Zusammenfassung Der Artikel beschreibt Geschichte und Bedeutung der Tätigkeiten armenischer Orienthändler vor allem im Handel mit persischer Rohseide über den Kaspi-Wolgahandelsweg als Teil des globalen Handels- und Kommunikationsnetzwerkes der armenischen Kaufleute von Neu Julfa. Den Rahmen bilden sowohl internationale wie später auch innerarmenische Konkurrenz um das Recht auf Transithandel durch Russland sowie der Kampf russischer Kaufleute gegen die Bevorzugung der Armenier auf wirtschaftlich-rechtlichem Gebiet.

In the fifty-one years since its publication Dirac's magnetic monopole conjecture has stimulated a theoretical outpouring rich in variety. We review here the experimental techniques with which monopoles have been sought and we will describe the limits on monopole properties these searches have established.

We study the magnetic monopoles in non-Abelian gauge theories. The exact static, spherically symmetric solutions of the magnetic monopoles in both Yang-Mills and unified gauge theories are obtained. The energyE of the static system is calculable and it is either zero or infinite. The existence of the magnetic monopole solution is a consequence of symmetry rather than dynamics. We propose a new definition of the electromagnetic field tensor, which relates the static solution of gauge fields and the magnetic monopole solution. (...) Experimental implications are discussed. (shrink)

Auch in freiheitlichen Demokratien gibt es mediale Formen und Verfahren, die staatlich monopolisiert sind. Dies sind die Verfahren zur Sicherung und Stabilisierung der Echtheit von Geld und staatlichen Dokumenten, also den zentralen Medien von Ökonomie und Staat. Im Sinne einer noch zu schreibenden Mediengeschichte des Staates stellt der Aufsatz diese Formen und Verfahren der Echtheitssicherung dar und zeigt auf, wie immer wieder auf neue technologische Bedrohungen des medialen Monopols des Staates reagiert werden musste. Even in liberal democracies there are media (...) forms and procedures monopolized by the state. Such are the methods to secure and stabilize the authenticity of money and state documents, i.e. the central media of economy and the state. In terms of a media history of the state, the paper describes these forms and methods of securing authenticity and shows how the state had to respond to ever new technological threats to its media monopoly. (shrink)

Even in liberal democracies there are media forms and procedures monopolized by the state. Such are the methods to secure and stabilize the authenticity of money and state documents, i.e. the central media of economy and the state. In terms of a media history of the state, the paper describes these forms and methods of securing authenticity and shows how the state had to respond to ever new technological threats to its media monopoly.

This paper introduces and reproduces a document from Feyerabend’s Nachlass including: (i) Feyerabend’s 1967 tentative translation into English of an original German typescript reporting the lecture notes of an academic course on magnetic monopoles delivered by physicist Felix Ehrenhaft (1879-1952) at the University of Vienna in the 1947 summer semester; and (ii) Feyerabend’s memoir focusing on Ehrenhaft in postwar Vienna.In addition to making available to a larger audience Ehrenhaft’s lectures on a highly controversial topic, the publication of Feyerabend’s typescript offers (...) the opportunity to reconsider, delve deeper into and cast a brighter light on a rather neglected aspect in the growing literature on Feyerabend’s thought: the significance of Ehrenhaft for the development of Feyerabend’s intellectual biography. (shrink)

Every year our sun should be losing about 10 20 protons (about a milligram's worth) in this way. This is not much of a loss, but it is irreversible, and it adds up. In 10..

The rise of digital platforms is growingly acknowledged as a pivotal characteristic of contemporary capitalism. A subset of the literature on digital platforms scrutinized the political economy of platform companies, their data-driven business models along with the economic, social, and political consequences of platformization. Yet, this strand has been overwhelmingly interested in Big Tech companies in the United States and China. In this article, I aim to expand the geographical span of this emerging literature by scrutinizing platformization dynamics in Turkey, (...) a middle-income country that has not been systematically examined so far along these lines. To this end, I present an assessment on the overall platform landscape in Turkey by focusing on three highlight digital platforms (Trendyol, Hepsiburada, and Getir). My analysis on the trajectory of these three platforms indicates the following. First, these platforms have exhibited meteoric growth rates and have risen among the most valuable companies in Turkey in a tremendously short period of time. Second, their aggressive growth strategies based on data extraction and network externalities have led to a strong monopolization drive. Third, they have rapidly expanded into adjacent business areas, transforming themselves into infrastructural components of the domestic economy, with profound impacts on production, trade, and labor relations. Fourth, they remain dependent on the infrastructure laid by Big Techs. These findings suggest that platformization is rapidly transforming economic landscapes other than the United States and China as well, yet in an uneven and dependent form, underlining the need to broaden the geographical focus of the concerned literature. (shrink)

Resumen: El rápido avance de la digitalización y la hiperconectividad de las sociedades modernas en los últimos años ha dado lugar a la dataficación de la vida de las personas y a la revolución del big data. Estos dos fenómenos presentan un gran potencial que puede originar múltiples beneficios en multitud de aspectos de la vida de los ciudadanos, pero también hay que tener en cuenta las implicaciones y los peligros de estos. Este artículo se centra en los peligros provocados (...) por las grandes corporaciones tecnológicas del planeta, las denominadas GAFAM (Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple y Microsoft). Los procesos de extracción, almacenamiento y análisis de datos de la vida de las personas llevados a cabo por las GAFAM presentan diversas implicaciones peligrosas para los propios ciudadanos entre las que destacan la monopolización de sus datos y la perdida de privacidad. En este artículo se profundizará en estas dos amenazas. Utilizando una metodología hermenéutico-crítica basada en el análisis de fuentes bibliográficas, el objetivo de este artículo es examinar los principales riesgos de las GAFAM para la ciudadanía y proponer soluciones a estos. Abstract: The rapid advance of digitization and hyperconnectivity of modern societies has led to the datafication of people's lives and the big data revolution. These two phenomena have great potential that can cause multiple benefits in many aspects of citizens' lives, but their implications and dangers must also be considered. This article focuses on the dangers caused by the large technology corporations on the planet, the so-called GAFAM (Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple, and Microsoft). The processes of extraction, storage, and analysis of data from people's lives carried out by the GAFAM have various dangerous implications for the citizens themselves, among which stand out the monopolization of their data and the loss of privacy. This article will delve into these two threats. Using a hermeneutical-critical methodology based on the analysis of bibliographic sources, the objective of this article is to examine the main risks of GAFAM for citizens and propose solutions to them. (shrink)

