In The Law of Peoples Rawls claims that liberal well-ordered societies (LWOSs) should regard certain non-liberal societies, decent hierarchical societies (DHSs), as equal members of a just international order, a ‘Society of Peoples.’ Rawls maintains, however, that while the ‘basic structures’ (the main political and economic institutions) of LWOSs are fair systems of social cooperation, the basic structures of DHSs are only ‘decent’ systems of social cooperation. I explain why the basic structures of DHSs (...) cannot be fair systems of social cooperation. In doing so, I refute a recent defense of DHSs advanced by Samuel Freeman. I then argue that because the basic structures of DHSs cannot be fair systems of social cooperation, Rawls is not justified in holding that LWOSs should refrain always from offering economic incentives to DHSs in order to encourage them to liberalize their political institutions. The ultimate aim of the foreign policies of LWOSs should be a world in which liberal democratic rights are respected by all societies. (shrink)

One prominent criticism of John Rawls’s The Law of Peoples is that it treats certain non-liberal societies, what Rawls calls ‘decent hierarchical societies’, as equal participants in a just international system. Rawls claims that these non-liberal societies should be respected as equals by liberal democratic societies, even though they do not grant their citizens the basic rights of democratic citizenship. This is presented by Rawls as a consequence of liberalism’s commitment to the principle of (...) toleration. A number of critics have claimed that Rawls’s treatment of these non-liberal societies is symptomatic of a more general problem with political liberalism, namely, its reliance on toleration as its ‘fundamental principle’. Against this view, I argue that the principle of toleration should not be understood as political liberalism’s ‘fundamental principle’. This is revealed through a consideration of the normative basis of what Rawls calls the ‘Liberal Principle of Legitimacy’. A correct understanding of political liberalism’s ‘fundamental principle’, which I claim is a principle of equal ‘civic respect’ for citizens, shows that Rawls’s toleration of non-liberal societies is in fact a misapplication of political liberalism to the global domain. Moreover, I explain that political liberalism must assert that the principle of equal civic respect for citizens is the correct principle to govern the public political relations of citizens in all pluralist societies, and that most ‘decent hierarchical societies’ are pluralist in nature. Identifying political liberalism’s fundamental principle as that of equal civic respect for citizens helps to render political liberalism, in both the domestic and international domains, a more coherent and compelling approach to thinking about fundamental political issues. Key Words: civic respect • international relations • justice • political liberalism • Rawls • toleration. (shrink)

In the works of Kant and Rawls, we find an acute sensibility to the pre-eminent importance of freedom of speech. Both authors defend free speech in democratic societies as a private and as a public entitlement, but their conceptions markedly differ when applied to non-liberal and non-democratic societies. The difference is that freedom of speech, for Kant, is a universal claim that can serve as a test of legitimacy of all legal orders, while for Rawls, some legal orders (...) are owed full recognition even if they do not in principle guarantee freedom of speech. I explain Kant’s account of free political speech and argue that the defence of individual rights should be seen as its core feature, both in republican and in autocratic states. I then argue that a much-overlooked shift in Rawls’s development toPolitical Liberalismlikewise ties his account of free speech in democratic societies to issues concerning rights and justice. In a next step, I discuss Rawls’s perspective on some non-democratic regimes in hisLaw of Peoples, regimes that he understands as well-ordered but which do not guarantee freedom of speech. I criticize Rawls’s account from Kant’s perspective and suggest to introduce a ‘module’ from Kant’s pre-republican thought into Rawls’s conception, aiming to secure a core area of rights- and justice-related speech. My claim is that under Kant’s view of autocratic legitimacy, an important extension of speech rights is called for even in non-liberal, non-democratic states, and that a Rawlsian account should and can adopt it. (shrink)

This article brings to the fore the shortcomings of the type of pluralism advocated by John Rawls both in Political Liberalism and in The Law of Peoples. It is argued that by postulating that the discrimination between what is and what is not legitimate is dictated by rationality and morality, Rawls’s approach forecloses recognition of the properly political moment. Exclusions are presented as being justified by reason and the antagonistic dimension of politics is not acknowledged. This article also takes issue (...) with Rawls’s ‘realistic utopia’, asserting that despite the reference to ‘decent’ hierarchical societies, it amounts to a universalization of the western liberal model. (shrink)

