are a concern in medical decision making and a robust area of biomedical research. However, there is relatively little philosophical investigation into side effects as such, especially given that side effects are appealed to for various applications in philosophy of medicine. In addition, health authorities like the FDA, CDC, and WHO have contrary definitions of ‘side effect.’ Moreover, these definitions have clear counterexamples. This dissertation aims to provide a complete account of what side effects are. I posit that (...) an account of side effects ought to draw clean conceptual lines between side effects and related treatment outcomes. I contend that an account of side effects must address two components: the reasons behind an intervention that produced the side effect, and the causal powers of the intervention that brought about that effect. With this account in mind, I address contemporary philosophical models that distinguish placebo effects from side effects. These arguments, respectively in chapters 2 and 3, yield a more complete, less problematic account of side effects than previous accounts. The dissertation then turns to the process of discovering side effects, specifically in the post-market context. Given the paucity of external validity in pre-market drug trials, chapter 4 argues that post-market ‘phase IV’ trials blur the received distinction of ‘confirmatory’ versus ‘exploratory’ experimentation in philosophy of science. The other component of post-market drug research is spontaneous reporting, or the voluntary reporting of a suspected side effect to a regulatory body. Chapter 5 uses the framework of risks and values in science to examine why clinicians underreport, which hinders our ability to prevent drug-related harms. Chapter 6 looks at how patients could mitigate underreporting and develops a social-epistemic, pragmatic, and ethical framework which can evaluate proposals to engage patients to spontaneously report their suspected side effects. In short, this dissertation aims to firstly address the conceptual problems in how we define ‘side effect’ and relate it to other treatment outcomes, and secondly it addresses issues that hinder the scientific investigation of side effects. (shrink)

The word ‘tyrant’ was not originally Greek, but borrowed from some eastern language, perhaps in western Asia Minor. On the other hand, tyranny as it developed in the Greek cities in the archaic age would seem to have been initially an indigenous growth, independent of any intervention by foreign powers. It then became a constantly recurring phenomenon of Greek political and social life, so long as the Greeks enjoyed an independent history.

First in the aether Parmenides places the morning star, which he believes to be the same as the evening star… [the moon] always looking towards the sunshine I shall not be concerned with the truth or falsity of these ascriptions, only with the fact that they are just the sort of thing that Parmenides could have said. Nor is an interest in Parmenidean reference new in the literature: Furth calls him a ‘hyperdenotationist’, and the word is apt on almost any (...) interpretation. (shrink)

Often a division of concepts can help us better understand unknown or seldom charted philosophical terrain: historically, the distinctions and differences between idealism and materialism have proven helpful, but with Quentin Meillassoux‟s concept of correlationism, the divisions between realism and anti realismwhich once seemed clean-cut are now harder to understand. Graham Harman has gone a step further than Meillassoux‟s initial definition of correlationism, by which “we mean the idea according to which we only ever have access to the correlation between (...) thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from the other,”2claiming in lectures that those who have pledged fidelity to the realism banner after Meillassoux aren‟t realist enough.Instead, says Harman, we should demand that any philosophy which claims to be realist must grant that no entity is more real than any other, whether they be atoms, quarks, institutions, regimes, human beings, bonobos, dreams or distant galaxies. A robust realism must maintain therefore that the universe is composed of objects of all shapes, sizes and types. It is here that I wish to stage something of an intervention; it seems to me that we could rather create a new division to help us understand the contemporary situation facing philosophy based on how various philosophies view objects. I propose that we contrast those philosophies which see objects only working through exterior means with those which grant some level of autonomy to objects; in other words, we should compare those philosophies which grant only an outer life to objects withthose which also grant them an inner life. A robust realism must not only count objects as means of our causal ends , or billiard balls in an extended chain of causation . Rather, a full-blown realism must look to the inner lives of objectsto understand the cosmos and not simply satisfy itself with studying their effects.By making this distinction, we can see more clearly the relevance of a number offigures who have yet to be regarded with any seriousness by the emerging speculative realism movement, creating another metaphysical option besidesweak and strong correlationism, eliminative materialism or idealism, speculative materialism and object-oriented philosophy, as well as better understand thefuture of speculative metaphysics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:To Think Like God: Pythagoras and Parmenides: The Origins of PhilosophyScott AustinArnold Hermann. To Think Like God: Pythagoras and Parmenides: The Origins of Philosophy. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing, 2004. Pp. xxx + 374. Cloth, $32.00.Mr. Arnold Hermann could presumably have used his connection with Parmenides Press to publish anything he wanted. Instead, he has put out a sober, bibliographically well aware, thesis about the origin, nature, and motivations (...) of Parmenides' thought, one evolved in dialogue with scholars such as Cordero, McKirahan, and Curd. The resulting monograph, to be the first of three on subjects connected with Parmenides and Plato's Parmenides, is a legitimate contribution to the field, to be taken very seriously as part of any scholarly bibliography. Best of all, in this reviewer's opinion, is the exploration of Parmenides' legal language and metaphors as they might affect the type of abstract object which can count as subject for the esti, the differences between or among routes and rules of inquiry, the necessity for a Doxa-section, the relationships with Xenophanes and Plato. Less successful, I think, is the attempt to put together a coherent picture out of the hazy evidence on Pythagoras and to distinguish levels of probability within that evidence. Nor, in spite of his praise for Mourelatos's book ("... truly one of the most indispensable works on the Eleatic," 214), does Hermann seem aware (see 189) that the possibility of a pluralistic Eleatic ontology was also present in that book, before it was followed by Curd's book.Hermann's thesis is that Parmenidean philosophy was an answer both to Xenophanes' challenge, to his indication of the limits of our human inquiry—our difference from the gods—and the problem of irrationals in Pythagoreanism. By setting out the rational limits which any purely theoretical inquiry must have, Parmenides intended to show that, in pursuing theory, we can, indeed, think like the gods. (Here excellent use is made of work by Mourelatos and Long.) But by distinguishing theoretical inquiry from empirical inquiry, Parmenides showed the limits of Pythagoreanism, which had been unable to make that distinction. (Units are theoretical entities, but points are empirical, so there are in reality no Pythagorean unit-points; rational numbers are theoretical while irrationals are empirical, and so on.) (Here there are affinities with the recent Popper book.) That is, the Doxa-section, according to Hermann, shows tragically that we do not always think like the gods, especially when we think empirically. Our contemporary science is continuing the inquiry that Parmenides began, but the original Parmenidean philosophy was a methodology about how to inquire into abstract objects, not necessarily a metaphysics, a theory about what those abstract objects are. Here Hermann differs from the standard portrait of Parmenides as theorist of an intelligible world; he thinks that it is Plato who is more responsible than Parmenides for theorizing about which objects correspond to the methodology. (Here he follows Mourelatos and Curd in viewing fragment 2 as setting up types of inquiry rather than types of entity.)One has no quarrel with the claim that Parmenides' originality is at least partly methodological. Yet a methodology whose strictures are this strong was thought, by Plato at least, to require absolute monism; is it an accident that I cannot have a pluralistic ontology without having non-identities between members of pairs of objects, non-identity being an example of saying what is not (fragment 8, lines 36–38)? Does not this particular methodology necessitate a very particular metaphysics? [End Page 481]And, if we do think like the gods, at least at times, are we not then thinking about what is ultimately real, i.e., about a certain type of object? If rules can be given which secure a kind of thought which is exempt from Xenophanean scepticism, do not these rules determine sorts of entities? And, if Pythagoreanism errs in confusing theoretical with empirical entities, must not we ourselves possess the perspective of a god or goddess in order to avoid the confusion?These are some of the questions provoked by this fresh book, which, untrammelled by much scholarly narrowness, is yet capable of contributing much to scholarly... (shrink)