Recently, there has been renewed interest in the search for low-mass magnetic monopoles. At the University of Oklahoma we are performing an experiment (Fermilab E882) using material from the old D0 and CDF detectors to set limits on the existence of Dirac monopoles of masses of the order of 500 GeV. To set such limits, estimates must be made of the production rate of such monopoles at the Tevatron collider, and of the binding strength of any such produced monopoles to (...) matter. Here we sketch the still primitive theory of such interactions, and indicate why we believe a credible limit may still be obtained. On the other hand, there have been proposals that the classic Euler–Heisenberg Lagrangian together with duality could be employed to set limits on magnetic monopoles having masses less than 1 TeV, based on virtual, rather than real processes. The D0 collaboration at Fermilab has used such a proposal to set mass limits based on the nonobservation of pairs of photons each with high transverse momentum. We critique the underlying theory, by showing that the cross section violates unitarity at the quoted limits and is unstable with respect to radiative corrections. We therefore believe that no significant limit can be obtained from the current experiments, based on virtual monopole processes. (shrink)

The energy spectrum of the bound states of the nucleon-monopole system is determined, the monopole harmonics Yq,l,m are related to Wigner's functions D m,m′ (L) of the rotation matrix, and the scattering wave functions of the proton in the dyon source field are calculated.

The paper provides an economic interpretation of legal culture. Drawing on analogies from other products and services markets, I argue that combinations of legal language, procedures and conceptual structures constitute a network which, mainly through cost considerations, come to occupy a dominant position in particular jurisdictions. The facts that a particular legal culture will be adopted by political rulers and that practising lawyers can both control entry to the profession and ‘capture’ law‐making processes suggest that legal culture networks may be (...) protected against competition. To the extent that they have monopolistic power, lawyers can exploit the key features of legal culture to extract rents: the law used can be more formalistic, more complex and more technical than is optimal. Whether the monopolistic power of a particular legal culture is sustainable depends on the relative strength of potential competitive forces. These can take the form of alternative cultures becoming available for particular branches of the law, thus partially dismantling the network, or through transfrontier transactions opening up the network to competition from foreign systems. (shrink)

In this paper, we examine the Dirac monopole in the framework of Off-Shell Electromagnetism, the five-dimensional U(1) gauge theory associated with Stueckelberg–Schrodinger relativistic quantum theory. After reviewing the Dirac model in four dimensions, we show that the structure of the five-dimensional theory prevents a natural generaliza tion of the Dirac monopole, since the theory is not symmetric under duality transforma tions. It is shown that the duality symmetry can be restored by generalizing the electromagnetic field strength to an element of (...) a Clifford algebra. Nevertheless, the generalized framework does not permit us to recover the phenomenological (or conventional) absence of magnetic monopoles. (shrink)

To monopolize the scientific data gained by Japanese physicians and researchers from vivisections and other barbarous experiments performed on living humans in biological warfare programs such as Unit 731, immediately after the war the United States government secretly granted those involved immunity from war crimes prosecution, withdrew vital information from the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, and publicly denounced otherwise irrefutable evidence from other sources such as the Russian Khabarovsk trial. Acting in “the national interest” and for the (...) security of the US, authorities in the US tramped justice and morality, and engaged in what the English common law tradition clearly defines as “complicity after the fact.” To repair this historical injustice, the US government should issue an official apology and offer appropriate compensation for having covered up Japanese medical war crimes for six decades. To help prevent similar acts of aiding principal offender in the future, international declarations or codes of human rights and medical ethics should include a clause banning any kind of complicity in any unethical medicine—whether before or after the fact—by any state or group for whatever reasons. (shrink)

Although Maxwell theory is O(3,1)-covariant, electrodynamics only transforms invariantly between Lorentz frames for special forms of the field, and the generator of Lorentz transformations is not generally conserved. Bérard, Grandati, Lages, and Mohrbach have studied the O(3) subgroup, for which they found an extension of the rotation generator that satisfies the canonical angular momentum algebra in the presence of certain Maxwell fields, and is conserved by the classical motion. The extended generator depends on the field strength, but not the potential, (...) and so is manifestly gauge invariant. The conditions imposed on the Maxwell field by the algebra lead to a Dirac monopole solution.In this paper, we study the generalization of the Bérard, Grandati, Lages and Mohrbach construction to the full Lorentz group in N dimensions. The requirements can be maximally satisfied in a three-dimensional subspace of the full Minkowski space; this subspace can be chosen to describe either an O(3)-invariant space sector, or an O(2,1)-invariant restriction of spacetime. The field solution reduces to the Dirac monopole found in the nonrelativistic case when the O(3)-invariant subspace is selected. When an O(2,1)-invariant subspace is chosen, the field strength can be associated with a Coulomb-like potential of the type A μ(x) = n μ/ρ, where ρ = (x μ x μ)1/2, similar to that used by Horwitz and Arshansky to obtain a covariant generalization of the hydrogen-like bound state. In the presence of these fields, which are determined entirely by symmetry considerations, without reference to a source equation, the extended generator is conserved under classical relativistic system evolution. (shrink)

The monopolization of our techno-scientific culture by digital information technology, the Technopoly has unintentionally resulted in the extinction of knowledge or postknowledge, by reducing knowledge to systems of symbols—formalized algorithmic hierarchies of symbol-systems without external reference; a totalistic virtuality, or real virtuality. The extinction of knowledge or post-knowledge has resulted in two mutually reinforcing situations. One situation is the rise of a new elite of technology experts. The other situation is the dummification of people. These two mutually reinforcing situations (...) further result in an illegitimate role reversal between people and their machines. The machines become treated as smart; people become treated as dummies. The role reversal of machines and people reinforces the monopoly of digital technology over everything. The monopoly of digital techno-scientific culture, the Technopoly, becomes accepted without question and without criticism. However, there is a way to retrieve knowledge, and that way is through restoring the tradition of critical discussion within all our institutions. Critical discussion can be restored by increasing democratic participation in our techno-scientific culture, which amounts to implementing a Socratic social architecture. (shrink)

This book presents the first detailed history of the modern passport and why it became so important for controlling movement in the modern world. It explores the history of passport laws, the parliamentary debates about those laws, and the social responses to their implementation. The author argues that modern nation-states and the international state system have 'monopolized the 'legitimate means of movement',' rendering persons dependent on states' authority to move about - especially, though not exclusively, across international boundaries. This new (...) edition reviews other scholarship, much of which was stimulated by the first edition, addressing the place of identification documents in contemporary life. It also updates the story of passport regulations from the publication of the first edition, which appeared just before the terrorist attacks of 9/11, to the present day. (shrink)

This is a stimulating and vivid area of philosophical research, but it has tended to monopolize the notion of 'good-for', linking it necessarily to welfare or ...