John Rawls argues, in The Law of Peoples , that a principle of toleration requires the international community to respect `decent hierarchical societies' that obey certain minimal human rights norms. In this article, I question that line of argument, using women's inequality as a lens. I show that Rawls's principle would require us to treat the very same practices of the very same entity differently if it happens to set up as an independent nation rather than a (...) state within a nation, and I criticize the consequences to which this asymmetry leads. I argue that Rawls gives us no good reason to think that we cannot justify a much richer set of norms for all the world's societies. I argue, however, that issues of justification should be sharply distinguished from issues of implementation, and that respect for the moral significance of national sovereignty ought to restrain us from intervention in all but the most extreme cases. Key Words: Rawls • women • equality • international relations • justice. (shrink)

De acuerdo a este artículo, la extensión realizada por Rawls de su concepción de justicia doméstica al contexto de las relaciones internacionales contradice premisas básicas de su propia teoría de justicia. Una extensión de la teoría doméstica consistente con sus propias premisas debería llevar a considerar una clase mayor de demandas como derechos humanos y a aceptar algún principio de distribución global.

This article explores whether the notion of the decent society as a normative concept is applicable under late modern conditions of normative pluralization and individualization. My argument is that the strength of the concept does not primarily lie in its descriptive value. It is rather a ‘utopian horizon’ against which aspects of societies can be analysed. This analytical value can tell us something about the state of various facets of social life. Having to cope with pluralization, individuals are (...) increasingly required to negotiate ambiguous and contradictory norms. It is this negotiation process that defines to a large extent various aspects of contemporary individualization. However, the fact that an individualized negotiation process occurs neither means that this process is characterized by decency nor produces by default a decent society nor a genuine sense of social integration. Thus, I argue that the concept ‘decency’ can make a qualitative addition to normative negotiation processes and thus in terms of social integration. (shrink)

John Rawls presents a liberal conception of international justice in his book The Law of Peoples, and this liberal conception of international justice has inspired a variety of responses from various perspectives. However, it seems that most such responses come from western perspectives, and that there is hence a corresponding paucity of seriously challenging responses based on non-western traditions. This paper aims to analyze Rawls’s liberal conception of international justice in view of the concept of natural justice expressed within the (...) Book of Change in order to illuminate the limitations and problems of Rawls’s conception in practice as well as in theory. Rawls employs the idea of political liberalism to construct a liberal conception of international justice that can be applied to a society of societies. Rawls addresses the eight principles for justice among free and democratic peoples, which have been historically accepted by western peoples. He admits that these principles are incomplete. There is no theoretical order among the eight principles equivalent to the lexical order of the two principles of justice in A Theory of Justice. There are no guidelines or basic principles for resolving the problem of priority that arises when the principles are themselves in conflict with one another. This situation may generate competing conceptions of justice within the society of peoples. Rawls mentions natural justice in his explanation for the extension of liberal political principles to decent hierarchical peoples. He takes as an example of natural justice the rule of formal equality that “similar cases be treated similarly.” He does not develop any further the idea of natural justice for his theory of international justice, which could potentially span the gap between his ideal theory and non-ideal theory, or enhance the reasonableness of his international justice, especially for non-liberal peoples. The Book of Change expresses the idea of natural justice that underlies the principle of Yin-Yang, which differs fundamentally from the liberal contract paradigm. The paper will argue that the idea of natural justice should be seriously considered for justice among peoples since it can provide the bedrock for criticizing non-public reason as well as public reason. (shrink)

This essay outlines an argument for fostering the conditions for civil society to emerge in conflict or post-conflict situations. Only where a ‘civil’ society and ‘decent’ society exist together can democratic engagement flourish in the long term. The essay explores the possibilities for decency in social and political conduct where conflict and rupture have been the norm. In establishing decency in social relations and in institutions, trust must be generated where distrust has prevailed as a result of the recent (...) past and memories of a longer past. Common in the contemporary period have been the interventions of humanitarian organizations — such as international and local human rights organizations. How can we assess this activity in relation to the establishment or re-establishment of a civil society and to practices and institutions that reflect decency? What occurs in ‘transitional’ times to foster social relations and institutions that reflect decency in actions between people? The essay looks briefly at the example of the Palestinian West Bank in this context. (shrink)

