Presenting a fascinating analysis of the idea of what can't be said, this book ascertains whether the notion of there being a truth, or a state of affairs, or knowledge that can't be expressed linguistically is a coherent notion. The author distinguishes different senses in which it might be said that something can't be said. The first part looks at the question of whether ineffability is a coherent idea. Part two evaluates two families of arguments regarding whether ineffable states of (...) affairs actually exist: the argument from mysticism and the argument from epistemic boundedness. Part three looks more closely at the relation between mystic and non-mystic stances. In the fourth and final part the author distinguishes five qualitatively different types of ineffability. _Ineffability and Philosophy_ is a significant contribution to this area of research and will be essential reading for philosophers and those researching and studying the philosophy of language. (shrink)

Experiences of absence are common in everyday life, but have received little philosophical attention until recently, when two positions regarding the nature of such experiences surfaced in the literature. According to the Perceptual View, experiences of absence are perceptual in nature. This is denied by the Surprise-Based View, according to which experiences of absence belong together with cases of surprise. In this paper, I show that there is a kind of experience of absence—which I call frustrating absences—that has been overlooked (...) by the Perceptual View and by the Surprise Based-View and that cannot be adequately explained by them. I offer an alternative account to deal with frustrating absences, one according to which experiencing frustrating absences is a matter of subjects having desires for something to be present frustrated by the world. Finally, I argue that there may well be different kinds of experiences of absence. (shrink)

But what are functions? Here, 15 leading scholars of philosophy of psychology and philosophy of biology present new essays on functions.

Some Molinists claim that a perfectly good God would actualize a world that is salvifically optimal, that is, a world in which the balance between the saved and damned is optimal and cannot be improved upon without undesirable consequences. I argue that given some plausible principles of rationality, alongside the assumptions Molinists already accept, God’s perfect rationality necessarily would lead him to actualize a salvifically optimal world; I call this position “Optimistic Molinism.” I then consider objections and offer replies, concluding (...) that Optimistic Molinism is undefeated and merits further exploration. (shrink)

Covering the basics as well as recent research results, this book provides a very readable introduction to the exciting interface of computability and ...

In this challenging study, André Gallois proposes and defends a thesis about the character of our knowledge of our own intentional states. Taking up issues at the centre of attention in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind and epistemology, he examines accounts of self-knowledge by such philosophers as Donald Davidson, Tyler Burge and Crispin Wright, and advances his own view that, without relying on observation, we are able justifiably to attribute to ourselves propositional attitudes, such as belief, that we consciously (...) hold. His study will be of wide interest to philosophers concerned with questions about self-knowledge. (shrink)

O presente trabalho tem como objetivo apresentar dois distintos projetos formativos: a paideia grega e a Bildung do esclarecimento alemão representada por Kant e Hegel, bem como o desenvolvimento desta última em Halbbildung no século XX. Para compreender os sentidos e contornos históricos em que essas formulações estavam postas, tornou-se necessário inseri-las no contexto mais geral das formações sociais em que elas estavam inseridas, revelando suas contradições.

This book presents a comprehensive and detailed exploration of the relationship between the thought of G.W.F. Hegel and that of John McDowell, the latter of whom is widely considered to be one of the most influential living analytic philosophers. It serves as a point of entry in McDowell’s and Hegel’s philosophy, and a substantial contribution to ongoing debates on perceptual experience and perceptual justification, naturalism, human freedom and action. The chapters gathered in this volume, as well as McDowell’s responses, make (...) it clear that McDowell’s work paves the way for an original reading of Hegel’s texts. His conceptual framework allows for new interpretive possibilities in Hegel’s philosophy which, until now, have remained largely unexplored. Moreover, these interpretations shed light on various aspects of continuity and discontinuity between the philosophies of these two authors, thus defining more clearly their positions on specific issues. In addition, they allow us to see Hegel’s thought as containing a number of conceptual tools that might be useful for advancing McDowell’s own philosophy and contemporary philosophy in general. (shrink)

Current work in language models (LMs) helps us speed up or even skip thinking by accelerating and automating cognitive work. But can LMs help us with critical thinking -- thinking in deeper, more reflective ways which challenge assumptions, clarify ideas, and engineer new concepts? We treat philosophy as a case study in critical thinking, and interview 21 professional philosophers about how they engage in critical thinking and on their experiences with LMs. We find that philosophers do not find LMs to (...) be useful because they lack a sense of selfhood (memory, beliefs, consistency) and initiative (curiosity, proactivity). We propose the selfhood-initiative model for critical thinking tools to characterize this gap. Using the model, we formulate three roles LMs could play as critical thinking tools: the Interlocutor, the Monitor, and the Respondent. We hope that our work inspires LM researchers to further develop LMs as critical thinking tools and philosophers and other 'critical thinkers' to imagine intellectually substantive uses of LMs. (shrink)

