We have parameterized Einstein’s thought experiment with atomic clocks, supposing that we knew neither if the space and time are relative or absolute, nor if the speed of light was ultimate speed or not. We have obtained a Parameterized Special Theory of Relativity (PSTR) (1982). Our PSTR generalized not only Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity, but also our Absolute Theory of Relativity, and introduced three more possible Relativities to be studied in the (...) future. After the 2011 CERN’s superluminal neutrino experiments, we recall our ideas and invite researchers to deepen the study of PSTR, ATR, and check the three new mathematically emerged Relativities 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5. (shrink)

According to the Special Theory of Relativity, there is no such thing as absolute simultaneity, contrary to the view defended in the book. However, this chapter demonstrates that the Special Theory of Relativity can be modified so as to allow absolute simultaneity. This modification involves reference to absolute space and the causal relations between space‐time points, and drops the assumption that the one‐way speed of light is constant through all frames of reference. Contrary (...) to the orthodox theory, the modified version has the additional advantage of avoiding a clash with quantum mechanics, such as brought out by the Einstein‐Podolsky‐Rosen thought experiment and Bell's Theorem. (shrink)

Summary It is here shown that the relativistic doctrine of the relativity of simultaneity is untenable and that both the special and general theories of relativity are inconsistent. It is also shown that the theories can perhaps be made consistent, but excessively weak, through the reintroduction of absolute space and a weakening of the Lorentz transformations. Non-relativistic hypotheses for some events thought to require relativity are suggested. Finally, some conjectures are made on how so wrong a (...) theory could have been accepted by so many for so long. (shrink)

There are two main camps in 20th-century philosophy of time: A-theorists who believe in the dynamic model of reality, and B-theorists who maintain a static model of reality. After the publication of Putnam’s influential article, “time and physical geometry”, the implications of the Special Theory of Relativity became serious in metaphysical discussions about temporal reality. Some philosophers argued that this theory contradicts the dynamic model and implies the ontology of the static model, namely, the objective reality of (...) the present, past and future events. In response, some advocates of the dynamic model argued that there can be dynamic models in relativistic setting, though they are different, radically, from old theories of dynamic reality. In this paper, first, I shall discuss how special relativity contradicts the traditional dynamic model and, then, how new dynamic models imply a relative concept of reality, in contrast to its old absolute concept and, so, why these strategies are very unintuitive. Finally, I shall argue that this radical conceptual shift about reality is, not only unintuitive, but unwarranted and, in some sense, inconsistent as well. (shrink)

The General Theory of Relativity (GR) and the Dynamic Universe (DU) are evaluated in how they explain frequencies of atomic clocks. DU and GR predict the frequencies with equal accuracy, but their explanations, the postulates they apply in the explanations and the word-views that come along with them are entirely different. The central argument is that if unified and under- standable physics is appreciated, then DU deserves to be taken as a viable alternative to GR. In GR different (...) frequencies of identical atomic clocks are explained by letting rates of the flow of time in their frames of reference vary as functions of the clocks’ states of motion and gravitation. The GR- based world-view is nonunderstandable because GR violates absolute simultaneity, and disunified because quantum mechanics is built on different postulates than GR. In DU different frequencies of identical atomic clocks are explained by letting their frequencies vary as functions of their states of motion and gravitation. As DU commits to absolute simultaneity and as the postulates of DU suffice as the ontological ground of quantum mechanics at least partially, DU provides an under- standable and unified scientific world-view. -/- Résumé: La théorie de la relativité générale (RG) et de l’univers dynamique (UD) sont évalués sur la fac ̧on dont ils expliquent les fréquences des horloges atomiques. La RG et l’UD prédisent les fréquences avec une précision égale, mais leurs explications, les postulats qu’ils appliquent aux explications et les visions du monde qui les accompagnent sont entie`rement différents. L’argument central est que si l’on reconnaˆıt la physique unifiée et compréhensible, alors l’UD mérite d’ être considéré comme une alternative viable à la RG. En RG, différentes fréquences d’horloges atomiques identiques sont expliquées en faisant varier les vitesses de l’écoulement du temps dans leurs cadres de référence en fonction des états de mouvement et de la gravitation des horloges. La vue du monde basée sur la RG est incompréhensible parce que la RG viole la simultanéité absolue, et est désunifiée parce que la mécanique quantique est construite sur des postulats différents de ceux de la RG. Dans l’UD, différentes fréquences d’horloges atomiques identiques sont expliquées en laissant leurs fréquences varier en fonction de leurs états de mouvement et de gravitation. Comme l’UD s’engage à la simultanéité absolue et que les postulats de l’UD suffisent, au moins en partie, comme fondements ontologiques de la mécanique quantique, l’UD fournit une vision du monde scientifique compréhensible et unifiée. (shrink)

