A number of recent studies have documented rapid changes in behavioural sensory acuity induced by aversive learning in the olfactory and auditory modalities. The effect of aversive learning on the discrimination of low-level features in the visual system of humans remains unclear. Here, we used a psychophysical staircase procedure to estimate discrimination thresholds for oriented grating stimuli, before and after differential aversive learning. We discovered that when a target grating orientation was conditioned with an aversive loud noise, it subsequently led (...) to an improvement of discrimination acuity in nearly all subjects. However, no such change was observed in a control group conditioned to an orientation shifted by ±90° from the target. Our findings cannot be explained by contextual learning or sensitisation factors. The results converge with those reported in the olfactory modality and provide further evidence that early sensory systems can be rapidly modified by recently experienced reinforcement histories. (shrink)

In vowel discrimination, commonly found discrimination patterns are directional asymmetries where discrimination is faster if differing vowels are presented in a certain sequence compared to the reversed sequence. Different models of speech sound processing try to account for these asymmetries based on either phonetic or phonological properties. In this study, we tested and compared two of those often-discussed models, namely the Featurally Underspecified Lexicon model and the Natural Referent Vowel framework. While most studies presented isolated vowels, we investigated a large (...) stimulus set of German vowels in a more naturalistic setting within minimal pairs. We conducted an mismatch negativity study in a passive and a reaction time study in an active oddball paradigm. In both data sets, we found directional asymmetries that can be explained by either phonological or phonetic theories. While behaviorally, the vowel discrimination was based on phonological properties, both tested models failed to explain the found neural patterns comprehensively. Therefore, we additionally examined the influence of a variety of articulatory, acoustical, and lexical factors but also the influence of factors beyond the well-known in depth via multiple regression analyses. The analyses revealed that the perceptual factor of perceived loudness has a greater impact than considered in the literature and should be taken stronger into consideration when analyzing preattentive natural vowel processing. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:IntroductionCynthia B. CohenThe explosion of genetic information in recent years raises a fundamental question for us as individuals and as members of various communities: Have we an obligation to know as much as possible about our genes—or should we bypass genetic information, leaving it hidden? A terrible ambivalence grips us when it comes to our genes. We want to respond to the Socratic call to know ourselves by learning (...) what lies on the minute threads of the chromosomes spun into the nuclei of our cells. At the same time, we fear obtaining that information, for it seems functionally equivalent to the oracle at Delphi, revealing a distinct and dangerous knowledge we would rather not have.What is it about genetic knowledge that creates such ambivalence in us? Genetic knowledge is empowering. It offers us the freedom to shape the contours of our lives and those of our families. At the same time, genetic knowledge is disempowering. It bears a peculiar mark of inevitability, telling us that we have no control over our present or future in important respects. Better to hide from such overbearing information than to suffer the assaults on our freedom it seems to create.We can see this ambivalence about genetic knowledge appearing again and again as the field of genetics has grown. Initially, genetics emerged as a tool for understanding how traits and diseases are passed from generation to generation. We used genetic testing mostly to enhance our personal decision making about reproductive matters. It was at this time that our hesitancy about pursuing such testing first arose, for we feared being put into a position of asking such painful questions as, “Knowing what we do about our genes, should we have children?” As the scope of genetic information expanded, we learned to test for genes that could signal the development of such terrible conditions as Huntington’s disease. The possibility of gaining access to such disturbing information exacerbated our fear of genetic knowledge—to some, the certainty of knowing seemed worse than the uncertainty of not knowing. As genetic research has disclosed genes associated with conditions that might, but not necessarily will occur, the uncertainty of knowing, to some, seems worse than that of not knowing. Further, questions focused on individuals, although still pertinent, are being supplanted by broader questions about families and [End Page vii] social groups. When added to the personal agony that genetic information can engender, the specter of egregious discrimination seems to some to outweigh the value of knowing. As the net is cast further and further from the initial genetic inquiries, the call to halt or control certain kinds of genetic testing is growing increasingly loud.Ambivalence about whether to obtain genetic information hovers over the pages of this issue of the Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal. The authors address both the promise and the