RÉSUMÉ: En excluant le monopole juridictionnel de la souveraineté afin de préserver une autorité supérieure aux souverains, Leibniz réduit celle-ci au seul monopole de la coercition. Cependant, cette redéfinition de la souveraineté place la guerre au cœur des relations internationales. Elle est, en tant que faculté, la condition de participation pour les souverains au «droit des gens», droit qui lui-même doit éviter de tellesguerres. La paix n’est donc pour Leibniz qu’au prix de l’établissement d’un équilibre entre forces contraires qui, en (...) s’opposant et si elles sont de même intensité, annulent réciproquement leurs effets. C’est cette conception dynamique de l’ordre politique que cet article se propose de traiter.ABSTRACT: This article deals with Leibniz’s dynamic conception of political order. Leibniz reduces the sovereignty of States to the monopoly of coercion by setting apart jurisdictional monopoly and sovereignty. With this new definition of sovereignty however, war becomes the core of international relations. The sovereigns’ ability to make war is the condition to take part in law of nations, whose precise aim is to prevent wars. Peace can only exist if there is a balance between opposite forces of similar magnitude that cancel each other. (shrink)

Research in the philosophy of addiction commonly explores how agency is impacted in addiction by focusing on moments of apparent loss of control over addictive behavior and seeking to explain how such moments result from the effects of psychoactive substance use on cognition and volition. Recently, Glackin et al. (2021) have suggested that agency in addiction can be helpfully analyzed using the concept of affordances. They argue that addicted agents experience addiction-related affordances, such as action possibilities relating to drugs, drug (...) paraphernalia, and drug-related activities, as aberrantly salient motivations for action. Building on this approach, we present a novel two-tiered affordance model of addiction. In doing so, we suggest that what is significant about the addicted person’s world is not simply what affordances are experienced as salient, but also the way in which the addicted person’s world is shaped by a dominant concern. It is not only that addiction-related affordances become more prominent as addiction progresses but that one’s plurality of concerns become monopolized by and funneled through addiction. Our model endorses Glackin et al.’s idea that addiction-related affordances become aberrantly salient, while proposing why they become and remain so. This way of viewing agency in addiction also brings to light important implications for recovery and treatment. For, if an addicted person adopts a new, even “socially approved”, dominant concern, there is a risk that the shape of addiction is preserved, even though the content changes, leaving an individual at the risk of addiction substitution or relapse. (shrink)

Abstract“Science Is Politics By Other Means” (SIPBOM) was coined in The Pasteurization of France, Latour’s 1984 empirical study of the birth of microbiology. Yet, it encapsulates an outstanding political theory of science that Latour has never formalized and that has remained unnoticed to this day. The theory is comprised of two dimensions. The first one is the ontological labor performed by science, that is, the laboratory production of new nonhumans. The second one is the ability of science to devise and (...) implement novel policies targeted at the new beings it produces. These “other means” are incorporated in political projects and contribute to the shaping of society. Fifteen years later, Latour published Politics of Nature ([1999] 2004), a full-blown political treatise equally devoted to the political character of science. It would be mistaken, however, to assume that it falls in the same SIPBOM paradigm as the Pasteur study. The compositionist theory it offers redefines politics as the institution of the nonhumans that make up external reality, a task that has traditionally been monopolized by Science. In this sense, “science is politics by other means” has become “politics is science by other means,” these “other means” now referring to “cosmopolitics,” that is, the due process advocated by compositionism. The first claim of the present paper is that the respective weight ascribed to politics and ontology is different in The Pasteurization of France and in Politics of Nature. The second claim is that compositionism is not as successful as Latour’s early theory to account for the politicity of science. (shrink)

la 4e de couverture indique : "Nietzsche demandait : pourquoi avons-nous voulu le vrai plutôt que le non-vrai (ou l'incertitude ou l'ignorance)? La question se voudrait radicale, et même la plus radicale, mais elle est encore conçue du dedans de la tradition européenne, bien que la prenant à revers : elle ose toucher à la valeur de la vérité, mais sans sortir de sa référence : elle ne remet pas en question le monopole que la vérité à fait à la (...) pensée. Du point de vue de la sagesse, la question deviendrait : comme a-t-on pu - et fallait-il? - faire une " fixation " sur la vérité? Et si, au lieu que ce soit la sagesse qui n'aurait pas accédé a la philosophie qui, en Grèce, en se braquant sur le vrai, avait dérapé hors de la sagesse? Car si le sage est " sans idée ", comme il est dit le Confucius, c'est que toute idée avancée est déjà un parti pris sur la réalité. Aussi, en partant sur les traces estompées de la sagesse, souhaité-je revenir sur ce qui a pu échapper à la philosophie ; comme redonner consistance à son autre enfoui, expliciter sa cohérence. Autrement dit, que faisons-nous aujourd'hui de la sagesse? Et que peut être une logique de la sagesse - une " logique " sans logos?". (shrink)

Issues of identity and reduction have monopolized much of the philosopher of mind’s time over the past several decades. Interestingly, while investigations of these topics have proceeded at a steady rate, the motivations for doing so have shifted. When the early identity theorists, e.g. U. T. Place ( 1956 ), Herbert Feigl ( 1958 ), and J. J. C. Smart ( 1959 , 1961 ), fi rst gave voice to the idea that mental events might be identical to brain processes, (...) they had as their intended foil the view that minds are immaterial substances. But very few philosophers of mind today take this proposal seriously. Why, then, the continued interest in identity and reduction? Th e concern, as philosophers like Hilary Putnam and Jerry Fodor have expressed it, is that a victory for identity or reduction is a defeat for psychology. For if minds are physical, or if mental events are physical events, then psychologists might as well disassemble their laboratories, making room for the neuroscientists and molecular biologists who are in a better position to explain those phenomena once misdescribed as “psychological.” Th e worry nowadays is not that locating thought in immaterial souls will make psychology intractable, but that locating thoughts in material brains will make it otiose. (shrink)

