First of all, this paper aims at a clarification of Wittgenstein's conception of grammatical propositions. Their essential characteristics will be developed and some of the central questions concerning their status will be discussed: Should grammatical propositions be seen as arbitrary conventions? How do they work in practices? And how do they relate to natural facts? Later on, the two propositions "Every rod has a length" and "Sensations are private" will be discussed in more detail, for (...) both fulfil three important features of grammatical propositions: They are not empirical descriptions, they are rules of a practice, and they are not knowledge-claims but express insights. Focussing on the grammar of pain language, it will be shown what kind of interdependency exists between grammar and natural facts. It will also turn out that some grammatical propositions are closely connected to our understanding of living a human form of life. (shrink)

“Grammar” is Ludwig Wittgenstein's preferred term for the workings of a language: the system of rules that determine linguistic meaning. A philosophical study of language is a study of “grammar”, in this sense, and insofar as any philosophical investigation is concerned with conceptual details, which manifest themselves in language, it is a grammatical investigation. In the Tractatus Logico‐Philosophicus Wittgenstein offered a mathematical picture of language: presenting language as a calculus. Like a calculus, language was claimed to be governed by (...) syntactic rules: formation rules about the licit combination of names to form elementary propositions; formation rules about the licit combination of elementary propositions to make complex propositions; and finally, truth‐table rules, which enable us to identify logical truths and entailments. Logical grammar, for the young Wittgenstein, is only logical syntax and logical syntax can be determined without paying any attention to the meaning of the signs. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 6, Issue 2-3, pp 165 - 181 Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘hinge propositions’—those propositions that stand fast for us and around which all empirical enquiry turns—remains controversial and elusive, and none of the recent attempts to make sense of it strike me as entirely satisfactory. The literature on this topic tends to divide into two camps: either a ‘quasi-epistemic’ reading is offered that seeks to downplay the radical nature of Wittgenstein’s proposal by assimilating his thought to (...) more mainstream epistemological views, or a non-epistemic, ‘quasi-pragmatic’ conception is adopted that goes too far in the opposite direction by, for example, equating ‘hinge propositions’ with a type of ‘animal’ certainty. Neither interpretative strategy, I will argue, is promising for the reason that ‘hinges’ are best not conceived as certainties at all. Rather, what Wittgenstein says in respect to them is that doubt is “logically” excluded, and where there can be no doubt, I contend, there is no such thing as knowledge or certainty either. (shrink)

The standard view of "believes" and other propositional attitude verbs is that such verbs express relations between agents and propositions. A sentence of the form “S believes that p” is true just in case S stands in the belief-relation to the proposition that p; this proposition is the referent of the complement clause "that p." On this view, we would expect the clausal complements of propositional attitude verbs to be freely intersubstitutable with their corresponding proposition descriptions—e.g., "the proposition that (...) p"—as they are in the case of "believes." In many cases, however, intersubstitution of that-clauses and proposition descriptions fails to preserve truth value or even grammaticality. These substitution failures lead some philosophers to reject the standard view of propositional attitude reports. Others conclude that propositional attitude verbs are systematically ambiguous. I reject both these views. On my view, the that-clause complements of propositional attitude verbs denote propositions, but proposition descriptions do not. (shrink)

Proposition and sentence are two separate entities indicating their specific purposes, definitions and problems. A proposition is a logical entity. A proposition asserts that something is or not the case, any proposition may be affirmed or denied, all proportions are either true (1’s) or false (0’s). All proportions are sentences but all sentences are not propositions. Propositions are factual contains three terms: subject, predicate and copula and are always in indicative or declarative mood. While sentence is a (...) class='Hi'>grammatical entity, a unit of language that expresses a complete thought; a sentence may express a proposition, but is distinct from the proposition it may be used to express: categories, declarative sentences, exclamatory, imperative and interrogative sentences. Not all sentences are propositions, propositions express sentence. Sentence is a proposition only in condition when it bears truth values i.e. true or false. We use English sentences governed by imprecise rule to state the precise rules of proposition. In logic we use sentence as logical entity having propositional function but grammatical sentences are different from logical sentences while the former are having only two divisions namely subject and predicate and may express wishes, orders, surprise or facts and also have multiple subjects and predicates and the latter must be in a propositional form which states quantity of the subject and the quality of the proposition and multiple subjects and multiple predicate make the proposition multiple. (shrink)

Katz offers such a grammatical account, in which makes it possible for the first time to explain the illocutionary potential of sentences within grammar.

