People often get angry when they perceive an injustice that affects others but not themselves. In two studies, we investigated the elicitation of third-party anger by varying moral violation and others’ outcome presented in newspaper articles. We found that anger was highly contingent on the moral violation. Others’ outcome, although relevant for compassion, were not significantly relevant for anger or less relevant for anger than for compassion. This indicates that people can be morally outraged: anger (...) can be elicited by a perceived violation of moral values alone, independent of the harm done. A severe negative consequence for others is not necessary to elicit anger. (shrink)

Machiavellianism is a double-edged sword in leadership. While Machiavellian leaders can be successful, they also can be amoral, influencing their followers to exhibit unethical, counterproductive, and corrupt behaviors. The extant research surrounding Machiavellian leadership has focused narrowly on how followers tacitly endorse such leader behaviors rather than standing up to the leader through whistleblowing. Drawing upon affective events theory (AET), this research examines the relationship between a leader’s Machiavellian traits, followers’ moral anger and empathic concern, and the likelihood (...) of whistleblowing. We conducted three complementary studies that examine our model. First, in a time-lagged, leader–follower field study, we examined the indirect relationship between Machiavellian leadership and whistleblowing through follower moral anger. Then, we adopted the causal chain design and conducted two independent recall experiments using the critical incident technique to establish the moderating role of follower empathetic concern on the causal relationship between Machiavellian leadership and moral anger, and the causal relationship between moral anger and whistleblowing. This research contributes to the literature by highlighting the emotional dynamics that explain a constructive follower response to leader Machiavellianism. (shrink)

Ethicists have become increasingly skeptical about the importance of empathy in producing moral concern for others. One of the main claims made by empathy skeptics is a psychological thesis: empathy is not the primary psychological process responsible for producing moral concern. Some of the best evidence that could confirm or disconfirm this thesis comes from research on empathizing with animals. However, this evidence has not been discussed in any of the prominent critiques of empathy. In this paper, I investigate six (...) different empirical claims commonly made about empathy toward animals. I find all six claims to be problematic, though some are more plausible than others, and argue that empathy is indeed not psychologically central to producing moral concern for animals. I also review evidence indicating that other moral emotions, particularly anger, are more strongly engaged with producing moral concern for animals, and are thus more capable of achieving various normative aims in animal ethics. The conclusion of my argument is that empathy should lose its currently privileged place. (shrink)

본 논문은 감정과 공공성의 관계를 해명하는 것을 목적으로 한다. 일반적으로 감정은 오늘날 도덕적 추론의 원천으로 작동한다고 인정되고 있다. 이는 칸트의 전통에 반하는 주장으로 흄과 스미스의 도덕감정론에 그 기원을 갖고 있다. 그러나 이들에게서조차 감정이 도덕적 판단의 원천이 될 수 있을지라도 감정이 공공성과 어떤 관계를 갖는지에 대한 해명은 부족하다고 할 수 있다. 따라서 필자는 감정이 도덕적 추론의 원천일 뿐만 아니라 감정이 공공성을 형성하고 공공성을 작동하는 하나의 중요한 계기가 될 수 있음을 밝히고자 한다.BR 이를 위해 필자는 먼저 다양한 감정 중 공공성과 가장 관계를 (...) 맺고 있다고 생각되는 분노와 연민의 감정을 고찰할 것이다. 국내외 많은 학자들이 감정의 윤리성과 사회성에 대한 연구를 최근 진행시키고 있는바 윤리학뿐만 아니라 사회학의 연구를 참조해 감정과 공공성이 밀접한 관계가 있음을 보여주고자 한다. 그리고 이는 감정의 인지적 성격, 가치적 성격을 부정하는 하버마스의 윤리에 대한 고찰과 비판을 함께 진행하여 본 연구의 설득력을 좀더 높이고자 한다. 결국 감정과 공공성의 관계에 대한 연구는 윤리학의 목표와 과제에 대한 질문과 연결되며, 인간의 고유성이 무엇이어야 하는지에 대한 반성으로 이어질 것이다. (shrink)

