THE MYTH OF NEUROSIS: OVERCOMING THE ILLNESS EXCUSE by Garth Wood New York: Harper and Row, 1986. 294 pp., $15.45, $7.95 paper.

I thank Professor Fulford for giving me an opportunity to comment on Bracken and Thomas’s essay. Unfortunately, this requires accepting the authors’ focus on discourses rather than deeds, on what psychiatrists say and how they say it rather than on what psychiatrists do and how they justify it. This I cannot do in good conscience. Nevertheless, out of respect to Professor Fulford and the journal Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, as well as a sense of professional obligation, I offer herewith (...) my brief comments. Bracken and Thomas are not the first persons to compare my work with Foucault’s, nor the first to comment on my writing style. In 2001, a pseudonymous blogger posted this comment (still .. (shrink)

I can only speculate about the echo of slavery and its impact upon how theories of race are disconnected from theories of mental illness.Haunting belongs to the structure of every hegemony.Why might psychiatry need postcolonial theories? Critical discourse on psychiatry and clinical psychology—itself quite heterogeneous across the humanities and the so-called psy disciplines—has intermittently focused on the redress of power in clinical encounters, which are often constituted by an interaction between persons in very different life circumstances and with (...) divergent positions in relation to authority and privilege, or social capital and capital itself. Postcolonial theories are relevant to this topic because they... (shrink)

Volume 52, Issue 7, July 2020, Page 709-715.

This article explores the circulation of ‘anti-psychiatry’ in British film and television during the long 1960s, focusing on the controversial BBC television play In Two Minds and its cinema remake Family Life. These films were inspired by R. D. Laing's ideas on the aetiology of schizophrenia, and were understood as uniting the personal and political motivations of progressive film-makers and progressive psychiatrists. Drawing upon practitioner interviews with producer Garnett and director Loach, and extensive archival research on the production (...) and reception of these films, this article contests previous scholarship on the popular circulation of anti-psychiatry and the movement's perceived polarisation from mainstream British psychiatry. While the reception of In Two Minds and Family Life did intensify an adversarial relationship between ‘rebel’ anti-psychiatrists and hard-line behaviourists such as William Sargant, the wider psychiatric field largely welcomed the films' contributions to mental health awareness and used the publicity to counter the idea of a ‘battle’ within the profession. This included leading UK mental health organisation the National Association for Mental Health looking to Loach and Laing as models for engaging contemporary audiences as it rebranded to MIND in 1972. This article contributes to historical understandings of the complex interactions between the fields of media and mental health, as well as recent scholarship challenging the idea of a clear split between anti-psychiatry and British medical orthodoxy. (shrink)

Through the examination of anti-psychiatric theory and literary texts, this timely and thought-provoking volume explores the possibilities of liberating our habitual patterns of perception and consciousness beyond the confines of a capitalist era. In Post-Capitalist Subjectivity in Literature and Anti-Psychiatry, Skott-Myhre asks the question, how might we be different if we didn't live in a capitalist society? By drawing on Marxist and post-Marxist theory, and conducting nuanced analysis of the professional writings of anti-psychiatrists including Basaglia and (...) Laing, and the work of fiction writers Kafka and Garcia Marquez, the text identifies alternative conceptualizations of the self. Focusing in particular on portrayals of institutions and the family, Skott-Myhre proposes that these social systems offer new modes of reading the world and ourselves which will transform social organization and free subjectivity from dominant capitalist structures. This transdisciplinary text responds to a revitalized interest in alternatives to traditional psychology, an interest in life beyond capitalism, and the crisis in the traditional family. Post-Capitalist Subjectivity in Literature and Anti-Psychiatry will offer timely reading for graduate students, researchers, and scholars in the fields of cultural studies, psychology, philosophy, family studies, and interdisciplinary studies. (shrink)

Inspired by American research on the role of the family environment in the development of schizophrenia, the Scottish psychiatrist Ronald D. Laing, now known as the figurehead of British antipsychiatry, began his own research project with his colleague Aaron Esterson in the late 1950s. In the process, he became convinced that those diagnosed as “schizophrenic” were far more rational than bourgeois families alienated from themselves. Driven by this perspective, Laing pushed harder into the public arena and began to become politically (...) active. This article analyzes Laing’s development into an anti-psychiatrist and star of the counterculture in the course of the 1960s and asks about the reasons and conditions of possibility for this transformation from scientist to “scientific political activist”. (shrink)

