Baumard proposes that life history slowing in populations over time is the principal driver of innovation rates. We show that this is only true of micro-innovation rates, which reflect cognitive and economic specialization as an adaptation to high population density, and not macro-innovation rates, which relate more to a population's level of general intelligence.

In a revolutionary new book, a theoretical physicist attacks the foundations of modern scientific theory, including the notion of time, as he shares evidence of ...

The series of Velvet revolutions in 1989, which brought about the collapse of communism in Europe, seem to have vindicated those political theorists and activists who believed in the possibility of non-violent power. The relative success of the 1989 revolutions has validated a new paradigm of revolutionary change based on the assumption that radical changes were attainable through moderate means. Yet the legacy of these non-violent revolutions also points towards the limits of political strategies fundamentally opposed to violence. The article (...) shows that the key architects of non-violent revolutions in 1989 were well aware of the contingent nature of all political actions, and were thus willing to take risks in their pursuit of freedom. (shrink)

Part intellectual history, part critical theory, The Last Man Takes LSD challenges the way we think about both Michel Foucault and modern progressive politics. One fateful day in May 1975, Foucault dropped acid in the southern California desert. In letters reproduced here, he described it as among the most important events of his life, one which would lead him to completely rework his History of Sexuality. That trip helped redirect Foucault's thought and contributed to a tectonic shift in the intellectual (...) life of the era. He came to reinterpret the social movements of May '68 and reposition himself politically in France, embracing anti-totalitarian currents and becoming a critic of the welfare state. Mitchell Dean and Daniel Zamora examine the full historical context of the turn in Foucault's thought, which included studies of the Iranian revolution and French socialist politics, through which he would come to appreciate the possibilities of autonomy offered by a new force on the French political scene that was neither of the left nor the right: neoliberalism. (shrink)

In the following short essay I set out the key insights and main arguments in Nick Hostettler’s Eurocentrism . This text is an important contribution to the potential for creative elaboration inherent in Roy Bhaskar’s Dialectic and is also a substantive achievement in its own right. Hostettler’s work provides a way to move beyond the partialities and tensions of eurocentrism and anti-eurocentrism by repositioning both in terms of the europic. There are, however, a number of potential limitations in the way (...) the argument is developed so far. Content Type Journal Article Category Review Essay Pages 99-111 Authors Jamie Morgan, Leeds Metropolitan University Journal Journal of Critical Realism Online ISSN 1572-5138 Print ISSN 1476-7430 Journal Volume Volume 12 Journal Issue Volume 12, Number 1 / 2013. (shrink)

"End-Of-Law week drinkS @ ACT Magistrates Court: Friday 20 May 2005." Ethos: Official Publication of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory, (198), pp. 24.

Modern medicine provides unprecedented opportunities in diagnostics and treatment. However, in some situations at the end of a patient’s life, many physicians refrain from using all possible measures to prolong life. We studied the incidence of different types of treatment withheld or withdrawn in 6 European countries and analyzed the main background characteristics.

The debate about how to interpret Foucault’s writings on neoliberalism has been going on for a while now: where some see in The Birth of Biopolitics a devastating critique of neoliberal reason, others see a laudatory exposition. Mitchell Dean and Daniel Zamora’s recent book The Last Man Takes LSD: Foucault and the End of Revolution is the newest contribution to this dispute. In it, the two authors rearticulate in book-length the position they have previously defended in several articles and (...) book chapters: that Foucault was enticed by neoliberal thought and that his reading of Gary Becker and others significantly affected the intellectual trajectory of his later years. While the arguments about what Foucault really thought of neoliberalism are central to the book – and many will no doubt find fault with its interpretation of Foucault in this regard – I set the somewhat tired exegetical debates aside for the purposes of this review. Instead, I focus on the book’s, in my opinion, more interesting project of analysing the broader relations between neoliberalism, Foucauldian thought and Left politics. Despite being a well-written and in many places highly interesting and worthwhile book, it ultimately falls short of a compelling analysis in this regard. (shrink)

