The aim of teaching philosophy to children ultimately is not to teach them the history of philosophy, but rather to teach them to think, starting from philosophical concepts. This will help to develop high-level skills in children such as questioning, research, understanding and interpreting knowledge, establishing meaningful relationships between knowledge, creating original ideas, and problem-solving. Models of philosophizing with children have been developed, and systematic application attempts have been made, producing successful results in many countries of the world. (...) According to Matthew Lipman, these skills should be developed at a very young age with use of the model of philosophy for children (P4C). Our aim is to show and explore how to develop and sustain creative thinking, which is one of the achievements of P4C. If Lipman is right, children participating in these activities will start to gain creative thinking skills from an early age and will apply this foundation in other knowledge acquisition processes at more advanced developmental stages. This presentation aims to reveal the interrelation between P4C and creative thinking activity. First P4C will be explained, and then creative thinking and the interrelation between the two will be expanded upon in the conclusion. (shrink)

Multiple modernities has emerged as the post-Huntingtonian paradigm in the study of secularism and religion, and the concepts ‘imaginary’ or ‘ verstehen’ are the most common candidates guiding research aiming to articulate this multiplicity. This article revisits Shmuel Eisenstadt’s original ‘Multiple Modernities’ thesis, Charles Taylor’s concept ‘imaginary’ and Max Weber’s ‘ verstehen’, and offers concise examples on how they are put into practice in the current literature on secularism and religion. I argue that the original Eisenstadt thesis is built upon (...) interactions of modernities, and the ‘imaginary’ and ‘ verstehen’ analytics eliminate from sight non-isomorphic relations between ideas and actions, despite the ample presence of both interactions and non-isomorphic relations in the politics of secularism and modernity. Turning multiple modernities into an exercise in typologies of non-interacting modernities articulated in isomorphic relations between ideas and actions produces new kinds of post-Huntingtonian culturalism. I finally sketch a comparative politics of new meanings as the counter-hypothesis to which ‘imaginary’, ‘ verstehen’ and non-interacting typology analytics of modernities have to respond. (shrink)

This paper will show how the philosopher Maṇḍanamiśra discusses in his Brahmasiddhi the cancellation of a former element by a latter, which is prescribed in Mīmāṃsāsūtra 6.5.54. We do not have yet a clear idea of what the value of this text holds for him. I would emphasize that probably more than we had expected, it forms an essential part of Maṇḍana’s philosophy. Its authority is sometimes stated explicitly and sometimes not; and we easily overlook the fact that his (...) argument is highly dependent on the Mīmāṃsā scheme. This rule, 6.5.54, was originally purely concerned with the performance of the sacrifice, but Maṇḍana applies it to his epistemic analysis, i.e. his discussion on the relative strength of the valid means of knowledge, giving this rule the status of basic testimony. Furthermore, he interprets the rule in his own unique way, or at least differently from Kumārilabhaṭṭa, integrating it with the argument by his famous predecessor Bhartṛhari. The mutual relationship among Maṇḍana, Kumārila, and Bhartṛhari, will be illuminated by focusing on what Mīmāṃsāsūtra 6.5.54 really means. (shrink)

There are various philosophers who have discussed the role of language in ancient India. Among them, Bhart ṛ hari considered the relation between the superficial appearance of speech and its essential nature. In actual life, we pronounce and perceive the word. He held that there must be some link between ideal logic and worldly truth. His focus in the Brahmakā n ̣ ḍ a of the Vākyapadīya, is on the process of communication, the process of the internalization of speech. He (...) differentiates the perspective of the speaker and the hearer, and explains the movement of sounds. The spho ṭ a theory addresses both how to pronounce the word and how to perceive it. Traces of his discussion are found in the works of his follower Ma n ̣ ḍ anamiśra in his book, Spho ṭ asiddhi. (shrink)

This chapter is a response to the decades of Western skepticism and cynicism regarding the sustainability of democracy in Africa toward the end of the last century as most African countries experienced what political scientists term the third wave of democratization. Focusing on the human rights tradition in Africa, which is given as the main reason for the skepticism, this chapter argues to the contrary that not only is there a vibrant tradition of human rights in Africa with particular reference (...) to the Akan model, but that its existence offers one of the best explanations for the relative success of democracy in Africa from the last century to the recent. The chapter shows further that an objective analysis into the Akan culture will reveal that the Akan conception of human rights which compliments negative rights with positive rights in principle and practice is more relevant and heuristic within African contexts than dominant conceptions of human rights from the Global North. This is seen in its demonstrated potential for facilitating and sustaining African democracies to maturity, despite the pressures from the pandemic and global economic crises. (shrink)

