본 연구는 ‘중국불교사상에 나타난 佛性의 변천과 여래장적 해석-『화엄경』 「여래출현품」과 「보왕여래성기품」을 중심으로-’에 대하여 살펴본 글이다. 그 결과 여래장 개념의 변천사는 ‘여래장→불성→여래성기→여래출현’순으로 점차 변화되었음을 경전을 통해 확인할 수 있었다. 여래장의 개념의 기원은 초기경전인 『증일아함경』중에서 찾아볼 수 있었는데, 여기서 언급된 용어는 ‘如來藏’이라는 것이다. 『증일아함경』 이후에는 이 용어는 더 이상 초기경전에서는 찾아볼 수 없었다. 그러나 부파불교이후 초기 대승경전의 출현과 발전에 따라 ‘여래장’이란 용어가 언급되고 있는데, 그 대표적인 경전으로는 『大方廣如來藏經』, 『대방등여래장경』과 『보성론』, 『승만경』이나 『대반열반경』, 『불성론』 등의 여래장계통 경전과 『화엄경』 등이다. 이들 경전 중에서 구체적으로 ‘여래장’이라는 의미를 (...) 설명하고 있는 경전은 『대방등여래장경』과 『대방광여래장경』이다. 그리고 ‘불성’이라는 용어가 나타난 최초의 경전은 『앙굴마라경』으로 보인다. 여기서 구체적으로 ‘불성’이라는 개념을 언급하고 있고, 이후 『대열반경』에서도 모든 중생에게 佛性이 있다고 설하고 있다는 것을 시작으로 차츰 여래장이라는 용어가 불성으로 변화되었다는 것을 확인할 수 있다. 이후 중국의 혜원스님(523∼592)은 佛性을 『대승의장』에서 ‘性’을 ‘佛性 · 如來性 · 如來藏性’으로 풀이한 반면, 중국화엄의 제1조인 두순스님과 제2조 지엄스님은 불도실천의 입문관으로서 불성관과 여래장관으로 여래장사상을 이해하고 있다. 특히 지엄스님은 이 마음을 청정한 진심으로 해석하고 동시에 이를 여래장 · 불성의 본성으로 보고 있는데, 이것은 『화엄경』유심사상의 여래장적 해석이라 할 수 있어 주목된다. 그리고 제3조인 법장스님도 ‘여래장연기’로 받아들이고 있다. 『화엄경』에는 여래장설이 직접적으로 설해지진 않으나, 중국의 『화엄경』의 주석가들은 자신이 이미 알고 있던 여래장사상을 바탕으로 하여 『화엄경』을 풀이하고 있다는 것을 알 수 있다.BR 본 연구의 주 텍스트 화엄대경의 경우, 구역60권본 『화엄경』 「여래보왕성기품」에서는 ‘여래성기’로 호칭되었다. 이에 비해 신역 80권본의 「여래출현품」은 ‘여래출현’의 용어로 사용되었으나, 여래장과 불성 그리고 여래성기와 여래출현은 둘 다 如來藏的의미로써 동일하다. 왜냐하면 『화엄경』에 깃들여있는 여래지 · 법신 등의 다양한 여래장적 변용의 교설은 일체중생의 성불에 대한 강력한 의지를 포함한 중국화엄교학의 특징이기 때문이다. 따라서 이러한 佛性에 대한 여래장적 해석을 「보왕여래성기품」과 「여래출현품」에서 다양한 비유로써 發現하고자 하는 근본大義는 모든 악을 저지르지 말고 모든 선을 행하여 스스로 그 마음을 깨끗이 해야 한다는 데 있다. 청정한 三業은 우리 내면에 숨어있던 佛性의 찬란한 광명을 온전히 드러낼 수 있다는 희망의 메시지를 우리에게 던져주고 있다. (shrink)

Busshō, one of the central fascicles of Dōgen’s Shōbōgenzō, is dedicated to the problematic of Buddha-nature, the understanding of which in Dōgen’s thought is fairly different from previous Buddhist philosophy, but concordant with his views on reality, time and person. The article will present a close reading of several passages of the fascicle with comment in order to argue that Dōgen’s understanding of Buddha-nature is not something that entities have, but a mode of how they are, (...) neither in itself nor for us, but in the total world-process. The relation between totality and particularity is not hierarchical, nor one of opposition, but conceived of a matter of perspective, which, as Dōgen shows, is both mediated and circumscribed by language. As a result, we can see that particularity of being is precisely what makes the totality of being accessible to every existent, not an obstacle to be overcome. (shrink)

The theism-atheism debate is foreign to many Mahāyāna Buddhist thinkers such as the Japanese Zen Master Dōgen. Nevertheless, his philosophy of ‘expression’ is able to shine a new light on the various incarnations of this debate throughout history. This paper will explore a/theism from Dōgen’s philosophical standpoint. Dōgen introduces the notion of ‘expression’ to describe the concomitant vertical and horizontal relationships of the religious project, namely the relationship between the individual and the divine as well as the relationship among a (...) multiplicity of individuals, each of which Dōgen conceives of as an expression of the divine and/or the oneness of the cosmos. Dōgen’s philosophy presupposes the ‘way of emptiness’ and Chengguan’s ‘four dharma worlds’. To Dōgen, the former indicates the conventional nature of predication and signification, while the latter denotes the existential interwovenness of numerous individuals and the divine oneness of the cosmos. Such a philosophy implies that all truth claims and philosophical positions are mere intellectual and discursive constructions that are formulated against a perceived other. Therefore, Dōgen observes laconically that ‘when one side is expressed, the other is obscured’ or, as Dōgen says elsewhere, ‘when expression is expressed, non-expression is not expressed.’ Dōgen’s philosophical framework provides some interesting insights about one or more discourses on atheism: Again, the basic assumption is that all philosophical paradigms, systems, and positions are devoid of an absolute truth value, framed in a specific cultural and historical context which they express, and formulated vis-à-vis a perceived other. In this paper, I will look at Friedrich Nietzsche’s atheism from the perspective of Dōgen’s philosophical standpoint. Concretely, I will present Nietzsche’s position on his own terms, translate his philosophy into Dōgen’s terminology, interpret his philosophy from the standpoint of Dōgen’s philosophical approach, and assess the utility of such an exercise. I believe that such a project enables us to read theism through the eyes of atheism, atheism through the eyes of theism, both through the eyes of Dōgen, and Dōgen through the eyes of the a/theism debate. In this last section, I will introduce the language of Nishida Kitarō who attempted a similar project in his The Logic of Basho and the Religious Worldview. The goal of this project is to determine what atheism denies, what atheism contributes, and why a multi-faceted and multi-cultural engagement of atheism is important today. (shrink)