Growth of the global food supply and predicted increases in the human population have been well-studied and modeled. Increases in food production have been based on a paradigm established in the post-World War II era which addresses increases in the need for food through the application of basic and translational scientific research to agricultural problems, with the assumption that technological solutions to food production can be used to reduce or eliminate hunger. However, the role of increased agricultural production has not (...) been adequately addressed as a factor in population expansion. While there is at present no viable and acceptable alternative to the current food production paradigm, the role of increased food production can and should be examined in the context of irremediable environmental damage and as a driving force in population growth. (shrink)

In recent years, feminist and queer theory have effectively disavowed both “the human” and revolutionary politics. In the face of massive geopolitical crisis, posthumanists have called for us to reconsider fundamentally the superiority and centrality of mankind and “the human,” and question how Man can presume to change the world by revolutionary action, particularly when Marx’s dreams seem to have been swept into the dustbin of history. This provocative book reaffirms what is most basic in feminism – the attack on (...) the “universality” and sovereignty of Man – but contends that the only way this can mean anything other than pessimistic rhetoric is to embrace human agency and the struggle against colonialism and capitalism. In a series of “creolized” readings – Foucault with Ali Shari’ati, Lacan with Fanon, and Spinoza with Sylvia Wynter – the authors demonstrate what is at stake in the ongoing debate between humanism and posthumanism, putting this debate in the context of contemporary global crises and the possibilities of revolution. In its defense of “political spirituality,” this book pushes for a new trajectory in response to the gross inequalities of today, one that offers us a very different view of revolution and its present-day potential. (shrink)

In the early 1970s, we and others in the economics profession became enamored with the notion of externalties—a cost or benefit imposed on or provided to others but not taken into account by the economic agents who generate the effect. We, and others, seemed to see external effects everywhere. There was polluted water and air, noise, urban blight, traffic congestion, and other features of modern life that seemed to call out for some form of corrective action. As the externalities (...) class='Hi'>revolution unfolded, economists and other social scientists overlooked the importance of evolved legal and other institutions that formally and informally establish property and liability rules that cause decision makers to face the cost of their actions, including what otherwise could be external costs imposed on unwilling third parties. While markets seemed always to fail, political institutions were seen systematically as without blemish, or so it seemed. It was this two-pronged failure, 1) a failure to consider and state assumptions about background institutional arrangements and 2) a disregard for special interest politics, that became the Achilles Heel of the otherwise elegant externality arguments. Eventually, it was the modern institutionalists, scholars who focused on laws, regulation, and rules of the marketplace, who attempted to close the lid and drive the nails on the externality coffin. In this paper, we reach back to 1920 and trace the rise and decline of the policy importance of externalities theory. Beginning with A. C. Pigou and Alfred Marshall, our story includes some of the great figures in economic history of thought. But while theory was being built, institutions were overlooked. Pigou continues to be a dominant player in the story until the 1960s and 1970s when externalities theory was challenged by James M. Buchanan, Ronald Coase and other scholars. It is here in the twilight years of the externalities revolution that the prospects of government failure are raised as being more daunting than the likelihood of market failure. Finally, in the late 1970s and beyond, the externalities revolution is replaced by a property rights revolution. (shrink)

In this article it will be argued that François Furet's attempt in Interpreting the French Revolution to provide a conceptual history of the French Revolution through a synthesis of Tocqueville and Cochin's historical and sociological accounts fails methodologically. It does so in two ways: Firstly, in its aim to distinguish between conceptual, explanatory history and empirical, narrative history, and secondly, in its distinction between revolution as process and revolution as act. Drawing on Claude Lefort and Paul (...) Ricoeur's interventions in the historiographical debate, I demonstrate that these seemingly methodological concerns, conceal a deeper historical and political question concerning the nature of the ‘event’ of revolution. In response to Furet's oblique turn to Hegel in his later work, this article traces the nature of the ‘conceptual inversion’ Furet claims to find in Hegel and Marx's accounts of the French Revolution. In relation to Marx, it is argued that Furet's critique fails to capture the allegorical nature of the political in Marx's thought, and underplays the significance of revolution as the basis for both the separation of the social and the political and their attempted unity. The article ends with some remarks on the importance of language and culture in rethinking the relationship between Hegel and Marx. (shrink)

