Human judgements are affected by the words in which information is presented —or ‘framed’. According to the standard gloss, ‘framing effects’ reveal counter-normative reasoning, unduly affected by positive/negative language. One challenge to this view suggests that number expressions in alternative framing conditions are interpreted as denoting lower-bounded (minimum) quantities. However, it is unclear whether the resulting explanation is a rationalising one. I argue that a number expression should only be interpreted lower-boundedly if this is what it actually means. I survey (...) how number expressions might be assigned lower-bounded meanings, due to their conventional semantics or pragmatic enrichment in context. I argue that deciding between these possibilities requires foundational philosophical input. (shrink)

Despite global and local attempts to end genital mutilation, in their various forms, whether of males or females, the practice has persisted throughout human history in most parts of the world. Various medical, scientific, hygienic, aesthetic, religious, and cultural reasons have been used to justify it. In this symposium on circumcision, against the background of the other articles by Hutson, Short, and Viens, the practice is set by the author within a wider, global context by discussing a range of rationalisations (...) used to support different types of genital mutilation throughout time and across the globe. It is argued that in most cases the rationalisations invented to provide support for continuing the practice of genital mutilation—whether male or female—within various cultural and religious settings have very little to do with finding a critical and reflective moral justification for these practices. In order to question the ethical acceptability of the practice in its non-therapeutic forms, we need to focus on child rights protection. (shrink)

In everyday confabulation and rationalisation of behaviour, agents provide sincerely believed explanations of behaviour which are ill-grounded and normally inaccurate. In this paper, I look at the commonalities and differences between confabulations and rationalisations and investigate their moral costs and benefits. Following Summers and Velleman, I argue that both can be beneficial because they constrain future behaviour through self-consistency motivations. However, I then show that the same features that make confabulations and rationalisations beneficial in some cases can also make (...) them morally costly, when behaviour is explained and justified through the endorsement of bad moral principles. I show that these effects are most likely to occur where the central element of confabulation, self-explanation, and the central element of rationalisation, self-justification, coincide. (shrink)

Conformity by an agent to a convention to which the agent is a party is rational only if the agent prefers to conform given the other parties conform and believes the others will conform. But this justification is inadequate; what, for example, is the justification for this belief? The required rational justification requires recourse to (a) preferences for general conformity (as opposed to merely conditional preferences for one's own conformity) and (b) procedures. An agent adopts a procedure when he chooses (...) to perform a whole set of future actions, as opposed to a single action. (shrink)

Cet article cherche à retracer quelques-uns des éléments à la fois empiriques, historiques et sociologiques de la Sociologie de la musique de Max Weber. Même si ce dernier s'intéresse en premier lieu au processus de rationalisation qui traverse la civilisation occidentale, sa Sociologie de la musique est fondée sur l'idée de médium technique, qu'il explore dans plusieurs directions différentes. Nous revisitons ici cette idée au moyen de quelques exemples tirés de la musique occidentale et en particulier du répertoire romantique (...) pour le piano. (shrink)

Au début du xixe siècle, la formation des officiers de l’armée des États-Unis s’effectue à l’Académie militaire de West Point. Défaillante en de nombreux points, y compris sur le terrain de l’enseignement mathématique, elle est transformée par Sylvanus Thayer en 1817, alors qu’il revient d’un séjour en Europe lors duquel les établissements militaires français ont fait l’objet de scrupuleuses observations. La supériorité des méthodes françaises – l’articulation mathématico-ingéniérique qui structure les curricula, le rôle de la géométrie descriptive et l’analyse dans (...) l’appréhension de l’art de la guerre, l’usage des manuels – semble chose donnée pour acquise du côté américain, si bien que, dans le sillage de West Point, d’autres académies militaires « à la française » ouvrent avant-guerre. Soutenant l’idée d’une « infusion française » plus ou moins passive, l’historiographie alimente bien souvent un récit qui mythifie et cristallise le rôle de la France dans la formation mathématique des militaires américains de la première moitié du xixe siècle, un récit qui minore, de fait, par son caractère univoque, l’importance des espaces intermédiaires – scientifiques, pédagogiques, institutionnels et éditoriaux – où entrent en contact les territoires émetteurs et récepteurs. Cet article montre comment les acteurs qui œuvrent à la formation mathématique dans les écoles militaires aux États-Unis – superintendants, professeurs et auteurs de manuels – procèdent par décomposition et réassemblage des savoirs et méthodes français, dont le « transfert » depuis l’autre côté de l’Atlantique et au sein du territoire américain emprunte des circuits moins prétendument polarisés et hiérarchisés, et très fortement soumis à une forme de rationalisation locale. (shrink)