One of the current debates in philosophy of mind is whether the content of perceptual experiences is conceptual or nonconceptual. The proponents of nonconceptual content, or nonconceptualists, typically support their position by appealing to the so-called Fineness of Grain Argument, which, in rough terms, has as its conclusion that we do not possess concepts for everything we perceive. In his Mind and World, John McDowell tried to give a response to the argument, and show that we do possess concepts for (...) everything we perceive. His response is based on the idea that we have a capacity to recognize all that we perceive. However, a good number of people took this proposal as being empirically false. My aim in this paper is to show that McDowell’s proposal is not only not empirically false, but likely to be empirically true. We do have the capacity to recognize all that we perceive, but such recognition capacity is dependent on information stored in short-term memory, and not in longterm memory, as McDowell’s critics have mistakenly supposed. (shrink)

This article offers an explanation of perhaps Wittgenstein’s strangest and least intuitive thesis – the semantical mutation thesis – according to which one can never answer a mathematical conjecture because the new proof alters the very meanings of the terms involved in the original question. Instead of basing our justification on the distinction between mere calculation and proofs of isolated propositions, characteristic of Wittgenstein’s intermediary period, we generalize it to include conjectures involving effective procedures as well.

The fact that names refer to individuals is a basic assumption of referentialist theories of proper names, but the notion of individual is systematically taken for granted in those theories. The present paper follows that basic assumption, but proposes to analyze the notion of individual prior to the development of any semantic theory of proper names. It will be argued that a particular perdurantist conception of individual should be adopted, which distinguishes the notions of individual occurrence, and individual simpliciter. A (...) new theory of proper names (called the cluster-occurrence theory) is presented, according to which names refer to individual occurrences, and the intension associated with a name is an individual simpliciter. The merits of the new theory are then assessed in confrontation with its standard rival accounts. (shrink)

This paper deals with the recent Swedish proposals of a Intuitionistic notion of Truth, by Dag Prawitz and Per Martin-Löf.

This volume provides the first full, political and philosophically rigorous account of Plato's dialogue Alcibiades Major. The book argues that Alcibiades Major accomplishes its goal, which is to redirect Alcibiades' political ambitions, not by arguing for specific propositions based on specific premises. The dialogue accomplishes its goal by generalizing the notion of argument to include appeals to Alcibiades' doxastic attitudes toward his ability and knowledge to become a powerful ruler of the Greek people. One such doxastic attitude that Alcibiades holds (...) about himself, and one that Socrates deftly disabuses him of, is that he does not have to cultivate himself to be competitive with the local, Athenian politicians. Socrates reminds Alcibiades that his true competitors are not Athenian politicians, but rather the Spartan and Persian kings. Consequently, the psychological momentum of the dialogue is motivated by Socrates' aim to engender the right sort of beliefs in Alcibiades. (shrink)

According to philosophers such as McDowell and Brewer, the contents of perceptual experience are conceptual. This view came to be known as Conceptualism. However, a number of critics have argued that they are wrong in thinking this, for they claim that there is an argument, the so-called Fineness of Grain Argument, which is valid and sound, and has as its consequence the falsity of Conceptualism. Although McDowell and Brewer seem to acknowledge that the Fineness of Grain Argument, if valid and (...) sound, has as its consequence the falsity of Conceptualism, they have ways of answering to the argument. In this paper, I will grant the proponents of Conceptualism that one of their ways of answering to the Fineness of Grain Argument is successful, and that the argument can be blocked. But I will argue that, even if this is the case, we have good reasons to think that Conceptualism is false. For there is another argument, that I will call the Constitution Argument, that has as its conclusion the falsity of Conceptualism. I show that the Constitution Argument is valid and sound, in which case we have good reasons to think that Conceptualism is false. (shrink)