This paper aims to reflect on a philosophy of resistance based on Michel Foucault’s thought and it questions whether the present has reached the end of the era of revolution. The paper presents two studies. Study I discusses the author’s position concerning Marx’s theses in order to outline the notion of resistance within the framework of relations of power. In that regard, the general strike of May 1968 is exemplary. Study II deals with how to think of resistance as (...) an experience. The notion of foyer highlights the articulating function between the ‘empowerment’ aspect of resistance and the processes of desubjectivation of experience. By developing this hypothesis, three themes addressed in Foucault’s works are considered: transgression, counter-conduct, and critical attitude. Finally, this thesis respects the limitations found in Foucault’s philosophy, without neglecting his records to support it. Conclusion suggests that the philosophy of resistance may promote an experience of defiance. (shrink)

In a book on Justinian’s wars of conquest, Peter Heather has argued that Rome’s ability to wage war in the sixth century CE was helped, to a large degree, by the military revolution that took place in Late Antiquity, which consisted of two principal parts: an increased deployment of Roman soldiers to the eastern frontier, and a shift towards Hunnic tactics. In this essay, however, I argue that these claims are misguided, and using five criteria set out by Lee (...) Brice in an article on military revolution during the reigns of Philip II and Alexander the Great of Macedon, I show that the changes which Heather argues in favour of had begun long before Late Antiquity. Instead, what we see is the continued gradual evolution of Rome’s military, with the Roman state shifting troops to the east from the beginning of the imperial era, and the first documented implementation of steppe-inspired changes dating to the second century. (shrink)

Are we rapidly approaching the end of the work-centered society? This article contends that at the century's end we may witness the disappearance of the great productivist utopias of the 1920s and 1930s. The crisis of productivist systems and ideologies may be far more significant than the more narrowly defined crisis of communism, or of `Fordism', that many critics have identified. Shifts in the forms of metaphor and the technology of work are taking place which call into question traditional notions (...) of the biopolitics of work. Modern productivism - the productivism of the industrial revolution - was governed by the belief that human society and nature are linked by the primacy and ultimate interchangeability (convertibility) of all productive activity. It presupposes a metaphor of the motor which first appeared during the first quarter of the 19th century. With the eclipse of the metaphor of the human motor, we can ask whether the end of the `work-centered model of society' might be attributed to the decline of its most compelling metaphor. If the body no longer occupies the central metaphor of productivism, what does this mean for the new configuration of labor and the model of labor based on information processing rather than the generation of things or the conversion of force? (shrink)