La traduction scientifique et technique et la terminologie relèvent d'un régime empirique comparable. Examinées au prisme de la doctrine linguistique de vérité logique, elles se différencient à partir de la ligne de démarcation langue naturelle / langage formel. Après avoir analysé les rapports respectifs des théories de la traduction et de la terminologie à la philosophie du langage issue de l'empirisme logique, on cherchera à clarifier les rapports réciproques entre ces théories chez les auteurs les plus représentatifs du modèle logico-ontologique. (...) On s'intéressera enfin à l'évolution du modèle dans un cadre fonctionnaliste et on s'interrogera sur les limites de la rupture épistémologique entrevue depuis les années 1980. L'engouement pour la traduction des terminologies servira d'exemple à charge. L'alternative pourrait venir de la sémantique textuelle.The scientific and technical translation and terminology are of a comparable empirical regime. Examined through the prism of linguistic doctrine of logical truth, they differ from the line natural language / formal language. After analyzing the reports of the respective theories of translation and terminology in the philosophy of language following the logical empiricism, we seek to clarify the interrelationship between these theories in the most representative authors logico-ontological model. Finally we will look at the evolution of the model in a functionalist and we will question the limits of epistemological rupture interview since 1980. The craze for the translation of terminologies used as an example to load. The alternative could have come from textual semantics. (shrink)

The evidence for rationalisation, which motivates the target article, is exaggerated. Experimental evidence shows that rationalisation effects are small rather than gross and, I argue, largely silent on the pervasiveness and persistence of the phenomenon. At least some examples taken to show rationalisation also have an interpretation compatible with deliberate, knowing reason-responsiveness on the part of participants.

Sunstein's Infotopia offers four reasons for thinking that information-pooling via mechanical aggregation of votes is superior to discursive sharing of opinions. This article focuses on two of them—the Common Knowledge Effect and Group Polarisation—showing that both phenomena might have perfectly good Bayesian explanations. Far from constituting 'errors', both can actually contribute to truth-tracking in ways that cannot be accomplished via mechanical aggregation of votes alone.

Sunstein's Infotopia offers four reasons for thinking that information-pooling via mechanical aggregation of votes is superior to discursive sharing of opinions. This article focuses on two of them—the Common Knowledge Effect and Group Polarisation—showing that both phenomena might have perfectly good Bayesian explanations. Far from constituting 'errors', both can actually contribute to truth-tracking in ways that cannot be accomplished via mechanical aggregation of votes alone.

More and more frequently, the organisation of design fits into a project organisation where different designers have to cooperate with flexibility and reactivity. In order to help these cooperative design processes, we have to respond to new types of needs: a relatively unformalised coordination that requires permanent mutual adjustment, the fact that members of the team are geographically distant, the difficulty of building a shared reference via design documents and technical and organisational decisions that structure the project. In order to (...) provide computer support for these needs, asynchronous Group Ware is often recommended. However, the efficiency of these tools depends on the models that structure the work processes and the knowledge exchanged. In this paper, we present ABRICo, a new Design Rationale formalism that permits the recording of cooperative decision-making processes in complex design situations. We describe the formalism and explain how we intend to use it to specify cooperative design tools usable via an Intranet for computing projects. (shrink)