It is said that the theory of relativity and quantum theory are independent of each other. Their relationship is like water and oil. Now, it is very important for modern physics to synthesize them. In Physics and mathematics, Super String theory is studied, but instead of it, the tendimensional world appears. Our world is a three-dimensional world. What is the ten-dimensional world? It is more difficult than the string which is of Plank length. In the ten (...) dimensional world, physics is facing darkness and nothingness which man can not explain with the traditional physical words.The solution depends upon philosophy. I tried to synthesize themand succeeded.The following is an outline of my synthesis. 1. Utility and relativity of mathematical truth Mathematical truth is not absolute but relative. In the universe ( outside the solar system ), there is no perfect line. Because, by the gravitation of large astronomical bodies, space and lines are curved. Mathematical figure and numeration depend upon the promise of mankind. These are not absolute. Physics, which is grounded upon mathematics in certainty, is also relative. It expresses not the whole of the universe but a part of the universe. 2. Community and difference between the theory of relativity and quantum theory Community is the negation of absoluteness of physical attributes. Difference is the assessment for mathematics. The theory of relativity relies on mathematics but quantumtheory does not always rely on it. According to circumstances, Niels Bohr and quantum physicists abandoned a frame of reference. 3. The origin of the theory of relativity 4. The origin of quantum theory In short, the theory of relativity and quantum theory are not perfect, they only irradiate a part of the universe. Man can reach the whole of the universe only by the philosophical intuition of nothingness and infinite (the principle of nothingness and love). (shrink)

This book presents a theory that unifies these theories by using a philosophical approach to disclose an oversight in the theory of relativity.

An examination of time as featured in the General Theory of Relativity, which supercedes Einstein’s Special Theory, serves to rekindle the issue of the existenceof absolute time. In application to cosmology, Einstein’s General Theory yields models of the universe featuring a worldwide time which is the same for all observers in the universe regardless of their relative motion. Such a cosmic time is a rough physical measure of Newton’s absolute time, which is based ontologically (...) in the duration of God’s being and is more or less accurately recorded by physical clocks. (shrink)

The various cosmological proposals by Einsteinian relativists seek to show the structure of the world as a consequence of the basic notions of relativity. In particular, the irrelevance of the state of motion of an observer to his description of the fundamental laws of nature is to be maintained. Furthermore, gravity is understood as being a description of the fact that particles move along certain minimal paths in non-Euclidean space. In this theory, the effect of one material particle (...) on another particle in the old-fashioned sense of gravitational attraction becomes indirect; that is, a particle moves on a minimal path in a space having a degree of curvature dependent on the material entities which exist in it, rather than having its path bent by the attraction between it and other material bodies, all of them existing in an absolute or receptacle-like space. (shrink)

This paper challenges Mugnai’s conceptualist reading of Leibniz’s theory of relations. I specifically question his idea that relational accidents are mental additions to absolute foundations. I examine some of the evidence on which he relies. Most importantly, I question his interpretation of Leibniz’s rejection of purely extrinsic denominations (abbreviated “NPED”) as stating that relations result from non-relational foundations. Mugnai thereby understands Leibniz’s notion of ‘extrinsic’ as ‘relational’ or ‘relative’. Such a reading contradicts both Leibniz’s definition of ‘extrinsic denominations’ (...) and the scholastic meaning of this notion. Furthermore, Leibniz’s use of NPED shows that some relations are intrinsic denominations. Additionally, I argue that conceptual relations cannot do all the work in Leibniz’s metaphysics. Fundamental notions such as expression, order and, most importantly, coexistence rely on non-conceptual relations. (shrink)

Contrary to our immediate and vivid sensation of past, present, and future as continually shifting non-relational modalities, time remains as tenseless and relational as space in all of the established theories of fundamental physics. Here an empirically adequate generalized theory of the inertial structure is discussed in which proper time is causally compelled to be tensed within both spacetime and dynamics. This is accomplished by introducing the inverse of the Planck time at the conjunction of special relativity and (...) Hamiltonian mechanics, which necessitates energies and momenta to be invariantly bounded from above, and lengths and durations similarly bounded from below, by their respective Planck scale values. The resulting theory abhors any form of preferred structure, and yet captures the transience of now along timelike worldlines by causally necessitating a genuinely becoming universe. This is quite unlike the scenario in Minkowski spacetime, which is prone to a block universe interpretation. The minute deviations from the special relativistic effects such as dispersion relations and Doppler shifts predicted by the generalized theory remain quadratically suppressed by the Planck energy, but may nevertheless be testable in the near future, for example via observations of oscillating flavor ratios of ultrahigh energy cosmic neutrinos, or of altering pulse rates of extreme energy binary pulsars. (shrink)

For much of this century it was widely assumed in philosophical circles that the relational doctrine of space, time, and motion had finally been established beyond the point of reasonable controversy. In large part this was due to a widespread perception that the theory of relativity is itself a relational theory. Indeed, some of Einstein’s own pronouncements foster this impression. For example, in his definitive formulation of general relativity of 1916, he argued the need for a (...) generalization of the principle of special relativity in order to eliminate the “factitious” causal role he saw inertial frames playing in classical mechanics and special relativity. ‘The laws of physics must be of such a nature that they apply to systems of reference in any kind of motion’. Einstein claimed this requirement is fulfilled by satisfaction of the Principle of General Covariance—that the equations expressing the laws of nature remain valid under arbitrary coordinate substitutions. This, he says, ‘takes away from space and time the last remnant of physical objectivity.’. (shrink)