Martin Heidegger is now widely recognized as the most influential philosopher of the Twentieth Century. Until the late 1960's, this impact derived mainly from his early magnum opus, 1927's Being and Time. Many of this century's most significant Continental thinkers---including Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Arendt, Gadamer, Marcuse, Habermas, Bultmann, and Levinas---acknowledge profound conceptual debts to insights first elaborated in this text. But Being and Time was never finished, and Heidegger continued to extend, develop, and in some places revolutionize his own thinking for (...) another fifty years. This "later" Heidegger's prolific body of work has decisively influenced the next generation of Continental thinkers, shaping the concepts and concerns of important figures such as Derrida, Foucault, Lacan, Blanchot, and Baudrillard. Despite this unparalleled impact, several basic aspects of Heidegger's later philosophy remain shrouded in mystery, confusion, and controversy. ;The End of Onto-Theology: Understanding Heidegger's Turn, Method, and Politics explains four central aspects of Heidegger's later thought: his controversial understanding of metaphysics as onto-theology, his famously recondite Kehre, his heretofore overlooked philosophical methodology, and his appalling misadventure with Nazism. ;Chapter I introduces the basic structure and unifying thesis of the text. Chapter II clarifies and periodizes Heidegger's mysterious Kehre or "turn," the philosophical transformation which distinguishes his "early" and "later" work. Chapter III uncovers another sense of Kehre, connecting this "turning" to Heidegger's infamous political misadventure. Chapter IV reconstructs Heidegger's famous Destruktion of the history of metaphysical foundationalism, showing how this "deconstruction" both disabused Heidegger of his own politically disastrous metaphysical ambition to recover a "fundamental ontology" and provides the necessary philosophical background for understanding Heidegger's later philosophy. Chapter V explicates Heidegger's later methodology, "ontohistorical placement through hermeneutic altercation," using the case of Nietzsche to demonstrate how Heidegger developed and deployed this method to situate other philosophers' contributions to the history of intelligibility. Chapter VI addresses the complex intersection of Heidegger's critique of Nietzsche's nihilistic legacy with his failed bid to assume philosophical leadership of the National Socialist "revolution," isolating its philosophical sources and establishing the important philosophical lessons Heidegger learned from his "great political error.". (shrink)

The present work carries us back to a period which, although chronologically no more than a generation or so behind us, has become as foreign to the present generation in Germany as if it were already a full hundred years old. Yet it was the period of Germany's preparation for the Revolution of 1848; and all that has happened in our country since then has been merely a continuation of 1848, merely the execution of the last will and testament (...) of the revolution. Just as in France in the eighteenth century, so in Germany in the nineteenth, a philosophical revolution ushered in the political collapse. But with what a difference! The French were in open combat with all official science, with the church and often also the state; their writings were printed beyond the frontier, in Holland or England, while they themselves were often on the point of landing in the Bastille. But the Germans were professors, state-appointed instructors of youth; their writings were recognized textbooks, and the system rounding off the whole development---the Hegelian system---was even raised, in some degree, to the rank of a royal Prussian philosophy of state! Was it possible that a revolution could hide behind these professors, behind their pedantically obscure phrases, their ponderous, wearisome sentences? Were not the liberals, the very people who then passed as the representatives of the revolution, the bitterest opponents of this brain-befuddling philosophy? But what neither governments nor liberals saw was seen by at least one man as early as 1833, and indeed by a man called Heinrich Heine. (shrink)

The theoretical fault-lines in liberal democratic theory have always been located in at least two important sites: that of process or procedure, and that of outcome. As to the former, the problem has been that of trying to ensure that the “will of the people” – or at least of the relevant people, the eligible voters – gets to be expressed through meaningful, practical mechanisms. According to the consensus shared by most mainstream liberal democratic theorists of the recent past, elections (...) to representative bodies and subsequent votes by the winners of these elections are such mechanisms. But of course at every turn we constantly find instances of elected governments thwarting the majority views of the same body of individuals by which they were originally elected. Liberal democratic theory says that, as long as the appropriate procedures for manifesting the majority will of the people concerning who is to represent them were followed, then the representatives are justified in voting against the apparent will of the people. But this is a clear practical contradiction. As for the the question of outcome, here recent liberal democratic theory has dug an even deeper hole for itself by abandoning the notion of a common good, to which at least some earlier theorists in this tradition still subscribed. Liberal democratic theory has ultimately denied itself any critical function with respect to outcomes. Instead, it is forced to ratify every outcome, however clearly misguided or even tragic it may be, as long as it is the product of the accepted authoritative set of procedures and institutions. Surely the new theoretical direction will need to come to grips with all the elements mostly absent from the Rawlsian approach and from the writings of most of Rawls’ liberal democratic fellow travelers: power, violence, domination, ideology, decision, interpretation, political expression, revolution, history, economy, biopolitics. New models for social and political philosophy are desperately needed! (shrink)