I critically examine the plausibility of Kant’s conception of rationalising, a form of self-deception that plays a crucial role for Kant’s moral psychology and his conception of the functions of critical practical philosophy. The main problem I see with Kant’s conception is that there are no theory-independent criteria to determine whether an exercise of rational capacities constitutes rationalising. Kant believes that rationalising is wide-spread and he charges the popular philosophers and other ethical theorists with rationalising. Yet, his opponents could, in (...) turn, charge him with rationalising and some theorists, namely Act-Consequentialists, seem to be in an even stronger position to charge Kant with rationalising than vice versa. In response, I propose standards that do not assume a specific normative theory and that become apparent when we look at clear-cut abuses of rationality. These standards of minimally decent reasoning can help us diagnose rationalising. I develop these standards by looking at inadequate uses of rational capacities that should strike us as problematic regardless of the specific ethical theory we adopt. I emphasise that even an abuse of rational capacities can yield true results and that we can never tell from a single judgement that someone rationalises. Rather, we must look for patterns. (shrink)

Au début du xix e siècle, la formation des officiers de l’armée des États-Unis s’effectue à l’Académie militaire de West Point. Défaillante en de nombreux points, y compris sur le terrain de l’enseignement mathématique, elle est transformée par Sylvanus Thayer en 1817, alors qu’il revient d’un séjour en Europe lors duquel les établissements militaires français ont fait l’objet de scrupuleuses observations. La supériorité des méthodes françaises – l’articulation mathématico-ingéniérique qui structure les _curricula_, le rôle de la géométrie descriptive et l’analyse (...) dans l’appréhension de l’art de la guerre, l’usage des manuels – semble chose donnée pour acquise du côté américain, si bien que, dans le sillage de West Point, d’autres académies militaires « à la française » ouvrent avant-guerre. Soutenant l’idée d’une « infusion française » plus ou moins passive, l’historiographie alimente bien souvent un récit qui mythifie et cristallise le rôle de la France dans la formation mathématique... (shrink)

In this article, I explore how the ideas of French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas offer insights into a debate often held today in the field of corporate governance, concerning the relative merits of statutory and voluntary approaches to the regulation of business. The philosophical position outlined by Levinas questions whether any rule-based systematisation of ethical responsibility, either statutory or voluntary, can ever equate to a genuine responsibility for the other person. I reflect on how various authors have adapted Levinas’s philosophy to (...) form a critique of bureaucracy and rule following in business, and the lack of ethical authenticity in corporate codes. However, this article also considers the question of whether a theoretical separation can be made between an ethical responsibility based on sensibility (as is suggested by Levinas) and a rational conceptualisation of how one is required to act. Considering the difficulty of disentangling these notions of ethics, I return to the problem of corporate governance and suggest an approach to stakeholder conflict based on mediation and dialogue, which rules out neither principles of conduct nor an openness of responsibility to the Other. (shrink)

For the Critical Theory tradition of the Frankfurt School, rationalisation is a central concept that refers to the socio-cultural closure of capitalist modernity due to the proliferation of technical, ‘instrumental’ rationality at the expense of some form of political reason. This picture of rationalisation, however, hinges on a separation of technology and politics that is both empirically and philosophically problematic. This article aims to re-conceptualise the rationalisation thesis through a survey of research from science and technology studies (...) and the conceptual framework of Niklas Luhmann's systems theory. It argues that rationalisation indeed exhibits a logic of closure, namely the ‘operational closure’ of sociotechnical systems of measurement, but that this closure in fact produces the historical logics of technical reason and, paradoxically, also generates spaces of critical-political openness. This opens up the theoretical and practical opportunity of connecting the politically just to the technically efficient. (shrink)

With modern rationalisation we subject life to quantification, generating evidence and models, and the more we subject life to codification, generating systems, regulations and procedures, the less we understand who we are and what we do. We plunge headlong into illusion, blinded by the clarity of our own newly-found rationality and the solidity of the evidence. We experience an eclipse of reason, no longer understanding what it is to formulate concepts and ideals, nor understanding what it is to offer (...) our lives, time and attention in an appropriate ratio or distribution. (shrink)

In the preface to his Philosophy of Right Hegel maintains that a philosophy is its own time apprehended in thought. It is not the philosopher's business to create an imaginary world of his own. His task is to understand the present and actual as subsuming the past in itself, as the culmination of a process of development.