Nous sommes dans une société où se multiplient les techniques de communication. Quelles sont-elles ? Quelles nouvelles formes de lien social accompagnent-elles ? Comment penser le rapport entre techniques et société ? Telles sont les interrogations avancées et qui s’appuient sur la demande sociale latente propre à nos sociétés et qui est à la source des progrès techniques, ceux-ci, ensuite, imposant leur propre logique.In our society, techniques of communication increase in number. What are they ? What new forms of social (...) link go with them ? How are we supposed to think the relationship between techniques and society ? Such are the questions we have to ask. They imply a social unconscious characteristic of modern societies and, in feed-back, the effects of the technical logic. (shrink)

A más de cien años de su nacimiento y casi treinta de su muerte, Paul Grice sigue siendo uno de los filósofos más citados, discutidos e incomprendidos del siglo xx. Innovador, desafiante e inconforme intelectualmente, parece haber llevado a cabo uno de los anhelos más profundos de la filosofía oxoniense del lenguaje ordinario: transformar la reflexión sobre el lenguaje en una reflexión sobre la acción humana. El libro argumenta a favor de esta tesis señalando cómo algunos problemas específicos de la (...) filosofía del lenguaje de Grice sólo pueden ser tratados en el contexto de sus reflexiones más maduras sobre acción, racionalidad y valor. Defiende también la posición de que muchas explicaciones de significado son lógicamente análogas a las explicaciones de la acción. Pero la evaluación de la acción en términos de las razones involucra al menos dos tipos de restricciones racionales: aquellas internas al hablante (lo que resulta racional para él) y otras externas (lo que el hablante debe hacer desde el punto de vista de los demás). Con su celebrado análisis del significado del hablante, Grice enfatiza rasgos del primer tipo; con su famosa teoría de la conversación, identifica rasgos del segundo. Y ambos tipos de restricciones solo tienen sentido si se reconoce que el significado de una palabra o de una conducta no es una cosa ni una entidad mental sino la conformidad del símbolo o la acción con un criterio normativo. La conclusión general de Grice resuena más allá de sus contribuciones precursoras en filosofía del lenguaje y permite articular una posición metafísica. En un mundo sin seres capaces de evaluar, de dar y reconocer valor, la pregunta por el significado carecería de objeto. (shrink)

The interplay between computability and randomness has been an active area of research in recent years, reflected by ample funding in the USA, numerous workshops, and publications on the subject. The complexity and the randomness aspect of a set of natural numbers are closely related. Traditionally, computability theory is concerned with the complexity aspect. However, computability theoretic tools can also be used to introduce mathematical counterparts for the intuitive notion of randomness of a set. Recent research shows that, conversely, concepts (...) and methods originating from randomness enrich computability theory.The book covers topics such as lowness and highness properties, Kolmogorov complexity, betting strategies and higher computability. Both the basics and recent research results are desribed, providing a very readable introduction to the exciting interface of computability and randomness for graduates and researchers in computability theory, theoretical computer science, and measure theory. (shrink)

It is widely believed by philosophers that we human beings are capable of stepping back from inclinations to act in a certain way and consider whether we should do so. If we judge that there are enough reasons in favour of following our initial inclination, we are definitely motivated, and, if all goes well, we act. This view of human agency naturally leads to the idea that our actions are self-determined, or controlled by ourselves. Some go one step further to (...) the point of saying that we should extend the fundamental aspects of this view of human agency to the epistemic realm. This we call ‘the control-view”. Here we will make a strong case against the control-view. While we have a substantial control over our practical lives, it is very unlikely that this extends to our epistemic lives. Our discussion will proceed in three stages. We will present two asymmetries between our practical and epistemic lives which are followed by a general argument against the control-view. (shrink)

Cet article propose une lecture de Sur le duel (1827). Le texte se présente comme l’examen de la forme grammaticale duelle à travers les différentes langues. Il s’agit donc de faire œuvre de linguistique comparée sous des traits propres à Humboldt, c’est-à-dire en alliant l’attention à l’empiricité singulière des langues et la réflexion générale sur le caractère fondateur du langage pour la pensée. Or, à cet égard, le duel acquiert un statut spécifique : il n’est plus seulement une catégorie grammaticale (...) dont il faut étudier les caractéristiques et la place au sein des différentes langues mais devient un concept essentiel qui rend raison du statut transcendantal du langage pour le développement de l’esprit humain. Ainsi, Sur le duel est le lieu de la fusion entre linguistique et anthropologie se jouant dans la figure d’une humanité n’existant pleinement que par le dialogue et d’un sujet originellement pluriel. (shrink)