Published in 1972, Anti‐Oedipus was the first of a number of collaborative works between the French philosopher, Gilles Deleuze, and the French psychoanalyst and political activist, Felix Guattari. As the first of a two‐volume body of work that bears the subtitle, Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Anti‐Oedipus is, to say the least, an unconventional work that should be understood, in part, as a product of its time – created as it was among the political and revolutionary fervour engendered by the (...) events of ‘May 1968’. However, this paper will suggest that Anti‐Oedipus – as a critique of psychoanalysis and the Oedipus complex, as well as being a study of the relationship between capitalism and schizophrenia – should also be understood in a less ‘time‐bound’ fashion. In particular, the paper will examine Deleuze and Guattari’s formulation of a concept of ‘desire’ and its employment in relation to subjectivity, time, capitalism, representation, and the radical ‘therapeutic’ practice that they refer to as ‘schizoanalysis’. Moreover, nearly 40 years after the events of May 1968 and against possible doubts concerning the contemporary relevance of psychoanalysis, it will be suggested that psychoanalysis and the Oedipus complex are to be understood as symptomatic of a wider ‘malaise’ that can be discerned within psychiatry, psychotherapy, and contemporary capitalist society itself, and that it is this that forms the broader target of the book’s critique. Accordingly, by providing an accessible and critical introduction to Anti‐Oedipus, the paper also hopes to stimulate further discussion and research regarding both the critique and the contribution that the work can make to contemporary psychiatry, psychotherapy, and mental health nursing generally. (shrink)

Psychiatry is increasingly dominated by the reductionist claim that mental illness is caused by neurobiological abnormalities such as chemical imbalances in the brain. Critical psychiatry does not believe that this is the whole story and proposes a more ethical foundation for practice. This book describes an original framework for renewing mental health services in alliance with people with mental health problems. It is an advance over the polarization created by the "anti-psychiatry" of the past.

Medicalization in contemporary psychopharmacology is increasingly dominated by commercial interests that threaten the scientific and ethical integrity of psychiatry. At the same time, the proliferation of new social media has altered the manner in which the social groups and institutions that have stakes in medicalization interact. Consumers are at once more powerful than ever before, but also more vulnerable. The upshot of all these developments is that medicalization is no longer simply the professed enemy of anti-psychiatry and (...) its supporters. It is now also an enemy of psychiatry. Once a welcome ally of psychiatry, medicalization appears to have turned into a fearsome enemy. (shrink)

The anti-psychiatry movement of the 20th century has notably denounced the role of values and social norms in the shaping of psychiatric categories. Recent activist movements also recognize that psychiatry is value-laden, however, they do not fight for a value-free psychiatry. On the contrary, some activist movements of the 21st century advocate for self-advocacy in sciences of mental health in order to reach a more accurate understanding of psychiatric categories/mental distress. By aiming at such epistemic gain, (...) they depart from the anti-psychiatry movement. Through the analysis of the epistemic and political influence of two of these movements – Neurodiversity and the Mad Studies, we show how this new activism has taken a scientific turn compatible with current philosophical scientific frameworks, while still developing a critical approach on psychiatry. (shrink)

Machine generated contents note: -- Clinical Theory -- 1. Psychiatry on schizophrenia: clinical pictures of a sublime object -- 2. Schizophrenia: the sublime text of psychoanalysis -- Cultural Theory -- 3. Antipsychiatry: schizophrenic experience and the sublime -- 4. Anti-Oedipus and the politics of the schizophrenic sublime -- 5. Schizophrenia, modernity, postmodernity -- 6. Postmodern schizophrenia -- 7. Glamorama, postmodernity and the schizophrenic sublime -- Conclusion.