Employing Constructive Type Theory Constructive Type Theory, we provide a logical analysis of[aut]Ibn SīnāIbn Sīnā’sIbn Sīnā descriptional propositions. Compared to its rivals, our analysis is more faithful to the grammatical subject-predicate structure of propositions and can better reflect the morphological features of the verbs that extend time to intervals. We also study briefly the logical structure of some fallacious inferences that are discussed by Ibn Sīnā. The CTT-framework makes the fallacious nature of these inferences apparent.

In discussing propositional quantifiers we have considered two kinds of variables: variables occupying the argument places of connectives, and variables occupying the argument places of predicates.We began with languages which contained the first kind of variable, i.e., variables taking sentences as substituends. Our first point was that there appear to be no sentences in English that serve as adequate readings of formulas containing propositional quantifiers. Then we showed how a certain natural and illuminating extension of English by prosentences did provide (...) perspicuous readings. The point of introducing prosentences was to provide a way of making clear the grammar of propositional variables: propositional variables have a prosentential character — not a pronominal character. Given this information we were able to show, on the assumption that the grammar of propositional variables in philosopher's English should be determined by their grammar in formal languages (unless a separate account of their grammar is provided), that propositional variables can be used in a grammatically and philosophically acceptable way in philosophers' English. According to our criteria of well-formedness Carnap's semantic definition of truth does not lack an ‘essential’ predicate - despite arguments to the contrary. It also followed from our account of the prosentential character of bound propositional variables that in explaining propositional quantification, sentences should not be construed as names.One matter we have not discussed is whether such quantification should be called ‘propositional’, ‘sentential’, or something else. As our variables do not range over (they are not terms) either propositions, or sentences, each name is inappropriate, given the usual picture of quantification. But we think the relevant question in this context is, are we obtaining generality with respect to propositions, sentences, or something else?Because people have argued that all bound variables must have a pronominal character, we presented and discussed in the third section languages in which the variables take propositional terms as substituends. In our case we included names of propositions, that-clauses, and names of sentences in the set of propositional terms. We made a few comparisons with the languages discussed in the second section. We showed among other things how a truth predicate could be used to obtain generality. In contrast, the languages of the second section, using propositional variables, obtain generality without the use of a truth predicate. (shrink)

It is shown that there exists no grammatical translation into classical (propositional) logic of the modal logics, nor of intuitionistic logic and of the relatedness and dependence logics, as defined in Richard L. Epstein's bookThe Semantic foundations of logic. In the book the result is proved for translations without parameters.Classical propositional logicPC can be translated into other logics. Usually the grammatical structure of propositions is preserved, in the sense of the following definition.

_ Source: _Volume 53, Issue 2-4, pp 294 - 321 Manuscript London, British Library, Burney 330 contains an anonymous collection of grammatical sophisms, dating in all probability from early 13th-century France or England, and all based on problematic biblical, liturgical or religious propositions. After a presentation of the manuscript and collection, this article examines two analysis tools that are applied in the majority of the sophisms, viz. a distinction between three layers of grammatico-semantic perfection or completeness, and the (...) grammatical and semantic supposition doctrines. It appears that these sophisms pay prominent attention to improper or figurative supposition, but are not intended for highly advanced readers. These preliminary results suggest that the Burney Sophismata Collection constituted an exercise tool to support textbook-based instruction in theological grammar, which was developed by such masters as Peter the Chanter and William de Montibus in the late 12th and early 13th centuries. (shrink)