This essay situates the debate on the philosophy of indigenous thought systems within the context of postcolonial theory. I argue that postcolonialism is a reinvention of preexisting indigenous philosophy. Beginning from the late 1960s into the early 1970s a seemingly new wave of thinking was theorized by scholars as postcolonialism. Today, its popularity is evident in the many academic fields that have adopted and adapted it as an instrument of scholarly inquiry. In this essay, I argue, using (...) class='Hi'>Akan proverbs, that postcolonialism is not a new philosophy. (shrink)

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In this article, Presbey engages in the discussion about consensus oriented political systems in Africa, how they can be understood as democratic, and how a currently recommendable system of democracy could be inspired by them. With reference to some interviews that she herself conducted with Akan queenmothers in Ghana, utilizing the sage philosophy approach, Presbey discusses Wiredu's and Gyekye'e recent evaluations of the consensus principle in the political system of the Akan. The discussion also takes up critical (...) remarks of Eze on Wiredu, and proposes some fertile comparative views on the political theory of Hannah Arendt. (shrink)

The reality of spirits? A historiography of the Akan concept of 'mind' (La réalité des esprits: Vers une historiographie de la conception akan de l'esprit). In this article the following thesis is considered: the classifications used to define African Indigenous Religions are 'inventions' of Western scholars of religion who employ categories that are entirely "non-indigenous". The author investigates the presumptions of this statement and discusses the work of scholars of religion studying the Akan and in particular the (...) Akan concept of mind. In the analytic philosophical tradition the precise meaning of Akan concepts of mind such as okra and sunsum, described by various scholars of religion in different eras, are reviewed. The pre-colonial, colonial and the postcolonial era all have had specific influence on the conceptualisation of the mind. On the basis of an historiography of the Akan mind the author concludes that, contrary to the originally thesis under review, 'cultural background' and 'academic discipline' are relatively unimportant in the classification of 'indigenous religions'. The 'paradigm' prevailing within a discipline , 'personal belief' and the spatio-temporal context in which conceptualisations are created, turn out to be far more significant. (shrink)

The paper evaluates the claims of Kwame Gyekye and Kwasi Wiredu that the Akan traditional governance structures are just as democratic or even more democratic that Western style representative democracies.

On the denial of traditional thought as philosophy Scholars, including philosophers, tend to squirm a little at the mention of African philosophy, ...

Many African scholars have expressed varied thoughts about the concept of a person, specifically about that which constitutes a person in African philosophy. These philosophers include Kwasi Wiredu, Kwame Gyekye and Segun Gbadegesin. What they have in common, though, is that their ideas on the concept of a person issue largely from the traditional philosophies of some West African peoples. Wiredu and Gyekye reflect on Akan conceptions while Gbadegesin carries out his discussions from the Yoruba cultural perspective. This (...) paper examines the thoughts of these prominent philosophers, with a particular focus on the constitution of the person and the nature of his or her destiny. (shrink)

Many Christian churches in parts of Ghana dominated by Akans do not allow corpses to be brought inside the church during funerals services. Others face constant and vehement objection when it is done. Cultural differences on the subject have fuelled heated disputes that have led in some cases to severe congregational division. Opposition is often sustained by a culturally biased approach to biblical texts concerning sacredness and defilement as related to Old Testament sanctuary and temple ritual. Particularly, the religious (...) class='Hi'>philosophy of mmusuo provides the psycho-emotive motivation from which many Akan Christians vehemently oppose the practice as sacrilegious. It also provides an analytical and rhetorical framework for appropriating various biblical passages relating to religious sacrilege. This paper unpacks this framework and proposes effectively contextualized theology as a means of avoiding such erroneous conflations and resolving the disputes that arise at the interface of African culture and Christian religion, especially in multicultural congregations. (shrink)

In this paper I compare Kwame Gyekye’s transcendentalist interpretation of the Akan conception of God with Kwasi Wiredu’s immanentist interpretation. I highlight the tension between the two thinkers’ interpretations of Akan religious thought within the broader conflict between transcendence and immanence. Using the analytic, critical, and interpretative method, I show how the reconciliation of Gyekye and Wiredu’s divergent, yet paradoxically overlapping visionscan be effected in the idea of panpsychism. In the process of effecting this reconciliation, I open up (...) a new area of research in African philosophy of religion that African philosophers will find rewarding to engage. (shrink)

In this paper I compare Kwame Gyekye’s transcendentalist interpretation of the Akan conception of God with Kwasi Wiredu’s immanentist interpretation. I highlight the tension between the two thinkers’ interpretations of Akan religious thought within the broader conflict between transcendence and immanence. Using the analytic, critical, and interpretative method, I show how the reconciliation of Gyekye and Wiredu’s divergent, yet paradoxically overlapping visions can be effected in the idea of panpsychism. In the process of effecting this reconciliation, I open (...) up a new area of research in African philosophy of religion that African philosophers will find rewarding to engage. (shrink)