" Lorsque les hasards de la naissance et de l'histoire font qu'aucune culture, place, conduite ou valeur ne vous apparaissent comme vôtres, en vertu de quels critères pouvez-vous préférer telle place, action, valeur ou conduite? En vertu de quoi l'esclave révolté vaut-il mieux que l'esclave soumis, le joueur que l'avare, le rebelle sans cause que l'inquisiteur?Telles sont les questions, vécues et vitales, qui ont motivé cet ouvrage. Parce que rien n'était donné à son auteur comme allant de soi pas même (...) l'adhésion à la vie du corps, il lui fallut produire lui-même ses préférences et certitudes ; et comme le sol ni les instruments culturels de cette production ne lui étaient pas non plus donnés, il lui fallait fonder - au sens radical que la phénoménologie donne à ce terme - une axiologie ou hiérarchie des possibles, et une théorie de l'aliénation qui expliquât pourquoi cette hiérarchie peut être niée ou non respectée en pratique.Le point de départ devait nécessairement être une ontologie existentielle : sans elle il n'y a pas d'anthropologie (philosophique) ni de morale possibles. On verra comment la seule ontologie existentielle qui existe, celle de Sartre, a pu être pliée aux besoins de cette entreprise : elle a permis de dégager les trois directions fondamentales de valorisation d'où découlent trois possibilités fondamentales d'éthique : les valeurs et attitudes vitales, puis esthétiques, puis, imprescriptible et jamais acquise, la valorisation de la valorisation elle-même par quoi la liberté, au terme d'une rupture (ou "conversion"), se déprend de toutes les valeurs au profit de sa propre activité souveraine.Pour moitié environ, ce volume est constitué d'analyses existentielles visant à vérifier la valeur opératoire de cette classification a priori : phénoménologie des valeurs corporelles, sensorielles, esthétiques, psychanalyse existentielle des attitudes de la "Vie aliénée", puis de celles, "esthétiques", de l'instantanéiste, de l'aventurier, du poète, du saint.La dernière partie porte sur l'articulation et l'intégration des trois niveaux axiologiques dans la perspective d'une éthique de la libération. On y trouvera un essai d'élaboration des instruments et de la méthode d'une compréhension de soi par soi, base de toute libération possible.Ce livre qui est par certains côtés une "somme" de l'existentialisme, en indique en même temps l'articulation avec le marxisme et son indispensable mais encore impossible dépassement pratique. Il fournit non point une morale, mais les instruments et les repères permettant d'en inventer une, de comprendre pourquoi la morale est impossible et de suppléer à son impossibilité. "A. G.SOMMAIRE : INTRODUCTION : ÊTRE ET VÉRITÉ I. L'IDÉE DE VÉRITÉ ABSOLUE II. L'ÉVIDENCE III. LE SENS IV. VÉRITÉ ET AUTHENTICITÉ PREMIÈRE PARTIE : AUTHENTICITÉ ET LIBERTÉ I. RÉFLEXION ET CONNAISSANCE DE SOI II. LA RÉFLEXION PURIFIANTE DEUXIÈME PARTIE : Chapitre 1, LA VIE ET LES ATTITUDES VITALES I. LA VIE NATURELLE II. LA VIE ALIÉNÉE III. LA VIE CONSCIENTE DE SOI Chapitre 2, LES ATTITUDES ESTHÉTIQUES I. LA CONVERSION ESTHÉTIQUE II. L'INSTANTANÉISTE III. L'AVENTURIER, LE JOUEUR IV. LE RÉVOLTÉ, LE POÈTE, LE SAINT TROISIÈME PARTIE : LE CHOIX DE LA LIBERTÉ I. LA CONVERSION MORALE II. LA MORALISATION DE LA SITUATION III. AXIOLOGIE ABSOLUE ET RELATIVE. (shrink)