John Rawls presents a liberal conception of international justice in his book The Law of Peoples, and this liberal conception of international justice has inspired a variety of responses from various perspectives. However, it seems that most such responses come from western perspectives, and that there is hence a corresponding paucity of seriously challenging responses based on non-western traditions. This paper aims to analyze Rawls’s liberal conception of international justice in view of the concept of natural justice expressed within the (...) Book of Change in order to illuminate the limitations and problems of Rawls’s conception in practice as well as in theory. Rawls employs the idea of political liberalism to construct a liberal conception of international justice that can be applied to a society of societies. Rawls addresses the eight principles for justice among free and democratic peoples, which have been historically accepted by western peoples. He admits that these principles are incomplete. There is no theoretical order among the eight principles equivalent to the lexical order of the two principles of justice in A Theory of Justice. There are no guidelines or basic principles for resolving the problem of priority that arises when the principles are themselves in conflict with one another. This situation may generate competing conceptions of justice within the society of peoples. Rawls mentions natural justice in his explanation for the extension of liberal political principles to decent hierarchical peoples. He takes as an example of natural justice the rule of formal equality that “similar cases be treated similarly.” He does not develop any further the idea of natural justice for his theory of international justice, which could potentially span the gap between his ideal theory and non-ideal theory, or enhance the reasonableness of his international justice, especially for non-liberal peoples. The Book of Change expresses the idea of natural justice that underlies the principle of Yin-Yang, which differs fundamentally from the liberal contract paradigm. The paper will argue that the idea of natural justice should be seriously considered for justice among peoples since it can provide the bedrock for criticizing non-public reason as well as public reason. (shrink)

In The Decent Society, Avishai Margalit’s contends that a good society is a decent society, a society whose institutions do not humiliate persons. However, Margalit affirms a stark distinction between the decent society and a just society. “[T]he concept of a decent society … is not necessarily connected with the concept of rights. Even a society without a concept of rights can develop concepts of honor and humiliation appropriate for a decent society.” This paper rejects (...) this position by showing that in order for a society to be a decent society it must incorporate fundamental rights. Sections II, III, and IV examine, criticize, and reject Margalit’s arguments to the contrary, and in so doing summon arguments that demonstrate the indispensable value of fundamental rights for any society that purports to be decent. The central contention here is that only a concept of humiliation that affirms and respects fundamental rights is sufficiently robust to recognize certain violations of these rights as constituting distinctive and devastating assaults on the self-respect of specific individuals. Thus insofar as a decent society cannot countenance such assaults, a decent society must include rights. (shrink)

ABSTRACT How should physicians act when faced with corporal punishment, such as amputation, or torture? In most cases, the answer is clear: international law, UN resolutions and universal codes of medical ethics absolutely forbid physicians from countenancing torture and corporal punishment in any form. An acute problem arises, however, in decent societies, but not necessarily liberal states, that are, nonetheless, welcome in the world community. The decent society is often governed, in whole or in part, by religious (...) laws, and while these states abridge various human rights they are peace loving, generally tolerant, and offer their citizens wide avenues for political participation. Under these circumstances the prohibition against corporal punishment and torture weakens, often compelling physicians to participate. This is true in two cases. In Rawls’ hypothetical nation of Kazanistan, Islamic law is the order of the day, and amputations and corporal punishment play an integral part in the execution of traditional Islamic justice. In Israel, torture is sometimes used to elicit the information needed to thwart impending terror attacks. In each case, a physician's participation is essential. In light of the near universal condemnation that accompanies torture and corporal punishment, physicians can only appeal to norms anchored in collective well‐being and concern for life that override respect for human dignity in these societies. Western societies have consistently rejected this reasoning, but it is part and parcel of life in the decent society. (shrink)