본 논문은『十門和諍論』〈佛性有無和諍門〉에 나타난 불성 유 · 무(佛性有無)에 대한 논쟁 및 이에 대한 원효(617∼686) 해석의 특성을 검토하는 것을 목적으로 한다. 기존 연구에서는 유성 · 무성론의 논법보다 원효의 화쟁 내용이나 일심과의 관련에 초점을 두었다. 하지만『十門和諍論』의 불성 논의에는 원효의 회통 부분이 남아 있지 않다. 따라서 유성론과 무성론의 논쟁에 대한 원효 해석을 통해 화쟁 방식을 추론할 수밖에 없다는 점에서, 원효가 불성 유 · 무(佛性有無) 논의를 정리하는 방식에 대한 검토가 필요하다고 보았다.BR 이러한 시각에서 본 논문에서는 불성 유 · 무에 대한 두 입장의 타당성과 이에 대한 (...) 원효 해석의 특성을 검토하고자 한다. 이를 통해 귀류법(prasaṅga) 등 전통적 논법을 사용하면서도 오류논법 등을 포섭하여 부정을 통한 긍정으로 이쟁(異諍)을 화(和)하는 방식을 분석할 것이다. 또한 법성(dharmatā)과 도리(yukti)의 차원에서 다양한 경증과 이증을 통해 해당 논의를 회통하는 방식을 검토할 것이다.BR 『十門和諍論』잔간에서는 유성론과 무성론의 양 입장을 서술한 후, 관련 오류를 지적하는 방식으로 논의가 진행되고 있다. 단, 무성론 비판에서 경증 자체가 아니라 경증에 대한 잘못된 해석이나 논리적 오류만을 드러내는 점을 고려해 보면, 유성론 비판에서도 이와 유사한 형태를 취했을 것으로 추정된다. 특히『釋華嚴敎分記圓通鈔』의 인용내용 등에 의거할 때, 산실부에서 이어졌을 화쟁은 대승적 견지에서 양론을 동등하게 포섭했을 것으로 생각된다. 다만 부정 이후, 긍정을 유도한다는 점에서『涅槃宗要』의 긍정적 종합과 달리, ‘선별적 부정 및 관점에 따른 긍정’ 방식이 활용되었을 것으로 보인다. (shrink)

In this book the author considers data from both early and later schools of Buddhism in an attempt to provide an overall characterization of the structure of Buddhist ethics. The importance of ethics in the Buddha's teachings is widely acknowledged, but the pursuit of ethical ideals has up to now been widely held to be secondary to the attainment of knowledge. Drawing on the Aristotelian tradition of ethics the author argues against this intellectualization of Buddhism and in favour of (...) a new understanding of the tradition in terms of which ethics plays an absolutely central role. In the course of this reassessment many basic concepts such as karma, nirvana, and the Eightfold Path, are reviewed and presented in a fresh light. The book will be of interest to readers with a background in either Buddhist studies or comparative religious ethics. (shrink)

The author of this paper aimed to understand the early Buddhism community in its entirety by examining the individual episodes in the "Mahavagga". There is a remarkable experience of the psychic power between the Buddha and the Brahmins. They are both aware of coming across of psychic forces that entered the way to the Buddhist Community. Using the brahmins mythology as a instrument for missionary work, the early Buddhism brings people close to Buddha's community. The Buddha visited (...) Uruvela-Kassapa and took lodging for the night where the sacred fire was kept, in spite of Kassapa's warning that the spot was inhabited by a fierce Naga. The Buddha, by his magical powers, overcame, first this N ganad then another, both of whom vomited fire and smoke. Kassapabeing pleased with this exhibition of iddhi-power, undertook to provide the Buddha with his daily food. The Buddha spent the whole rainy season there, performing, in all, three thousand five hundred miracles of various kinds, reading the thoughts of kassapa, splitting firewood for the ascetic sacrifices, heating stoves for them to use after bathing in the cold weather, etc. Still Kassapa persisted in the thought, "The great ascetic is of great magic power, but he is not anarahant like me." Finally the Buddha decided to startle him by declaring that he was not an arahant, neither did the way he followed lead to arahantship. Thereon kassapa owned defeat and reverently asked for ordination. The Buddha asked him to consult with his pupils, and they cut off their hair and threw it with their sacrificial utensils into the river and were all ordained. Nadi Kassapa and Gaya Kassapa were ordained with their pupils. At Gay sisa the Buddha preached to them the Fire Sermon, and they all attained arahantship for the early Buddhist Community. The episode of Uruvela Kassaps in the Mahavagga text ultimately idealizes the power of psychic and the start of the community. It is probable, even at the time when the episode were written, that as a matter of fact every one, in ordinary daily life, spoke imply the vernaculars in a much more simple and natural state of society. It is the Mahavagga authors, when addressing a cultured public at a date when the vernaculars had become the paramount literary language. Another point is that though brahmins take part in the religious and philosophical conversations of those early tims, and in the accounts of them are always referred to with respect, and threaten with the same courtesythat they always themselves extended also to others, yet they hold no predominant position. The majority of the ascetic, and the most influential individuals among them, are not brahmins. That is only a matter of course will be the obvious subjection. The Mahavagga texts I quotes, if not the work of bitter opponents, were at least composed under India bramins influence, and are prejudiced against the brahmins. (shrink)

서구의 전통적 영성 개념은 인간의 외부에 절대존재를 상정하여 인격적 하느님의 초월성을 강조함과 아울러 개인이 그러한 절대자에게 복속하는 것을 기본적 구도로 삼는다. 따라서 서구영성의 종교체험은 인간 영혼과 하느님과의 완벽한 일치 보다는 관계적 일치를 추구하며, 인간 영혼이 끝까지 개체성을 상실하지 않고 하느님과 사랑으로 하나가 되는 경험을 강조한다. 그러나 불교에서는 인간 외부에 별도의 절대적 존재를 인정하지 않는다는 점에서 종교체험에 있어서 서구의 영성관과 다른 길을 모색한다. 현대사회에서 영성이란 일상을 넘어서는 초월적, 종교적 체험 또는 그러한 체험을 하는 주체를 가리키는 일반적인 용어로 광범위하게 사용된다. 영성이 궁극적 (...) 가치를 향한 자기초월의 능력 또는 자기초월을 위한 노력의 체험이라고 할 때, 불교에서 영성에 대응되는 것이 불성 개념이다. 중생에게 불성이 있다고 하는 것은 중생의 실천을 격려하여 모든 중생들이 해탈하기를 기원하는 일종의 방편이다.『열반경』에 나타난 불성 개념은 일천제성불설과 관련지어 살펴볼 때 미래라는 시간 개념이 결합되는 모습으로 나타난다. 열반에 대한 형이상학적 논의만으로는 성불이라는 사건이 완성될 수 없으며, 반드시 행위자에 의한 선업을 쌓는 행위가 뒷받침되어야 만이 열반에 도달할 수 있다. 수행의 누적과 직접적으로 관련된 불성개념은 연인불성이다. 이렇게 볼 때 일천제란 단지 과거의 행적의 결과에 따라서 붙여진 호칭일 뿐 미래에까지 적용되는 개념은 아니다. 그리고 미래의 결과는 현재에 어떠한 마음가짐으로 어느 정도의 선을 행하느냐에 따라 달려 있는 것이다. (shrink)