threat of the information to be derived from genetic tests. Each examines a different facet of the problem of knowing that vexes the terrain of genetic technology and proposes blueprints for resolving it.Cynthia B. Cohen opens by examining whether genetic testing should be used to unearth information about conditions children might develop later in life. She challenges the current trend within the professional genetics community to keep such information hidden, claiming that the putative psychosocial burdens of receiving that information are outweighed by the psychosocial benefits. Moreover, Cohen maintains that having such information can enhance, rather than impair, the adult autonomy of children. She offers a framework for assessing whether to test in individual cases and maintains that it is the responsibility of parents to make the final decision for their children.A similar response to our ambivalence about obtaining genetic knowledge is given by Robert Wachbroit. In discussing the dilemma caused by pleiotropic genetic tests—those in which a single gene mutation is involved in several apparently unrelated diseases—he favors fully disclosing their dual nature to patients before testing. Wachbroit’s emphasis on openness extends beyond informed consent recommendations, for he maintains that patients have an obligation to know as much about their genetic proclivities as possible. He goes on to confute the common wisdom that genetic information is... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:I Had Never Heard Someone Use That Word BeforeAdrienne Feller NovickThe patient was dying. As the social worker, I had arranged the meeting and sat shoulder to shoulder with the family and the attending physician in the small nondescript room. The family was grief-stricken and asked intelligent questions as they made difficult decisions about end-of-life care for their loved one. The doctor spoke with gentle kindness, acknowledging their difficult (...) decision as he completed the neon pink Medical Orders for Life Sustaining Treatment (MOLST) form and left the room. I was tangled up with emotions; I felt relieved that the meeting had gone smoothly, sad for the patient and family, and in awe of the doctor for his ability to lead the difficult conversation. I stayed behind to ask the family if there was anything I could do to help them. [End Page E4]Before I could speak, the patient's wife turned to me and said, "I am so glad that k--- left the room." (Using a derogatory word for a person of the Jewish faith). My brain began processing the statement. I am a Jewish woman. Did I hear that right? Did she say what I think she said? Should I say something? I froze, and time seemed to stop. She was looking at me expectantly, waiting for a response. Her face reminded me of someone waiting for the other person to return a "high five." I was flooded with emotion. A succession of thoughts ran through my head, everything from being rude in response or getting physical. I did neither. I said nothing. I smiled and left the room feeling like I had been gut-punched.I was in denial. I made excuses for the wife; she was stressed. I kept thinking I must not have heard her correctly and that I was overreacting. I continued to work with the family as though nothing had happened until the patient died five days later. I felt ashamed and never told anyone about what happened. I regretted not saying anything. I replayed the conversation in my mind and felt depressed and angry. Inside I felt complicit for not speaking up, but I had no words. I assumed bias in healthcare was rare. I did nothing.Years later, after I completed a patient visit in the Intensive Care Unit (ICU), I observed a group of surgical residents doing rounds. The attending welcomed me to join this valuable clinical learning experience. As the group approached the next bed, the patient pointed to one resident and loudly said, "I don't want a doctor who looks like that to come near me." I gasped aloud and froze, waiting to see what would happen next. The attending looked directly at the patient and said calmly, "We are all here to help you. That is not an appropriate thing for you to say." Then, he turned to the resident and nodded, directing them to resume their bedside assessment. The patient mumbled something inaudibly and said nothing.To my astonishment, the doctor acknowledged the microaggression (a microaggression is a statement, action, or incident regarded as discrimination), addressed the issue, respectfully supported the resident, created a safe space for everyone on the healthcare team and resumed quality patient care without missing a beat. He modeled a strategy to address patient bias and taught a valuable skill. This was a learning moment for me. It helped me refocus my past experience and provided me with a useful strategy to address bias in the future.As a member of the medical ethics consultation service, I listen, provide support, and aid in challenging communications. I had the opportunity to model the communication strategy I acquired in the ICU. The medical ethics team was consulted for a patient refusing treatment. The patient was disrespectful to healthcare team members, cursing at nurses and residents, using ethnic slurs, and saying he "would rather die than let one of them touch him. I entered the patient's room with the healthcare team, introduced myself, and explained the reason for my visit. The patient defiantly agreed he had used slurs, saying he wanted to go home. I continued, everyone here... (shrink)