:Recent behavioral economics studies have shown that third parties compensate players in Dictator, Ultimatum, and Trust games. However, there are almost no studies about what drives third parties to compensate victims in such games. It can be argued that compensation is a form of helping; and helping behavior, in a variety of forms, has been widely researched, especially with regard to motivators. Previous work on helping behavior has focused on empathic concern as a primary driver. In sharp contrast, (...) class='Hi'>anger is often seen as an antisocial motivator resulting in aggression. However, other research has shown that moral outrage, anger evoked by the violation of a moral rule or a social norm, can lead to the punishment of a perpetrator, often described as altruistic or pro-social punishment. Some of the motivations for pro-social punishment, namely a concern for justice or the restoration of community values, can also be realized through victim compensation. We therefore propose the hypothesis that moral outrage leads to compensating behavior above and beyond what is predicted by empathic concern, but only when a social norm has been violated. We test this hypothesis in two studies, both of which use modified trust games in which the investor experiences a loss due either to a social norm violation or some other cause. Study 1 shows that trait moral outrage predicts third-party compensatory behavior above and beyond empathic concern, but only when a social norm is violated. To better understand the causal mechanism, Study 2 directly manipulated moral outrage, showing again that moral outrage leads to compensation, but only when a social norm is violated. View HTML Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.I’M SO ANGRY I COULD HELP YOU: MORAL OUTRAGE AS A DRIVER OF VICTIM COMPENSATIONVolume 32, Issue 2Erik W. Thulin and Cristina Bicchieri DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052516000145Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle [email protected]@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. I’M SO ANGRY I COULD HELP YOU: MORAL OUTRAGE AS A DRIVER OF VICTIM COMPENSATIONVolume 32, Issue 2Erik W. Thulin and Cristina Bicchieri DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052516000145Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. I’M SO ANGRY I COULD HELP YOU: MORAL OUTRAGE AS A DRIVER OF VICTIM COMPENSATIONVolume 32, Issue 2Erik W. Thulin and Cristina Bicchieri DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052516000145Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation Request permission. (shrink)

To understand human emotions we need, alongside appraisal, the concept of emergence (derivation from the expectations of relationships) and the concept of unfolding (of sequences that can be expressed as narratives). These processes can be seen in resentment, which has not been studied extensively in psychology. It is associated with envy, and it can be thought of as a kind of destructive anger. Such issues can be studied in works of literature: simulations of the social world in which emotions (...) can be experienced by means of empathy. Shakespeare's Othello enables us to understand the emergence and unfolding of resentment in Iago, who is passed over for promotion and improvises a plan to destroy Othello. Iago's resentment is difficult to empathize with, and the play raises the question of whether we need to recognize in ourselves the capacity for reprehensible emotions. (shrink)

Theories of morality suggest that negative emotions associated with antisocial behavior should diminish motivation for such behavior. Two reasons that have been proposed to explain why some individuals repeatedly harm others are that (a) they use mechanisms of moral disengagement to justify their actions, and (b) they may not empathize with and vicariously experience the negative emotions felt by their victims. With the aim of testing these proposals, the present study compared spinal cord injured disabled athletes and able-bodied athletes to (...) determine the effect of reduced visceral afferent feedback caused by spinal cord injury on antisocial behavior, moral disengagement, empathy, and negative emotion (i.e., anger, anxiety, and dejection). Disabled athletes reported less frequent antisocial behavior and lower moral disengagement than able-bodied athletes. Group differences in antisocial behavior were mediated by differences in moral disengagement. The two groups did not differ in empathy or negative emotion. The findings of this study suggest that antisocial behavior may be regulated by mechanisms of moral disengagement. (shrink)

Justin D'Arms says that moral disapproval is more closely tied to anger than to the “empathic chill” effect I emphasized in Moral Sentimentalism, but I argue that anger is in several ways inappropriate or unsatisfactory as a basis for understanding disapproval. I go on to explain briefly why I think we need not share D'Arms's worries about the possibility of nonveridical empathy but then focus on what he says about the reference-fixing theory of moral terminology defended in (...) Moral Sentimentalism. I explain why I think his interpretations of my view—both at the Spindel Conference and subsequently—misunderstand the (Kripkean) character of that view. My reply to Lori Watson questions whether her criticisms of Moral Sentimentalism's account of morality are sufficiently sensitive to the self−other asymmetry that typifies so much of ordinary moral thinking. (shrink)