ABSTRACT How should physicians act when faced with corporal punishment, such as amputation, or torture? In most cases, the answer is clear: international law, UN resolutions and universal codes of medical ethics absolutely forbid physicians from countenancing torture and corporal punishment in any form. An acute problem arises, however, in decent societies, but not necessarily liberal states, that are, nonetheless, welcome in the world community. The decent society is often governed, in whole or in part, by religious (...) laws, and while these states abridge various human rights they are peace loving, generally tolerant, and offer their citizens wide avenues for political participation. Under these circumstances the prohibition against corporal punishment and torture weakens, often compelling physicians to participate. This is true in two cases. In Rawls’ hypothetical nation of Kazanistan, Islamic law is the order of the day, and amputations and corporal punishment play an integral part in the execution of traditional Islamic justice. In Israel, torture is sometimes used to elicit the information needed to thwart impending terror attacks. In each case, a physician's participation is essential. In light of the near universal condemnation that accompanies torture and corporal punishment, physicians can only appeal to norms anchored in collective well‐being and concern for life that override respect for human dignity in these societies. Western societies have consistently rejected this reasoning, but it is part and parcel of life in the decent society. (shrink)

Would a just society or government absolutely refrain from shaming or humiliating any of its members? "No," says this essay. It describes morally acceptable uses of shame, stigma and disgust as tools of social control in a decent (just) society. These uses involve criminal law, tort law, and informal social norms. The standard of moral acceptability proposed for determining the line is a version of perfectionistic prioritarian consequenstialism. From this standpoint, criticism is developed against Martha Nussbaum's view that to (...) respect the dignity of each person, society absolutely must refrain from certain ways of shaming and humiliating its members and rendering them objects of communal disgust. (shrink)

In The Law of Peoples, John Rawls defends the claim that ‘decent’ societies (non-liberal, non-democratic constitutional republics) deserve full and good standing in the international community. His defense of decent societies consists of two main arguments. First, he argues that the basic human right to political participation does not imply a right to democratic political institutions. This argument has been thoroughly discussed by commentators. Second, he argues that decent societies, if admitted to the international (...) community, would pose no special threat to the stability of that community. This argument has largely been ignored. My aim in this article is to analyze this second argument, which I call the ‘peace argument'. argumen. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Jeremy Waldron has argued that Berlin ignored the importance of institutions and constitutions and worked with an impoverished conception of social and political design. Political structures, legal and political institutions, constitutional design, mechanisms of representation and the rule of law: all this remained untouched by Berlin, who seemed, in Waldron’s opinion, largely uninterested in the actual political institutions of liberal society. In this essay, I argue that what may be missing in Berlin—close and sustained attention to, and interest in, (...) institutions and social context—can be found in the works of his prominent contemporary, Raymond Aron, who also wrote about liberty during the Cold War. As such, Aron’s An Essay on Liberty can and should be read as a complement to Berlin’s essay “Two Concepts of Liberty.”. (shrink)

One of the most interesting features of Jürgen Habermas’s latest work on democracy is his attempt to acknowledge the problem of social complexity while remaining faithful to the core idea of the Rousseauian conception of democratic legitimacy: the idea that legitimacy is grounded on citizens’ participation in processes of opinion- and will-formation which ensure the reasonableness of collectivedecisions. The challenge for Habermas is to show how it is possible to conciliate the consequences of social complexity with this understanding of legitimacy (...) and popular sovereignty. Does Habermas’s attempt succeed? This is the question examined in the present article.L’un des aspects les plus intéressants du dernier ouvrage de Jürgen Habermas est sa tentative de reconnaître le problème de la complexité sociale tout en demeurant fidèle a I’idée centrale de la conception rousseauiste de légitimité démocratique. Cette dernière est fondée sur la participation du citoyen aux processus de formation de I’opinion publique et de la volonté populaire, qui seule peut assurer le caractère raisonnable des décisions collectives. Le défi que doit relever Habermas consiste à démontrer la possibilité de concilier les conséquences de la complexité sociale avec cette compréhension de la légitimité et de la souveraineté populaire. Peut-on considérer la tentative de Habermas comme un succès? Voilà la question qui sera abordée dans le présent article. (shrink)