Si Pierre Bourdieu condamne les sociologies qui ramènent tout à l'économie, il a lui-même un vocabulaire théorique qui semble dériver de l'économie. Comment expliquer ce paradoxe? Cet ouvrage mène l'enquête et s'interroge philosophiquement sur le sens qu'il convient de donner, dans son corpus, au concept d'économie. Nous tentons alors de redéfinir une constellation de notions que l'on réserve généralement à la discipline économique standard. La valeur, l'échange, l'intérêt, l'investissement, le capital ou encore le crédit ont des significations élargies sur lesquelles (...) nous nous proposons de réfléchir afin de lever les équivoques propres à la pensée de Bourdieu. Mais ce livre a également une ambition critique. Nous aimerions montrer que les économistes usuels doivent abandonner leur prétention au monopole sur ce lexique. Ils ne l'appréhendent en réalité que dans une sphère restreinte de pratiques, qui doit être de nouveau articulée à une économie symbolique étendue."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Ex interiore ipso exeas. Preface. This book reconstructs the history of a still open dialectics between several ethoi, that is, shared codes of unwritten rules, moral traditions, or self-aware attempts at reforming such codes, and ethical theories discussing the nature and justification of such codes and doctrines. Its main claim is that this history neither amounts to a triumphal march of reason dispelling the mist of myth and bigotry nor to some other one-way process heading to some pre-established goal, but (...) instead to a chain of controversies where the partners’ will to win unintentionally yields a wealth of insights on human existence that has still something to teach us. -/- 1. The Hellenic moral tradition. -/- Two different traditions of morality in vi-v century Greece are described. The birth of philosophical questioning of traditional morality and temporal and spatial variation of custom is described within the context of the v century crisis, the demise of traditional aristocratic and tyrannical rule and the birth of democracy. Two conflicting answers to the challenge are reconstructed, namely conventionalist or immoralist theories formulated by the Sophists and the eudemonist and intellectualist Socratic theory. -/- 2. Plato and the Good. -/- Plato’s own reformulation of Socrates rejoinder to the Sophists is reconstructed. His psychological views, his classification of the four cardinal virtues and his political theory are described as parts of a unitary system, culminating in an extremely realist moral ontology identifying the idea of the good with the essence of the (moral and extra-moral) world itself. -/- 3. Aristotle and practical philosophy. -/- Aristotle’s invention of practical philosophy as a field separated from first philosophy is shown to be an implication of his break with Plato moral ultra-realism. Aristotle’s agenda in his moral works is arguably dependent on a polemical intention, namely dismantling Socratic intellectualism. The semi-inductive or virtuously circular method of practical philosophy is illustrated, starting with the received opinions of the better and wiser individuals and trying dialectically to sift what is left of mistake and inconsistency in such opinions, finally trying to correct mistakes and make the overall practical science more consistent. The relationship of individual ethics, or ‘monastics’, with the art and the science of the pater families, or ‘economics’, and the science of the ruler and citizen, or politics, is illustrated. The nature of virtues, or better, excellences of character, is discussed, highlighting the basic role of hexes, or ‘dispositions’. Prudence, or better, practical wisdom, is the focus of the chapter. Its relationship with boùleusis or deliberation is discussed, and its autonomous status vis-à-vis theoretical knowledge is stressed. -/- 4. Cynics and Stoics: ethics as therapy. -/- The chapter provides an overview of Hellenistic ethics, which almost amounts to Hellenistic schools of philosophy, in so far as ‘philosophy’ became in these centuries primarily the name for a way of life. The typical character of the Cynical movement is highlighted, that of a school of life, not a school aimed at providing any kind of intellectual training was to be provided. The various phases of Stoicism are described, and the shifting place that was given to ethics in the Stoic system of idea, culminating in the paradoxical view of ethics, its impossibility in principle notwithstanding, as the only truly significant and necessary part of philosophy. The peculiar character of the Epicurean school is described, a combination of the science of well-being aiming, more than pleasure understood as in the popular view, the reduction of useless suffering, of unnecessary needs, and at a balanced selection of pleasures of the best and most durable kind. -/- 5. Roman and Imperial Moralists. -/- The chapter is dedicated to the reconstruction of a particular kind of literature, whose specific features have long been under-stressed, namely the Roman and Imperial moral literature. Cicero is treated at some length, showing how his own synthesis of various Hellenistic trends is as a truly philosophical enterprise, deserving serious consideration after one or two centuries when he was confined to the role of literate. Epictetus is given pride of place, stressing the novelty of his approach to ethics as cognitive therapy, in this case just following an already existing new wave of interest after nineteenth-century oblivion justified by alleged lack of authentic ‘philosophical’ character. -/- 6. The Hebrew moral tradition. -/- A reconstruction of basic ideas from a few books of the Hebrew Bible is provided, starting with the Prophetic tradition and the focus on God’s mercy as the source of motivation and standard for human behaviour. Then a comparative analysis is undertaken of a parallel tradition, namely the three codifications of the Torah (Law or, better, Instruction), highlighting how a core of moral ideas may be recognized as a basis and preamble of codification of civil law, cultural practice, and regulation of ritual purity. The importance of Levitic is stressed as the turning point when the stress on mercy, typical of the Prophetic tradition, starts being combined with legal tradition yielding the change in the sensibility of the Second Temple time. -/- 7. Second Temple Judaism. -/- This chapter describes the Long March leading from the post-exile Zadokite restoration to the first-century aevi vulgaris. The first topic reconstructed is the Zadokite theology of the double retribution. The second is the alternative Enochic tradition consistently rejecting the central role of the Temple, the Priesthood and worship as atonement for sins and offering as an alternative God’s unlimited mercy and preaching mercy, not sacrifice as the way of behaving requested by God. Wisdom literature, the third subject discusses, is a kind of third way, on the one hand increasingly critical towards the double retribution and ruling theology’s optimism facing the world as it is and on the other mocking at the Enochic current as a band of dreamers and visionaries. The third way consists in disenchantment facing the word as it is combined with a refusal of vain and childish hope of prizes for the righteous, suggesting instead the leading idea of right deeds for righteousness’s sake. Rabbi Hillel, Rabbi Yeshua and Philo of Alexandria are described as the three leading figures at the culminating point of such process of emergence of a new sensibility, gradually including mercy as an essential part of justice and establishing the starting point of both the Rabbinic and the Christian tradition. This starting point consists precisely in the precept of one’s neighbour’s love or of the golden rule, whose meaning is, arguably, more consistent than a long-lasting Christian tradition deriving from John and Augustine made us believe. And Christian morality, vis-à-vis allegedly legalist ‘Ancient Testament’ teachings, is less of a novelty than most early Christian writers announced. -/- 8. Talmudic moral doctrines and proto-Christian paraenesis. -/- The first three sections examine the moral doctrines of so-called 'ethical Treaties' from the Talmud, a group of treaties, among which the best known is Pirke Avot, that were left out of the six "orders" of the canon as they did not fit in any of the six groups of issues ritual or legal on which the division was based. According to Maimonides, their peculiar theme is provided by the Deot, 'opinions', i.e., mental dispositions, that is, the translation of the Greek term hexes and Arab akhlak (in turn providing in this language the name for ethics as such). The three topics I reconstruct are: i) the notion of Torah: The Torah is understood as the world order itself, or as the ‘Wisdom’ that existed even before creation and was "the tool by which the world was built"; however, the Torah is an earthly and human entity, as it was "received" by humans, and from that very moment belongs to them; ii) the relationship between love of God and love of neighbour; the treaties require us to study and practice the Torah ‘for its own sake’, that is, require us to act out of love, not out of fear or hope of reward; iii) the idea of sanctification of daily life: having disappeared with the destruction of the Temple the possibility of any conflict between liturgical service and everyday life, the latter is assumed to be in itself divine service: to give food to the poor has the same value as sacrifices in the Temple, and as an implication, the insistence become recurrent on the goodness of created things in themselves along with a polemic against ascetic currents. The conclusions drawn are: i) the moral teachings of the Talmud and those of Yeshua are, rather than similar, virtually identical; one may safely say that the precept of love and the golden rule are central ones for all Talmudic rabbis, that mercy plays an indispensable role alongside with justice, and the latter is not a different thing from one’s neighbour’s love; ii) a peculiarity of Talmud rabbis facing Yeshua is the idea of study as worship, and knowledge as a source of justice; but this is an idea of Judaism after the Temple's destruction that cannot be attributed to the Pharisees of Yeshua’s time; iii) the relation of study and practice in the Talmud parallels that between faith and deeds in Paul's epistles, that is, respectively faith or learning are a necessary and sufficient condition to be recognized as righteous, but deeds are the inevitable effect of either faith or learning. The last two sections examine first the various Christian currents and then Gnostic para-Christian or non-Christian currents as well as Manicheism. The sayings ascribed to Yeshua are examined first, yielding the conclusion that a close equivalent may be found for every saying in Talmudic literature and yet the whole is ascribed to one rabbi, with rather consistent stress on God’s mercy and unconditional forgiving as the mark of true imitation of God. Thus, Yeshua’s teaching is pure, purest Judaism. The last section describes briefly the galaxy of Gnostic currents and Manicheism, trying to sketch the profile of moral teachings resulting from an encounter of Asian spiritual traditions, Hellenistic lore and sparks of teachings from apocalyptic Jewish currents. -/- 9. Christianity as “philosophy”. -/- The chapter reconstructs the stormy story of several encounters between Christian currents and Hellenistic philosophical schools. The first one was with late Cynicism. Recent, rather controversial, literature discovered the jargon and several rhetorical topics from the Stoic and Cynical popular philosophy in a few books from the New Testament itself. This, far from proving that Rabbi Yeshua himself had been influenced by cynical preachers, is a proof of the necessity to translate the original Christian message in a Greek lexicon deeply impregnated with cynic terminology. The second was with Platonism, yielding the mild and temperate moral teaching of Clemens of Alexandria, teaching the sanctity of nature and the human body, the joy of moderate fruition of ‘natural’ kinds of pleasures, and the beauty of the marital life – in short, the opposite of the standard picture of Medieval Christianity. Ambrose of Milan brings about a different kind of synthesis, namely with Middle Platonism, where Stoic themes prevail. The most