Loudness is the magnitude of the auditory sensation that a listener experiences when exposed to a sound. Several sound attributes are reported to affect loudness, such as the sound pressure level at the listener's ears and the spectral content. In addition to these physical attributes of the stimulus, some subjective attributes also appear to affect loudness. When presented with a sound, a listener interacts with an auditory object and can focus on several aspects of the latter. (...) class='Hi'>Loudness appears to differ depending on how listeners apprehend this object, notably whether they focus on the sound that reaches their ears or that is produced by the source. The way listeners focus on the auditory object may depend on the stimulus itself. For instance, they might be more likely to focus on the sound emitted by the source if the latter is visible. The instructions given by the experimenters can also explicitly direct the listener's focus on the sound reaching the ears or emitted by the source. The present review aims at understanding how listeners focus on the auditory object depending on the stimuli and instructions they are provided with, and to describe how loudness depends on this focus. (shrink)

In this paper I challenge the widely held assumption that loudness is the perceptual correlate of sound intensity. Drawing on psychological and neuroscientific evidence, I argue that loudness is best understood not as a representation of any feature of a sound wave, but rather as a reflection of the salience of a sound wave representation; loudness is determined by how much attention a sound receives. Loudness is what I call a quantitative character, a species of phenomenal (...) character that is determined by the amount of attention that an underlying perceptual representation commands. I distinguish quantitative from qualitative character; even qualitative characters that represent degrees of sensible magnitudes are phenomenally and functionally distinct from quantitative characters. A bifurcated account of phenomenal character emerges; the phenomenal is not exhausted by the qualitative. (shrink)

Obstetric violence has been analyzed from various perspectives. Its psychological effects have been evaluated, and there have been several recent sociological and anthropological studies on the subject. But what I offer in this paper is a philosophical analysis of obstetric violence, particularly focused on how this violence is lived and experienced by women and why it is frequently described not only in terms of violence in general but specifically in terms of gender violence: as violence directed at women because they (...) are women. For this purpose, I find feminist phenomenology most useful as a way to explain and account for the feelings that many victims of this violence experience and report, including feelings of embodied oppression, of the diminishment of self, of physical and emotional infantilization. I believe that the insights to be found in feminist phenomenology are crucial for explaining how and why this phenomenon is different in kind from other types of medical violence, objectification, and reification. Iris Marion Young’s description of feminine existence under patriarchy, as conformed by a perpetual oppressive “I cannot,” is at the center of my analysis. I argue that laboring bodies are at least potentially perceived as antithetical to the myth of femininity, undermining the feminine mode of bodily comportment under patriarchy and thereby seriously threatening the hegemonic powers. Violence, then, appears to be necessary in order to domesticate these bodies, to make them “feminine” again. (shrink)

Previous work showed that the beginning of a sound is more important for the perception of loudness than later parts. When a short silent gap of sufficient duration is inserted into a sound, this primacy effect reoccurs in the second sound part after the gap. The present study investigates whether this temporal weighting occurs independently for different frequency bands. Sounds consisting of two bandpass noises were presented in four different conditions: a simultaneous gap in both bands, a gap in (...) only the lower frequency band, a gap in only the higher frequency band, or no gap. In all conditions, the temporal loudness weights showed a primacy effect at sound onset. For the frequency bands without a gap, the temporal weights decreased gradually across time, regardless of whether the other frequency band did or did not contain a gap. When a frequency band contained a gap, the weight at the onset of this band after the gap was increased. This reoccurrence of the primacy effect following the gap was again largely independent of whether or not the other band contained a gap. Thus, the results indicate that the temporal loudness weights are frequency specific. (shrink)

Hardly anyone disputes that discrimination can be a grave moral wrong. Yet this consensus masks fundamental disagreements about what makes something discrimination, as well as precisely why acts of discrimination are wrong. Benjamin Eidelson develops systematic answers to those two questions. He claims that discrimination is a form of differential treatment distinguished by its special connection to the differential ascription of some property to different people, and goes on to argue that what makes some cases of discrimination intrinsically wrongful is (...) that they manifest an attitude of disrespect for the personhood of those who are disfavored. He endeavors to specify what this attitude consists in, and to demonstrate how attending to its character can help us to better understand the moral dimensions of different forms of wrongful discrimination. The book concludes with an extended discussion of racial profiling in law enforcement. (shrink)