This is a comparative study of the discourses on the nature of sacred language found in Indian Abhidharma texts and those written by 7th century Chinese Buddhist scholars who, unlike the Indian Buddhists, questioned 'the essence of the Buddha's teaching'. This issue labeled fo-chiao t'i lun, the theory of 'the essence of the Buddha's teaching', was one of the topics on which Chinese Yogācāra scholars have shown a keen interest and served as the inspiration for extensive intellectual (...) dialogues in their texts. It is in Hsüan-tsang's massive and organized translation works, begun in 648, that various previous translations of the term buddhavacana from Indian Abhidharma texts were given the unified translation of fo-chiao. (Fo-chiao literally means "the Buddha's teachings," and is the term used in the modern period for "Buddhism.") By combining fo-chiao with the term t'i, meaning 'essence' or 'substance' throughout his translations, Hsüan-tsang attempted to define 'the essence of the Buddha's teaching'. In Indian Abhidharma texts, the nature of the Buddha's word was either 'sound' (abdha), the oral component of speech, or 'name' (nāma), the component of language that conveys meaning, or some combination of the two. From the time of Hsüan-tsang's translation, however, discourse on the nature of sacred language was no longer relegated to the category of language or of epistemological investigation, but became grounded in the Chinese discussion investigating the 'essence' or 'substance' of the Buddha's teaching, and even of 'Buddhism' itself. As such, it sought to transcend the distinction between language and meaning. This gradual but explicit process of inquiry into the nature of 'the Buddha's word' was a necessary antecedent to the transition to a 'Chinese' Buddhism. (shrink)

Recent controversies in Japanese Buddhist scholarship have focused upon the Mah y na notion of a “Buddha nature” within all sentient beings and whether or not the concept is compatible with traditional Buddhist teachings such as an tman. This controversy is not only relevant to Far Eastern Buddhism, for which the notion of a Buddha-nature is a central doctrinal theme, but also for the roots of this tradition in those Indian Mah y na s tras which (...) utilised the notion of tath gatagarbha. One of the earliest Buddhist texts to discuss this notion is the Queen r m l S tra, which appears to display a transitional and revisionist attitude towards traditional Mah y na doctrines such as emptiness and no-abiding-self. These and related issues are examined as they occur in the r m l S tra and as they might relate to the issue of the place of Buddha-nature thought within the Buddhist tradition. Finally some concluding remarks are made about the quest for “true” Buddhism. (shrink)

Mipam on Buddha-Nature: The Ground of the Nying-ma Tradition. By Douglas S. Duckworth. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2008. Pp. xxxiv + 292. $80 ; $27.95.

Contains essays by many of the most important twentieth century Japanese philosophers, offering challenging and illumination insights into the nature of Reality as understood by the school of Zen.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 23 (2003) 187-189 [Access article in PDF] Blue Jean Buddha: Voices Of Young Buddhists. Edited by Sumi Loundon. Foreword by Jack Kornfield. Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2001. xxi + 234 pp. Blue Jean Buddha is not the name of one of this year's short-lived pop sit-coms nor is it a trendy apparel statement. You will not find low-rise, hip-hugging jeans and navel-studded co-eds in this collection (...) of lively and articulate essays by young American Buddhists in their late twenties and early thirties. (But then again you might have found them if today's teen Buddhists were represented!) Blue Jean Buddha is highly readable and mind-opening to those unfamiliar with the growth of Buddhist communities and practitioner networks in North America as well as for text and church-bound academicians of Buddhist-Christian discourse.Blue Jean Buddha:Voices of Young Buddhists is a medley of twenty-nine upbeat and down-home personal testimonies of mostly Westerners who were raised as Buddhists in the United States or who converted early on in life. The book is divided into four parts: Lessons, Life Stories, Livelihood, and Reflections. Refreshingly immediate introductory pages (really a series of questions!) and the concluding Reflections are offered by editor Sumi Loundon, an artist and graduate of Harvard Divinity School and former chair of the Harvard Buddhist Community. Sumi herself was born into a small Zen community in rural New Hampshire, practiced vipassana for years and is now committed to the Buddhist traditions of Korea, where I first met her at a temple in Seoul. She is planning to come out with a second volume of essays by more representatives of America's fertile Buddhist garden in 2004.The essays in Blue Jean Buddha are a cornucopia of commentary and questions about the reception of Buddhism in the West, the spiritual odysseys of exceptional young seekers, and thoughtful ruminations on the transformative effects of dharma practice for personal and social change. These are the voices of American Buddhism at its grassroots, in the lives of young Buddhists as they are actually living it. One contributor, Elijah, age twenty-eight, was recognized as a tulku by the Dalai Lama when he was eight; another voice is Hanuman, twenty-four, a musician and proud "Bu-Hin-Chris-Jew" whose senior performance was called "The Mind Is a Belligerent Puppy—Easy to Train, Difficult to Discipline." Yet another contributor is Liane, a Japanese American Jodo Shinshu follower, thirty-three, whose faith was tested after she became paralyzed from the neck down in an automobile accident when she was twenty.Blue Jean Buddha is one of those versatile books you can recommend to almost anyone you meet to introduce them to the living practice of Buddhism in contemporary America. The personal vignettes are short, compelling, and easy to read on a plane, on a bus, or at your bedside. College students at all levels will enjoy it because of the open spirit with which it is presented. It asks many leading questions about [End Page 187] Buddhism and the nature of spiritual life in general. Readers will be happily surprised, remarking, "Hey! I was there, too! That's what I was thinking!" You can read and reread it many times and still get some new personal insight out of it. I certainly did, assisting my wife, Jinsuk Lim, preparing a Korean translation of the book. A best-seller among Eastern spiritual titles distributed by Amazon.com and Shambhala, the Korean version sold very well in Buddhist and more intellectually progressive circles. Those conversant with Buddhist studies in general as well as meditation and transpersonal psychology will recognize a few familiar surnames; candid and compassionate offspring of illustrious parents have contributed to Blue Jean Buddha. I will leave it to SBCS members in the know to seek out and identify them!As for the interface of Buddhist and Christian beliefs and interfaith practice of concern to our seasoned readers, let us allow editor Sumi Loundon to offer her musings from her own youthful experience: The essays in this book... (shrink)

An environmental history of Buddhism. The book addresses the basic concerns of environmental history: the history of human thought about "nature" or "the environment"; the influence of environmental factors on human history; and the effect of human-caused environmental changes on human society.