The special theory of relativity (STR) is widely supposed to be in tension with A-theories of time, those giving special significance to the present moment. A-theories are diverse in the features they regard as distinctive of the present, but all agree that there is an absolute fact of the matter about which events have the feature of presentness. Famously, the standard notion of simultaneity operationalised within the theory of relativity is not absolute. If A-theorists (...) accept relativistic physics, they must either refine their A-theory and sever joint presentness from simultaneity (‘conciliatory’ responses to the problem), or supplement standard relativity by adding further spacetime structure that grounds a relation of absolute simultaneity (‘supplementing’ responses). This chapter considers the prospects for such approaches, concluding that while there is no knock-down argument from relativity against the A-theory, attempts to marry the A-theory with STR are more trouble than they are worth. (shrink)

The way, in which quantum information can unify quantum mechanics (and therefore the standard model) and general relativity, is investigated. Quantum information is defined as the generalization of the concept of information as to the choice among infinite sets of alternatives. Relevantly, the axiom of choice is necessary in general. The unit of quantum information, a qubit is interpreted as a relevant elementary choice among an infinite set of alternatives generalizing that of a bit. The invariance to the axiom (...) of choice shared by quantum mechanics is introduced: It constitutes quantum information as the relation of any state unorderable in principle (e.g. any coherent quantum state before measurement) and the same state already well-ordered (e.g. the well-ordered statistical ensemble of the measurement of the quantum system at issue). This allows of equating the classical and quantum time correspondingly as the well-ordering of any physical quantity or quantities and their coherent superposition. That equating is interpretable as the isomorphism of Minkowski space and Hilbert space. Quantum information is the structure interpretable in both ways and thus underlying their unification. Its deformation is representable correspondingly as gravitation in the deformed pseudo-Riemannian space of general relativity and the entanglement of two or more quantum systems. The standard model studies a single quantum system and thus privileges a single reference frame turning out to be inertial for the generalized symmetry [U(1)]X[SU(2)]X[SU(3)] “gauging” the standard model. As the standard model refers to a single quantum system, it is necessarily linear and thus the corresponding privileged reference frame is necessary inertial. The Higgs mechanism U(1) → [U(1)]X[SU(2)] confirmed enough already experimentally describes exactly the choice of the initial position of a privileged reference frame as the corresponding breaking of the symmetry. The standard model defines ‘mass at rest’ linearly and absolutely, but general relativity non-linearly and relatively. The “Big Bang” hypothesis is additional interpreting that position as that of the “Big Bang”. It serves also in order to reconcile the linear standard model in the singularity of the “Big Bang” with the observed nonlinearity of the further expansion of the universe described very well by general relativity. Quantum information links the standard model and general relativity in another way by mediation of entanglement. The linearity and absoluteness of the former and the nonlinearity and relativeness of the latter can be considered as the relation of a whole and the same whole divided into parts entangled in general. (shrink)

The physicist's conception of space-time underwent two major upheavals thanks to the general theory of relativity and quantum mechanics. Both theories play a fundamental role in describing the same natural world, although at different scales. However, the inconsistency between them emerged clearly as the limitation of twentieth-century physics, so a more complete description of nature must encompass general relativity and quantum mechanics as well. The problem is a theorists' problem par excellence. Experiment provide little guide, and the (...) inconsistency mentioned above is an important problem which clearly illustrates the intermingling of philosophical, mathematical, and physical thought. In fact, in order to unify general relativity with quantum field theory, it seems necessary to invent a new mathematical framework which will generalise Riemannian geometry and therefore our present conception of space and space-time. Contemporary developments in theoretical physics suggest that another revolution may be in progress, through which a new kind of geometry may enter physics, and space-time itself can be reinterpreted as an approximate, derived concept. The main purpose of this article is to show the great significance of space-time geometry in predetermining the laws which are supposed to govern the behaviour of matter, and further to support the thesis that matter itself can be built from geometry, in the sense that particles of matter as well as the other forces of nature emerges in the same way that gravity emerges from geometry. Scientific research is not a process of steady accumulation of absolute truths, which has culminated in present theories, but rather a much more dynamic kind of process in which there are no final theoretical concepts valid in unlimited domains. (David Bohm). (shrink)

There will be more philosophy than physics in this paper for I make no pretentions to an expert knowledge of physics. Categories are, however, in my line; and here I may have some insight.In the theory of relativity much depends upon the conception of the velocity of light in empty space. Such is the expression Einstein employs. If this velocity is to be a quantity independent of the choice of the inertial system to which it is referred, no (...) absolute meaning can be assigned to the conception of the simultaneity of events that occur at points separated by a distance in space. Rather a special time must be allocated to every inertial system. “It is in consequence of this that space and time are welded together into a uniform four-dimensional continuum.” Thus succinctly does Einstein express the c hoice in his article in the Encyclopedia Britannica. (shrink)

In 1905 Albert Einstein, in a paper entitled “On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies”, as a solution to the disagreement between classical mechanics and the results of the Michelson's experiment, who showed the invariance of the speed of light in vacuum measured in different inertial reference systems, developed the theory of special relativity. In this essay Einstein expounded a theory that, instead of introducing a privileged system, required the revision of the concepts of space and time of (...) classical physics. Combining the principle of Galilean relativity, according to which the laws of physics are invariant in all inertial reference systems, with the physics of electromagnetism, according to which the speed of light in a vacuum is constant, Einstein concluded that time is no more than a relative measure, namely that whenever we have to do with speed equal to or close to that of light, time is no longer a variable absolute and independent of the reference system adopted, but depends on the variable position. This is what Einstein shows through the critical examination of the concept of simultaneity. The abandonment of the traditional conception of space and time based on the idea of a spatial continuum flowing through a temporal continuum coherently leads to the assumption of a space-time continuum in which distances and time intervals vary with the changing the reference system, and together vary, of course, all other sizes to those connected. (shrink)