This book provides a comprehensive introduction to the leading topics, theories and debates in modern social theory. Fourteen chapters have been written by specialists in the field, providing up-to-date guidance on the full sweep of the modern sociological imagination, from the legacies of the classical figures of Marx, Durkheim, Weber, Simmel and Parsons to the work of cutting-edge contemporary theorists.

I argue that, because God is the author of history and has a purpose for his creation, evolution has a plot and can be analyzed with tools drawn from literary criticism. This necessitates engagement with the “epic of evolution” genre of scientific literature. I survey several prominent versions of the epic and distinguish between a purely naturalistic epic of evolution and a goal‐oriented Christian epic of evolution (CEE). In dealing with CEE, I use the thought of J. R. R. Tolkien, (...) along with Kevin Vanhoozer and Dorothy Sayers, to discuss the ways in which we can theologically legitimate speaking of God as the “author” of evolutionary history. (shrink)

This is the third edition, with updated notes and appendices, of Cicero's speech defending Caelius Rufus. It gives an insight into the political events of the period, and also helps to reconstruct the 'social background' of Catullus. It is of particular interest to the literary historian.

On the hermeneutic. Palmer declares it unnecessary to recover Parmenides’ original authorial intentions in performing his poem ). It is “simply a mistake—one might term it the ‘essentialist fallacy’—to privilege Parmenides’ intended meaning as the determining factor in his subsequent influence”. Here the claim is not the one that authorial intention is irrecoverable, but the quite different claim that it is an “error vitiating most appraisals of this influence [of Parmenides on Plato to make] the assumption that one can base (...) an appraisal upon an interpretation of Parmenides developed independently of the actual Platonic reception”. And it is thus Palmer’s claim that most previous studies of what I above termed ‘the Plato-Parmenides connection’ have tacitly assumed that we can guess at how Plato received Parmenides by starting with our own interpretations of Parmenides. Stated in this way, the hermeneutic is original and quite acceptable, indeed necessary. But if exaggerated into the intention, say, to comment only on those parts of Parmenides used by Plato utterly without any attempt to read them as they might have carried meaning for Parmenides himself, such a hermeneutic would rule out even Palmer’s own procedure. For example, Palmer reads the second ‘deduction’ of the second half of the Parmenides as corresponding to what the historical Parmenides himself meant in sentences like “Both Parmenides himself and Plato’s Parmenides then draw the conclusion that Being/the One is equal to itself”. One must therefore proceed with care, as Palmer does in the sentence I have just quoted. Palmer cannot mean that the meaning of Parmenidean words or the use or construction of Parmenidean sentences is “largely irrelevant” to a study of how Plato ‘receives’ Parmenides. (shrink)