Some philosophers claim that to see something you must discriminate it from other things. But they do not tell us what it is to discriminate something. I distinguish five types of discrimination. Then I argue that the plausibility of the claim that seeing something requires discriminating it, as opposed to simply attributing some properties to it, hinges on the type of discrimination under consideration. A weak form of discrimination trivializes the debate. Stronger notions of discrimination, however, cannot be understood without (...) attribution (i.e., representation-as). Attribution appears to form the fundamental level of personal-level representation. (shrink)

In this essay, I explore the view that wrongful discrimination is disrespectful. In section 1, I articulate three conceptions of disrespect, each of which provides a special way to understand the way in which wrongful discrimination is disrespectful. In section 2, I ask what it would take for any of these conceptions to serve as the basis for a plausible theory of wrongful discrimination. I argue that any adequate theory of wrongful discrimination must be able to do two things well: (...) reliably identify cases of wrongful discrimination and, also, explain why they are wrong. In section 3, I examine the objection that all respect-focused theories violate the first desideratum. In section 4, I contend that the objection does not apply to all respect-based theories; in particular, it does not apply to a respect-focused deliberative theory of wrongful discrimination. Though such a theory is much more powerful than its competitors, I argue that it fails to offer a satisfying explanation of why discrimination is wrong due to the fact that it locates the wrong of discrimination within deliberative processes, rather than looking to the harmful-impacts of discrimination on people affected by it. (shrink)

In this paper, I will argue that it is a moral obligation for companies, firstly, to accept their moral responsibility with respect to non-discrimination, and secondly, to address the issue with a full-fledged programme, including but not limited to the countering of microsocial discrimination processes through specific policies. On the basis of a broad sketch of how some discrimination mechanisms are actually influencing decisions, that is, causing intended as well as unintended bias in Human Resources Management (HRM), I will argue (...) that the well known tools of legislation and ethical codes are necessary although insufficient to cope with the problem. However, based on empirical evidence, we know which set of measures is likely to diminish discrimination. Taking non-discrimination seriously implies complex and longitudinal policies which include assigning responsibility for a non-discrimination policy within the firm, making managers conscious of implicit stereotypes and helping them to cope with prejudices that no one can totally overcome. Insofar as corporate responsibility with respect to non-discrimination is accepted and strategies that are not prohibitively expensive are known, companies are bound to implement them. Not implementing the best set of measures may be considered at least as a moral shortcoming or, depending on the size of the company, mere lip service to the non-discrimination principle. Although the paper refers to empirical material of diverse backgrounds, its intent is clearly normative. It wishes to spell out what companies ought to do if they are committed to responsible behaviour. The discussion of effective remedies against discrimination is based on a case study of a French company. The retailer Auchan was recently surprised to learn that it was discriminating against ethnic minorities despite strong ethical standards, an ethics committee and ethical leadership. The company dropped its naïve beliefs and set up an ambitious policy cope with the issue. The case illustrates what recent empirical research has revealed about the effectiveness of diversity policies: establishing responsibility for diversity results, firm ethical commitment and support from top management make diversity programs effective. (shrink)

This paper presents a partial analysis of perceptual knowledge, an analysis that will, I hope, lay a foundation for a general theory of knowing. Like an earlier theory I proposed, the envisaged theory would seek to explicate the concept of knowledge by reference to the causal processes that produce (or sustain) belief. Unlike the earlier theory, however, it would abandon the requirement that a knower's belief that p be causally connected with the fact, or state of affairs, that p.