The exploitation of Einstein's relativity theory on behalf of the relativization of all norms and values is the most conspicuous aspect of a culturally disastrous trend, which, in its various ramifications, is the critical target of this book. Students of history, psychology, sociology and metaphysics will find much food for thought and rich material in this latest of the author's long-standing efforts aimed at the demythologization of science. This book presents fourteen not readily available essays of the winner (...) of the Templeton Prize for 1987. Co-published with the Intercollegiate Studies Institute. (shrink)

Einstein’s special theory of relativity has had a wide influence on fields far removed from physics. It has given the impression that physics has shown that there are now no absolute truths, that all beliefs are relative to the observer, and that traditional stable landmarks have been washed away. We each have our own frame of reference that is as good as any other frame, so that there are no absolute standards by which our actions may (...) be judged. The predictions of relativity theory, such as the elimination of simultaneity, the variation of mass with velocity, and the equivalence of mass and energy, are all highly counterintuitive and yet are precisely confirmed by detailed measurements. The clear rocklike mechanical physics of Newton seems to have dissolved into a swirling mist of unintelligible concepts, and familiar certainties seem to have disappeared. A detailed analysis of relativity theory shows, however, a completely different picture. Properly understood, it is a logical extension of Newtonian physics that expresses the relations of space and time in a more exact and elegant way and in the process shows forth more clearly the invariant features of the world. The apparently counterintuitive features appear as natural consequences that extend and refine our classical concepts. The traditional landmarks remain, but God’s world is more subtle than we had previously imagined. (shrink)

This is a new release of the original 1949 edition.

The A-theory of time has intuitive and metaphysical appeal, but suffers from tension, if not inconsistency, with the special and general theories of relativity (STR and GTR). The A-theory requires a notion of global simultaneity invariant under the symmetries of the world's laws, those ostensible transformations of the state of the world that in fact leave the world as it was before. Relativistic physics, if read in a realistic sense, denies that there exists any notion of global (...) simultaneity that is invariant under the symmetries of the world's laws. If physics is at least a decent guide to metaphysics--as sympathies for scientific realism would suggest--then relativistic physics supports the B-theory. If there were a physically natural way to modify the symmetries of the physical laws so as to remove those that are repugnant to the A-theory, while retaining empirical adequacy, then such an altered physics might be attractive to the A-theorist and would weaken the support given by relativity to the B-theory. I exhibit a way to do so here, displaying a Lagrangian density explicitly containing distant simultaneity, yet implying Einstein's field equations. The modification involves a change in the nature of the lapse function and makes use of the Dirac-Bergmann formalism of constrained dynamics, which recently has been discussed much by John Earman. Here this formalism is adapted slightly to permit both local and global generalized coordinates. A classification of senses in which time might be absolute or not is made along the way. Some suggestions for extending the work by finding a first principles motivation are made. An appendix outlines an argument why many local presents are insufficient and a global present is attractive, while two more appendices review the Dirac-Bergmann apparatus for GTR and then apply it to the theory at hand. (shrink)

This richly detailed biography captures both the personal life and the scientific career of Isaac Newton, presenting a fully rounded picture of Newton the man, the scientist, the philosopher, the theologian, and the public figure. Professor Westall treats all aspects of Newton's career, but his account centers on a full description of Newton's achievements in science. Thus the core of the work describes the development of the calculus, the experimentation that altered the direction of the science of optics, and especially (...) the investigations in celestial dynamics that led to the law of universal gravitation. (shrink)

In this paper, I reply to Seungbae Park’s (2020) critique of the view I defend in Chapter 6 of The Relativity of Theory: Key Positions and Arguments in the Contemporary Scientific Realism/Antirealism Debate (Cham: Springer, 2020), namely, Relative Realism. Relative Realism is the view that, of a set of competing scientific theories, the more predictively successful theory is comparatively true. Comparative truth is a relation between competing theories. So, to say that T1 is comparatively true is to (...) say that T1 is closer to the truth than its competitors, T2, T3, ..., Tn. Park offers two arguments against Relative Realism. The first is an argument by analogy to NBA players, which is supposed to show that, contrary to what the relative realist argues, absolute judgments about the (approximate) truth and (predictive) success of competing theories are rationally justified. The second is what Park calls “The Argument from Double Spaces,” which is supposed to show that, contrary to what the relative realist argues, relative judgments about the (comparative) truth of competing theories are not rationally justified. I argue that Park’s arguments fail to do what he wants them to do. (shrink)

We consider a sequence of absolute-space kinematical theories which differ more or less from the special theory of relativity (STR) in the amount of clock retardation which they predict, but which agree with STR with respect to roundtrip light experiments, such as Michelson-Morley and Kennedy-Thorndike. This sequence of theories is imbedded in the synchrony-free formulation of STR developed by Winnie by modifying the equal passage time principle. The paper has bearing on the relationship between the slow clock (...) transport behavior of clocks and the one-way velocity of light. Experiments which claim to measure the latter are discussed. (shrink)