The Substitution Anomaly is the failure of intuitively coreferential expressions of the corresponding forms “that S” and “the proposition that S” to be intersubstitutable salva veritate under certain ‘selective’ attitudinal verbs that grammatically accept both sorts of terms as complements. The Substitution Anomaly poses a direct threat to the basic assumptions of Millianism, which predict the interchangeability of “that S” and “the proposition that S”. Jeffrey King has argued persuasively that the most plausible Millian solution is to treat the selective (...) attitudinal verbs as lexically ambiguous , having distinct meanings associated with the different sorts of complement terms. In opposition this approach, I argue that there are independent reasons for maintaining the univocality of these verbs and that this can be done while accommodating the Substitution Anomaly and without sacrificing the transparency of the relevant attitude ascriptions. In particular, I show how, by employing an extended version of Edward Zalta’s system of intensional logic for abstract objects, one can construct for a regimented fragment ℜ of English containing the relevant vocabulary a semantical theory ℑ which (a) treats ℜ’s selective attitudinal verbs as univocal, (b) regards genuine terms as occurring transparently under such verbs in sentences of ℜ, and yet (c) predicts the occurrence of the Substitution Anomaly in ℜ. (shrink)

Previous research on the INTRODUCTORY IT PATTERN unveiled various lexical and grammatical aspects of its use as a grammatical stance device, including the range of the most frequently used adjectival and verbal stance lexemes, associated stance meanings, the most frequent sub-patterns, and the distinct uses in various contextual settings of the pattern. However, the stance meanings of the pattern, which are deeply rooted in the associated lexical resources, are still understudied. This study explores the meanings of the INTRODUCTORY (...) IT PATTERN by referring to the stance meanings of the pattern associated with the adjectival and verbal lexemes that are statistically attracted to the pattern. The research samples were extracted from the British component of the International Corpus of English. The samples were manually annotated for different stance types and a collexeme analysis was performed to identify the full range of stance lexemes statistically associated with the INTRODUCTORY IT PATTERN. The results show that both adjectival and verbal collexemes are statistically and functionally significant for the delivery of discrete stance types/subtypes. Adjectival collexemes are frequently deployed for all four stance types: Epistemic stance, Evaluation stance, Dynamic stance, and Deontic stance, while verbal collexemes are valuable lexical resources for the Epistemic stance, as their use entails modalized evidentiality, pointing to epistemic judgment of the writer-speaker toward events/propositions. Close examination of the use of adjectival and verbal collexemes identified three fundamental meanings of the INTRODUCTORY IT PATTERN. First, the pattern is inherently evaluative as it tends to attract more lexemes with evaluative meanings and associates evaluative meanings with superficially non-evaluative lexemes. Second, it features a scalarized expression of diversified stance types/subtypes, thus, especially reflective of the scalarized semantic feature of stance expression. Third, it connotates an overwhelmingly positive likelihood judgment. The article concludes by discussing the limitations of this study. (shrink)

Signed languages employ finely articulated facial and head displays to express grammatical meanings such as mood and modality, complex propositions, information structure, assertions, content and yes/no questions, imperatives, and miratives. In this paper we examine two facial displays: an upper face display in which the eyebrows are pulled together called brow furrow, and a lower face display in which the corners of the mouth are turned down into a distinctive configuration that resembles a frown or upside-down U-shape. Our (...) analysis employs Cognitive Grammar, specifically the control cycle and its manifestation in effective control and epistemic control. Our claim is that effective and epistemic control are associated with embodied actions. Prototypical physical effective control requires effortful activity and the forceful exertion of energy and is commonly correlated with upper face activity, often called the “face of effort.” The lower face display has been shown to be associated with epistemic indetermination, uncertainty, doubt, obviousness, and skepticism. We demonstrate that the control cycle unifies the diverse grammatical functions expressed by each facial display within a language, and that they express similar functions across a wide range of signed languages. (shrink)