Luck egalitarianism is a responsibility-sensitive theory of distributive justice. Its application to health and healthcare is controversial. This article addresses a novel critique of luck egalitarianism, namely, that it wrongfully discriminates against those responsible for their health disadvantage when allocating scarce healthcare resources. The philosophical literature about discrimination offers two primary reasons for what makes discrimination wrong (when it is): harm and disrespect. These two approaches are employed to analyze whether luck egalitarian healthcare prioritization should be considered wrongful discrimination. Regarding (...) harm, it is very plausible to consider the policies harmful but much less reasonable to consider those responsible for their health disadvantages a socially salient group. Drawing on the disrespect literature, where social salience is typically not required for something to be discrimination, the policies are a form of discrimination. They are, however, not disrespectful. The upshot of this first assessment of the discrimination objection to luck egalitarianism in health is, thus, that it fails. (shrink)

According to a prominent view, discrimination is wrong, when it is, because it makes people worse off. In this paper, I argue that this harm-based account runs into trouble because it cannot point to a harm, without making controversial metaphysical commitments, in cases of discrimination in which the discriminatory act kills the discriminatee. That is, the harm-based account suffers from a problem of death. I then show that the two main alternative accounts of the wrongness of discrimination—the mental-state-based account and (...) the objective-meaning account—do not run into this problem. (shrink)

Audre Lorde wrote in her essay The Transformation of Silence into Language to Action, “I have come to believe over and over again that what is most important to me must be spoken, made verbal and s...

Discrimination, understood as differential treatment of individuals on the basis of their respective group memberships, is widely considered to be morally wrong. This moral judgment is backed in many jurisdictions with the passage of equality of opportunity legislation, which aims to ensure that racial, ethnic, religious, sexual, sexual-orientation, disability and other groups are not subjected to discrimination. This chapter explores the conceptual underpinnings of discrimination and equality of opportunity using the tools of analytical moral and political philosophy.

Modern feminist movements run the risk of being appropriated by capitalist agenda and commodified for mass appeal, thus stripping them of their revolutionary potential. I would propose that in order for feminism to challenge this, movements may want to consider the subversion of subjectivity. Deleuze and Guattari's notions of becoming-animal and becoming-woman emphasise a subjectivity not confined by rigid identity, such as man/woman. However, feminists have challenged this theory, suggesting it is difficult to both fight for and dispel the very (...) same notion, that is, woman. I argue that in first considering the feminine subject via the Lacanian understanding of ‘Woman’, it can be argued that feminine subjects can engage with becoming-animal to destabilise the notion of ‘Woman’. Riot Grrls, FEMEN and Pussy Riot all demonstrate tactics which could be said to utilise becoming-animal and have had varying success in avoiding commodification. (shrink)

This article examines the relationship between women entrepreneurs’ job autonomy and work–life balance, with a particular focus on how this relationship might be augmented by environments that discriminate against women, whether socio-economically, institutionally, or culturally. Multisource data pertaining to 5334 women entrepreneurs from 37 countries indicate that their sense of job autonomy increases the likelihood that they feel satisfied with their ability to balance the needs of their work with those of their personal life. This process is particularly prominent when (...) they operate in countries characterized by discriminatory socio-economic and institutional conditions, though a mitigating instead of invigorating effect arises in culturally discriminatory settings. For business ethics scholars and practitioners, these findings indicate how the extent to which women entrepreneurs, seeking to combine professional and private responsibilities, derive benefits from initiatives aimed at enhancing their job-related freedom critically depends on whether they operate in adverse external environments. (shrink)

Music and noise can be considered as a collection of vibrational events which may impinge upon the body and the mind. As such they can induce beneficial or harmful bodily and psychological reactions. Much contemporary music production and consumption, however, produces sensory saturation and/or overload with sounds being manipulated in terms of spectrum and dynamic range. Such manipulation is not harmful by definition, but the manipulations may increase the potential for harm. Much research has been devoted to the risk of (...) auditory overstimulation, but the topic is still relevant as listening to music is a significant form of leisure noise exposure. Listening habits and attitudes toward loud music may even promote behaviors that could cause harm to listeners, both in a direct and indirect way. Listening to loud music, in fact, may be damaging to the cochlea (and possibly also the auditory nuclei and the auditory pathway), and may cause both temporary or permanent hearing loss. On the other hand, loud music may have benefits for us, particularly in terms of social integration and an enhanced sense of wellbeing and fun. Several questions can therefore be raised. What are the physical effects of sound as transferable and vibrational energy? Are there constraints and biases that shape and modify our reactions to the sounds? What are the perceptual and associated behavioral aspects? What are the psychological mechanisms for liking loud music? What are the social factors that contribute to increased preferences for loud music? And how can we assess the beneficial and harmful effects of sounds that are outside of the optimal range of stimulation? (shrink)