Two radically different views about time are possible. According to the first, the universe is three dimensional. It has a past and a future, but that does not mean it is spread out in time as it is spread out in the three dimensions of space. This view requires that there is an unambiguous, absolute, cosmic-wide "now" at each instant. According to the second view about time, the universe is four dimensional. It is spread out in both space and (...) time - in space-time in short. Special and general relativity rule out the first view. There is, according to relativity theory, no such thing as an unambiguous, absolute cosmic-wide "now" at each instant. However, we have every reason to hold that both special and general relativity are false. Not only does the historical record tell us that physics advances from one false theory to another. Furthermore, elsewhere I have shown that we must interpret physics as having established physicalism - in so far as physics can ever establish anything theoretical. Physicalism, here, is to be interpreted as the thesis that the universe is such that some unified "theory of everything" is true. Granted physicalism, it follows immediately that any physical theory that is about a restricted range of phenomena only, cannot be true, whatever its empirical success may be. It follows that both special and general relativity are false. This does not mean of course that the implication of these two theories that there is no unambiguous cosmic-wide "now" at each instant is false. It still may be the case that the first view of time, indicated at the outset, is false. Are there grounds for holding that an unambiguous cosmic-wide "now" does exist, despite special and general relativity, both of which imply that it does not exist? There are such grounds. Elsewhere I have argued that, in order to solve the quantum wave/particle problem and make sense of the quantum domain we need to interpret quantum theory as a fundamentally probabilistic theory, a theory which specifies how quantum entities - electrons, photons, atoms - interact with one another probabilistically. It is conceivable that this is correct, and the ultimate laws of the universe are probabilistic in character. If so, probabilistic transitions could define unambiguous, absolute cosmic-wide "nows" at each instant. It is entirely unsurprising that special and general relativity have nothing to say about the matter. Both theories are pre-quantum mechanical, classical theories, and general relativity in particular is deterministic. The universe may indeed be three dimensional, with a past and a future, but not spread out in four dimensional space-time, despite the fact that relativity theories appear to rule this out. These considerations, finally, have implications for views about the arrow of time and free will. (shrink)

Einstein, Relativity and Absolute Simultaneity is an anthology of original essays by an international team of leading philosophers and physicists who have come together to reassess the contemporary paradigm of the relativistic concept of time. A great deal has changed since 1905 when Einstein proposed his Special Theory of Relativity, and this book offers a fresh reassessment of Special Relativity’s relativistic concept of time in terms of epistemology, metaphysics, and physics.

Two radically different views about time are possible. According to the first, the universe is three dimensional. It has a past and a future, but that does not mean it is spread out in time as it is spread out in the three dimensions of space. This view requires that there is an unambiguous, absolute, cosmic-wide "now" at each instant. According to the second view about time, the universe is four dimensional. It is spread out in both space and (...) time - in space-time in short. Special and general relativity rule out the first view. There is, according to relativity theory, no such thing as an unambiguous, absolute cosmic-wide "now" at each instant. However, we have every reason to hold that both special and general relativity are false. Not only does the historical record tell us that physics advances from one false theory to another. Furthermore, elsewhere I have shown that we must interpret physics as having established physicalism - in so far as physics can ever establish anything theoretical. Physicalism, here, is to be interpreted as the thesis that the universe is such that some unified "theory of everything" is true. Granted physicalism, it follows immediately that any physical theory that is about a restricted range of phenomena only, cannot be true, whatever its empirical success may be. It follows that both special and general relativity are false. This does not mean of course that the implication of these two theories that there is no unambiguous cosmic-wide "now" at each instant is false. It still may be the case that the first view of time, indicated at the outset, is false. Are there grounds for holding that an unambiguous cosmic-wide "now" does exist, despite special and general relativity, both of which imply that it does not exist? There are such grounds. Elsewhere I have argued that, in order to solve the quantum wave/particle problem and make sense of the quantum domain we need to interpret quantum theory as a fundamentally probabilistic theory, a theory which specifies how quantum entities - electrons, photons, atoms - interact with one another probabilistically. It is conceivable that this is correct, and the ultimate laws of the universe are probabilistic in character. If so, probabilistic transitions could define unambiguous, absolute cosmic-wide "nows" at each instant. It is entirely unsurprising that special and general relativity have nothing to say about the matter. Both theories are pre-quantum mechanical, classical theories, and general relativity in particular is deterministic. The universe may indeed be three dimensional, with a past and a future, but not spread out in four dimensional space-time, despite the fact that relativity theories appear to rule this out. These considerations, finally, have implications for views about the arrow of time and free will. (shrink)

Several recent papers which purport to substantiate or negate arguments in favor of certain theories of absolute space have been based on fallacious principles. In this paper we discuss three related instances, indicating where misconceptions have arisen. We establish, contrary to popular belief, that the classical Lorentz ether theory accounts for all the experimental evidence which supports the special theory of relativity. We demonstrate that the ether theory predicts the null results obtained from pulsar timing (...) and Mössbauer experiments. We conclude that a measurement of the one-way velocity of light has physical meaning within the context of the Lorentz theory, and argue that an adequately designed experiment to measure the one-way velocity of light should be attempted. (shrink)