Mental health research and care in the twenty first century faces a series of conceptual and ethical challenges arising from unprecedented advances in the neurosciences, combined with radical cultural and organisational change. The Oxford Textbook of Philosophy of Psychiatry is aimed at all those responding to these challenges, from professionals in health and social care, managers, lawyers and policy makers; service users, informal carers and others in the voluntary sector; through to philosophers, neuroscientists and clinical researchers. Organised around a (...) series of case studies in five key topic areas - concepts of disorder, the philosophical history of psychopathology, philosophy of science, ethics and philosophical value theory, and philosophy of mind - the book provides a detailed introduction to the field and a framework for study and skill development. Each case study is supported by selected readings from both philosophy and mental health, thinking skills exercises, self-test questions, key learning points and detailed guides to further reading. There is an introduction for philosophers to classification and descriptive psychopathology, and for practitioners to philosophical methods (including logic). The philosophical topics covered include philosophical methods (analytic and Continental); phenomenology, hermeneutics and existentialism, logical empiricism and its successors; idealism and realism; reasons and causes; and modern theories of mind and brain, free will and personal identity. Topics from mental health include psychiatry and 'anti-psychiatry'; Jaspers' psychopathology and the new neurosciences; the future of psychiatric classifications; strengths-based approaches, recovery practice, social inclusion and diversity; and key topics in psychopathology, such as delusion, autism, disorders of volition, thought insertion and other experiences in schizophrenia. The Oxford Textbook of Philosophy of Psychiatry aims to secure the skills-base of the discipline by bringing philosophers closer to the realities of practice in mental health, and mental health practitioners closer to the resources of philosophy as a partner to the sciences in responding to the challenges of twenty-first century mental health and social care. (shrink)

In this paper, recent publications in the field of psychiatric nosology, classification, and diagnosis are reviewed. An attempt is made to group such writings into three broad themes: "essentialist/realist," "anti-essentialist/pragmatic," and "eliminative." The conceptual nature of these groupings is explored, and similarities between some elements of biological psychiatry and phenomenological psychiatry are outlined. The paper attempts to undercut current ways of thinking about psychiatric disorders by drawing on John McDowell's criticism of the idea of a value-free objective (...) standpoint, and further relates our difficulties in thinking about mental disorders to McDowell's wider diagnosis of problems in contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

A close examination of the relationship between media, art, and the "Electra complex" The feminist counterpart to Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus, Anti-Electra is a philosophy of "the girl" as a model of contemporary transgressive subjectivity. Elisabeth von Samsonow asserts that focusing on the girl's escape from the Oedipus complex leads to a fundamental shift in our most common views on media and art. Presenting an interpretation of contemporary technics, Anti-Electra argues that technology today encompasses Electra's gadgets and (...) toys. According to von Samsonow, satellite drive technologies such as wireless telephones, WLAN, and GPS echo the "preoedipal constellation" that the girl specializes in. And with the help of the girl, the cartography of overlapping zones between humankind and animals, as well as between humankind and apparatuses, is redesigned through what the book holds as a "radical totemism." Anti-Electra ultimately offers a new view on gender, the contemporary world dyed by symbolic girlism, and the (universal) girl in critical dialogue with media, ecology, and society. (shrink)

It is common to note that social environment and cultural formation shape mental disorders. The details of this claim are, however, not well understood. The paper takes a look at the claim that culture has an impact on psychiatry from the perspective of metaphysics and the philosophy of science. Its aim is to offer, in a general fashion, partial explications of some significant versions of the thesis that culture and social environment shape mental disorders and to highlight some of (...) the consequences social constructionism about psychiatry has for psychiatric explanation. In particular, it will be argued that the alleged dependence of facts about particular mental disorders and about the second order property of being a mental disorder on social facts amounts to a robust form of constructivism, whereas the view that clinician–patient interaction is influenced by cultural facts is perfectly compatible with an anti-constructivist stance. (shrink)

France saw a great intellectual upsurge in a variety of different academic fields in the 1970s, principally in philosophy, but also in the social sciences, linguistics, anthropology, history, and psychiatry. Different strands of thinking, from the linguistic school of structuralists, Lévi-Strauss’ structuralist anthropology, Louis Althusser’s reconsiderations of the basis of Marxism, Derrida’s philosophical critique of phenomenology and structuralism, Lacan’s of Freud and the unconscious, and Michel Foucault’s historical genealogy, all seemed to be coalescing in a reconsideration of the centrality (...) of Man in what had been assumed to be a human-centred universe. Often seen as representing the triumph of subjectivity over objective reality, this chapter will show how the theories of deconstruction were really a critique of the Subject. (shrink)

This reflection piece considers how expertise has been generated within the history of madness, disability, eugenics, psychiatry and anti-psychiatry. As numerous scholars and critics have pointed out, the power of rational argumentation can be persuasive, while its absence can be pathologized. Yet, in the fields of madness studies and critical disability studies we can see many examples of how the dividing line between normal and pathological states have been contested, especially where those categories correspond with notions of (...) expertise, experience, and insight. This short paper reflects on these themes and draws from a selection of research case studies, in the hopes of encouraging other scholars to take up these questions in their own work to destabilize concepts of expertise as fixed categories of ability and skill. Instead, I use these examples to promote a more complex and diverse way of interpreting expressions of dissent as potential forms of expertise. (shrink)