While advancing the idea that morality is a universal human phenomenon, Kwasi Wiredu suggests that human reason, rather than the will of God, grounds morality and determines what is good in traditional Akan society. I note in this chapter that while Wiredu’s rationalism deviates from the traditional African theistic view that God is the source of morality, his appeal to reason rather than divine authority is consistent with his religious philosophy. This religious philosophy accommodates what I call (...) the limited God view in the African philosophy of religion. I compare Wiredu’s humanistic moral framework with the moral framework sustained by traditional African theism and argue that from a practical standpoint, both moral frameworks are attractive, as they enhance the dignity of the human being. (shrink)

2 Corinthians 5:20 belongs to a long chain of verses beginning from 5:11 to 6:13. These verses at large deal with the subject of reconciliation. A concept that emerges from Paul’s teaching is that God through the redemptive work of Christ on the cross is restoring the whole world to himself and has given us also this ministry of reconciliation. However, this paper focuses on three Greek words extracted from the text: Christou, presbeoumen, and katallasso. The study is done mainly (...) through literary activities from existing materials such as Biblical and Akan literature. It first examines, in brief, the background data on Paul’s Second Epistle to the Corinthians to provide a historical milieu for understanding the issues Paul raises. It then continues to discuss the above-mentioned Greek words. It will also be seen that the explanation of the text has been looked at from Akan (Asante Twi) reading of the same text and then engages them within the Akan context. The paper concludes with an invitation to see ourselves as key players in what God is doing in the world. (shrink)

This study examines the issues of indigenous philosophies, which are embedded in different aspects of socialization process among the Akan of Ghana. The research explores the possibility of forging a new future that builds on the positive aspects of their past and present and on carefully chosen ideas, methods and technology from abroad.

Well-Being in African Philosophy: Insights for a Global Ethics of Development, edited by Bolaji Bateye, Mahmoud Masaeli, Louise Müller, and Angela Roothaan, explores the notion of well-being in African and intercultural philosophy and its insights into global ethics of development. Drawing from longstanding debates on communitarianism in the context of personhood in African philosophy, as well as those in intercultural philosophy, the diverse contributors present manifold ways to philosophize about well-being from African contexts. Hailing from sub-Saharan (...) Africa, Europe, and the Middle East, they address questions of human well-being related to the major global challenges of our time, such as climate change and socio-economic, gender, and racial inequality in society, education, and organization. This collection, building on the work of African independence philosophers as well as oral traditions from a critical development studies perspective, offers fresh views on well-being, development, and morality, thus contributing to global ethics from an African vantage point. The first author of this book's introduction is Louise Müller. See: Müller, L and A. Roothaan (2023). ‘Introduction’. In: Well-Being in African Philosophy: Insights for a Global Ethics of Development. Maryland, USA, Lexington Books by Rowman and Littlefield, 1-11. (shrink)

This paper is an account of the author’s emergence as an Afro-Caribbean philosopher, although formally trained and still working in the discipline of sociology. In order to complete this account, I made use of an Akan theory of the self and the circular path of its development, in order to integrate the details of the influences, major phases, and changes leading to my emergence as a Caribbean philosopher, as well as some of the academic challenges to the field of (...) Caribbean philosophy as a whole that had to be overcome. (shrink)

From an African point of view, there is no social justice in the world today and, from that point of view, there may not be much difference between the African, African-American, Asian, or even Western perspectives. There may, however, be some difference in the reasons given in support of this perspective or, rather, conclusion. The African perspective is heavily influenced by events such as the trans-Atlantic slave trade, colonialism, and, more recently, by the report of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation (...) Commission and the bombing of the American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The reason, in part, is that all of these events or reports seem to reinforce the belief, which I take to be contrary to the core principle of social justice, that African lives are either worthless or do not count as much as others. Further, they seem to have the effect of cheating Africans or making fools out of them, which, from a traditional Akan point of view, is a violation of the tenets of social justice. (shrink)

To liberate African philosophy from the remnants of the colonial style of thought, Kwesi Wiredu promotes the idea of the conceptual decolonization of African philosophy. He argues that, to accomplish this project, African philosophers must theorize in African vernaculars. This article attempts to show that the project of the conceptual decolonization of African philosophy by recourse to theorizing in African vernaculars is challenging. It examines a particular strategy that Wiredu deploys in “Conceptual Decolonization as an Imperative in (...) Contemporary African Philosophy,” in which he hopes to demonstrate that the Akan conception of mind is superior to the Cartesian conception of mind. It demonstrates that Wiredu’s attempt to show the superiority of the Akan conception of mind is unsuccessful and that his project of conceptual decolonization fails. Nevertheless, it concludes that Wiredu’s conceptual decolonization project still shows promise even in light of our criticisms. (shrink)

Abusua do funu. The matriclan loves a corpse. AKAN PROVERB My father died, as I say, while I was trying to finish this book. His funeral was an occasion for strengthening and reaffirming the ties that bind me to Ghana and “my father's house' ...