Depuis plus d’une cinquantaine d’années, les noms sous-spécifiés ou Nss ont fait l’objet de plusieurs tentatives de classification. Cette catégorie nominale, difficile à cerner, possède certaines caractéristiques comme l’incomplétude informationnelle, le besoin d’une spécification, la capacité à condenser l’information et à la catégoriser. Si ces propriétés sémantiques et discursives contribuent toutes deux à justifier l’existence d’une catégorie nominale particulière que constitueraient les Nss, à mi-chemin entre le mot plein et l’élément grammatical, elles pointent surtout vers une fonction des Nss (...) dans l’expression du point de vue du locuteur et donc d’une évaluation. C’est en ce sens que nous proposons une classification modale des Nss, inspirée des travaux de Chevalier et Léard et de Gosselin. Une telle typologie, mettant en lumière les schémas modaux qui sous-tendent le discours, permettrait ainsi de mieux rendre compte du fonctionnement global des Nss, à la fois sur les plans sémantique, textuel et discursif. (shrink)

La découverte scientifique radicale, et le changement radical de paradigme associé, sont traités ici comme découlant de la mise à jour de ce qu’on appelle des ‘assomptions’ d’arrière-plan. Celles-ci sont considérées comme plus ou moins équivalentes aux ‘propositions charnières’ discutées par Wittgenstein dans De la certitude. Sur cette base, diverses questions liées aux changements de signification, au changement théorique, à l’incommensurabilité, etc., sont discutées. On montre que la conception d’ensemble de Kuhn, une fois précisée, n’implique ni l’idéalisme ni le (...) relativisme, et que la rationalité et le progrès scientifique peuvent être sauvés d’une manière acceptable par les scientifiques praticiens. (shrink)

La découverte scientifique radicale, et le changement radical de paradigme associé, sont traités ici comme découlant de la mise à jour de ce qu’on appelle des ‘assomptions’ d’arrière-plan. Celles-ci sont considérées comme plus ou moins équivalentes aux ‘propositions charnières’ discutées par Wittgenstein dans De la certitude. Sur cette base, diverses questions liées aux changements de signification, au changement théorique, à l’incommensurabilité, etc., sont discutées. On montre que la conception d’ensemble de Kuhn, une fois précisée, n’implique ni l’idéalisme ni le (...) relativisme, et que la rationalité et le progrès scientifique peuvent être sauvés d’une manière acceptable par les scientifiques praticiens. (shrink)

The reason for characterizing mental states as propositional attitudes is sentence form: ‘S Vs that p’. However, many mental states are not ascribed by means of such sentences, and the sentences that ascribe them cannot be appropriately paraphrased. Moreover, even if a paraphrase were always available, that in itself would not establish the characterization. And the mental states that are ascribable by appropriate senses do not form any natural subset of mental states. A reason for the characterization relying on beliefs, (...) etc., about non‐existing things is also rejected. Last, some sentences ascribing abilities and dispositions have the same grammatical form as some senses that ascribe mental states, so that the attempt to paraphrase the latter would obscure the conceptual relations between the two sorts. It follows that mental states are not relations to propositions. (shrink)

Attitudinal propositionalism is the view that all mental attitude content is truth-evaluable. While attitudinal propositionalism is still silently assumed in large parts of analytic philosophy, recent work on objectual attitudes (i.e. attitudes like ‘fearing Moriarty’ and ‘imagining a unicorn’ that are reported through intensional transitive verbs with a direct object) has put attitudinal propositionalism under explanatory pressure. This paper defends propositionalism for a special subclass of objectual attitudes, viz. experiential attitudes. The latter are attitudes like seeing, remembering, and imagining whose (...) grammatical objects intuitively denote (events or) scenes. I provide a propositional analysis of experiential attitudes that preserves the merits of propositionalism. This analysis uses the possibility of representing the target-scenes of experiential attitudes by the intersection of all propositions that are true in these scenes. I show that this analysis makes available the usual (Russellian) account of intensionality and the common (Boolean) logic for entailments. (shrink)

Tarski's equivalence, as he allows, applies only roughly to assertions in ordinary language. Some of the relevant exceptions are of merely grammatical importance but others leave scope for interesting metaphysical pronouncements on science, mathematics and other fields of assertion. To understand these latter exceptions is to gain insight into Baylis' and Lukasiewicz' views on the question "Are some Propositions neither True nor False?" (this journal, 1936). From different standpoints each is right and each is wrong. This comment also (...) applies to some later contributions to their controversy. (shrink)

Russellians can have a no proposition view of empty names. I will defend this theory against the problem of meaningfulness, and show that the theory is in general well motivated. My solution to the problem of meaningfulness is that speakers’ judgements about meaningfulness are tracking grammaticality, and not propositional content.