This book presents the case for Compassionate Reasoning as a moral and psychosocial skill for the positive transformation of individuals and societies. It has been developed from a reservoir of moral philosophical, cultural, and religious wisdom traditions over the centuries. These have been derived from a careful combination of classical schools of ethical thought that are artfully combined with compassion neuroscience, contemporary approaches to conflict resolution, public health methodologies, and positive psychological approaches to social change. There is an urgent need (...) for human civilization to invest in the broad-based cultivation of compassionate thoughts, feelings, and especially habits. This skill is then combined with moral reasoning to move the self and others toward less anger and fear, more joy and care in the pursuit of reasonable policies that build peaceful families, communities, and societies. There are many people across the planet who work every day for the sake of others but who are ensconced in exhausting work with dangerous and difficult situations of conflict. These people are often heroic bridge-builders and creators of peaceful societies, and they have a common set of cultivated moral character traits and psychosocial skills. They tend to be kinder, more reasonable, more self-controlled, and more goal-oriented to peace. They are united by a particular set of moral values and the emotional skills to put those values into practice. The aim of this book is to articulate the best combination of those values and skills that lead to personal and communal sustainability, not burnout and self-destruction. The book pivots on the observable difference in the mind-and proven in neuroscience imaging experiments-between destructive empathic distress, on the one hand, and, on the other, joyful, constructive, compassionate care. Facing existential threats to life on the planet, humans can and must make such skills universally sustainable and ingrained. (shrink)

Empathy is a familiar form of emotionally charged imaginative perspective taking. In this dissertation I offer an account of empathy’s moral importance that emphasizes the special value of its unique epistemic functions. Specifically, I defend what I call the humane understanding thesis: empathy is the source of a distinct epistemic good, humane understanding, which consists in the appreciation of the intelligibility of others’ emotional perceptions, and humane understanding is necessary for fully virtuous relations with other people. Adam Smith held that (...) empathy is the unique means by which we judge the propriety of other’s emotions. I draw out the kernel of truth in this surprising claim. Emotions inevitably present the world in a certain evaluative light. When I see my situation as calling out for my anger, or fear, or adoration, my emotion appears to me to be properly responsive to my situation. I can judge my emotion to be inappropriate, all things considered. However, I cannot both be angry at your betrayal and be totally mystified by my own anger, or resent you but see no absolutely nothing in your conduct that appears to call out for my resentment. This insight applies to empathy. When we empathize, we feel genuine emotions. And when we feel these emotions, we cannot fail to appreciate the intelligibility of the other’s original emotion first-hand. This appreciation constitutes humane understanding of the other’s emotion. I further clarify the nature of this epistemic achievement by distinguishing it from two other nearby forms of understanding, one that is achieved through narrative rather than perspective taking, and one that is achieved through unemotional perspective taking. Empathy has recently come in for some heavy criticism. It has been described as not only morally unnecessary, but positively morally corrosive. Recognizing that empathy is the unique means by which we secure humane understanding of others’ emotional perceptions enables us to appreciate aspects of empathy’s moral significance that its most prominent detractors have neglected. Humane understanding is a powerful way of being close to another person, and closeness is something that social beings like ourselves crave, not for any further or deeper purpose, but just because it is valuable to us in and of itself. People have a powerful need to be empathized with because empathy relieves a painful form of loneliness. Empathy can be a way of caring, rather than just a means of getting us to care. In further defense of empathy’s moral significance, I also argue that empathy has a meaningful role to play in the development of both our reflective beliefs about moral properties and our emotional sensitivity to those same properties. Empathy can allow us to discover new moral distinctions through imaginative emotional experience, and it can also help us to shape and sharpen our moral emotional perception. Finally, I round out my review of empathy’s moral significance with an argument that empathy with others makes it very difficult to intend to treat them in certain immoral ways. We cannot both empathize with someone and see them as unfeeling, as unthinking, or as lacking a normative perspective on the world. Consequently, empathizing with someone is at least not compatible with treating them as a mere object. I offer my Smithian picture of empathy’s moral and epistemic functions as an alternative to the popular Humean view that empathy moves us from our default position of solipsism and egoism to knowledge of and care for other’ inner lives. That view’s ambition is tantalizing, but it distorts both the nature of empathy and the nature of our other-oriented concern and understanding. Hume’s account of empathy’s significance, and the more recent accounts that take after it, end up making it look as though empathy simply contributes to the expansion of egoism, and/or as though empathy depends for its motivational efficacy on a kind of epistemic mistake. (shrink)