Tidak bisa disangkal bahwa filsafat Barat dewasa ini hampir identik dengan wacana filosofis (philosophical discourse), berupa konsep, teori, atau sistem, yang umumnya berkembang dinamis dan dipelajari sebagai disiplin keilmuan dalam lingkungan akademis melalui satuan kurikulum perguruan tinggi modern. Maka tidak mengherankan bila filsafat cenderung identik dengan filsafat akademis (academic philosophy). Namun berkat dua buku Pierre Hadot (1922-2010) kita terbantu untuk menyadari hilangnya sebagian besar pemahaman filsafat itu sendiri terutama wawasan klasik yang mengungkapkan fokus utama penghayatan maupun lintasan peralihan fokus (...) utama tersebut dalam perkembangan sejarah. Hadot berpendapat bahwa filsafat pada awalnya adalah bios atau way of life (manie de vivre). Filsafat sebagai way of life terungkap dalam serangkaian latihan rohani (melete dalam arti Platonis, askesis dalam arti Stoa dan Kekristenan Yunani, atau exercitium spirituale dalam arti Kekristenan Latin awal), dengan mengembangkan berbagai wacana filosofis sebagai sarana panduan untuk membentuk (to form) alih-alih hanya menginformasikan (to inform) pilihan hidup dan kebebasan eksistensial seseorang menurut bingkai penghayatannya dalam sekolah filsafat. Tujuannya adalah memandu pilihan hidup dan mengembangkan kebebasan eksistensial mereka sesuai kodrat insaninya (phusis tou anthropou), seperti menguasai diri (enkrateia) atau kemandirian diri (autarkheia) di hadapan pengaruh eksternal, serta menyadari tempat (topos) mereka dalam kosmos (phusis tou kosmou). Nilai absolut aktivitas berfilsafat lebih menekankan tindakan baik alih-alih mengetahui kebaikan. Berwacana filosofis tanpa pembalikan sekaligus penentuan arah baru (peristrophe - periagoge) melalui pelatihan rohani hanya akan membentuk seseorang menjadi sofistik atau ahli retorika alih-alih sosok filsuf. Pihak pertama dalam sejarah Yunani antik abad kelima dan keempat SM memang dikenal sebagai sosok terpelajar yang licin bersilat kata (elenkhos) memperdagangkan seni kecakapan dan pengetahuan demi memuaskan hasrat ego. Namun, pihak terakhir sosok filsuf selalu sadar akan ketidaktahuan maupun kekurangan diri (bahwa ia bukan sage atau orang bijak) sehingga ia selalu memandu hasratnya untuk terus mencintai dan mendekatkan diri ke arah kebijaksanaan. Hadot berupaya menjelaskan pandangannya, filsafat sebagai way of life, setidaknya melalui dua pembacaan. Dalam PWL (4 bagian dan 11 bab), ia membingkai pandangannya melalui pembacaan eksegese untuk menguraikan klaimnya dengan mengembangkan metode, materi, tokoh, dan tema terkait. Dalam PAW (3 bagian dan 12 bab), ia mengembangkan pembacaan eksegesenya dengan menelusuri fenomena kerohanian dalam sejarah filsafat Barat, meliputi awal kemunculannya pada era antik, peralihannya pada monastisisme Kristen, keterputusannya pada Abad Pertengahan, dan jejak kesinambungannya pada era modern. [] Akhirnya, dalam PWL dan PAW, Hadot benar-benar menyajikan bingkai pemahaman yang kokoh terhadap klaimnya mengenai filsafat sebagai way of life, termasuk implikasinya dalam merangsang diskusi lebih lanjut baik untuk mengungkap persetujuan atau bantahan maupun kemungkinan alternatif atas klaim tersebut berdasarkan sumber teks serupa. Selain itu, layak untuk diperhatikan bahwa melalui uraiannya yang rinci dan seksama dalam mendekati setiap konteks lintasan filsafat seturut Sitz im Leben, Hadot rupanya juga menawarkan pesan inspiratif dan relevan bagi pembaca budiman ahli, pengajar, pelajar, peminat filsafat, atau siapa saja yang selalu berhasrat mencintai kebijaksanaan untuk bertanya: apa makna berfilsafat dewasa ini? (Haryanto Cahyadi, peneliti filsafat dari Keuskupan Timika, Papua.). (shrink)