One of the most interesting features of Jürgen Habermas’s latest work on democracy is his attempt to acknowledge the problem of social complexity while remaining faithful to the core idea of the Rousseauian conception of democratic legitimacy: the idea that legitimacy is grounded on citizens’ participation in processes of opinion- and will-formation which ensure the reasonableness of collectivedecisions. The challenge for Habermas is to show how it is possible to conciliate the consequences of social complexity with this understanding of legitimacy (...) and popular sovereignty. Does Habermas’s attempt succeed? This is the question examined in the present article.L’un des aspects les plus intéressants du dernier ouvrage de Jürgen Habermas est sa tentative de reconnaître le problème de la complexité sociale tout en demeurant fidèle a I’idée centrale de la conception rousseauiste de légitimité démocratique. Cette dernière est fondée sur la participation du citoyen aux processus de formation de I’opinion publique et de la volonté populaire, qui seule peut assurer le caractère raisonnable des décisions collectives. Le défi que doit relever Habermas consiste à démontrer la possibilité de concilier les conséquences de la complexité sociale avec cette compréhension de la légitimité et de la souveraineté populaire. Peut-on considérer la tentative de Habermas comme un succès? Voilà la question qui sera abordée dans le présent article. (shrink)

이 글의 목적은 현대 이스라엘의 철학자 아비샤이 마갈릿(1939-)의 1996년작『품위 있는 사회』에 전개된, 독특하고 도전적인 사회사상의 의의와 한계를 규명하는 것이다. ‘품위 있는 사회’의 기획인 이 사상이 바람직한 사회의 여느 이념형과 다르게 다소간 비상한 주목을 끄는 이유는 그것이 다른 유력한 사회 질서 모델인 ‘정의로운 사회(just society)’ 및 ‘문명화된 사회(civilized society)’와의 입체적인 비교를 통해 ‘품위 있는 사회(decent society)’의 규범적인 중요성과 우선성을 부각하기 때문이다. 논자는 이 세 가지 사회 유형을 구별하는 마갈릿의 논변이 존 롤스가 선도한 평등주의적 정의관에 필수적인 ‘인간 존엄’의 이념을 일깨우는 중요한 (...) 발견적 기능을 수행함을 밝혀낼 것이다. 그러나 동시에 그것은 ‘인간 존엄’을 구현하기 위한 사회 제도의 과감한 기획을 막아서는 보수주의적 장애물로 작용할 수 있음도 드러낼 것이다. ‘품위 있는 사회’론의 그러한 규범적 양가성을 매개로 논자는 그것이 롤스 이래로 활발히 논의되어 온 평등주의적 정의관의 (‘대체재’가 아니라) ‘보완재’로 적절히 자리매김할 수 있는 가능성을 타진할 것이다. (shrink)

Are there any coherent and defensible alternatives to liberal democracy? The author examines the possibility that a reformed democratic centralism-the principle around which China's current polity is officially organized-might be legitimate, according to both an inside and an outside perspective. The inside perspective builds on contemporary Chinese political theory; the outside perspective critically deploys Rawls's notion ofa "decent society " as its standard. Along the way, the author pays particular attention to the kinds and degree of pluralism a (...) class='Hi'>decent society can countenance, and to the specific institutions in China that might enable the realization of a genuine and/or decent democratic centralism. The author argues that by considering both inside and outside perspectives, and the degrees to which they inter-penetrate and critically inform one another, we can engage in a global philosophy that neither pre-judges alternative political traditions nor falls prey to false conceptual barriers. (shrink)

Counter to the popular impression that Adam Smith was a champion of selfishness and greed, Jerry Muller shows that the Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations maintained that markets served to promote the well-being of ...

The ethical experience and lessons of China’s and the world's response to COVID-19 will be debated for many years to come. But one feature of the Chinese authoritarian response that should not be overlooked is its practice of silencing and humiliating the whistle-blowers who told the truth about the epidemic. In this article, we document the humiliation of Dr Li Wenliang, the most prominent whistle-blower in the Chinese COVID-19 epidemic. Engaging with the thought of Israeli philosopher Avishai Margalit, who argues (...) that humiliation constitutes an injury to a person’s self-respect, we discuss his contention that a decent society is one that abolishes conditions which constitute a justification for its dependents to consider themselves humiliated. We explore the ways that institutions humiliate whistle-blowers in Western countries as well as in China. (shrink)