This article comments on Jonathan Wolff’s contribution ‘Paying People to Act in Their Own Interests: Incentives versus Rationalisation in Public Health ’ from an economics perspective. The role of incentives in public health is discussed from both a neoclassical and behavioural economics viewpoint. Jonathan Wolff contributes to this discussion by outlining a new mechanism. He demonstrates that incentives may matter in a different way than has been considered so far. In particular, Wolff shows that we should not view individuals (...) in isolation when we consider the effects of incentives. (shrink)

He discusses the work of such familiar commentators as Clausewitz, Engels, and Treitschke, and examines little-known writings by Proudhon, De Quincey, Ruskin, Valery, and many others, culminating in the extraordinary dialogue between Freud ...

R T Allen; ‘Because I Say So!’ Some Limitations Upon the Rationalisation of Authority, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 21, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Page.

R T Allen; ‘Because I Say So!’ Some Limitations Upon the Rationalisation of Authority, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 21, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Page.

Two experiments are reported that employed think-aloud methods to test predictions concerning relevance effects and rationalisation processes derivable from Evans' (1996) heuristic-analytic theory of the selection task. Evans' account proposes that card selections are triggered by relevance-determining heuristics, with analytic processing serving merely to rationalise heuristically cued decisions. As such, selected cards should be associated with more references to both their facing and their hidden sides than rejected cards, which are not subjected to analytic rationalisation. Experiment 1 used (...) a standard selection-task paradigm, with negative components permuted through abstract conditional rules. Support was found for all heuristic-analytic predictions. This evidence was shown to be robust in Experiment 2, where "select - don't select" decisions were enforced for all cards. Both experiments also clarify the role played by secondary heuristics in cueing the consideration of hidden card values during rationalisation. We suggest that whilst Evans' heuristic-analytic model and Oaksford and Chater's (e.g., 2003) optimal data selection model can provide compelling accounts of our protocol findings, the mental models theory fares less well as an explanation of our full dataset. (shrink)

ABSTRACT A number of authors have recently advanced a ‘disjunctivist’ view of the rationalising explanation of action, on which rationalisations of the form ‘S A’d because p’ are explanations of a fundamentally different kind from rationalisations of the form ‘S A’d because she believed that p’. Less attempt has been made to explicitly articulate the case against this view. This paper seeks to remedy that situation. I develop a detailed version of what I take to be the basic argument against (...) disjunctivism, drawing on a framework of explanatory proportionality. The disjunctivist cannot reject this framework, I argue, because they need it to respond to another challenge, from psychological individualism. As I explain, however, the proportionality-based challenge is not in principle insurmountable, and I outline a number of ways in which a case for disjunctivism might be developed in response to it. The paper thus clarifies the dialectic around disjunctivism about the rationalisation of action and, specifically, what advocates of the view must do in order to make a compelling case for it. (shrink)

The idea of believing for a good reason has both normative and psychological content. How are these related? Recently, a number of authors have defended a ‘disjunctivist’ view of rationalisation, on which a good reason can make a subject’s responses to it intelligible in a way that mere ‘apparent reasons’ cannot. However, little has been said about the possible epistemological significance of this view or its relationship to more familiar forms of disjunctivism in the philosophy of perception. This paper (...) examines the relationship between epistemological disjunctivism and disjunctivism about rationalisation, arguing that the latter provides an attractive articulation of certain elements of the former. The specific claim is that disjunctivism about rationalisation enables the proponent of epistemological disjunctivism to explain why beliefs that are based on conclusive normative reasons provided by perception are susceptible to a certain kind of undercutting defeat. On the way to motivating this claim, the paper considers possible ways of articulating epistemological disjunctivism in terms of reasons, distinguishes different forms of disjunctivism about reasons for belief and clarifies the relationships between them. (shrink)