This essay explores the differences and common position, mutual connections and influence between the theory of Buddhist nature as the central problem of Buddhism and the theory of human nature as the central problem of Confucian philosophy it holds that the largest difference between the two theories is that Buddhism emphasizes abstract noumenon, while Confucianism emphasizes man, human nature and ethical relations; and after entered into China, Buddhism has been influenced by Confucian theory of human nature, (...) gradually gone on a humanized and mindized road, and become a much more ethicalized religion. (shrink)

Chan Buddhist discourse refers repeatedly to many kinds of animals, particularly dogs and cats, as symbols or in fables in order to comment ironically on human attitudes and behavior. These creatures are appreciated for their positive qualities yet are also scathingly criticized for representing a lack of discipline and self-control. This paper considers how a couple of Chan gongan cases featuring animals are related to the Mahayana doctrine of universal Buddha-nature. Does Chan accept and approve or reject and (...) refute the orthodox view, does it craft a standpoint of ironic inconclusiveness that deliberately bypasses and reorients traditional doctrinal disputes, or do these cases primarily express an allegorical message regarding possibilities or challenges for humans seeking to attain an experience of enlightenment? (shrink)

A concise, popular introduction to Buddhism, this book presents Buddha's teaching: avoid "desiring too much and avoid desiring too much stopping of such desiring." After a preliminary exposition, the author proceeds to examine the causes for various misinterpretations of Buddha's teaching and concludes with his own criticisms. Bahm's lack of sympathy, however, prevented him from seeing the relevance of Buddha's teaching to the problems confronting Western civilization. And in desiring too much to argue and to document, he (...) interferes with the natural persuasiveness of Buddhism. Nevertheless, the book is to be recommended as a useful introductory work on Buddhism.--T. L. M. (shrink)

I argue against the dialetheist interpretation of Madhyamaka propounded by Garfield and Priest, in part on textual grounds, but also on the grounds that their reading completely misses the rhetorical strategy behind the use of contradictions for soteriological ends in the Indian Buddhist tradition.

The Buddha’s final illness, brought on by his last meal prior to his death, was traditionally seen as one of a set of ailments suffered by him at various points during his lifetime. This paper looks at different Buddhist explications of the causes of these ailments and applies them to the episode of the Buddha’s final illness. In both instances, three explanatory strategies are detected: the first stresses the causative importance of the Buddha’s own negative karmic deeds (...) in past lives; the second looks to the negative deeds and karma of others than the Buddha; the third offers non-karmic explanations. The first two engendered two rather different kinds of j?taka stories; the last did not involve any j?takas but highlighted various kinds of ‘natural’ explanations. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddha Loves Me! This I Know, for the Dharma Tells Me SoDonald K. SwearerI intend no disrespect to either the Buddha or the Christ by my rewrite of Anna Bartlett Warner’s 1859 Sunday school song, “Jesus Loves Me.” That one might construct the Buddha in the image of a loving Jesus may be more startling or offensive to Buddhists (and also to Christians) than the modern, (...) apologetic view of the Buddha as a rational renouncer. Versions of both can be textually justified; however, each is a reification that reflects the bias of the interpreter. Both ignore the complexity of the figure of the Buddha within the varied and diverse traditions of Buddhism. My starting point in the following essay acknowledges this complexity as well as the inevitable limitations of my personal interpretation of the Buddha, necessarily conditioned by my experience. I propose to structure the essay around two polarities—universal/particular and wisdom/compassion—looking first at the Buddha and then briefly reflecting dialogically at the end of each section on the figure of the Christ.Buddha: Universal and ParticularIn my personal experience in Buddhist Asia, especially Thailand, and my studies of Buddhist traditions, in particular the Theravada, I have been impressed by the creative tension between the universal and particular dimensions of the figure of the [End Page 113] Buddha. Even the modern Western view of the Buddha evidences this tension. Typically the word Buddha evokes the story of Prince Siddhattha’s renunciation of his royal status, subsequent quest for enlightenment, and eventual realization of nibbana. 1 In the hands of a comparative mythologist such as Joseph Campbell, the detailed embellishments of the Buddha’s sacred biography are absorbed into the tripartite, monomyth structure of the hero’s narrative—separation, attainment, return. For Campbell, the story of the historical Buddha, Siddhattha Gotama, represents a rite of passage, a deep psychological truth of self-discovery symbolized by other heroes in world mythology. Despite the antistructuralist critique by historical and textual scholars, as well as the feminist criticism that the heroic journey does not reflect women’s experience, in one form or another the Buddha reified as an exemplar of the universal paradigm of the individual’s journey of self-realization continues to capture the Western imagination.A somewhat more sophisticated version of the universal hero motif is the Buddha as ‘rational renouncer,’ an interpretation favored by both Buddhists and scholars of Buddhism who portray the Buddha as an empiricist and pragmatist somewhat on the order of William James. In this view, Prince Siddhattha’s quest was a rational response to the experience of suffering, and the truth he perceived on the night of his enlightenment was nothing more nor less than a direct perception of the universal law of cause and effect obscured to ordinary awareness. De-emphasizing both the ascetical and devotional aspects of the Buddha’s sacred biography, the rational renouncer school of thought places its emphasis on epistemological transformation characterized in Buddhist texts as “seeing things as they really are.”The Buddha as universal hero and as rational renouncer can be critiqued as modernized, rationalized, westernized reifications of the Buddha, an example of the ‘orientialist’ distortion that characterized the colonial project. Charles Hallisey has pointed out that such reconstructions of the Buddha were not merely the products of Western scholars but owed much to Asian Buddhists as well. 2 But are we to assume that throughout the history of Buddhism, similar hermeneutical moves and debates over the nature of the Buddha did not exist? I find a tension in the Buddhist tradition between two contrasting images of the Buddha: as an exemplar of a universal truth, and as a being defined by the contingencies of human particularities.Theravada Buddhists find strong support in the sutta for a humanistic interpretation of the Buddha. In particular, they argue that the Buddha of the early Buddhist canonical texts specifically denied that he was a god, and that he was a teacher of the truth he perceived at his enlightenment. They find support for this view in the Mahaparinibbana Sutta, wherein the Buddha tells his followers that when he dies the teaching and the disciplinary rules he... (shrink)

