The three major classical accounts of the morality of abortion are all subject to at least one major problem. Can we do better? This article aims to discuss three accounts that purport to be superior to the classical accounts. First, it discusses the future of value argument for the immorality of abortion. It defends the claim that the future of value argument is superior to all three of the classical accounts. It then goes on to discuss Warren's attempt to fix (...) up her personhood account and David Boonin's attempt to fix up Tooley's desire account. Warren claims that her updated version of a personhood account is superior to any potentiality account, such as the future of value account. The article evaluates her claim. Boonin argues that his improved desire view both deals adequately with the apparent counterexamples to Tooley's original account and also is superior to the future of value account. The article evaluates his views as well. (shrink)

How can the abortion issue be resolved? Many believe that the issue can be resolved if, and only if, we can determine when human life begins. Those opposed to abortion choice typically say that human life begins at conception. Many who favor abortion choice say that we will never know when human life begins. The importance of the when-does-human-life-begin issue is not so much argued for as it is taken to be self-evident. Furthermore, belief that this issue is fundamental is (...) taken for granted – at least outside of philosophy – by many of the people who seem to disagree about almost everything else concerning abortion. It has been my experience that – with rare exceptions – even those who insist that the issue of abortion should focus on the interests of pregnant women believe that this focus is warranted because fetuses are either not yet fully alive or not yet fully human. (shrink)

There is an argument against abortion that should be rejected. It is the argument that abortion is the killing of an innocent human being, and since the killing of an innocent human being is immoral, abortion is therefore immoral. The major premise should be corrected to read: ?Generally speaking, the killing of innocent human beings is immoral'; for in some situations morality demands the killing of the innocent. Moreover, given the deep structure of English and the differences between unborn and (...) born progeny, the question of whether a human fetus is a human being is best answered in the negative. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that a commitment to a very modest form of egalitarianism—equality between non-disabled human adults—implies fetal personhood. Since the most plausible bases for human value are in being human, or in a gradated property, and since the latter of which implies an inequality between non-disabled adult humans, I conclude that the most plausible basis for human equality is in being human—an attribute which fetuses have.

This paper explores the rhetoric of obstetric ultrasound technology as it relates to the abortion debate, specifically the interpretation given to ultrasound images by opponents of abortion. The tenor of the anti-abortion approach is precisely captured in the videotape, Ultrasound:A Window to the Womb. Aspects of this videotape are analyzed in order to tease out the assumptions about the (female) body and about the access to truth yielded by scientific technology (ultrasound) held by militant opponents of abortion. It is argued (...) that the ultrasound images do not offer transparent confirmation of the ontological status of the embryo and fetus. Rather, the window of ultrasound is constructed through a complex combination of visual and verbal devices: ultrasound images, photographic images, verbal argument, and emotional appeal. (shrink)

This is a public philosophy article that aims to make available an idea about abortion from my Sex, Love, and Gender book.

This essay re-examines the disability critique of prenatal and pre-implantation screening in light of evidence about the larger context in which fertility and reproductive healthcare is rendered in the U.S. It argues that efforts to identify acceptable criteria for trait-based selection or otherwise impose reasons-based limitations on reproductive choice should be avoided because such limitations tend to perpetuate the discrimination encountered by adults with disabilities seeking fertility and reproductive health services.

Access to abortion care has been hugely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. This has prompted several governments to permit the use of telemedicine for fully remote care pathways, thereby ensuring pregnant people are still able to access services. One such government is that of England, where these new care pathways have been publicly scrutinised. Those opposed to telemedical early medical abortion care have raised myriad concerns, though they largely centre on matters of patient safeguarding. It is argued that healthcare professionals (...) cannot adequately carry out their safeguarding duties if the patient is not in the room with them. These concerns lack empirical support. Emerging evidence suggests that safeguarding processes may, in fact, be more effective within telemedical abortion care pathways. In this article, we address two specific safeguarding concerns: (1) that a remote consultation prevents a healthcare professional from identifying instances of abuse, and (2) that healthcare professionals cannot reliably confirm the absence of coercion during a remote consultation. We demonstrate that such concerns are misplaced, and that safeguarding may actually be improved in telemedical care pathways as victims of abuse may find it easier to engage with services. It is inevitable that some individuals will fall through the net, but this is unavoidable even with in-person care and thus does not constitute a strong critique of the use of telemedicine in abortion care. These safeguarding concerns set aside, then, we argue that the current approval that enables telemedical early medical abortion should be afforded permanence. (shrink)

I argue against responsibility arguments that offer a defence of abortion even on the assumption that the fetus is a person. I focus on argumentation originally offered by Judith Jarvis Thomson and then later defended by David Boonin. I offer thought experiments meant to show that, under certain conditions, one bears moral responsibility for creating a fetus. I then offer a positive argument for when one is morally responsible for the creation of a fetus. This argument relies on the presence (...) of other forms of sex that reasonably approximate the goods of penile-vaginal intercourse. Given the presence of these options, sexual partners who engage in penile-vaginal intercourse bear moral responsibility for the creation of the fetus. While I do not think this argument settles the abortion debate – there still may be other ways to successfully defend abortion – it does explain why responsibility arguments like those offered by Thomson fail. (shrink)

This essay concerns what people should do in conflict situations when a doubt of fact bears on settling whether an alternative under consideration is legitimate or not. Its principal audience are those who believe that abortion can be legitimate when not having an abortion gives rise to serious harms that can be avoided by having one, but who are concerned that fetuses might feel pain when being aborted, and who believe that causing unnecessary pain should be avoided when doing so (...) would not pose an undue burden. The essay remains neutral on the substantive questions of the moral status of the unborn and the morality of abortion. The question of fetal pain has taken center stage in the last few years in the .. (shrink)