In Born Free and Equal: A Philosophical Inquiry into the Nature of Discrimination, Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen defends the harm-based account of the wrongness of discrimination, which explains the wrongness of discrimination with reference to the harmfulness of discriminatory acts. Against this view, we offer two objections. The conditions objection states that the harm-based account implausibly fails to recognize that harmless discrimination can be wrong. The explanation objection states that the harm-based account fails adequately to identify all of the wrong-making properties of (...) discriminatory acts. We argue that the structure of a satisfactory view cannot be outcome-focused. A more promising family of views focuses on the deliberation of the discriminator and in particular on the reasons that motivate or fail to motivate her action. (shrink)

Sometimes, a form of discrimination is hard to register, understand, and articulate. A rich precedent demonstrates how victim testimonies have been key in uncovering such “hidden” forms of discrimination, from sexual harassment to microaggressions. I reflect on how this plausibly goes too for “attentional discrimination”, referring to cases where the more meaningful attributes of one social group are made salient in attention in contrast to the less meaningful attributes of another. Victim testimonies understandably dominate the “context-of-discovery” stage of research into (...) these initially opaque forms of discrimination; a victim’s encounter with the gap between their experience and dominant conceptual frameworks for understanding it is what provides an initial foothold for analysis to begin. Some object, however, to this methodology continuing to dominate the later “context-of-justification” stage, where the hypothesis is rigorously challenged. I argue that this objection underestimates not just how other methodologies are more likely to inherit the various mechanisms of invisibility hiding the discrimination in question, but also how victim testimonies are distinctively well-suited to recognize and challenge those mechanisms. Victim testimonies, then, ought to continue playing a dominant role into these later stages of research regarding hidden forms of discrimination. (shrink)

In recent years, apparently the Big Bang as described by the Lambda CDM-Standard Model Cosmology has become widely accepted by majority of physics and cosmology communities. Even some people have concluded that it has no serious alternative in horizon. Is that true? First, as we argued elsewhere, Big Bang story relies on singularity. In other words, when we are able to describe the observed data without invoking singularity, then Big Bang model is no longer required. Therefore, here we explore a (...) few alternative stories other than Big Bang story, which most cosmologists believe it is the nearest to Biblical account of creation. We would argue that re-reading of Genesis 1:2 will lead us to another viable story, albeit the alternative has not been developed rigorously as LCDM theories. We also briefly discuss a fluid Maxwell equations of Prof. Tsutomu Kambe based on vortex sound theory. (shrink)

In Faces of Inequality: A Theory of Wrongful Discrimination, Sophia Moreau embarks on a classic philosophical journey. It’s what philosophers nowadays call an explanatory project. The goal of explanatory projects is to deepen our understanding of wrongful actions and what they share in common. In this review essay, I argue that Moreau’s book embodies a valuable explanatory project and contribution to discrimination theory that ought to be on the radar of lawyers, legal theorists, and philosophers. After sketching the book’s arguments, (...) I explain why they are so refreshing. The remainder of the essay proceeds in a more critical mode. First, I argue that book’s explanatory aspirations fall short, and I sketch a framework for a more radically pluralistic theory of wrongful discrimination. This framework has the power to embrace Moreau’s compelling view that discrimination wrongs people by failing to treat them as equals while also recognizing a rich array of other discriminatory wrongs found in lived experience. Second, I argue that Faces of Inequality will disappoint readers looking for a truly inclusive account of wrongful discrimination. I end by emphasizing the book’s contribution to political philosophy and its ambition to provide a truly liberatory theory of what we owe to each other as moral and political equals. (shrink)

What makes discrimination morally bad? In this paper, we discuss the putative badness of a case of consensual discrimination to show that prominent accounts of the badness of discrimination—appealing, inter alia, to harm, disrespect and inequality—fail to provide a satisfactory answer to this question. In view of this, we present a more promising account.