La succession récente de crises économiques et financières constitue le symptôme le plus évident des dysfonctionnements du système économique. De nouvelles approches comme la responsabilité sociale des entreprises et la finance socialement responsable proposent d’humaniser le capitalisme et de reconfigurer l’économie de marché. Ces deux courants de pensée ont d’ailleurs contribué à opérer un important changement dans l’imaginaire social quant à la façon de concevoir la légitimité des activités économiques. Malgré leur grand inté­rêt, ces nouvelles approches comportent des limites relativement (...) à leur effica­cité et leur capacité de remédier aux dysfonctionnements reconnus. C’est pour­quoi nous souhaitons examiner ces deux approches et envisager la discussion des questions éthiques dans une perspective plus large. Nous le ferons en affirmant que le dilemme éthique de l’économie se pose assez simplement dans les termes suivants : moraliser l’économie de l’intérieur ou reformuler la question éthique à l’extérieur du discours économique, notamment par la voie politique et démocra­tique. Dans le premier cas de figure, c’est l’effectivité des approches normatives comme la RSE et la FSR qui doit être examinée. Dans le second cas de figure, c’est la place de l’éthique dans le discours social et sa relation avec l’économie qui doit être discutée. Nous discuterons donc ces deux cas de figure et proposerons de reformuler la question éthique à l’extérieur de la sphère économique en utilisant l’éthique comme cadre d’analyse transversale et matrice des choix sociopolitiques. (shrink)

The emerging field of lipidomics has identified lipids as key players in disease physiology. Their physicochemical diversity allows precise control of cell structure and signaling events through modulation of membrane properties and trafficking of proteins. As such, lipids are important regulators of brain function and have been implicated in neurodegenerative and mood disorders. Importantly, environmental chronic stress has been associated with anxiety and depression and its exposure in rodents has been extensively used as a model to study these diseases. With (...) the accessibility to modern mass‐spectrometry lipidomic platforms, it is now possible to snapshot the extensively interconnected lipid network. Here, we review the fundamentals of lipid biology and outline a framework for the interpretation of lipidomic studies as a new approach to study brain pathophysiology. Thus, lipid profiling provides an exciting avenue for the identification of disease signatures with important implications for diagnosis and treatment of mood disorders. (shrink)

. The ‘common good’ spirituality of Louis-Joseph Lebret and his influence in the Constitution and development thinking in Brazil. Journal of Global Ethics: Vol. 17, Lebret and the Projects of Économie Humaine, Integral Human Development, and Development Ethics, Guest Editors Des Gasper and Lori Keleher, pp. 185-203.

According to Molinism, logically prior to his creative decree, God knows via middle knowledge the truth value of the counterfactuals or conditionals of creaturely freedom (CFs) and thus what any possible person would do in any given circumstance. Critics of Molinism have pointed out that the Molinist God gets lucky that the CFs allow him to actualize either a world of his liking or even a good-enough world at all. In this paper, I advance and strengthen the popular critique in (...) two ways. First, I specify the kind of luck to which God is subject, which is circumstantial moral luck. Second, and more importantly, I argue that exposure to this luck is problematic because something external to God and beyond his control determines the degree of praiseworthiness he deserves in relevant possible worlds. My main contention is that divine subjection to circumstantial moral luck raises the theoretical costs of Molinism. (shrink)

The Antecedent-Behavior-Consequence (ABC)-analysis is a tool for analyzing behavior and stems from the field of psychology where it is used as a tool for the understanding of behavior in general and organizational behavior in particular. In this paper the ABC-analysis is implemented as a tool to understand why people behave ethically in organizations, through the identification of key environmental factors that cause such behavior. This analysis can be the first step to recognizing the complexity of circumstances determining ethical behavior, as (...) well as trigger for changing that behavior. This will be elaborated in the implementation process of an ethical code. The working of the ABC-analysis will be illustrated with an example derived from field research concerning the reorganization of a department of a chemical company. (shrink)

This paper deals with the mutations in Wittgenstein’s treatment of the notions of “generality” and of “singularity”, from his first philosophy, in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, to his later mature philosophy represented by the Philosophical Investigations. As we shall see, Wittgenstein’s philosophical handling of the notion of “visual perception” plays a key role in those conceptual transformations.

This paper offers a new interpretation for Wittgenstein`s treatment of mathematical identities. As it is widely known, Wittgenstein`s mature philosophy of mathematics includes a general rejection of abstract objects. On the other hand, the traditional interpretation of mathematical identities involves precisely the idea of a single abstract object – usually a number –named by both sides of an equation.