In the past decade or so there has been a surge of monographs on the nature of ‘Buddhist Ethics.’ For the most part, authors are concerned with developing and defending explications of Buddhism as a normative ethical theory with an apparent aim of putting Buddhist thought directly in dialogue with contemporary Western philosophical debates in ethics. Despite disagreement among Buddhist ethicists concerning which contemporary normative ethical theory a Buddhist ethic would most closely resemble (if any), 1 it is arguable (...) that all Buddhist ethicists (like all Buddhists) embrace and endorse the Four Noble Truths as a framing assumption. That is, a Buddhist ethic will (1) typically assume that we fallible .. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Buddha through Christian EyesElizabeth J. HarrisIt was in Sri Lanka in 1984 that I had my first ‘encounter’ with the Buddha. When at the ancient city of Anuradhapura, I stole away from the group I was with to return for a few minutes to the shrine room adjacent to the sacred bo tree, the one believed to have grown from a cutting of the original tree (...) under which the Buddha gained enlightenment. Devotees dressed in white were sitting or prostrating silently. I joined them and looked toward the image, which showed the Buddha sitting in meditation against a painted scene of pale blue sky, white clouds, and mountains. Suddenly the image became more than mere plaster. All I can say is that it communicated. It beckoned. Against the blue of the sky, the serene head became suffused with cosmic significance. I know that there was unfinished business between me and the Buddha.The moment was prophetic. Two years later, I returned to Sri Lanka to study Buddhism and stayed over seven years. ‘Study’ is not quite the right word because, together with the academic, I also sought to immerse myself in Buddhism with the wish to see it through the eyes of Buddhists. I practiced meditation under Buddhist teachers, participated in temple devotion, and joined pilgrimages. It was a process that meant temporarily letting go of much that was dear to me as a Christian. But the rewards were inestimable. Never again has the image at Anuradhapura ‘spoken’ to me. In fact, on return visits it has appeared artistically poor, certainly no match for the older stone images, open to the air, in other parts of the city. But then, around and inside that very shrine room in May 1985, Tamil guerrillas gunned down 146 innocent devotees, rupturing centuries of devotion with pools of blood.My seven and a half years in Sri Lanka make it almost impossible for me to write about the Buddha as a complete outsider. I remain a Christian, but the Buddha has become part of me. An exquisitely carved wooden image of the Buddha in meditation is now part of my home. The peace that emanates from it gives me strength. In complete honesty, I can say that I revere the Buddha.But what Buddha do I revere? Do I revere the Buddha in the same way as Buddhists? To reflect on how my appreciation of the Buddha may be different from that [End Page 101] of Buddhists is not easy, for Buddhism contains within itself so many faces of the Buddha. There is the historical Buddha of the earlier parts of the Pali canon, the Buddha of the later hagiographic biographies, the Buddha of popular devotion, Mahayana Buddhism’s vision of multiple Buddhas and cosmic buddhahood, the Buddha of what has been termed Protestant Buddhism. Yet I sense that there is a common thread within all of these faces—namely, the Lord Buddha as the supreme embodiment of compassion and wisdom, the one who has seen into the nature of reality and the human predicament and has taught the path of liberation.All that I know of Buddhism tells me that the person of the Buddha is central. The devotion shown to the image is more than would be given to a human teacher and more than would be given to a god. Acchariya manussa is one phrase used in the Pali texts—“wonderful man.” He is human, yet more than human in that he was enlightened and worked toward this enlightenment without outside aid through countless lives of self-sacrifice and virtue. This I believe all Buddhists would agree to, and such a being is supremely worthy of reverence.How does my appreciation tally with this? It is the Theravada tradition that has nurtured my own understanding, and it has done so in three ways. First, there has been my reading of the Sutta Pitaka of the Pali canon. In the first two years of my time in Sri Lanka, I read through most of the nikaya of the Sutta Pitaka, albeit in translation, and I found myself encountering again and again a teacher I could respect and revere. “How... (shrink)

This essay arose from a collaborative project exploring the meaning of apophatic discourse in different religious traditions. I focus on the paradox of language as both liberating and ensnaring that resonates across the great diversity and heterogeneity of Buddhist traditions. Apophatic discourse is a widespread response to this paradox, as it is motivated by a recognition of the limits of words and concepts even as it seeks to point to that which is beyond these limits. The questions of whether there (...) is a nonconceptual reality beyond the limits of words and concepts, and if so, what it might be, and why, precisely, language and reason are incapable of articulating nonconceptual reality, and what the role of language might be in leading beyond itself, are all sources of considerable debate among Buddhist thinkers. What is shared by figures with different responses to these questions is an understanding of apophasis as a form of Buddhist practice. The aim of Buddhist apophatic practice is to disrupt our natural linguistic attitude, in which we are beguiled by language, presupposing that our words and concepts somehow correspond with the ultimate nature of reality. How is apophatic discourse—enacting an awareness of the limits of language—meaningful if it cannot actually describe that which it is about? Buddhist apophatic discourses, such as ontological doctrines of ineffability, negations, and silence, are not simply pointing to ultimate reality, but are meaningful as transformative practices in the context of an interpretive community with shared soteriological goals and doctrines. Thus, even as apophatic discourse is ever transcending positive claims, it depends on kataphatic discourse to have any specific meaning. (shrink)

A shorter and less technical treatment of its subject than the author’s acclaimed _Buddhism As Philosophy_ (second edition, Hackett, 2021), Mark Siderits's _The Buddha’s Teachings As Philosophy_ explores three different systems of thought that arose from core claims of the Buddha. By detailing and critically examining key arguments made by the Buddha and developed by later Buddhist philosophers, Siderits investigates the Buddha's teachings as philosophy: a set of claims—in this case, claims about the nature of (...) the world and our place in it—supported by rational argumentation and, here, developed with a variety of systematic results. _The Buddha’s Teachings As Philosophy_ will be especially useful to students of philosophy, religious studies, and comparative religion—to anyone, in fact, encountering Buddhist philosophy for the first time. (shrink)