Wittgenstein is generally supposed to have abandoned in the 1930's a realistic conception of the meaning of mathematical propositions, founded on the idea of tmth-conditions which could in certain cases transcend any possibility of verification, for a realistic one, where the idea of truth-conditions is replaced by that of conditions of justification of assertability. It is argued that for Wittgenstein mathematical propositions, which are, as he says, "grammatical" propositions, have a meaning and a role which differ (...) to a much greater degree from those of ordinary propositions than either platonistic realism or intuitionistic anti-realism would admit, and that is the tendency to assimilate the mathematical proposition to an ordinary descriptive proposition which confers on it an appearance of meaning independent of the possibility of proving it, and not, as Dummett would say, that it is a decision concerning the kind of meaning it has which gives it the status of a proposition describing a determinate objective reality. (shrink)

Wittgenstein is generally supposed to have abandoned in the 1930's a realistic conception of the meaning of mathematical propositions, founded on the idea of tmth-conditions which could in certain cases transcend any possibility of verification, for a realistic one, where the idea of truth-conditions is replaced by that of conditions of justification of assertability. It is argued that for Wittgenstein mathematical propositions, which are, as he says, "grammatical" propositions, have a meaning and a role which differ (...) to a much greater degree from those of ordinary propositions than either platonistic realism or intuitionistic anti-realism would admit, and that is the tendency to assimilate the mathematical proposition to an ordinary descriptive proposition which confers on it an appearance of meaning independent of the possibility of proving it, and not, as Dummett would say, that it is a decision concerning the kind of meaning it has which gives it the status of a proposition describing a determinate objective reality. (shrink)

Can the idea of a minimal proposition be successfully held? I will first formulate what the minimal proposition is in the minimalist’s mind, taking Emma Borg as the representative. What a minimalist seeks for a minimal proposition is the abstract and skeletal core meaning of a sentence, and this faith is founded on the notion of minimal word meaning—an atomic, code-like, conceptual thing. I show that the problem of this notion of minimal proposition lies in the three features, intuitive read-off, (...) invariantness, and truth-evaluability, that Borg ascribes to it. I shall argue, first, that positing a conceptual-like thing as the invariant minimal content of word cannot support the invariantness of the minimal proposition of a sentence, and second, that the skeletal content, as the minimal proposition of a sentence, is a grammatically analyzed product and thus is hardly truth evaluable. According to the analyses, the idea of a minimal proposition with these three features identified by minimalists cannot be maintained. (shrink)

Dans quelle mesure le calcul logique peut-il rendre compte de la temporalité en général et éclaircir plus particulièrement l'intuition du temps que décrivait Augustin dans ses Confessions? L'objectif de cet article est de montrer que le système axiomatique du calcul classique des propositions,– dans la mesure où il peut, moyennant certaines conditions, être partiellement appliqué aux structures grammaticales indo-européennes exprimant la réalité du temps,– révèle que la conception augustinienne du temps élaborée dans les Confessions est inséparable de la structure (...) grammaticale du latin dans laquelle elle est exprimée et des croyances théologiques de son auteur. (shrink)

The principal claims supported include: (i) that 'believe' and 'know' take the same grammatical object 'that p'; (ii) that each may take grammatical objects that the other cannot take; (iii) that merely grammatical considerations cannot determine whether 'that p' designates a proposition or a fact; (iv) that, on an epistemically relevant interpretation, 'that p' may be construed either as designating a proposition or a fact or both; (v) that propositions and facts are correlative and heuristic entities. (...) The issues are developed in the context of exploring chiefly the views of Zeno Vendler, Alan White, and Peter Geach. Complications bearing on the distinction between thought and speech are considered. (shrink)