shocking case is Augustine, where early Manichean education is overcome in a former phase by a synthesis of Plotinian Neo-Platonism and Christian preaching, yielding a sustained polemic with the Manicheans and rather optimistic views on life and Creation, the body and sexuality, and Hebrew-Judaic tradition not far from Clemens of Alexandria. In a later phase, occasioned by controversy on the opposite front, with such Christian currents as the Pelagians and Donatists, Augustine comes back to heavily anti-Judaic and world-denying ascetic attitudes where is earlier Manichean upbringing seems to emerge again. The tragedy of medieval Christianity will be the later Augustine’s overwhelming influence. A final section is dedicated to the monastic tradition where a curious mixture of world-denying asceticism with an astonishingly penetrating ‘science’ of introspection emerges. -/- 10. Ethics in the Arabic-Islamic Philosophy. -/- The Qurān and the qadit, that is, collections of sayings ascribed to the prophet Muhammad contain a wealth of precepts and catalogues of virtues mirroring moral contents from the Jewish and the Christian traditions, among them the basic notion of imitation of the Deity, where mercy is assumed to be its basic trait. An important tradition within Islam, namely Sufism, stressed to the utmost degree the role of mercy, turning Islam into a mystic doctrine centred on the retreat from the world, abandonment to God’s will, and a peaceful and fraternal attitude to our fellow-beings. A secular literary tradition originating in the Sassanid Empire, the literature of advice to the Prince, had for a time a widespread influence in the newly constituted Arabic-Islamic commonwealth. In a later phase, the legacy of Hellenic philosophy made its way into the intellectual elite of the Islamic world. The first important legacy was Platonic, and the Republic became the main text for Islamic Platonism. In a second phase also Aristotelian and Stoic influence were assimilated. Miskawayh’s treatise was the masterwork at the time Arabic philosophy reached its Zenith. It is a treatment of the soul’s diseases and their remedies, combining the Aristotelian doctrine of the golden mean with the Stoic doctrine of the passions and elements of Galenic medicine. Towards the eleventh-twelve centuries, a war raged among theologians and philosophers, finally won by the former with the disappearance of philosophy as such. The newly established mainstream, yet, was no kind of intolerant fanaticism. It drew from the work of mystic theologian Al-Ghazālī, the best heir of Sufism, teaching a tolerant and peaceful attitude to our fellow-beings and a passive attitude to destiny as an expression of the Divine will. -/- 11. Ethics in the Jewish philosophy. -/- The encounter between the Talmudic tradition and Hellenic philosophy had taken place for the first time in Alexandria at the time of Philo but the two traditions had parted way again. In fact, the kind of Platonic Judaism founded by Philo survived only within Christianity, in the fourth Gospel and then in writings by Clemens of Alexandria. The Talmudic literature had absorbed too a few traits from the Hellenic Philosophy, namely an idea of ethics as care of the self and a role for the education of character as propaedeutic to theoretical knowledge. In the Arabic-Islamic world, a second round started when Jewish authors writing in Arabic undertook the task to prove the full compatibility of the tradition deriving from Tora and Platonic philosophy. The culmination of this attempt is provided by Moshe ben Maimon who tried to use Aristotelian ethics as a language into which the teaching from the Pirke Avot could be translated. -/- 12. The practical philosophy revival in Latin Europe. -/- A reconstruction is carried out of a fresh start of philosophical ethics in Latin Europe at the turn of the Millennium rescuing a Platonic and Augustinian legacy, with Anselm and Peter Abelard. In this phase remarkable innovations are introduced, including Abelard’s claim of the obliging character of erring consciousness. In a second phase, the rediscovery of Nicomachean Ethics thanks to Latin translation of Arabic versions, gives birth to a new wave of ethical studies, recovering the very idea of Aristotelian practical philosophy, with the potential implication of a full legitimization of natural morality, i.e. ethics without Revelation. -/- 13. Scholastic practical philosophy: Thomas Aquinas. -/- Aquinas’s ethics is theological ethics out of which it would be vain to try to extract self-contained philosophical ethics. His treatment of topics in philosophical ethics, yet, does not boil down to the repetition of Aristotelian arguments but is rather a creative reshaping of such arguments. For example, he introduces also in the practical philosophy a first principle parallel to the principle of non-contradiction; and he also carries out a synthesis of Aristotelianism, Stoicism, neo-Platonism. Even though it is essentially moral theology, Aquinas’s doctrine - unlike Augustine – grants full citizenship to "natural" morality, firstly by rejecting the claim that the corruption of human nature due to the original sin is so radical as to leave pure nature incapable of moral goodness. The doctrine is presented in a more sophisticated formulation in a few of the Quaestiones such as De Malo and De Veritate, in the Summa contra Gentes and in the commentaries to Aristotle than in the famous Summa Theologica, but the latter work includes the only or the largest exposition of some decisive part of the theory. Thus, the Summa Theologica should be read for what it is more than criticized for not being what it was not meant to be. It was not meant to be the brilliant synthesis of all that Reason he had been able to produce with what Revelation had added about which the Neo-Thomists used to dream, but rather a manual for the training of preachers and confessors, where theoretical claims are not too ambitious, and a few serious tensions are left. Besides a jump between the Prima Secundae and the Secunda Secundae, being the former an essay in virtue theory and the latter a handbook for confessors, the most serious tension is perhaps the one between the ethics of right reason presented in most of Prima Secundae and the eudemonistic ethics developed in quaestiones 1-5 of the same part; the alternative ethical theory which also may be found in Augustine, the Stoic view of a cosmic reason eventually coincident with the moral law, was believed by Anselm (followed by John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham) to be incompatible with eudemonism. It is questionable whether Thomas was able to solve the tension proving that it is just an apparent tension, in so far as the right reason and bliss derived from the knowledge of God tend to coincide, but this is just a conjecture. Thomas’s ethics is a virtue ethics, not a law-based one, and moral judgment focuses on the virtues, particularly charity, not on the commandments and even less on absolute prohibitions; Thomas, however, would not have considered a drastic alternative between law and the virtues such as the one which has been advanced in late twentieth-century philosophy to be justified. Nonetheless, when it discusses ‘special’ virtues, it ceases to be an ethics of virtue and becomes a disappointing and often contradictory discussion of legal and illegal acts. Such a discussion takes most of the time ‘reasonable’ middle positions on controversial issues but not the alternative approach that Aristotelianism would have made possible; even when some occasional Aristotelian claim shows up, such as money’s barrenness as a reason against usury, this seems to be made by an author who apparently ignores the Aristotelian Thomas of the Prima Secundae. It is an ethic of human autonomy which recognizes the binding character of the individual conscience and, potentially, even a duty to disobey unjust laws. It is true that what Thomas writes in his discussion of the death penalty and persecution of heretics is simply disgusting, and yet we should blame Thomas the man, not the Thomist ethical theory. Finally, Thomas’s ethics is no way an ethical ‘absolutism’, as both the traditionalist Catholic theologians and secularists tend to believe, but rather an ethic of prudential judgment on the individual case. Exceptions to this approach – or better the result of logical fallacies – are provided by the thesis of the absolute character of negative precepts and of the existence of so-called intrinsically evil acts, a thesis that would simply cease to make sense in the light of Thomas’s own distinction between human act and natural act, carrying consequences that Thomas did not live long enough to draw. -/- 14. Scholastic practical philosophy: John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham. A reconstruction is carried out of the ethical doctrines by both most authoritative Franciscan doctors. Their continuity with Aquinas is vindicated against prejudice carried by centuries of polemics within the Catholic Church and tendentious disparaging of both as forerunners of execrable Reformation. Besides aspects of continuity, also the important novelties are illustrated, first John’s abandonment of Aquinas’s and Augustine’s eudemonism, asserting righteousness for righteousness’s sake, and then William’s explicit defence of the philosopher’s virtues, that is, natural morality, and his solution to the dilemma of God’s omnipotence and the universal validity of natural law extending to God himself. -/- 15. Aristotelianism interpreted by the Magistri Artium. -/- A reconstruction of the until recently forgotten ethical doctrines by the Parisian Magistri Artium, falsely depicted as ‘Averroists’ and either deprecated as heretics or mistaken for predecessors of modern secularism. In fact, they illustrate a view of ‘natural’ virtue as may be understood by human reason without the assistance by Revelation. -/- Etiamsi daremus Deum non esse. Intermediate considerations. Three considerations may be suggested by the story told in the book. The first one is that intellectual histories have been mounted in the past with the same state of mind as one may mount a war chariot. Such constructions are not very helpful as tools for understanding the past. Wars waged in the past have left the field obstructed by ruins not easy to remove even by those historians who have animated by an impartial academic motivation. They have been influenced too by consequences of past emphasis on some authors and damnatio capitis suffered by others, by stratifications left on sources by secondary literature and translations, by allotment of originally close sources to different literary genres, by the monopolization of religious texts by churches with full cooperation by secular scholars who still fear contamination. The second one is that aware or unaware ethnocentrism has carried various calamities to our comprehension of the past. Their last vestiges have surfaced again in the semi-scholarly discussion on the idea of Europe occasioned by the debate on a project of a European Constitution. Mention of Europe’s Christian roots has been the clumsiest move. Proclamations of such roots were so obvious in what they affirmed as they were totally off-path concerning what they omitted, namely that he modern European moral tradition included legacies from Middle-Eastern wisdom, Hellenic philosophy, Roman Imperial legal literature, and, besides, a Jewish legacy in turn incorporating other more ancient Middle-Eastern legacies and which has been partly conveyed by Christianity. And the Islamic-Arabic philosophy too, in so far it made the Nicomachean Ethics available to Latin Christian scholars, is one more of Europe’s roots. The third is that religious traditionalists and secularist fundamentalists have gone hand in hand for a couple of centuries in either extolling or deprecating the allegedly Modern idea of Ethics without God, first formulated by Hugo Grotius with the claim that natural law would still be valid ‘etiamsi daremus – quod sine summo scelere dari potest – Deum non esse’. The facts are, firstly, that this is not an irreligious claim and Grotius was just a pious and meek Christian and, secondly, that it is not a ‘modern’ claim but rather one more formulation of the claim that there is a natural morality, independent of divine revelation, a claim shared by Moshe ben Maimon, Aquinas and William of Ockham. -/- . (shrink)