The question of 'the end of metaphysics' is generally considered as a central issue concerning the nature and significance of philosophy as such, and, accordingly, as belonging to the realm of 'pure' or 'fundamental' philosophy. By contrast, this book investigates to what extent the end of metaphysics might be related to specific influences from outside philosophy. Focusing on the period between 1830 and 1848, it argues that metaphysics was not so much challenged by internal philosophical argument, but rather by a (...) transformation of Western culture in its entirety. Metaphysics was overtaken by the modern spirit of the age. In consequence, this book approaches 'the end of metaphysics' as a problem of the philosophy of culture. Three historians of culture provide an overview and analysis of the 'Age of Revolution' by focusing upon the political revolution in France, the industrial revolution in England and the intellectual revolution in Germany respectively. The proclamations of the end of metaphysics by Auguste Comte, Friedrich Engels and Otto Friedrich Gruppe are shown to mirror this threefold cultural transformation. Against this backdrop, the idea of the end of metaphysics is brought into relief as a historical reality during the years 1830 to 1848. The editors are members of the Centre for Metaphysics and Culture at the University of Antwerp. (shrink)

Herbert Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man is framed as a response to the “end of ideology” thesis of political equilibrium and a criticism of mainstream theoretical construction in advanced industrial countries. Such formulations obscured new forms of self-alienation in totally administered society, and replaced any conceived potential subjectivity with objective laws that govern social relations. One-Dimensional Man is also framed as a response to the “crisis of Marxism” by underscoring the importance of popular ideology in shaping subjective action, which at present, precludes (...) proletarian revolution. (shrink)

The hegemonic form of contemporary queer theory is dependent on a model of desire as autonomous and deregulated, derived from post-'68 French theory and particularly the work of Michel Foucault. Such a model is at risk of finding itself in congruence with a deregulated post-Fordist capitalism that recuperates supposedly dissident sexual identities. This article returns to the work of Foucault to identify a largely unacknowledged tendency in his work that contests the valorization of sexuality and calls for an `end of (...) the monarchy of sex'. This possibility is linked to Foucault's controversial exploration of the concept of `spiritual politics' through his engagement with the Iranian revolution. Rather than regarding this as a regression into a reactionary religiosity, I argue that it forms an inquiry into new political possibilities of revolt. These possibilities contest what Alain Badiou has identified as the nihilism of contemporary capitalism, in which desire and sexuality are deployed to constrain the political imagination to a limited bodily `materialism'. Drawing on the work of the later Foucault, it becomes possible to develop this new politics around asceticism, which is not so much withdrawal from the world but the refusal of the mediations of identity through sexuality and the body. (shrink)

The sudden collapse of the Communist states in Eastern Europe during the autumn of 1989 is now history. The transformation of the world in 1989 has been reported and commented on through analyses of the political, economic, and social state of affairs that led to one of the most surprising events of the 20th century. However, in many ways this story has been only partially told. This is because of a lack of attention paid to the vital role that the (...) Christian churches played in that transformation. This article seeks to remedy that omission through a brief history of the period. The author utilizes an array of secondary and primary sources in the writing of this history. He was also an observer of most of the revolutions of Eastern Europe and interviewed a number of participants in the dramatic events of 1989. (shrink)

In his article La fin de la matière (1906) Henri Poincaré reported that according to many physicists “matter does not exist”, but he immediately added: “this discovery is not conclusive”. This caution was not shared by many philosophers, who swiftly saluted both special and general relativity as the sources of a new conception of physical objects. In my talk I will focus on Marburg neo-Kantianism (Cohen, Natorp and Cassirer) with its characteristic thesis of a progressive “dissolution” of matter modern physics, (...) culminating in relativity. I will point out that this view predated Einstein’s discoveries and was rooted in a long epistemological tradition starting with Leibniz and Kant. Indeed, the neo-Kantian philosophers argued that this view was an originally Platonic insight that modern physics (and Einstein’s relativity in particular) eventually confirmed. I will show that this historical-philosophical perspective influenced the reception of relativity and left open a number of epistemological and scientific problems. (shrink)