The article analyses and interprets the critique of the special dharmic theory of the early Buddhist school of sarvāstivāda-vaibhāṣika undertaken by the school of sautrāntika. Special attention is paid to the critique of the theory of the existence of dharmas, elementary psycho-physical data, in all three time periods. At the beginning, a general Buddhist theory of two truths is presented, which tries to legitimize the so-called philosophy of abhidharma as a “higher teaching” regarding reality (dharma theory) which is only rudimentarily (...) present in the Buddha’s discourses. Then we turn to a concise presentation and analysis of the key ontological concepts of sarvāstivāda-vaibhāṣika, and then to the critique of the same undertaken by the school of sautrāntika. It is concluded that sautrāntika, with its critique, “returned” Buddhist philosophy on the path of pure phenomenology after the sarvāstivada-vaibhāṣika’s attempt to interpret the Buddha’s teaching in line with a realistic reductive ontology. (shrink)

This book offers a unique synthesis of past and current work on the structure, meaning, and use of negation and negative expressions, a topic that has engaged thinkers from Aristotle and the Buddha to Freud and Chomsky. Horn's masterful study melds a review of scholarship in philosophy, psychology, and linguistics with original research, providing a full picture of negation in natural language and thought; this new edition adds a comprehensive preface and bibliography, surveying research since the book's original publication.

This is a comparative study of the discourses on the nature of sacred language found in Indian Abhidharma texts and their counterparts by seventh century Chinese Buddhist scholars who, unlike the Indian Buddhists, questioned "the essence of the Buddha's teaching," and developed intellectual dialogues through their texts. ;In the Indian Abhidharma texts, Sa ngitiparyaya, Jnanaprasthana, Mahavibhasa, Abhidharmakosa, and Nyayanusara, the nature of the Buddha's word was either "sound," the oral component of speech, or "name," the component (...) of language that conveys meaning, or both. I show that the Sautrantikas refused to accept the category of "name," which was abstract and hypothetical to them. However, the attitude of the opposing Sarvastivadins, attested in the Mahavibhasa, for whom "name" was approved in their ontological structure, was ambivalent. In the Abhidharmakosa, both positions were introduced without commentary. Sanghabhadra, an ardent Sarvastivadin, was the only one who explicitly claimed that "name" should be the nature of the Buddha's word. ;What was mainly a linguistic debate in India became transformed in China into a religious and metaphysical one. Chiao-t'i, "the essence of the Buddha's word," was used for the first time by Hsuan-tsang for buddhavacana, "the word of the Buddha" in Sanskrit. Adding the term "essence" altered the nature of the debate. Wonch'uk was the first to view the issue from the broad perspective of its history and provenance in the Indian Buddhist texts. K'uei-chi incorporated it into Yogacara: the Buddha's teaching is what is represented in sentient beings' minds. Fa-tsang defined the essence of the Buddha's teaching as the truth appearing in the mind of the Buddha, which he equated with the truth of the Hua-yen world, tathata. This gradual but candid process of dialogue on "the Buddha's word" preluded a transition to "Chinese" Buddhism. An inquiry no longer in the category of language or of epistemological investigation claims its own identity in the Chinese discussion querying the "essence" or "substance" of the Buddha's teaching, and even "Buddhism" itself, transcending the distinction between language and meaning. (shrink)