In April 2002, New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman was awarded a Pulitzer Prize for a series of columns he wrote in the months following September 11. On the surface, the columns seemed to fit Cummins Gauthier’s criteria for public grieving: they engaged readers emotionally; they empathized with victims and survivors; and they helped readers develop moral attitudes, opinions and responses. However, in analyzing the columns from a feminist ethic of care perspective—one that expands the boundaries of the moral community (...) beyond the borders of a nation-state—one finds that Friedman’s columns can distort the process of public grieving, leading citizens toward anger and an “us” verus “them” mentality rather than healing and a genuine concern that embraces the value of all human beings. (shrink)

This article examines responses to the controversial picketing and media‐savvy provocations of the Westboro Baptist Church (WBC). Since WBC’s conduct is widely perceived as cruel, people often respond with anger and animosity, which reinforce WBC’s self‐representation as a persecuted church. Conversely, I have engaged Westboro Baptists in interviews that function as “bridging conversations.” This methodology centers on critical‐empathic listening, comparative religious ethics, and a disciplined restraint from expressing moral judgment. I argue that this response is supported by the (...) data and understandings obtained, metapragmatic commentary, my rapport with churchgoers, and evidence of their empathy. In conclusion, I gauge the methodology’s risks and consider its expansion, for example, with undergraduates who have joined our conversations. In an era of polarized discourse, nonjudgmental listening is a counter‐intuitive response that troubles entrenched binaries, including the public fashioning of WBC as a dehumanized enemy. (shrink)

In April 2002, New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman was awarded a Pulitzer Prize for a series of columns he wrote in the months following September 11. On the surface, the columns seemed to fit Cummins Gauthier’s criteria for public grieving: they engaged readers emotionally; they empathized with victims and survivors; and they helped readers develop moral attitudes, opinions and responses. However, in analyzing the columns from a feminist ethic of care perspective—one that expands the boundaries of the moral community (...) beyond the borders of a nation-state—one finds that Friedman’s columns can distort the process of public grieving, leading citizens toward anger and an “us” verus “them” mentality rather than healing and a genuine concern that embraces the value of all human beings. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Kant’s SadismErmanno BencivengaIn The Ethics Of Psychoanalysis, Lacan says: “So as to produce the kind of shock or eye-opening effect that seems to me necessary if we are to make progress, I simply want to draw your attention to this: if The Critique of Practical Reason appeared in 1788, seven years after the first edition of The Critique of Pure Reason, there is another work which came out six (...) years [!] after The Critique of Practical Reason, a little after Thermidor in 1795, and which is called Philosophy in the Boudoir.” 1 What is supposed to produce the shock effect is not the simple juxtaposition of dates, of course, but the implicitly Hegelian reading of history which makes those dates significant, and which comes out in full strength when Lacan says, in Kant avec Sade: “The Philosophy in the Boudoir comes eight years [!] after the Critique of Practical Reason. If, after seeing that the former agrees with the latter, we prove that it completes it, we will say that it gives the truth of the Critique.” 2 Lacan’s “proof,” however, is anything but rigorous or systematic; so his provocative statement will probably sound inspiring to Lacan enthusiasts and gratuitous to virtually anyone else. Which is a pity, because the statement is absolutely correct: it is indeed the case that Sade brought to their extreme consequences the characteristic premises of Kant’s ethics, thus unfolding their truth in ways which the man Kant might even have vehemently resisted, but which were nonetheless necessary. Here I would like to provide more of a systematic and rigorous defense of this statement, though I make no claim as to how faithful my reconstruction might be to Lacan’s “intentions” (the irrelevance of this issue from the point of view espoused here will soon become apparent; hence it will also become apparent that it is an issue this point of view need not be concerned with). [End Page 39]According to Kant, a moral duty cannot be based on any inclination or feeling—including feelings of compassion or sympathy for another human being. Any dependence on such feelings would represent a pathology of reason, a case of reason being guided by something other than itself, of it not being practical, and hence of heteronomous behavior. Making the well-being of some other human, or of one’s community, or of humankind, the goal of one’s action would be relegating rationality to (at best) an instrumental role, and thus denying any ethical value to that action. Kant says that “kindness done from duty—although no inclination impels us, and even although natural and unconquerable disinclination stands in our way—is practical, and not pathological, love, residing in the will and not in the propensions of feeling, in principles of action and not of melting compassion; and it is this practical love alone which can be an object of command.” 3This independence of any empirical conditioning is further articulated in the distinction between acting in conformity with duty and acting from the motive of duty: “When... disappointments and hopeless misery have quite taken away the taste for life; when a wretched man, strong in soul and more angered at his fate than faint-hearted or cast down, longs for death and still preserves his life without loving it—not from inclination or fear but from duty; then indeed his maxim has a moral content.” 4 But now the problem is how exactly to understand this distinction. Kant’s talk of motives suggests that it’s one’s intentional state that makes the difference: that the very same behavior may have only the appearance of morality, or instead be truly moral, depending on what one’s goals are. If, say, I promote the well-being of my neighbor because it makes me feel good, or because I empathize with him, then there is nothing moral to what I do. If, on the other hand, I do exactly the same thing because it is rational to do so, then there will be moral content to it. And indeed this position is often identified with Kant, and sometimes suggested by Kant himself—from now... (shrink)