There is no question that something goes on in the head, which has been called consciousness. But is it consciousness? Over the last fifty years, there has been a concerted attempt to show how consciousness can be physical, of the brain. The diversity of views is characteristic of a Kuhnian pre- normal science revolution: but the revolution has not arrived. This is because the assumption that consciousness exists is wrong. In this paper consciousness (with e.g. its subjective/objective distinction) (...) is characterized as a pre-scientific theory. The biological ontology of the phenomenon is revealed, and its placement in organismic biology explained. The phenomenon will be termed brain-sign, as appropriate to its biological function. The nature of this function completely reconstructs our view of ourselves, and other creatures in which it is manifest. The detail and ramifications cannot be addressed at length in a paper, but a research program is outlined briefly. (shrink)

This paper uses Martin Luther and Mao Zedong's translation strategies to philosophize anew the dialectic between the national and the global in the history of revolutions. Luther and Mao each instigated a "revolution" by translating a universal faith into a vernacular; the end product in each case was the globalization of his vernacularized faith and the export of his local revolution all over the world. By vernacularizing a universal faith, Luther and Mao respectively inaugurated a new national idiom, (...) a new national identity and, in the case of Mao, founded a new nation. The far more intriguing phenomenon which I identify – and on which I seek to make my most original contributions is: Protestantism and Maoism developed global reach not despite, but because of, their insistence on a local translation-articulation of a universalist ideology. My paper attends to both the similarities and differences between Luther and Mao. (shrink)

Nobel-price winning atmospheric chemist Paul Crutzen introduced in 2000 the concept of the Anthropocene as the name for the successor geological period to the Holocene. The Holocene started about 12,000 years ago and is characterized by the relatively stable and temperate climatic and environmental conditions that were conducive to the development of human societies. Until recently, human development had relatively little impact on the dynamics of geological time. Although disagreement exists over the exact birth date of the Anthropocene, it is (...) indisputable that the impact of human activity on the geo-climatic environment became more pronounced from the industrial revolution onwards, leading to a situation in which humans are now widely considered to have an eco-geologically critical impact on the earth's bio-physical system. The most obvious example is the accumulation of greenhouse gases like CO2and Methane (CH4) in the atmosphere and the changes this induces in climatic dynamics. Others are the growing homogenization of biodiversity as a result of human-induced species migration, mass extinction and bio-diversity loss, the manufacturing of new (sub-)species through genetic modification, or the geodetic consequences resulting from, for example, large dam construction, mining and changing sea-levels. (shrink)

Hugo Grotius and the Century of Revolution, 1613-1718 is a reconstruction of the way Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) was read and used by English political and religious writers in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Engaging with the reception of all of Grotius's key works and a wide range of topics, the volume has much to say about the search for peace in an age of religious conflict and about the cultural roots of the Enlightenment. Most of all, Marco Barducci (...) aims to deepen our understanding of the connections that made English political thought part of the history of European thought. To this end, it brings together a succinct account of Grotius's own thinking on key topics, mapping these accounts within English debates, to show why his ideas were seen to be relevant at key moments; shows awareness of the possibilities for the misappropriation inherent in reception; and adds something new to our understanding of why seventeenth-century Englishmen argued in the ways that they did. (shrink)