With the naturalist worldview having become widely accepted, the trend of naturalistic Buddhism has likewise become popular in both academic and religious circles. In this article, I preliminarily reflect on this naturalized approach to Buddhism in two main sections. In section 1, I point out that the Buddha rejects theistic beliefs that claim absolute power over our destiny, opting instead to encourage us to inquire intellectually and behave morally. The distinguishing characteristics of naturalism such as a humanistic approach, rational (...) enquiry, empirical observation, as well as a pragmatic and realistic outlook can all be seen in the Buddha’s teachings. In section 2, however, I advance arguments to show that while the Buddha is opposed to theistic doctrines, his views are not entirely in accordance with the presuppositions of naturalism. Firstly, the Buddha’s foremost concern is not purely intellectual in nature—the purpose of his teachings is to realize a soteriological goal through spiritual practice. Secondly, naturalism tends to subscribe to ‘self-being,’ while the Buddha holds all things to exist conditionally and impermanently. Because of the dependent nature of all things, it is not possible to discover their essence through reduction. Thirdly, naturalized philosophy would be a kind of belief-habit that follows from certain preconditioned assumptions. But the Buddha encourages us to re-examine our conceptual proliferation leading to biased views, as that ultimately leads to suffering. I conclude by proposing a broader naturalist outlook that would allow for a more inclusive conception of the natural world that would take the axiological dimension of human transcendence into account and increase an overall understanding of human potentiality. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Cult of Nothingness: The Philosophers and the BuddhaA. J. NicholsonRoger-Pol Droit. The Cult of Nothingness: The Philosophers and the Buddha. Translated by David Streight and Pamela Vohnson. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003. Pp. xii + 263.Roger-Pol Droit's recently translated study, The Cult of Nothingness: The Philosophers and the Buddha, is not a book about Buddhism per se. Rather, it is a rich (...) and theoretically sophisticated overview of the reception of Buddhism in Europe that deserves shelf space alongside Wilhelm Halbfass' India and Europe and Raymond Schwab's The Oriental Renaissance. But while some of the figures Droit covers may be familiar from these other studies in the history of orientalism, Droit's book has its own unique narrative thread. Specifically, Droit wishes to examine the once widespread notion that Buddhism is a nihilistic religion, a religion that worships nothingness. His central thesis is that this conception of a nihilistic religion really wasn't about Buddhism at all, but "that Europe... was speaking only of herself." Droit sees in the cult of nothingness the subconscious expression of a crisis of foundations among nineteenth-century European intellectuals, as well as a "hidden laboratory for the theoretical development of European nihilism."Along the way to illustrating this thesis, Droit leads a masterful and extremely entertaining tour of the opinions of early Buddhologists and Eastward-looking philosophers, some of whom have seldom been documented elsewhere. He also provides an enormous bibliography of European writings on Buddhism from 1638 to 1890. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the Buddha was often identified as one of many gods belonging to an inchoate and primitive world of mythical concordances. Thus, George Stanley Farber wrote in 1816 that "the primeval Buddha... is the same as Vishnu, or Shiva, or Osiris." Writers in this genre were especially fond of identifying the Buddha with the god Mercury. The sole reason, it seems, was simple linguistic confusion-the word for the planet Mercury in Sanskrit is budha, one letter short of buddha. Furthermore, the preeminent Indologist Sir William Jones posited the identity of the Norse god Woden and Buddha; this was later taken up by A. W. Schlegel in his Indische Bibliothek, and eventually influenced the publication of such unforgettable titles as Holmboe's Traces du Buddhisme en Norvège avant l'introduction du Christianisme. Jones elsewhere hinted that the Buddha might have been of Ethiopian, rather than Indian origin, and this set off another wave of speculation. To reconcile theories of a primordial god named Buddha with new evidence that the Buddha had been a man who had lived at a relatively recent date, for a short time a theory of two Buddhas emerged, first suggested by Antione Augustin Giorgi, and later taken up by Jones himself.Droit sees Hegel as the single figure most responsible for establishing the link between Buddhism and nothingness that endured in the nineteenth-century philosophical imagination. Droit painstakingly charts Hegel's changing attitudes toward Buddhism over the course of his lectures from 1822 to 1831. In spite of, or perhaps because of, Hegel's familiarity with all of the most recent secondary works on Buddhism, he had great difficulty in integrating Buddhism into his philosophical grand [End Page 577] narrative. But his most enduring interpretation of Buddhism came in 1827, when he asserted that for Buddhism, "Saintliness consists in man uniting himself with God, with nothingness, with the absolute in this destruction, in this silence.... Man must make himself nothing." Hegel did not get this idea from his contemporaries, but from an earlier stratum of writing on Buddhism, that of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Jesuit missionaries. After this portrayal of Buddhism became prevalent in European philosophical circles, an extraordinary debate developed. The notion of a religion that worships nothingness was so contrary to common sense that it threatened the Enlightenment conviction that there existed a single, universal human nature. Jules Barthélmy Saint-Hilaire summed it up quite clearly: "In the presence of a phenomenon so curious and so deplorable... one might ask... if, in those climates where life is so horrific and nothingness is worshiped instead of God, human nature is... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Beside Still Waters: Jews, Christians, and the Way of the BuddhaAlon Goshen-GottsteinBeside Still Waters: Jews, Christians, and the Way of the Buddha. Edited by Harold Kasimow, John P. Keenan, and Linda Klepinger Keenan. Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2003. 284 pp.Religion,Wilfred Cantwell Smith teaches us, is about people, not about ideas. This remarkable collection of essays provides us with a glimpse into people, their spiritual aspirations, and their life (...) journeys. This collection of narratives of Jews and Christians, who recount the story of their involvement with Buddhism, turns out to be a powerful spiritual medium. It allows us to get to know, at times in a very intimate and revealing manner, the stories, struggles, and processes that have shaped participants in this enterprise. Many of the participants are well-known figures in academia and in religious or interfaith circles. Getting to know the person behind the idea, or the book, is always a valuable means of grounding and contextualizing what might otherwise be disembodied ideas or concepts. But the volume does much more than introduce us to an impressive array of sensitive and thoughtful personalities. Through the life stories told in this volume, key elements of the relationship between the three religions—theological, philosophical, and ritual—are confronted. The flow of the book moves in interesting ways between the personal, philosophical, theological, experiential, and mystical, as the various life stories weave the greater whole of this book. The sum total of the fourteen stories of Jews and Christians and their encounter with Buddhism provides an interesting vantage point on the Jewish-Buddhist and the Christian-Buddhist encounters. (I use the term "encounter," as opposed to "dialogue," following the distinction made in this volume byE.Burke Rochford Jr.; "encounter" involves personal change and transformation, something shared by nearly all participants in this volume.) From this perspective, interesting observations emerge regarding the ways in which the encounter impacts and interfaces with both Judaism and Christianity, on the sociological, ritual, theological, and experiential levels. The juxtaposition of two sets of stories, Jewish and Christian, allows us, finally, to make some interesting observations on the difference between these two parallel sets of encounters with Buddhism. [End Page 259]The concept underlying this volume—sharing stories, short spiritual biographies —suggests the growing importance of biography or autobiography and narrative in the study of religion. This collection of short contemporary spiritual biographies makes us aware of the importance of narrative as part of spiritual process, and of its sharing. As the reader discovers, storytelling is a very powerful medium for conveying ideas and sharing processes. Something of the transformative nature of the very enterprise of encounter is thus communicated through the medium of this book. There is no doubt that every reader of this book who is sympathetic to the sensibilities of interreligious encounter will be moved and inspired by some of the stories and testimonies here collected.The strengths of Beside Still Waters are also its weaknesses. The medium of storytelling calls for particular literary skills quite distinct from the spiritual and intellectual qualities that have rightly earned participants in this volume their place in it. Moreover, not all participants are able to share a personal, let alone a spiritual, process. Some of the writers (Cobb, Lubarsky) share an intellectual journey, couched in the appropriate autobiographical context. Others (notably Muck) offer theological insight. At the other extreme, a significant group of Christian contributors shares with us some of the most intimate mystical moments of their spiritual odyssey. The uniform assignment that contributors were asked to fulfill has thus been variously interpreted. This makes the book both highly interesting and, in some sense, weak. The lack of consistent focus takes the reader on a ride between a range of dimensions and experiences—intellectual, experiential, mystical, sociological, and more. With the exception of the mystical-experiential dimension that looms large in some of thepresentations, none of the substantive issues is ever fully developed. The cross between autobiography and religious reflection whets one's reflective appetite, offering tantalizing theological insight, only to fade into one of the dimensions of narrative through which the individual contributors address their task. The sum total of the... (shrink)