Psychiatry is a discipline that deals with both the physical and the mental lives of individuals and though it is true that, largely because of this characteristic, different models are used for different disorders, there is still a remnant tendency towards reductionist views in the field. In this paper I argue that the available empirical evidence from psychiatry gives us reasons to question biological reductionism and that in its place we should adopt a pluralistic explanatory model that is (...) more suited to the needs of the discipline and to the needs of the patients it is meant to help. This will allow us to retain psychiatry as an autonomous science that can productively co-exist with neuroscience while also giving patients the kind of attention they need. I further argue that this same evidence supports a view of the mind that is anti-reductive and that allows that causation can be both bottom-up and top-down and that such a view is available in emergentism coupled with an interventionist model of causation. (shrink)

Exploring phenomenological philosophy as it relates to psychiatry and the social world, this book establishes a common language between psychiatrists, anti-psychiatrists, psychologists and social workers. It is an inter-disciplinary work by phenomenological philosophers, psychiatrists, and psychologists to discover the essence and foundations of social psychiatry. Using the phenomenology of Husserl as a point of departure, the meanings of empathy, interpersonal understanding, we-intentionality, ethics, citizenship and social inclusion are investigated in relation to psychopathology, nosology, and clinical research. This (...) work, drawing upon the rich classical and contemporary phenomenological tradition, touching on a broad range of thinkers such as Deleuze, Levinas, and R.D. Laing, also explicates how phenomenology is a method capable of capturing the human condition and its intricate relation to the social world and mental illness. (shrink)

This dissertation is a contribution to the contemporary field of phenomenological psychopathology, or the phenomenological study of psychiatric disorders. The work proceeds with two major aims. The first is to show how a phenomenological approach can clarify and illuminate the nature of psychopathology—specifically those conditions typically labeled as major depressive disorder and bipolar disorder. The second is to show how engaging with psychopathological conditions can challenge and undermine many phenomenological presuppositions, especially phenomenology’s status as a transcendental philosophy and its corresponding (...) anti-naturalistic outlook. In the opening chapter, I articulate the three layers of the subject matter of phenomenological research—what I refer to as “existentials,” “modes,” and “prejudices.” As I argue, while each layer contributes to what we might call the “structure” of human existence, they do not do so in the same way, or to the same degree. Because phenomenological psychopathology—and applied phenomenology in general—aims to characterize how the structure of human existence can change and alter, it is paramount that these layers be adequately delineated and defined before investigating these changes. In chapters two through five, I conduct hermeneutic and phenomenological investigations of psychopathological phenomena typically labeled as major depressive disorder or bipolar disorder. These investigations address the affective aspects of depression and mania, and the embodied aspects of depression. In addition to clearly articulating the nature of these phenomena, I show how certain psychopathological conditions involve changes in the deepest or most fundamental layer of human existence—what I refer to as existentials. As I argue, many of the classical phenomenologists (including Husserl and Heidegger) believed that these structural features were necessary, unchanging, and universal. However, this presupposition is challenged through the examination of psychopathological and neuropathological conditions, undermining the status of phenomenology as a transcendental philosophy. While this challenge to classical phenomenology is only sketched in the early chapters, in chapters six and seven I develop it in more detail in order to achieve two distinct ends. In chapter six I argue that psychopathology and neuropathology not only challenge phenomenology’s status as a transcendental philosophy, but also supply a key to developing a phenomenological naturalism (which I contrast with a naturalized phenomenology). Phenomenological naturalism, as I articulate it, is a position in which phenomenology is not subsumed by the metaphysical and methodological framework of the natural sciences, but nonetheless maintains the capacity to investigate how the natural world stands independent of human subjectivity (and how events in the natural world can bring about changes in the most fundamental structures of human existence). In the seventh chapter I argue that a phenomenology in which existentials are contingent and variable rather than necessary and unchanging allows phenomenologists to contribute to new dimensional approaches to psychiatric classification. Rather than begin from distinct categories of disorder, these approaches begin from distinct core features of human existence. These features, referred to as either dimensions or constructs, can vary in degree and are studied in both normal and pathological forms. (shrink)