The principal claims supported include: (i) that 'believe' and 'know' take the same grammatical object 'that p'; (ii) that each may take grammatical objects that the other cannot take; (iii) that merely grammatical considerations cannot determine whether 'that p' designates a proposition or a fact; (iv) that, on an epistemically relevant interpretation, 'that p' may be construed either as designating a proposition or a fact or both; (v) that propositions and facts are correlative and heuristic entities. (...) The issues are developed in the context of exploring chiefly the views of Zeno Vendler, Alan White, and Peter Geach. Complications bearing on the distinction between thought and speech are considered. (shrink)

In On the Genesis of Thought and Language, linguist Alexey Koshelev explores fundamental questions of how human concepts arise in a child, why concepts appear in a child before words, the genesis of language, and why there are so many languages. Chapter One introduces the fundamental dichotomy "visual (exogenous) vs. functional (endogenous)" cognitive units; these units are used to give non-verbal definitions of mental representations of various objects, actions, and situations. In particular, definitions of such concepts as GLASS, CHAIR, BANANA, (...) TREE, LAKE, RUN, and some others are given. Chapter Two discusses how children form concepts, hierarchical relationships, and propositions (conceptual 'utterances'). It is shown that the initial units of the child's representation of the world are pre-conceptual cognitive units--mental representations of whole situations. In the course of two consecutive cycles in the child's cognitive development, these units transform into (a) primary notions--object and motor concepts, and (b) binary role relationships. Together, they constitute the elementary language of thought which, in the process of thinking, is used to build conceptual structures--propositions. It is further demonstrated that, immediately after the formation of thought, the child begins to develop his native language in which concrete and motor concepts become initial meanings of nouns and verbs, while propositions become the meanings of the child's expressions. The chapter concludes with a contrastive analysis of the proposed approach and Aristotle's and Chomsky's views on thought and language. Chapter Three analyzes how a community's culture affects its language. It is demonstrated that the progress of a community, the main constituent of the civilizational component of its culture, enhances the development of the content component of language by extending the range of its lexical and grammatical meanings. In the context of this analysis, Daniel Everett's (2008) hypothesis that culture affects language structure is discussed. In the subsequent sections, models of the development of human and social activity are offered. These models comprise three components: Activity (main component), Thought, and Language (auxiliary components that ensure the successful realization of activities). The models are illustrated with examples of some concrete societies. (shrink)

Can language directly access what is true, or is the truth judgment affected by the subjective, perhaps even solipsistic, constructs of reality built by the speakers of that language? The construction of such subjective representations is known as veridicality, and in this book Anastasia Giannakidou and Alda Mari deftly address the interaction between truth and veridicality in the grammatical phenomena of mood choice: the indicative and subjunctive choice in the complements of modal expressions (words like must, may, can, and (...) possible) and propositional attitude verbs (such as know, believe, remember, dream, and persuade). Combining several strands of analysis-formal linguistic semantics, syntactic theory, modal logic, and philosophy of language- Giannakidou and Mari's theory not only enriches the analysis of linguistic modality, but also offers a unified perspective of modals and propositional attitudes. Their synthesis covers mood, modality, and attitude verbs in Greek and Romance languages including Italian and French, while also offering broader applications for languages lacking systematic mood distinction, such as English, and explaining interactions between modality, time, and evidentiality. (shrink)

Noam Chomsky claims that we know the grammatical principles of our languages in pretty much the same sense that we know ordinary things about the world (e.g. facts), a view about linguistic knowledge that I term ''cognitivism''. In much recent philosophy of linguistics (including that sympathetic to Chomsky's general approach to language), cognitivism has been rejected in favour of an account of grammatical competence as some or other form of mental mechanism, describable at various levels of abstraction (''non-cognitivism''). (...) I argue for cognitivism and against non-cognitivism. First, I show that the distinction between competence and performance in current linguistics is as clearly made as ever it was, in spite of recent interest in linguistic processing modules. Second, I use these facts about the practice of theoretical linguistics to refute various proposals for a non-cognitivist construal of grammatical competence, and to support cognitivism by reflecting on the inapplicability of a multi-level account of linguistic competence. Cognitivism is then defended against several objections centring around the problems of rational integration and conceptualization of grammatical knowledge. Finally, the conception of competence argued for in relation to linguistics is placed in the larger context of cognitive science research and its implications for philosophy of mind. (shrink)