PurposeCancer can be a burden on the relationship and even lead to relationship dissolution. Previous studies about the impact of cancer on close relationships almost exclusively involve cancer patients. So far, little is known about the views of spouses. Therefore, this study focuses on partners or ex-partners of cancer patients.MethodsIn this cross-sectional study, N = 265 partners or ex-partners of cancer patients are examined regarding a possible separation, the reasons for separation and the influence of the cancer on the relationship. (...) In addition, predictors of separation and the positive or negative perception of the impact of cancer on the relationship were investigated.ResultsThe separation rate was marginally lower than in the general population in Germany. The most frequent reason for separation was the death of the cancer patient, followed by relationship problems, and the cancer disease itself. Among those who were separated, 57.4% reported that cancer contributed to the separation. On average, the influence of cancer on relationship dissolution is indicated with 82.9%. Also, for those who stayed together, 83.7% reported an impact of the cancer on the relationship, of which 55.9% reported a negative impact. Logistic regressions indicated that higher levels of depression were associated with greater odds of a more negative perception of the influence of cancer on the relationship, whereas a more satisfied relationship tended to be associated with a more positive perception. Those who had no psychological treatment in the past, lower anxiety levels and lower relationship satisfaction had an increased risk of separation. Overall, relationship satisfaction was significantly lower than in the general population in Germany.ConclusionIn particular, psychological factors such as depression and anxiety as well as relationship satisfaction appear to be factors influencing separation and the perception of the influence of cancer on the relationship as positive or negative. Therefore, it seems to be reasonable to consider these aspects in the psychosocial support and also to include the partners in order to achieve a stable and satisfied relationship which has a positive effect on health and psychological well-being. (shrink)

The biinterpretability conjecture for the r.e. degrees asks whether, for each sufficiently large k, the [Formula: see text] relations on the r.e. degrees are uniformly definable from parameters. We solve a weaker version: for each k ≥ 7, the [Formula: see text] relations bounded from below by a nonzero degree are uniformly definable. As applications, we show that Low 1 is parameter definable, and we provide methods that lead to a new example of a ∅-definable ideal. Moreover, we prove that (...) automorphisms restricted to intervals [d, 1], d ≠ 0, are [Formula: see text]. We also show that, for each c ≠ 0, can be interpreted in [0, c] without parameters. (shrink)

Pierre André,Michel Bourban | : Dans un contexte d’urgence, les philosophes ne peuvent plus se contenter d’élaborer des théories idéales de la justice climatique fondées sur des motivations purement morales. Il est désormais nécessaire d’envisager des approches non idéales. Nous proposons ici de prendre au sérieux le problème de la motivation à l’action et nous mettons en avant certains motifs prudentiels pour lutter contre le changement climatique, en vue non pas de remplacer, mais de renforcer les motivations morales existantes, (...) mais insuffisantes. Nous commençons par présenter trois grandes approches idéales qui ont prévalu jusqu’ici dans la recherche sur la justice climatique et sont fondées respectivement sur l’éthique déontologique, sur l’éthique des vertus et sur l’utilitarisme. Nous mettons en évidence leurs limites pratiques, en ciblant le problème de la motivation à l’action. Nous proposons ensuite quelques pistes pour résoudre ce problème en esquissant une approche non idéale de la justice climatique. Cette approche est centrée sur les motivations amorales ressortant de l’examen attentif des perturbations systémiques globales et des contextes nationaux et locaux spécifiques. Elle est à notre sens incontournable pour motiver les États-nations, les entreprises et les individus. Il s’agit cependant moins de la substituer totalement aux théories idéales de la justice climatique que de compléter celles-ci pour établir une vision plus compréhensive qui distingue le problème de la justification morale de celui de la motivation. | : In a situation of urgency, philosophers can no longer rely exclusively on ideal theories of climate justice grounded on purely moral motives. It has become necessary to build nonideal approaches. We propose to give serious consideration to the problem of motivation to act by putting forward some prudential reasons for tackling climate change—with the aim not of replacing existing but inadequate moral motivations, but of strengthening them. First, we identify three major ideal approaches that have so far prevailed in climate justice research, grounded respectively on deontological ethics, on virtue ethics, and on utilitarianism. We highlight their practical limitations, particularly with regards to the problem of motivation to act. Second, we open the way for an alternative nonideal approach to climate justice based on amoral motivations issuing from a careful examination of global systemic disruptions as well as of specific national and local situations. This approach cannot be ignored if one wishes to motivate nation-states, corporations, and individuals to act. However, our goal is not to replace ideal theory with nonideal theory, but rather to complete the former with the latter for a more comprehensive account of climate justice that distinguishes the problem of moral justification from the problem of motivation. (shrink)

We investigate the upper semilattice Eq* of recursively enumerable equivalence relations modulo finite differences. Several natural subclasses are shown to be first-order definable in Eq*. Building on this we define a copy of the structure of recursively enumerable many-one degrees in Eq*, thereby showing that Th has the same computational complexity as the true first-order arithmetic.