Abstract“Simulanten des Irrsinns auf dem Vortragspult”: Dada, War and Psychiatry – ‘Active Dynamics of Trauma’. This paper relates stage performances of dada artists to war neurosis and shell shock as sociocultural phenomena. The leitmotif of this investigation is the notion of simulation, as dada artists were referred to as malingerers (simulators) of madness by the press at the time. I hypothesize that the performers imitate/simulate with drums, shouting and ‘bruitist’ sound poems, the noises of war, staging themselves as war (...) neurotics in a kind of shocking clinical demonstration. Both discourses intersect in the fact that many dadaists try to dodge the draft by simulating madness. The scandalizing anti‐art of dada will be understood as contagious anti‐pedagogy, trying to vaccinate against the madness of the era. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:George Engel’s Legacy for the Philosophy of Medicine and PsychiatryBradley Lewis (bio)KeywordsBiopsychosocial model, George Engel, pragmatism, philosophy of medicine, philosophy of psychiatryEach of the respondents to this paper raises critical and important concerns. I am grateful for the quality of their insights. David Brendel’s response, along with his recent book, Healing Psychiatry: Bridging the Science/Humanism Divide, resembles my efforts in several ways. Like Brendel, I too believe that (...) the American pragmatic philosophy can be helpful in healing the splits and divisions within psychiatry. And, like Brendel, I believe that psychiatry would benefit from what he calls the “four ps” of pragmatism. Where we differ with regard to George Engel and his biopsychosocial model seems to be less about philosophy and more about strategy. Brendel argues that Engel was too scientistic in his manifest reasoning to be considered a pragmatist. I agree with this description of Engel. But, strategically, we can go beyond Engel’s manifest reasoning to draw out the implications of Engel’s writings in a pragmatic fashion. I am not saying that Engel did this himself; I am only saying that it is very possible to reinterpret Engel along these lines.Brendel also argues that the biopsychosocial model itself needs improvement. But, just as it is possible to update Engel’s theoretical scaffold, we can also update Engel’s biopsychosocial model. Along the lines of Brendel’s concerns, we can easily revise the model so that we remember that not all problems need complex analysis and interventions. Some problems are relatively simple and can have a simple solution. We can also revise the model so we include questions of consumer participation and the provisional nature of the clinical encounter. I see nothing in the biopsychosocial model that contradicts either of these concerns. Yes, the biopsychosocial model needs to be updated, refurbished, expanded, and reimagined. That is my point in the paper.The traction of Brendel’s concerns is not can we reinterpret Engel? or can we refresh the biopsychosocial model?—of course we can. The traction of his concern seems to be “should we?” To this strategic question, Brendel’s answer is no and my answer is yes. I argue that it is a good idea to refresh and refurbish Engel and his biopsychosocial model because it helps to create a connection with an important tradition within both medicine and psychiatry: the tradition of balanced, broadminded, nuanced, patient-centered and anti-reductionistic [End Page 327] care. This tradition is important because medicine and psychiatry seem perpetually vulnerable to the temptations of reductionist approaches and to what Engel, and Nassir Ghaemi more recently, call “dogmatism” (Engel 1977, 130; Ghaemi, 2003, 301). Whether reductionism and dogmatism take the form of biopsychiatry, or psychoanalysis, or antipsychiatry, or cognitive-behavioral therapy, the problems of dogmatism are the same.I am sure Brendel would agree with this, which is why he raises pluralism to such a prominent position in his own reasoning. The difference is that Brendel believes we can better get to this kind of balanced clinical care by letting go of the past figures like Engel and moving into the bright light of the twenty-first century. Maybe so. But my thinking when I wrote the paper goes the other way around. For me, if clinical medicine and psychiatry more carefully tended to its history and tradition, it would be less likely to fall sway to the next Johnny-come-lately reductionistic model.Jeffery Spike’s memories of George Engel during the years they worked together at the University of Rochester School of Medicine provide a good sense of why Engel is an important figure to remember and to pay homage. As Spike puts it, Engel was not only a “legendary figure” with an “almost mythical diagnostic ability,” Engel “probably had more influence on the philosophy of medicine in the United States than any other person, physician, or philosopher.” Both of these accomplishments help to explain why Engel is worth remembering.Those of us in medicine and psychiatry all know mythical clinicians and teachers—the ones who seem like Michael Jordan used to seem on the basketball court, able to somehow make even... (shrink)