It is well known in contemporary Madhyamaka studies that the seventh century Indian philosopher Candrakīrti rejects the foundationalist Abhidharma epistemology. The question that is still open to debate is: Does Candrakīrti offer any alternative Madhyamaka epistemology? One possible way of addressing this question is to find out what Candrakīrti says about the nature of buddha’s epistemic processes. We know that Candrakīrti has made some puzzling remarks on that score. On the one hand, he claims buddha is the (...) pramāṇabhūta-puruṣa (person of epistemic and moral authority), sarvākārajñatājñānaṃ (omniscient, wise), pratyakṣalakṣaṇam (exclusively perceptual in characteristic) [Candrakīrti (MABh VI.214)], and claims that there are clearly four pramāṇas—epistemic warrants—direct perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), testimony (āgama) and analogy (upamāna) [Candrakīrti (Pp I.3), cf. MacDonald 2015, pp. 287–288]. On the other hand, somewhat paradoxically, Candrakīrti claims that buddhahood is an embodiment of a complete cessation of “mind and mental processes” [Candrakīrti (MABh XI.1, 155a; MAB XI.17d)] Now how are we to make sense of these two seemingly contradictory statements? Do these statements reflect any deeper conflicts within Candrakīrti’s system or is there a coherent way to interpret these statements? The Tibetan Prāsaṅgika interpreters of Candrakīrti’s Madhyamaka largely agree that there is no internal contradiction in Candrakīrti’s system, and agree there is a way to make coherent sense of these statements. Nevertheless, the Tibetans exegetes bring to the table two radically conflicting proposals to approach Candrakīrti’s Mādhyamaka; both claiming to successfully address the apparent tension arising from Candrakīrti’s statements. One proposal is made by Tsongkhapa Losang Dakpa (Tsong kha pa bLo bzang grags pa, 1357–1419), who maintains the tension can be plausibly resolved by demonstrating that Candrakīrti’s unique non-foundationalist epistemological program renders him an epistemological coherentist. In contrast Taktsang Lotsawa Sherap Rinchen (sTag tshang Lo tsā ba Shes rab rin chen, 1405–1477) argues that according to Candrakīrti buddha is a global agnostic, on the ground of the nonexistence of mind and mental processes for those who have attained fully awakening. Taktsang instead proposes the no-mind thesis as a more plausible way to resolve the tension in Candrakīrti’s philosophy, categorically refusing to attribute to buddha any cognitive processes and epistemic warrants. This paper is an analysis of Taktsang’s no-mind thesis—the claim that buddhas utterly lack any knowledge of the world because they do not have epistemic processes and warrants to perceive the world—in what follows a rational reconstruction of his arguments is developed in order to evaluate his thesis. We shall then assess the implications of accepting Taktsang’s no-mind thesis. (shrink)

"In the Sanskrit name of The Diamond Sutra, vajrachedika, or 'diamond,' refers to the unbreakable foundation of self-nature inherent in the human mind; prajñā to the light of self-nature that ceaselessly surges forth from that foundation; and pāramitā to the recovery of the adamantine self-nature and actions based on that self-nature, by using its light to hone wisdom for the practice of a life without delusion." -- Back of book.

The Wu Gongan is primarily known for its minimalist expression based on Zhaozhou's “No” response to a monk's question of whether a dog has Buddha-nature. Crucial for the key-phrase method of meditation of Dahui Zonggao, the term Wu is not to be analyzed through logic or poetry. However, an overemphasis on the nondiscursive quality overlooks sophisticated rhetoric through metaphors used for the anxiety of doubt caused by Wu undermining conventional assumptions that is compared to a cornered rat; and (...) the experience of enlightenment generated by the power of Wu likened to a sword cutting through all delusions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The BuddhaTerry C. MuckWhen I think of the Buddha, the subject of my scholarly study, the picture my mind produces is soft and blurred at the edges—out of focus but not in a way that makes it difficult to see or understand. It is more in the way a photography studio uses background and light to project the subject forward. The Buddha, in my mind’s eye, seems (...) friendly, accessible. This Buddha, my Buddha, manages to combine great warmth and great mystery.By contrast, when I think of Jesus, the object of my faith, I see clearly a well-defined personality. There is no portraiture here. It is more like a candid snapshot taken by a very good camera with plenty of natural light; a great photograph, a picture that produces a clear image, in my mind at least, of a person I know and understand. It is a picture of someone walking around Palestine doing great deeds, a father to my Buddha brother—and to me.I love both the Buddha and Jesus. I have loved Jesus since early Sunday school days in Huntington, Indiana, at the Bible Baptist Church on Lake Street. I have loved the Buddha since I first began reading about him in graduate school at Northwestern University and listening to Walpola Rahula lecture about him in classes there. Both the Buddha and Jesus were great men, doing divine things that have changed the world for billions after them. The differences my mind produces are in the realm of qualities. I love them both, but I see them differently.Why the differences? I suppose one reason is that they are different. Gautama Buddha lived in sixth-century B.C.E. India where he was the son of a king, chose a life of religious itinerancy, and died of food poisoning at eighty years of age. Jesus lived in Palestine in the first century C.E. where he was the son of a carpenter, chose a life of religious itinerancy, and was crucified by the Roman authorities after being convicted on a charge of political subversion.They both chose a life of religious itinerancy, to be sure. But the meaning of each of those traveling lives has been the subject of great debate, both within and without their respective religious traditions. Disagreements abound. In fact, in one of those [End Page 105] odd quirks of human cantankerousness, the deeper one gets into each of the traditions, Buddhism and Christianity, the more diverse and passionate are the views about the Buddha and the Christ.The diversity of views deep within each tradition can be stunning to the average Buddhist and Christian on the street, who tend to have a rather homogenized view of each other—kind of a standard life story that could be easily summarized in the pages and pictures of a comic book. But deep within the traditions, Buddhists argue about Buddha nature, Buddha veneration, and the role the Buddha plays in human liberation. Christians argue about Jesus’ divine and human status, his uniqueness, and the role he plays in human salvation. One good thing about all this disagreement: it makes my musings about the Buddha and Jesus pale in comparison.Still, I would like to understand better. Why do I see the Buddha and Jesus differently?Socialization and HistorySurely the most important reason can be summarized in one word: socialization. I was raised to love Jesus, to believe in him. Here’s how I was raised to see Jesus: Jesus is God’s son, born to a woman named Mary and a man named Joseph. God sent Jesus to help human beings lost in a morass of bad deeds, psychological confusion, and social injustices. This melange of evil is so pervasive among human beings that solutions can only come from someone outside the system, willing to enter into the system and guide others out, both by what he says and by what he does—how he lives his life.What Jesus said, what Jesus did, and who Jesus was—all are unique. Others of us can try to live like Jesus—indeed, we should. But none of us, not one, can... (shrink)

Hawking, in his book, A Brief History of Time, concludes with a conditional remark: If we find a complete theory to explain the physical world, then we will come to understand God’s mind. With Goedel in mind, we can raise questions about the completeness of our scientific understanding and the nature of our understanding with regard to God’s mind. We need to ask about the higher order of our understanding when we move to knowing God’s mind. We go onto (...) develop these problems with Nietzsche’s thoughts on the death of God, and the emergence of super human intelligences. Then, we come to Buddha, a logical genius, to see how the Buddhistic enlightenment exemplifies the super human intelligence, as well as the higher order understanding in our knowledge of God’s mind. (shrink)