The impossibility results of Bovens and Hartmann (2003) and Olsson (2005) call into question the strength of the connection between coherence and truth. As part of the inquiry into this alleged link, I define a notion of degree of truth-conduciveness, relevant for measuring the usefulness of coherence measures as rules-of-thumb for assigning probabilities in situations of partial knowledge. I use the concept to compare the viability of some of the measures of coherence that have been suggested so far under different (...) circumstances. It turns out that all of these, including the prior, are just about equally good in cases of very little knowledge. Nevertheless, there are differences in when they are applicable, and they also depart more from each other when more knowledge is added. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

The impossibility results of Bovens and Hartmann (2003, Bayesian epistemology. Oxford: Clarendon Press) and Olsson (2005, Against coherence: Truth, probability and justification. Oxford: Oxford University Press.) show that the link between coherence and probability is not as strong as some have supposed. This paper is an attempt to bring out a way in which coherence reasoning nevertheless can be justified, based on the idea that, even if it does not provide an infallible guide to probability, it can give us an (...) indication thereof. It is further shown that this actually is the case, for several of the coherence measures discussed in the literature so far. We also discuss how this affects the possibility to use coherence as a means of epistemic justification. (shrink)

Tenue le 6 novembre 2021, à l’Hôtel de Ville de Grenoble, dans le cadre du débat « Validisme, intersectionnalité, lutte pour les droits », cette conférence vise à examiner différents biais sur lequel repose l’invisibilisation des artistes handicapé·e·s. J’y explique notamment comment, pendant longtemps, il m’a été impensable d’être artiste : plus qu’inatteignable, cet horizon m’était inimaginable. C’est l’occasion de revenir sur la production sociale de cet inimaginable, ainsi que sur les moyens mis en œuvre pour déverrouiller mon imaginaire et (...) me sentir peu à peu légitime à me définir comme artiste. (shrink)

Research programs regularly compete to achieve the same goal, such as the discovery of the structure of DNA or the construction of a TEA laser. The more the competing programs share information, the faster the goal is likely to be reached, to society’s benefit. But the “priority rule”-the scientific norm according to which the first program to reach the goal in question must receive all the credit for the achievement-provides a powerful disincentive for programs to share information. How, then, is (...) the clash between social and individual interest resolved in scientific practice? This chapter investigates what Robert Merton called science’s “communist” norm, which mandates universal sharing of knowledge, and uses mathematical models of discovery to argue that a communist regime may be on the whole advantageous and fair to all parties, and so might be implemented by a social contract that all scientists would be willing to sign. (shrink)