Abstractabstract:William Osler (1849–1919) is often considered the most influential physician in the emergence of science-based medicine. However, his approach to clinical medicine tends to be misunderstood, and its relevance to psychiatry has not been explored systematically. Osler's approach to the patient had four components: biological reductionism about disease, a scientific approach to clinical diagnosis, therapeutic conservatism, and a humanistic approach to the person. These concepts conflict with the pragmatic, eclectic, anti-reductionistic assumptions of contemporary psychiatry, as codified in (...) its interpretation of a "biopsychosocial" model. This model leads to unscientific practice, with excessive use of medications given for symptoms, and inattention to identifying and treating diseases. This article suggests that implementing Osler's philosophy of medicine in psychiatry would greatly benefit the latter. It would inaugurate a new "biohumanistic" approach to psychiatry. (shrink)

In her paper, “Evidence-based medicine in context: A pragmatist approach to psychiatric practice,” Jorid Moen sets out to advance the debate about role of evidence-based medicine in psychiatric practice. She views this debate as dichotomous and unproductive. It is dichotomous in the sense that EBM is linked to foundationalist theories of knowledge, whereas critiques of EBM are often based in anti-foundationalist theory. It is unproductive because neither position offers a way forward. Moen draws on the philosophical tradition of pragmatism (...) in hopes that ‘opposing positions of EBM might be brought to agree that the different perspectives they represent are both relevant and important for psychiatric. (shrink)

En este artículo, nos proponemos analizar el horizonte epistemológico sobre el que se construye la psiquiatría de Kraepelin, particularmente su posición frente al problema de los criterios de clasificación de las enfermedades mentales, que fue un tema ampliamente discutido por la psiquiatría mundial a fines del siglo XIX. Analizamos de qué modo Kraepelin se vinculaba con el debate de su época sobre la definición de criterios científicos, válidos y objetivos de clasificación de las enfermedades psiquiátricas, para, posteriormente, analizar las consecuencias (...) implícitas en una elección de criterios diagnósticos que significó el abandono de las narrativas de los pacientes frente a la fantasmagoría de las categorías diagnósticas. In this paper we analyze the epistemological framework on which Kraepelin's psychiatry was built. We are particularly interested in Kraepelin's position relating to the criteria of classification of mental illnesses; a topic that was widely discussed by in psychiatry throughout the world at the end of the XIX century. We analyze his contributions to the discussion concerning the definition of scientific and objectively valid criteria for the classification of psychiatric illnesses. Then, we show how settling upon certain diagnostic criteria led to paying little attention to patients narratives, and giving major weight to the paraphernalia of diagnostic categories. (shrink)

The article views the development of the Tartu–Moscow semiotic school from the analysis of texts to the study of spatial entities (semiosphere being most well known of them). It comes to light that ‘culture’ and ‘space’ have been such notions in Tartu–Moscow School to which, for instance, the ‘semiosphere’ does not add much. There are studied possibilities to join Uexküll’s and Lotman’s basic concepts (as certain grounds of Estonian semiotics) with Tartu–Moscow School’s treatment of culture and space through the notion (...) of ‘semiotic subject’. Such an approach allows to see transdisciplinarity, which has come to issue only during the last decade, already in the first conceptions of Tartu–Moscow School where transdisciplinarity revealed itself in the symbiotic use of ‘culture’ and ‘space’. (shrink)

Summary John Stuart Mill's classic tale of disillusionment from a ‘narrow creed’, an overt as much as a covert theme of his Autobiography (London, 1873), has for many years served as a guide to the search for the causes and sources of his ‘enlargement-of-the-utilitarian-creed’ project. As a result, in analyses of Mill's mature views, Samuel Taylor Coleridge—and friends—commonly take centre stage in terms of influence, whereas John's father—James Mill—is reduced either to a supernumerary or a villain in the last act (...) of John's intellectual development. However, students of Mill's works should not take at face value the story presented in Autobiography. Mill's own emphasis on the role of his ‘new influences’ has led scholars to disregard the role of his ‘old influences’ in his attempt to create a broader theory of living—one which takes into account both the intellectual and the emotional capacities of individuals. A close look at key aspects of John Stuart Mill's ‘enlargement project’ suggests that James Mill may have played a more positive role than is usually acknowledged. A way into the intellectual affinity of the two Mills is the person they both kept returning to for guidance and inspiration throughout their lives: Plato. (shrink)