The essay first makes some observations on the general interrelationship between the logical writings of Albert and Buridan. Second, it gives an account of a ‘semantic logical model’ for analyzing complex subject terms in some basic categorical propositions which is defended by Albert of Saxony, and briefly recounts Buridan's criticisms of that model. Finally, the essay maintains that the Albertian model is typically compatible with, and a further development of, what is called by a late-fourteenth century anonymous scholar ‘the (...) English-Rule’ but the ‘determinable/determinate’ grammatical model defended by Buridan is not. (shrink)

The question of the affinity between Wittgenstein's philosophy and pragmatism is one that has been often discussed, usually by philosophers sympathetic to a broadly affirmative answer. Pragmatism came into being in 1867 in a reading group in Cambridge Massachusetts, the members of which included Peirce and James. Putnam observes that though the later Wittgenstein may not have been a pragmatist “in the strict sense”, he “shares a central, perhaps the central emphasis with pragmatism: the emphasis on the primacy of practice”. (...) Though Wittgenstein might have resisted the idea that he gave “primacy” to any concept, there is clearly a sense in which Putnam is right. Wittgenstein also admits a class of propositions he calls “grammatical propositions” or “norms of description”. James's most significant influence over Wittgenstein lies in the philosophy of psychology. James's method in psychology is empiricist and introspectionist, and he is a master of the description of mental life. (shrink)

This paper considers the connection between concepts, conceptual schemes and grammar in Wittgenstein’s last writings. It lists eight claims about concepts that one can garner from these writings. It then focuses on one of them, namely that there is an important difference between conceptual and factual problems and investigations. That claim draws in its wake other claims, all of them revolving around the idea of a conceptual scheme, what Wittgenstein calls a ‘grammar’. I explain why Wittgenstein’s account does not fall (...) prey to Davidson’s animadversions against the idea of a conceptual scheme as a force operating on a pre-conceptual content. In the sequel I deny that the distinction between grammatical and empirical propositions disappears in the last writings: it is neither deliberately abandoned, nor willy-nilly undermined by the admission of hinge propositions in On Certainty or by the role accorded to agreement in judgement. (shrink)

The logical form of a discourse—such as a proposition, a set of propositions, an argument, or an argumentation—is obtained by abstracting from the subject-matter of its content terms or by regarding the content terms as mere place-holders or blanks in a form. In a logically perfect language the logical form of a proposition, a set of propositions, an argument, or an argumentation is determined by the grammatical form of the sentence, the set of sentences, the argument-text, or (...) the argumentation-text expressing it. Two such discourse-texts are said to have the same grammatical form, in this sense, if a uniform one-one substitution of content words transforms the one exactly into the other. The sentence ‘Abe properly respects every agent who respects himself’ may be regarded as having the same grammatical form as the sentence ‘Ben generously assists every patient who assists himself’. (shrink)

It is sometimes argued that Wittgenstein's conception of grammar and the role he allocated to grammar (in his sense of the term) in philosophy changed between the Big Typescript and the Philosophical Investigations. It is also held that some of the grammatical propositions Wittgenstein asserted prior to his writing of the Philosophical Investigations are theses, doctrines, opinions or dogmatism, which he abandoned by 1936/37. The purpose of this paper is to show these claims to be misunderstandings and misinterpretations. (...) On all important matters, his conception of grammar and of grammatical investigations, of grammatical statements or propositions and of grammatical clarification did not change between the Big Typescript and the Investigations. Grammatical propositions (e.g. the meaning of a word is its use; a sample in an ostensive definition belongs to the means of representation; belief is not a mental state) are no more theses, doctrines or opinions than is “a bachelor is an unmarried man.” Nor are they in any way dogmatic. (shrink)