Many people believe that the abortion debate will end when at some point in the future it will be possible for fetuses to develop outside the womb. Ectogenesis, as this technology is called, would make possible to reconcile pro-life and pro-choice positions. That is because it is commonly believed that there is no right to the death of the fetus if it can be detached alive and gestated in an artificial womb. Recently Eric Mathison and Jeremy Davis defended this position, (...) by arguing against three common arguments for a right to the death of the fetus. I claim that their arguments are mistaken. I argue that there is a right to the death of the fetus because gestating a fetus in an artificial womb when genetic parents refuse it violates their rights not to become a biological parent, their rights to genetic privacy and their property rights. The right to the death of the fetus, however, is not a woman's right but genetic parents’ collective right which only can be used together. (shrink)

The overturn of Roe v. Wade has resulted in fewer rights and resources for people seeking abortion care, particularly in the South. The Hyde Amendment has historically restricted abortion access for those enrolled in Medicaid. We argue here that its guarantees of minimum abortion coverage should be leveraged to offset harms where possible.

While empirical evidence has exposed the harms and health disparities flowing from being denied a wanted abortion, we know less about how anti-abortion laws and policies impact health care more broadly. This article surveys the public health impacts of Dobbs on health care beyond wanted abortion care. The article argues that focusing the public’s attention on the harmful consequences of abortion bans for healthcare beyond wanted abortion care could help to fend off further restrictions on abortion.

BackgroundThere are two types of voluntary interruption of pregnancy: elective and therapeutic abortion. These forms are different for many reasons, and it is reasonable to assume that they can have negative consequences that can last until a subsequent gestation. However, no study has analyzed the psychological experience of gestation after a previous abortion, distinguishing the two forms of voluntary interruption of pregnancy.ObjectiveThis study aims to explore the level of prenatal attachment and centrality of pregnancy in nulliparous low-risk pregnant women with (...) a recently previous elective or therapeutic abortion.MethodsA total of 34 nulliparous pregnant women with a history of abortion, aged from 27 to 48 years, were recruited in the maternity ward of a public hospital of the metropolitan area of Tuscany and Lombardy during the third trimester of gestation. The participants filled out a battery of questionnaires aimed at assessing prenatal attachment and centrality of pregnancy.ResultsAnalyses of variance showed that women with a history of elective abortion reported a higher centrality of pregnancy than women with a past therapeutic abortion. On the contrary, women with a past therapeutic abortion reported higher prenatal attachment.ConclusionElective and therapeutic abortions are different experiences that impact the way women experience a subsequent pregnancy. Future research should further investigate the psychological experience of gestation after abortion. (shrink)

Bernard Gert argues that legitimate moral disagreement calls for tolerance and moral humility; when there is more than one morally acceptable course of action, then intolerance and what Gert calls “moral arrogance” would be objectionable. This article identifies some possible difficulties in distinguishing moral arrogance from moral reform and then examines Gert's treatment of abortion as a contemporary example of moral disagreement that he characterizes as irresolvable.

This book questions how abortion laws can be regulated in a time when abortion rights are still subject to intense debate. It addresses objections to basing abortion law on considerations of moral risk, presents two anti-abortion arguments - the deprivation argument and the substance view - to demonstrate the risk of permitting abortion, and discusses the moral risk of restricting access to abortion when it may unjustifiably harm women. The author also shows how welfare states can address the negative effects (...) of restrictive abortion laws by preventive, mitigative and compensatory measures. This is a thought-provoking and challenging book that will be of great interest to those considering abortion laws across the fields of medical ethics, bioethics, moral philosophy, law and politics. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Abortion is a philosophically interesting issue because both sides seem so certain of their conclusions, yet the issue is at the same time clearly a derivative one. It is also highly political, and needs to be seen within the context of the growth of the women's movement. A philosophical overview of the issue in section 1 construes the central claims of the pro‐choice and anti‐abortion positions as moral and conceptual constructions, which extend everyday moral thinking into the area of (...) abortion. It notes the interesting relation between such constructions and other arguments about abortion, and how this is responsible for their social and historical specificity. Section 2 defends the pro‐choice position as a victory of moral sensitivity over linguistic guile. Section 3 situates the argument within the politics of feminism, and recognises the limited contribution which philosophy is able to make. (shrink)

Giubilini and Minerva argue that, in cases where in utero abortion is currently condoned, ‘after-birth abortion’, or infanticide, ought also to be permitted.1 For example, a third-trimester abortion might be defended on the basis of foetal genetic abnormality, or through appeal to unacceptable parental suffering should the child live. On the authors’ formulation, infanticide in neonates of the same corrected age, in otherwise identical circumstances, ought also to be defended. The paper has, unsurprisingly, provoked public criticism, and even revulsion. I (...) argue that the distress evoked is a moral consideration in its own right. Community interests ought to inform …. (shrink)

Legislative hearings on the Helms Human Life Statute (S.158) and the Hatch Human Life Amendment (S.J.Res.110) revealed the depth of the philosophical differences between pro- and anti-abortionists on fundamental values, and on the relationship between law and morality and between science and politics. These differences could have profound implications for national policy. They could also have an impact on the basic separation of powers between the legislative and judicial branches of the national government and the boundaries between federal and state (...) political activity. (shrink)