Le présent essai porte sur la question de la place de la critique des religions en philosophie et dans l'espace public. C'est une discussion franche avec des philosophes québécois qui défendent la liberté de religion comme si cette liberté était la forme exemplaire des libertés fondamentales d'une société démocratique. Les croyances religieuses échappent-elles à la science? Est-il vraiment rationnel de croire que la nature est l'œuvre d'une intelligence surnaturelle? Pourquoi la croyance religieuse est-elle érigée en norme? Quelle est la place (...) de la religion à l'école? Peut-on dissocier la morale de la religion? Sans aller jusqu'à conclure que les religions doivent être éliminées ou que la science détient le monopole de la vérité, il ressort de cette analyse rigoureuse que l'attitude de traitement préférentiel des religions est injuste envers les non-croyants et qu'elle est en bonne partie la cause de la querelle sur la laïcité. " La position que défend ici Doyon est somme toute pérenne : sans aller jusqu'à remonter à Lucrèce et à quelques autres auteurs de l'Antiquité, elle est nettement celle qui se déploie à partir du Siècle des Lumières, et que diversement et de manière complémentaire formulent en France des gens comme Condorcet, D'Holbach, Buisson et d'autres. L'incontournable question que nous laisse ce bel ouvrage est dès lors de savoir s'il faut modifier cette position canonique ou si ce n'est pas plutôt pour s'en être éloigné que nous faisons aujourd'hui face aux difficultés qui sont les nôtres." – Normand Baillargeon, extrait de la préface. (shrink)