This article outlines a theory of naive probability. According to the theory, individuals who are unfamiliar with the probability calculus can infer the probabilities of events in an extensional way: They construct mental models of what is true in the various possibilities. Each model represents an equiprobable alternative unless individuals have beliefs to the contrary, in which case some models will have higher probabilities than others. The probability of an event depends on the proportion of models in which (...) it occurs. The theory predicts several phenomena of reasoning about absolute probabilities, including typical biases. It correctly predicts certain cognitive illusions in inferences about relative probabilities. It accommodates reasoning based on numerical premises, and it explains how naive reasoners can infer posterior probabilities without relying on Bayes's theorem. Finally, it dispels some common misconceptions of probabilistic reasoning. (shrink)

An often repeated account of the genesis of special relativity tells us that relativity theory was to a considerable extent the fruit of an operationalist philosophy of science. Indeed, Einstein’s 1905 paper stresses the importance of rods and clocks for giving concrete physical content to spatial and temporal notions. I argue, however, that it would be a mistake to read too much into this. Einstein’s operationalist remarks should be seen as serving rhetoric purposes rather than as attempts (...) to promulgate a particular philosophical position --- in fact, Einstein never came close to operationalism in any of his philosophical writings. By focussing on what could actually be measured with rods and clocks Einstein shed doubt on the empirical status of a number of pre-relativistic concepts, with the intention to persuade his readers that the applicability of these concepts was not obvious. This rhetoric manoeuvre has not always been rightly appreciated in the philosophy of physics. Thus, the influence of operationalist misinterpretations, according to which associated operations strictly define what a concept means, can still be felt in present-day discussions about the conventionality of simultaneity. The standard story continues by pointing out that Minkowski in 1908 supplanted Einstein’s approach with a realist spacetime account that has no room for a foundational role of rods and clocks: relativity theory became a description of a four-dimensional ‘absolute world’. As it turns out, however, it is not at all clear that Minkowski was proposing a substantivalist position with respect to spacetime. On the contrary, it seems that from a philosophical point of view Minkowski’s general position was not very unlike the one in the back of Einstein’s mind. However, in Minkowski’s formulation of special relativity it becomes more explicit that the content of spatiotemporal concepts relates to considerations about the form of physical laws. If accepted, this position has important consequences for the discussion about the conventionality of simultaneity. (shrink)

Different ways of thinking about presence can have significant consequences for one's thinking about temporal experience. Temporal presence can be conceived of as either absolute or relative. Relative presence is analogous to spatial presence, whereas absolute presence is not. For each of these concepts of presence, there is a theory of time which holds that this is how presence really is. For the A-theory, temporal presence is absolute; it is a special moment in time, a (...) time defined by events in what has been called the A-series. For the B-theory, temporal presence is relative ; it is itself defined relative to moments in time, a time defined by events in the B-series. Many A-theorists go further to claim that the present is the only real moment in time; the past and future are unreal. One can have different sets of problems depending on whether one thinks in terms of absolute presence or relative presence. For example, there is the concept of the 'specious' present – a duration many theorists claim that we perceptually experience. It is argued in this paper that the specious present has problems given absolute presence, which it does not have given relative presence. Many of the problems are avoided by having an extended present. However, A-theory, the standard theory of time which advocates absolute presence, cannot have an extended present. Further, the best solution for absolute presence which is extended, durational presentism, involves denying the standard theories in the philosophy of time. (shrink)

This paper examines the young Kant’s claim that all motion is relative, and argues that it is the core of a metaphysical dynamics of impact inspired by Leibniz and Wolff. I start with some background to Kant’s early dynamics, and show that he rejects Newton’s absolute space as a foundation for it. Then I reconstruct the exact meaning of Kant’s relativity, and the model of impact he wants it to support. I detail (in Section II and III) his (...) polemic engagement with Wolffian predecessors, and how he grounds collisions in a priori dynamics. I conclude that, for the young Kant, the philosophical problematic of Newton’s science takes a back seat to an agenda set by the Leibniz-Wolff tradition of rationalist dynamics. This results matters, because Kant’s views on motion survive well into the 1780s. In addition, his doctrine attests to the richness of early modern views of the relativity of motion. (shrink)

Neither special nor general relativity make any use of a notion of absolute simultaneity. Since A-Theories about time do make use of such a notion, it is natural to suspect that relativity and A-Theory are inconsistent. Many authors have argued that they are in fact not inconsistent, and I agree with that diagnosis here. But that doesn’t mean, as these authors seem to think, that A-Theory and relativity are happy bedfellows. I argue that (...) class='Hi'>relativity gives us good reason to reject the A-Theory, even though strict inconsistency isn’t that reason. (shrink)