Many experimental found footage films base their meanings and effects on an interaction between the figurative content of the image and its material-technological underpinnings. Can this interaction arise accidentally without artistic appropriation? A recently digitised film by the Czech cinema pioneer Jan Kříženecký, Opening Ceremony of the Čech Bridge (1908), presents such an exercise in accidental aesthetics. At one point, the horizontal and vertical trembling of the cinematograph – obtained from the Lumière brothers – translates into a trembling of the (...) figures on the bridge so precisely that the figurative and material spheres appear to cooperate towards a common aesthetic goal. To account for such phenomena, film theory, found footage filmmaking, and archival practice need to join forces with philosophy. More specifically, Gilbert Simondon's notion of transduction, a process based on the intersection of diverse realities within a domain, allows us to conceptualise the paradoxical interaction between the figurative and material dimensions and the unintentional meanings that arise out of it. Transduction enables the distribution of elements between these heterogeneous spheres while maintaining a certain stability within a system. In the case of archival films in which transduction occurs without prior intention or expectation, transduction can be foregrounded and prolonged. The connection between transduction and the “trembling meaning” of Opening Ceremony, understood within the wider context of camera instability in experimental found footage, will uncover the aesthetic potentialities held by the autonomous creativity of film matter and its interferences with the figurative content. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to present a formal model of social net- works suitable for studying questions in social epistemology. We show how to use this model, in conjunction with a computer program for simulating groups of inquirers, to draw conclusions about the epistemological prop- erties of different social practices. This furnishes us with the beginnings of a systematic research program in social epistemology, from which to approach problems pertaining to epistemic value, optimal organization, and the dynamics of (...) multi-agent inquiry. (shrink)

Les Quatre Saisons de Vivaldi imitent-elles les bruits du monde? Peut-on penser l'histoire de la musique comme une libération progressive de la contrainte imitative, d'un ancrage naturel ou même naturaliste? Beethoven, Berlioz, Schumann, Wagner ou Debussy constituent-ils les étapes qui aboutissent à une musique pure? Le romantisme a fait de la musique le paradigme de l'Art en la concevant comme un langage délivré du poids du sens, un art abstrait » parce qu'autonome. Par la richesse savante des auteurs et des (...) œuvres examinés, par les repères chronologiques et théoriques mis en lumière, l'anthologie proposée ici est une véritable histoire de la pensée sonore et de la pratique musicale du XVIIIe siècle au début du XXe siècle. Le mélomane, le musicologue, comme l'historien ou le philosophe de l'art, pourront évaluer d'un œil neuf les liens de l'imitation et de l'expression, la dispute de l'abstraction et les rapports que les arts entretiennent à la signification. (shrink)

Victorian scriptural hermeneutics : history, intention, and evolution -- Intertext 1 : Victorian legal interpretation -- Carlyle : between biblical exegesis and romantic hermeneutics -- Intertext 2 : Victorian science and hermeneutics : the interpretation of nature -- George Eliot's hermeneutics of sympathy -- Intertext 3 : Victorian literary criticism -- Subjectivism, intersubjectivity, and intention : Oscar Wilde and literary hermeneutics.

1. Bd. Die Relativitätstheorie fällt : physikalische, philosophische, wissenschaftssoziologische und allgemeinverständliche Korrektur : hundert Jahre Kultus des Irrtums sind genug -- 3. Bd. Die Urknalltheorie fällt.

Desire After Affect offers a detailed analysis of the affective turn and its consequences for the humanities.

The Univalent Foundations project constitutes what is arguably the most serious challenge to set-theoretic foundations of mathematics since intuitionism. Like intuitionism, it differs both in its philosophical motivations and its mathematical-logical apparatus. In this paper we will focus on one such difference: Univalent Foundations’ reliance on an intensional rather than extensional logic, through its use of intensional Martin-Löf type theory. To this, UF adds what may be regarded as certain extensionality principles, although it is not immediately clear how these principles (...) are to be interpreted philosophically. In fact, this framework gives an interesting example of a kind of border case between intensional and extensional mathematics. Our main purpose will be the philosophical investigation of this system, and the relation of the concepts of intensionality it satisfies to more traditional philosophical or logical concepts such as those of Carnap and Quine. (shrink)

This paper is an investigation in the use of truthmaker theory for exploring the relation of logic to world, and as a tool for metaphysics. A variant of truthmaker theory, which we call the simple theory, is defined and defended against objections. It is characterized formally, and its central features are derived. As part of this project, we give a formal metaphysics based on nondeterministic necessitation relations among possible entities. In what is called the fundamental theorem of truthmaking, it is (...) shown that, as long as a logic is sound and complete, its inferential structure will be isomorphic to the necessitation structure of our metaphysics. We thus arrive at a purely structural logic–world relationship which can be used for metaphysical investigations. Other products of our investigation are a sound and complete semantics for first-order logic with identity and a solution to a result of Restall which has threatened to make truthmaker theory trivial. (shrink)