It is usually accepted that whether or not indirect discrimination is a form of immoral discrimination, it appears to be structurally different from direct discrimination. First, it seems that either one involves the agent focusing on different things while making a decision. Second, it seems that the victim’s group membership is relevant to the outcomes of either sort of action in different ways. In virtue of these two facts, it is usually concluded that indirect discrimination is structurally different from direct (...) discrimination. I argue against the notion that indirect discrimination and direct discrimination have significantly different structures. I first argue that both kinds of discrimination involve similar decision-making processes. Second, I analyze how being in a social group affects personal identity, and from there argue that indirect discrimination and direct discrimination are about group membership similarly. In virtue of these two arguments, I conclude that direct and indirect discrimination are structurally similar. (shrink)

Although the demographics on male versus female death-row prisoners suggest that males are the criminal justice system’s primary targets, the author argues that the system still discriminates against women. Utilizing postmodern scholarship, he argues that female prisoners are punished primarily for violating dominant norms of gender correctness.

Several leading theorists embrace the Simple Desert Account of Discrimination. This account involves two claims: it claims that a mismatch between what people deserve, on the one hand, and what they get, on the other hand, is (a) integral to discrimination, and (b) wrong. I shall query (a). First, I challenge what I see as the principal, positive argument for the Simple Desert Account. Second, in some cases wrongful discrimination brings about a better match between desert and what people get. (...) Situations in which this could be the case include those where: the discriminatee is a serial discriminator herself; the person wrongfully discriminated in favour of deserves greater advantages than she enjoys; by engaging in wrongful discrimination the discriminator reduces her moral deservingness and thereby the gap between her level of deservingness and her otherwise unfittingly low level of advantage. (shrink)

In this paper, I will argue that it is a moral obligation for companies, firstly, to accept their moral responsibility with respect to non-discrimination, and secondly, to address the issue with a full-fledged programme, including but not limited to the countering of microsocial discrimination processes through specific policies. On the basis of a broad sketch of how some discrimination mechanisms are actually influencing decisions, that is, causing intended as well as unintended bias in Human Resources Management, I will argue that (...) the well known tools of legislation and ethical codes are necessary although insufficient to cope with the problem. However, based on empirical evidence, we know which set of measures is likely to diminish discrimination. Taking non-discrimination seriously implies complex and longitudinal policies which include assigning responsibility for a non-discrimination policy within the firm, making managers conscious of implicit stereotypes and helping them to cope with prejudices that no one can totally overcome. Insofar as corporate responsibility with respect to non-discrimination is accepted and strategies that are not prohibitively expensive are known, companies are bound to implement them. Not implementing the best set of measures may be considered at least as a moral shortcoming or, depending on the size of the company, mere lip service to the non-discrimination principle. Although the paper refers to empirical material of diverse backgrounds, its intent is clearly normative. It wishes to spell out what companies ought to do if they are committed to responsible behaviour. The discussion of effective remedies against discrimination is based on a case study of a French company. The retailer Auchan was recently surprised to learn that it was discriminating against ethnic minorities despite strong ethical standards, an ethics committee and ethical leadership. The company dropped its naïve beliefs and set up an ambitious policy cope with the issue. The case illustrates what recent empirical research has revealed about the effectiveness of diversity policies: establishing responsibility for diversity results, firm ethical commitment and support from top management make diversity programs effective. (shrink)

Because imagination constitutes an indispensable tool of phenomenology, e.g., in understanding another author’s description, in eidetic reduction, etc., the practicability of phenomenological method and its claim to objectivity ought to be reconsidered with regard to its dependence on imagination. Auditory imagery serves to illustrate problems involved in grasping and analyzing imaginative contents – loudness in this case. Similar to phonetic segmentation and classification, phenomenologists segment and classify mental acts and contents. Just as phoneticians rely on experts’ evaluations of notations (...) to reach valid results, phenomenologists may try to develop similar agreement procedures to escape the ‘subjectivism’ of their solitary first-person approach. (shrink)