The deep crisis in modern fundamental science development is ever more evident and openly recognised now even by mainstream, official science professionals and leaders. By no coincidence, it occurs in parallel to the world civilisation crisis and related global change processes, where the true power of unreduced scientific knowledge is just badly missing as the indispensable and unique tool for the emerging greater problem solution and further progress at a superior level of complex world dynamics. Here we reveal the mathematically (...) exact reason for the crisis in conventional science, containing also the natural and unified problem solution in the form of well-specified extension of usual, artificially restricted paradigm. We show how that extended, now causally complete science content provides various "unsolvable" problem solutions and opens new development possibilities for both science and society, where the former plays the role of the main, direct driver for the latter. We outline the related qualitative changes in science organisation, practice and purposes, giving rise to the sustainability transition in the entire civilisation dynamics towards the well-specified superior level of its unreduced, now well understood and universally defined complexity. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Hegel's Century: Alienation and Recognition in a Time of Revolution by Jon StewartClay GrahamJon Stewart. Hegel's Century: Alienation and Recognition in a Time of Revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021. Pp. xi + 338. Hardback, $39.99.Hegel's Century serves as (yet another) important contribution in Jon Stewart's ever-expanding research in nineteenth-century philosophy. The central premise of this monograph explores Hegel's pan-European legacy and argues that Hegelian concepts (...) are fundamental for understanding major philosophical themes of the era, especially on the European continent. Dominant among these themes are alienation and recognition, particularly their adaptation to political philosophy and religious criticism. Stewart develops his theses via a series of chapters dedicated to individual thinkers: Heine, Feuerbach, Bauer, Marx, Kierkegaard, Dostoyevsky, Bakunin, and Engels. In each case, the concepts of alienation and recognition are teased out of primary texts and connected to, and contrasted with, their Hegelian origin. While scholars of nineteenth-century philosophy may find some value in re-envisioning the development of continental thought through Stewart's narrative [End Page 330] (especially insofar as it challenges unfortunate caricatures of the history of ideas), the target audiences of Hegel's Century are advanced students of philosophy and the general public of interested persons. Though this approach has its shortcomings, it is nevertheless a valuable addition to the literature. Not only does Stewart tell a compelling story about the trajectory of nineteenth-century philosophy, but he also connects this conceptual evolution to shifts in political, economic, literary, and religious history. As such, Hegel's Century is best thought of as a gateway text for students and autodidacts fascinated by the philosophical bases for a century of upheaval and revolution.Following a general introduction, Stewart divides the book into three parts, each more substantive than the last. His introduction does the necessary legwork detailing the purpose, audience, and strategy of the book. Its most philosophically interesting aspect is the outline of seven ideas Stewart hopes will reform the reception of nineteenth-century philosophy in the modern classroom. Philosophical exposition begins in part 1, which consists of two chapters wherein Stewart details those aspects of Hegel's philosophy that will be most thoroughly thematized throughout the book. These ideas are largely sourced from specific portions of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, and Lectures on the Philosophy of History. Chapter 1 focuses on Hegel's view of alienation in the Phenomenology, especially the (in)famous section on the master and bondsman. In chapter 2, Stewart explains Hegel's conception of Christianity and the nature of divinity. Stewart maintains that as a result of dense prose and conceptual rigor, Hegel's religious views were open to myriad ambiguous interpretations. When Stewart turns to "first-generation" thinkers, namely, those who attended Hegel's lectures in Berlin and were a direct part of the intoxicating intellectual atmosphere that spread therein, questions concerning the essence of Christianity (as Feuerbach's magnum opus suggests) are front and center. Stewart's cursory account of Hegel's theory of Christianity serves adequately as the background for contextualizing this intellectual drama.In part 2, three of these "first-generation" thinkers are given their own chapters: Heine (chapter 3), Feuerbach (chapter 4), and Bauer (chapter 5). In each case, the chapter starts with a short intellectual biography focusing on the formative role Hegel played in the thinker's development. This is followed by a sustained discussion of a few central texts and interspersed analyses of how Hegel's influence is felt therein. Stewart's discussion often shows the ambivalence with which each of these thinkers handled their Hegelian inheritance. Though the specifics differ, each of these three thinkers took Hegelian theory to a more radical limit than Hegel himself did. The chapters on Heine and Bauer—figures usually overlooked in survey courses—are admirable introductions for the interested neophyte.In part 3, Stewart shows Hegel's tentacles extending throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century, notwithstanding the Hegelians' difficulty in acquiring academic posts. The political and religious radicalism of first-generation critics bleeds into the formative development of the so-called "second generation" of thinkers: Marx... (shrink)