Fragmentalism was first introduced by Kit Fine in his ‘Tense and Reality’. According to fragmentalism, reality is an inherently perspectival place that exhibits a fragmented structure. The current paper defends the fragmentalist interpretation of the special theory of relativity, which Fine briefly considers in his paper. The fragmentalist interpretation makes room for genuine facts regarding absolute simultaneity, duration and length. One might worry that positing such variant properties is a turn for the worse in terms of theoretical (...) virtues because such properties are not involved in physical explanations and hence theoretically redundant. It will be argued that this is not right: if variant properties are indeed instantiated, they will also be involved in straightforward physical explanations and hence not explanatorily redundant. Hofweber and Lange, in their ‘Fine’s Fragmentalist Interpretation of Special Relativity’, object that the fragmentalist interpretation is in tension with the right explanation of the Lorentz transformations. It will be argued that their objection targets an inessential aspect of the fragmentalist framework and fails to raise any serious problem for the fragmentalist interpretation of special relativity. (shrink)

The semantic theory of truth, formulated by Alfred Tarski in the 1939s, is primarily a mathematical theory. On the other hand, it also has a considerable philosophical content. This paper presents the second aspect of this theory. It can be shown that several traditional philosophical issues pertaining to the concept of truth can be illuminated by Tarski’s account of truth. It concerns, for instance, the idea of correspondence, the relation of truth and logic, the problem of the (...) relativity/absoluteness of truth, etc. (shrink)

Marxism proved and developed the theory of the infinite process of the increase of absoluteness in relative truth ; and this, together with the introduction of the dialectical materialist concept of practice into gnoseology , led to a fundamental change in the entire theory of knowledge, elevating it to the level of a theory of ascent toward genuine knowledge of the objectively real world via contradiction.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:32. HUME'S CLASSICAL THEORY OF JUSTICE1 Let me begin by formulating a broad distinction between two sorts of theories of justice. I shall stipulate that a modern theory of justice is one which treats justice as a moral quality, in fact as one moral quality among a multitude of moral virtues, and which accordingly takes the obligation tö' be just as pre-eminently a moral obligation. On this (...) approach the philosophical appreciation of justice requires that we interpret it in terms of a moral theory, and correspondingly any viable moral theory is expected to afford a framework within which the virtue of justice is to be understood. The important philosophical question to be asked about justice concerns the moral obligation to abide by the conventions and rules of justice. By a classical theory of justice I mean one which treats this quality not as one moral virtue among many others but as fundamental to morality itself. Here justice would have to be explained before one could develop a satisfactory account of morality. Questions about the moral obligation of justice are on this approach not as important philosophically as questions about the basis of justice itself. The modern and the classical theories are distinguished by the relationship each posits between justice and morality. In the modern approach, the account one offers of morality conditions the account one can offer of justice, while in the classical theory the account one offers of justice conditions the account one can offer of morality. As exemplifying a classical theory of justice one might cite Plato's Republic or, closer to the present topic, Hobbes' De Homi ne. While there seems to be no definitive interpretation of Hobbes ' overall moral and political theories, in this work he maintains that the development of a settled morality is subsequent to the establishment of civil society and therein, of course, also of the order of justice. The following passage from the De Homine shows how the order 33. of civil justice plays a foundational role relative to the moral order. Eut whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire, that is it which he for his part calleth good: and the object of his hate and aversion, evil; and of his contempt, vile and inconsiderable. For these words of good, evil, and contemptible, are ever used with relation to the person that useth them: there being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common rule of good and evil, to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves; but from the person of the man, where there is no commonwealth; or, in a commonwealth, from the person that representeth it; or from an arbitrator or judge, whom men disagreeing shall by consent set up, and make his sentence the rule thereof. 2 Attributing to Hobbes the view that the account one gives of justice and the civil order conditions and serves as a necessary presupposition to the account one can give of a settled morality permits us to count Hobbes among those thinkers who have offered a classical theory of justice. Because Hume seems in so many ways to deserve the appellation of thoroughly modern philosopher, it is not surprising that he is naturally construed as sharing in the modern conception of justice. I want to argue that this way of interpreting Hume is mistaken and that he is in fact a classical theorist of justice. I shall contend, furthermore, that getting clear about the kind of theory of justice Hume offers allows us to resolve a problem in his moral theory—specifically a problem relating to the correction of the moral judgment. In view of these aims, the paper has three parts: (1) investigation as to what kind of theory of justice Hume offers; (2) exploration of a quandary inherent in the modernist interpretation which serves as an objection to the thesis of this paper; and (3) resolution of this objection and conclusion as to the character of Hume's theory of morality. At the end I shall explore a few corollaries 34. of the thesis that Hume is a classical theorist of justice. 1. Hume: A Classical Theorist of Justice There are... (shrink)

This chapter examines the primary texts relevant to political theory from the traditional period of Buddhism. It argues that the traditional-period texts largely continue the early period’s theory of more-or-less absolute monarchy with a relatively enlightened king, while also seeking to connect the mythological first king to the Buddha, and contemporary kings both to the Buddha and the first king. The texts of this period attempted to sacralize kingship and reduce the differences between the spiritual and temporal (...) realms. These texts also demonstrate a remarkable unity, despite being produced over a long period of time, in many different locations, by authors identified with various sects of Buddhism. (shrink)