Penser la démocratie sans demos implique de dénouer le lien solidement établi au XIXe siècle entre les concepts de démocratie et de souveraineté du peuple. A cela, la mondialisation contemporaine ne cesse de nous inciter. Le procès continu de démocratisation de l'Etat moderne a été rendu possible par l'individualisation du sujet de droit, elle-même résultat de la destruction des droits particuliers des sociétés d'Ancien Régime par l'action centralisatrice d'un pouvoir de type territorial. Mais, en s'imposant comme la seule instance garante (...) des droits, l'Etat moderne a aussi nationalisé la citoyenneté. Or, il est certain qu'aujourd'hui l'érosion du monopole juridique et judiciaire de l'Etat s'accompagne d'une multiplication et d'une hétérogénéité croissantes des pouvoirs auxquels les individus peuvent et doivent s'adresser pour obtenir la reconnaissance et la garantie des droits qu'ils revendiquent. Cette situation nous fait obligation de dénationaliser la citoyenneté sans sacrifier pour autant cette forme spécifique de subjectivité politique qu'est l'individu sujet de droits, sans renoncer par conséquent aux ressources émancipatrices dont cette figure du sujet politique a fait la preuve au cours des deux derniers siècles. (shrink)

Inspired by Weber’s charismatic carrier groups, Eisenstadt coined the term institutional entrepreneur to capture the rare but epochal collective capable of reorienting a group’s value-orientations and transferring charisma, while making them an evolutionary force of structural and cultural change. As a corrective to Parsons’ abstract, ‘top-down’ theory of change, Eisenstadt’s theory provided historical context and agency to moments in which societies experienced qualitative transformation. The concept has become central to new institutionalism, neo-functionalism, and evolutionary-institutionalism. Drawing from the former two, a (...) more robust theory of institutional entrepreneurship from an evolutionary-institutionalist’s perspective is posited. In essence, entrepreneurs formulate institutional projects with dual logic: a collective side focused on innovation where efforts are directed towards organizational symbolic mechanisms of integration and a self-interested side directed towards resource independence, monopolization, mobility, and power-dependence. While outcomes vary based on numerous environmental factors, success leads to greater structural/symbolic independence and ability to reconfigure physical-temporal-social-symbolic space. (shrink)

This paper endeavors to appraise scholarly works from the 1940s to the contemporary era, examining the scientific quest to transpose human cognition and consciousness into a digital surrogate, while contemplating the potential ramifications should humanity attain such an abstract level of intellect. The discourse commences with an explication of theories concerning consciousness, progressing to the Turing Test apparatus, and intersecting with Damasio’s research on the human cerebrum, particularly in relation to consciousness, thereby establishing congruence between the Turing Test and Damasio’s (...) notions of consciousness. Subsequently, the narrative traverses the evolutionary chronology of transmuting human cognition into machine sapience, and delves into the fervent endeavors to metamorphose human minds into synthetic counterparts. Additionally, theoretical perspectives from the domains of philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience provide insight into the constraints intrinsic to AI implementations, contentious hypotheses, the perils concealed within artificial networks, and the ethical considerations necessitated by AI frameworks. Furthermore, contemplation of prospective repercussions facilitates the refinement of strategic approaches to safeguard our future Augmented Age Realities within AI, circumventing the prospect of inhabiting an intimidating technopolis where a mere 30% monopolize the intellect and ingenuity of the remaining 70% of human minds. (shrink)