This article shows that there are square circles in the sense that there are mathematical objects that are at the same time both perfectly circular and perfectly square. The philosophical significance of this is discussed, especially in view of philosophy's widespread use of “square circle” as a typical example of an impossibility. In particular, the focus is on what the existence of square circles means for the possibility of conceptual analysis, and more generally what we can learn about the nature (...) of non-formal concepts and their use in philosophy. (shrink)

This article focuses on a theoretical account integrating classic and recent findings on the communication of emotions across cultures: a dialect theory of emotion. Dialect theory uses a linguistic metaphor to argue emotion is a universal language with subtly different dialects. As in verbal language, it is more challenging to understand someone speaking a different dialect—which fits with empirical support for an in-group advantage, whereby individuals are more accurate judging emotional expressions from their own cultural group versus foreign groups. Dialect (...) theory has sparked controversy with its implications for dominant theories about cross-cultural differences in emotion. This article reviews the theory, its mounting body of evidence, evidence for alternative accounts, and practical implications for multicultural societies. (shrink)

This note argues that, insofar as contemporary mathematics is concerned, there is overwhelming evidence that if mathematical objects are structures, then isomorphism should not be taken as their identity condition. This goes against a common version of structuralism in the philosophical literature. Four areas are presented in which identifying isomorphic structures or objects leads to contradiction or inadequacy. This is followed by a philosophical discussion on possible ways to approach the distinction, and a section on the possibility of proceeding intensionally, (...) as is done in e.g.\ the Univalent Foundations program. (shrink)

Ce compte rendu a déjà paru sur le site de la revue Études. A. Sueur, Vie de Joachim Burmeister, Paris, Rhuthmos, 2019, 103 p. Joachim Burmeister est connu, dans toutes les histoires de la musique, comme celui qui, le premier, a proposé, autour de 1600, une analyse rhétorique des œuvres musicales : celles-ci ne sont plus désormais comprises comme de belles formes reproduisant la splendeur et l'unité des structures du monde, selon la grande approche médiévale, mais comme des discours - (...) Recensions. (shrink)

Theory and Reality is about the connection between true theories and the world. A mathematical framefork for such connections is given, and it is shown how that framework can be used to infer facts about the structure of reality from facts about the structure of true theories, The book starts with an overview of various approaches to metaphysics. Beginning with Quine's programmatic "On what there is", the first chapter then discusses the perils involved in going from language to metaphysics. It (...) criticises contemporary intuition-driven metaphysics, comments on naturalistic approaches, and then presents the main proposition put forward in the thesis: we should base metaphysics on model theory. In chapters 2 to 5, mathematical treatments are given of concepts that we need: theories, metaphysics, necessitation and semantics. These are used in chapters 6 and 7 to prove that, seen from a certain informative view point, any true theory will give rise to an isomorphism between that theory and the world. This conclusion is similar to Wittgenstein's in the Tractatus, but differs in that it places the structural relationship on the level of whole theories, rather than single propositions. (shrink)

We present a class of first-order modal logics, called transformational logics, which are designed for working with sentences that hold up to a certain type of transformation. An inference system is given, and com- pleteness for the basic transformational logic HOS is proved. In order to capture ‘up to isomorphism’, we express a very weak version of higher category theory in terms of first-order models, which makes tranforma- tional logics applicable to category theory. A category-theoretical concept of isomorphism is used (...) to arrive at a modal operator nisoφ expressing ‘up to isomorphism, φ’, which is such that category equivalence comes out as literally isomorphism up to isomorphism. In the final part of the paper, we explore the possibility of using trans- formational logics to define weak higher categories. We end with two informal comparisons: one between HOS and counterpart semantics, and one between isomorphism logic, as a transformational logic, and Homo- topy Type Theory. (shrink)

Simeon Solomon was a Pre-Raphaelite artist who navigated the modernity of VictorianEngland to create works revolving around explicitly Jewish themes; often creating overtly Jewish images, highly unusual among the generally explicitly Christian movement. This article will deal with how Solomon constructed and dealt with his own identity as a Gay, Jewish man in the modern, and heavily Christian environment of mid-nineteenth century Victorian London. Using contemporary approaches to historicism, observation, and spirituality, his works deal with the complexities of his identity (...) as Jewish and homosexual in a manner where neither was shameful, but rather, sources of inspiration. (shrink)