The relation of the special and the general principle of relativity to the principle of covariance, the principle of equivalence and Mach's principle, is discussed. In particular, the connection between Lorentz covariance and the special principle of relativity is illustrated by giving Lorentz covariant formulations of laws that violate the special principle of relativity: Ohm's law and what we call “Aristotle's first and second laws.” An “Aristotelian” universe in which all motion is relative to “absolute space” (...) is considered. The first law: a free particle is at rest. The second law: force is proportional to velocity. Ohm's law: the current density is proportional to the electrical field strength. Neither of these laws fulfills the principle of relativity. The examples illustrate, in the context of Lorentz covariance and special relativity, Kretschmann's critique of founding Einstein's general principle of relativity on the principle of general covariance. A modification of the principle of covariance is suggested, which may serve as a restricted criterium for a physical law to satisfy Einstein's general principle of relativity. Other objections that have been raised to the validity of Einstein's general principle of relativity are based upon the preferred state of inertial frames in the general, as well as in the special theory, the existence of tidal effects in “true” gravitational fields, doubts as to the validity of Mach's principle, whether electromagnetic phenomena obey the principle, and, finally, the anisotropy of the cosmic background radiation. These objections are reviewed and discussed. (shrink)

Pointing to the importance of invariance principles has been ranked as one of Einstein’s greatest merits. The symmetries represent an additional category used in a description of the physical world, additional to initial conditions and the very laws of Nature, as distinguished by Newton. Some invariances related to space and time are easy to describe: that the laws of nature are the same everywhere, that they are time independent, and that they do not change if some physical system is subjected (...) to a rotation around an axis in space. The relativistic invariance, which Einstein re-established in his special relativity, was based on giving a full physical meaning to the transformations which Lorentz used to relate observers moving uniformly with respect to each other. He realized that there is no absolute “at rest”, and no sensible “simultaneous” events. What is absolute in his relativity is the constant speed of light, and a well defined proper-time interval. The relativity entered physics as the first great creative principle on Einstein’s list. Subsequently, its marriage to the quantum principle established in atomic physics, brought out the quantum field theory as a mighty tool for the future investigation of the subatomic world. The newly discovered fundamental interactions urged to look for a principle explaining them. It has been found in the form of the gauge principle underlying the present day standard model of elementary particle interactions. It is remarkable that Einstein gave his magical touch also to quantum and gauge principles. Still, the most important Einstein’s idea is that the whole of physics has to be expressed in Minkowski’s space, subject to Lorentz transformations. Today we are aware that, like other symmetries with their restrictions, Lorentz symmetry would be restricted to the non cosmological scale. New ideas in conjunction with the forthcoming cosmological measurements may lead to astonishing results. (shrink)

The existence of a definite tangent space structure (metric with Lorentzian signature) in the general theory of relativity is the consequence of a fundamental assumption concerning the local validity of special relativity. There is then at the heart of Einstein's theory of gravity an absolute element which depends essentially on a common feature of all the non-gravitational interactions in the world, and which has nothing to do with space-time curvature. Tentative implications of this point for (...) the significance of the vacuum solutions in general relativity, and for the issue of quantising gravity, are briefly examined. (shrink)

Roy Wood Sellars (1880–1973) is often reduced to his role as father of Wilfrid Sellars. This is unfair because during the 1920s, ‘30s, and ‘40s, Roy Wood was one of the leading figures of the then prevailing American realist movement. In the present paper, I will focus on one particular facet of R. W. Sellars’ philosophical approach: his continual examination of Albert Einstein’s special theory of relativity. I shall primarily reconstruct his discussion of Einstein’s theory, as it (...) can be found in his seminal The Philosophy of Physical Realism (1932). In contrast to authors such as Bertrand Russell or Émile Meyerson, Sellars refused to interpret special relativity in a realist vein. In his view, it should be seen as an “ars mensurandi” and thus being interpreted purely operationally. As with Einstein himself, the concept of simultaneity was his paradigm case in point. However, Sellars opined that besides the physical (mensurational) concepts of time and simultaneity there also exists an ontological understanding of these notions. “Real” time and “absolute” simultaneity are, according to Sellars, the indispensable non-relativistic counterparts to Einstein’s respective relativistic conceptions. They are to be interpreted realistically since they prove, Sellars maintains, to be explanatory regarding events in Einstein-Minkowski’s world. In the course of the paper, I shall compare this view with the one defended by Henri Bergson. Furthermore, Sellars’ later approach from the 1940s and ‘50s will be briefly considered and critically discussed by confronting it with more recent attempts at ontologically ‘grounding’ special relativistic kinematics. (shrink)

Experiments designed to test Special Relativity are reviewed and their capabilities of distinguishing Special Relativity from Absolute Space-Time theories is analyzed. Of two specific forms of Absolute theories proposed in recent years, we show that one is refuted by past experiments while the other is still in contention.

Old and recent ideas concerning the nature of time are reviewed, starting from Mach's refusal of Newton's absolute time. Many experiments show that the slowing down of moving clocks is a real phenomenon. Such must then also be the so-called “twin paradox,” which owes its name to its evident incompatibility with the philosophy of relativism (not to be confused with the theory of relativity). The Lorentz reformulation of special relativity started by postulating physical effects of the (...) ether, but accepted Einstein's clock synchronization. Only because of this Lorentz could not understand the advantages of an easily deducible different theory. As stressed by Popper, one of the main problems of the usual approach is the introduction of a superdeterministic universe. Recent results obtained by the author show that a theory is possible, based on relative time but on absolute simultaneity, in which the conceptual difficulties of relativity are avoided. (shrink)