Le terme de « rationalisation », qui renvoie à un processus menant de l’« irrationnel » au « rationnel », prend deux valeurs opposées, selon que le processus en question est considéré comme objectif ou subjectif, légitime ou non. Le développement d’une nouvelle forme de rationalité en Grèce ancienne (la philosophie) et son historiographie postérieure présentent souvent des tensions intéressantes entre les deux options. Avons-nous affaire au « phénomèn » originel, dont la raison, malgré qu’elle en ait, doit s’accommoder, (...) ou déjà à des utilisations et transpositions, qui font « référence » à des prétentions ou des types de pensée traditionnels ? L’article étudie sous ce rapport deux cas célèbres : la description fantastique que donne Parménide de son voyage chez la Déesse dans le proème de son poème et l’autoportrait d’Empédocle en « magicien » dans un de ses fragments, pour suggérer, contre certaines tendances récentes de l’interprétation, qu’ils répondent tous deux à la seconde hypothèse. (shrink)

The De praedestinatione of John Scottus Eriugena was intended as a contribution to a controversy sparked off by Gottschalk of Orbais concerning predestination. This work met with trenchant criticism and condemnation even though it firmly rejected Gottschalk’s views on double predestination. One of the reasons for this hostile reception was undoubtedly Eriugena’s singular conception of the freedom of will, a subject I intend to discuss elsewhere. In the present text, however, I would like to focus on another important cause of (...) the rejection of Eriugena’s treatise. In my opinion, this second reason was a pre-scholastic project of rationalization of the faith in the spirit of St. Augustine and using the method of Boethius and Martianus Capella. It would appear that Eriugena’s contemporaries were not ready for the favorable reception of his idea of the vera philosophia that was the same as the vera religio. Yet, as Goulven Madec once rightly observed, the vera ratio of Scotus was closely bound up with the lux mentium which is nothing else than God revealing himself in the human language of the Scriptures. Eriugena’s masters and models were the Church Fathers and his intention was to continue their efforts to achieve an understanding of the faith in his own, personal way. (shrink)

The aim of the text is to consider Gianni Vattimo's claim that hermeneutics needs to be more rational due to its criticised relativism and aestheticism. From this perspective, the author considers the projects proposed by Bartosz Brożek and Chrysostomos Mantzavinos, based on the assumption that the cognitive phenomena underlying the understanding of human behaviour and the resulting artefacts can be described using naturalistic methods. Finally, the question is considered whether these attempts, coming from outside the hermeneutic movement, offer hope for (...) eliminating the flaws of hermeneutics mentioned by Vattimo, and what the prospects are for further research on this issue. (shrink)

The common-sense view that reasons guide us in thought and action and that humans are essentially reason-responsive animals is increasingly under attack by defenders of what one can call the Rationalisation View, which emphasises that we typically rationalise actions and judgements that are based on intuition rather than reasoning. This article defends the former view of human Reason, partly by replying to prominent advocates of the latter, partly by proposing accounts of reflective reasoning and rationalisation that bring to (...) light a common, underappreciated feature: they both involve the capacity to see considerations as reasons. This capacity, the author conjectures, should be the starting point for investigating the faculty we call ‘Reason’, its evolutionary origin, and the (ir)rationality of different kinds of thought associated with it. (shrink)

Advances in veterinary orthopaedics are assessed on their ability to improve the function and wellbeing of animal patients. And yet historically veterinarians have struggled to bridge the divide between an animal's physicality and its interior experience of its function in clinical settings. For much of the twentieth century, most practitioners were agnostic to the possibility of animal mentation and its implications for suffering. This attitude has changed as veterinarians adapted to technological innovations and the emergence of a clientele who claimed (...) to understand and relate to the subjective experiences of their animals. While visualising technologies and human analogies have shaped the nuts and bolts of veterinary orthopaedic practices, an emerging awareness of the inability of radiographic images to apprehend or correlate to a patient's experience of their function reliably has required veterinarians to place a greater emphasis on the owner's knowledge of the "selves" inhabiting their animals. Rather than simply basing clinical judgments on the "look" of their patients, the indeterminacy in the connection between form and function has compelled veterinarians to put questions regarding particular human-animal relationships near the centre of their practices, not least in orthopaedic surgery. (shrink)