This paper makes a conceptual inquiry into the notion of ‘publics’, and forwards an understanding of this notion that allows more responsible forms of decision-making with regards to technologies that have localized impacts, such as wind parks, hydrogen stations or flood barriers. The outcome of this inquiry is that the acceptability of a decision is to be assessed by a plurality of ‘publics’, including that of a local community. Even though a plurality of ‘publics’ might create competing normative demands, its (...) acknowledgment is necessary to withstand the monopolization of the process of technology appraisal. The paper presents four ways in which such an appropriation of publicness takes place. The creation of dedicated ‘local publics’, in contrast, helps to overcome these problems and allows for more responsible forms of decision-making. We describe ‘local publics’ as those in which stakeholders from the different publics that are related to the process of technology implementation are brought together, and in which concerns and issues from these publics are deliberated upon. The paper will present eight conditions for increasing the effectiveness of such ‘local publics’. (shrink)

A widely shared view in the cognitive sciences is that discovering and assessing explanations of cognitive phenomena whose production involves uncertainty should be done in a Bayesian framework. One assumption supporting this modelling choice is that Bayes provides the best approach for representing uncertainty. However, it is unclear that Bayes possesses special epistemic virtues over alternative modelling frameworks, since a systematic comparison has yet to be attempted. Currently, it is then premature to assert that cognitive phenomena involving uncertainty are best (...) explained within the Bayesian framework. As a forewarning, progress in cognitive science may be hindered if too many scientists continue to focus their efforts on Bayesian modelling, which risks to monopolize scientific resources that may be better allocated to alternative approaches. (shrink)

The primary goal of this paper is to provide substantial motivation for exploring an Acquaintance account of phenomenal consciousness, on which what fundamentally explains phenomenal consciousness is the relation of acquaintance. Its secondary goal is to take a few steps towards such an account. Roughly, my argument proceeds as follows. Motivated by prioritizing naturalization, the debate about the nature of phenomenal consciousness has been almost monopolized by representational theories. Among them, Self-Representationalism is by far the most antecedently promising. However, on (...) thorough inspection, Self-Representationalism turns out not explanatorily or theoretically better than the Acquaintance account. Indeed, the latter seems to be superior in at least some important respects. Therefore, at the very least, there are good reasons to take the Acquaintance account into serious consideration as an alternative to representational theories. The positive contribution of this paper is a sketch of an account of consciousness on which phenomenal consciousness is explained partly in representationalist terms, but where a crucial role is played by the relation of acquaintance. (shrink)

The ArgumentThis essay describes the emergence and stabilization in French and English experimental accounts, in second half of the seventeenth century, of the narrative sequence: X did (some process in the laboratory) and X saw (something happen), where X stands for a pronoun, I or we in English,je, nousoronin French. Focussing on the French case, it shows how the use of the collective pronounonin the experimental accounts registered in the files of the Académie des Sciences is directly related to the (...) will of this newly created institution to assert a collective authority on the production and legitimization of experimental matters-of-fact produced in the laboratory. It is argued, through the case of the discovery of the blind spot in the eye by Mariotte, that this new narrative form imbeds a construal of the experiment as a public spectacle, and of the proof as a witnessing event, which eludes the Academy's attempts to monopolize the process of fact validation and favors the diffusion and display of experiments in front of larger audiences. The question of whether a privileged witness such as the King of France who patronized the Academy could not have constituted by himself a suitable audience to ensure a full legitimization of experimental matters-of-fact while remaning within the bounds of academic practices is addressed. It is answered in the negative by providing evidence for the lack of interest of the absolute monarch in experiments. On the other hand, the outdoor practices of observation and measurement are shown to interfere in a constructive manner with the absolutist power and to capture the attention of the absolutist monarch, where laboratory experiments had failed. It is proposed that natural philosophers in the early modern period bear the burden of proof in buying credibility for the phenomena they try, by paying a tribute to the standing of the patrician elites that witness their experiments. This makes sense in a straightforward manner of the lack of interest of the King of France in a practice which exalts the power of the very group he is trying hard to control through the absolutist structure of power. (shrink)

From seed to table, the food chain is gendered. When seeds and food are in women’s hands, seeds reproduce and multiply freely, food is shared freely and respected. However, women’s seed and food economy has been discounted as “productive work.” Women’s seed and food knowledge has been discounted as knowledge. Globalization has led to the transfer of seed and food from women’s hands to corporate hands. Seed is now patented and genetically engineered. It is treated as the creation and “property” (...) of corporations like Monsanto. Renewable seed becomes nonrenewable. Sharing and saving seed becomes a crime. Diversity, nourished by centuries of women’s breeding, disappears, and with it the culture and natural evolution that is embodied in the diversity is lost forever. Food, too, is transformed in corporate hands. It is no longer our nourishment; it becomes a commodity. And as a commodity it can be manipulated and monopolized. If food grain makes more money as cattle feed than it does as food for human consumption, it becomes cattle feed. If food grain converted to biofuel to run automobiles is more profitable, it becomes ethanol and biodiesel. (shrink)

Drawing on an analysis of German national cybersecurity policy, this paper argues that cybersecurity has become a key site in which states mobilize science and technology to produce state power. Contributing to science and technology studies work on technoscience and statecraft, I develop the concepts of “territorialization projects” and “digital territory” to capture how the production of state power in the digital age increasingly relies on technoscientific expertise about information infrastructure, shifting tasks of government into the domain of computer scientists (...) and network engineers. The notion of territorialization projects describes states’ ongoing struggle to mobilize science and engineering in order to transform globally distributed information infrastructure into bounded national territory and invest it with patriotic meaning: making digital territory. Digital territory, in other words, is nationalized information infrastructure: it includes building and monopolizing infrastructure as well as normative ideas about nation—who is a digital citizen, and who isn’t; or what constitutes “good” and “bad” digital citizens. Nationalizing information infrastructure and placing statecraft into the hands of scientists and engineers might indicate an emerging form of “techno-nationalism”—a combination of nationalist and technocratic tendencies—raising urgent questions for STS scholarship to investigate the consequences of territorialization projects for justice, democracy, and civic life. (shrink)