Should significant enhancement of human capacities using genetic technologies become possible, each generation will have an unprecedented power over the next. I argue that it is implausible to leave decisions about the genetic traits of children entirely up to individuals and that communities will sometimes be justified in intervening to protect the interests of children against their parents. While a number of influential authors have suggested that the primary interest that the community should aim to protect is the child’s right (...) to “an open future”, when we examine closely what we desire for our children, it is clear that sometimes we have good reasons to try to restrict their opportunities to pursue dangerous, corrupting, or meaningless projects. Rather than maximise the openness of their future, then, we should strive to ensure that children have access to sufficient opportunities to make available a reasonable range of valuable life-choices. Importantly, both the assessment of what counts as a reasonable range and our judgements about which forms of life are valuable must inevitably make reference to substantive notions about the nature of human flourishing. A more appropriate formulation, then, of what should be protected by law and/or regulation, is the child’s right to a “decent future”, understood as a future which promises a reasonable range of opportunities to lead a life of human flourishing. I then proceed to highlight the challenge posed by the task of settling upon an idea of what counts as a decent future, for multicultural societies wherein ideas about the standards against which we should evaluate human flourishing are likely to be highly contested. (shrink)

This essay brings together some lines of thought contained in Maria Markus’s ‘Lovers and Friends’ (2010) and ‘Decent Society and/or Civil Society?’ (2001), and, on that basis, explores possibilities for thinking about friendship in the context of contemporary social change. I begin by situating current problems concerning the semantics of friendship in their historical trajectory. I then go on to elaborate friendship’s ‘normative flexibility’, that is, its relative immunity to reifying societal pressures. Finally, I reflect upon the connexions between (...) friendship’s normative particularities and Markus’s elaboration of ‘decency’. (shrink)

This article tries to analyze the meaning of a decent minimum of health care, by confronting the idea of decent care with the concept of justice. Following the ideas of Margalith about a decent society, the article argues that a just minimum of care is not necessarily a decent minimum. The way this minimum is provided can still humiliate individuals, even if the end result is the best possible distribution of the goods as seen from the (...) viewpoint of justice. This analysis is combined with an analysis from the perspective of solidarity, particularly of reflective solidarity, as a way to develop decent care, which is care that does not humiliate individuals and maintains their dignity. (shrink)

This article tries to analyze the meaning of a decent minimum of health care, by confronting the idea of decent care with the concept of justice. Following the ideas of Margalith about a decent society, the article argues that a just minimum of care is not necessarily a decent minimum. The way this minimum is provided can still humiliate individuals, even if the end result is the best possible distribution of the goods as seen from the (...) viewpoint of justice. This analysis is combined with an analysis from the perspective of solidarity, particularly of reflective solidarity, as a way to develop decent care, which is care that does not humiliate individuals and maintains their dignity. (shrink)

Recent advancements in AI have prompted a large number of AI ethics guidelines published by governments and nonprofits. While many of these papers propose concrete or seemingly applicable ideas, few philosophically sound proposals are made. In particular, we observe that the line of questioning has often not been examined critically and underlying conceptual problems not always dealt with at the root. In this paper, we investigate the nature of ethical AI systems and what their moral status might be by first (...) turning to the notions of moral agency and patience. We find that their explication would come at a too high cost which is why we, second, articulate a different approach that avoids vague and ambiguous concepts or the problem of other minds. Third, we explore the impact of our philosophical and conceptual analysis on the regulatory landscape, make this link explicit, and finally propose a set of promising policy steps. (shrink)

In this workshop, a decentered approach to stakeholder theory is proposed, where a shared network problem, rather than a firm, frames stakeholder interactions. Two case studies are presented to illustrate the potential usefulness of adopting a decentered perspective on firm-stakeholder relations. Multi-stakeholder learning dialogues and actor-network theory are introduced as examples of possible theoretical frameworks that allow the adoption of a decentered perspective.

Hierarchical complexity's unidimensional measurement can help rectify policy confusion and debates about democratization and terrorism reduction. Stages of political development examined using the method yield task analyses demonstrating why stages cannot be skipped or rushed. Composites of stages and societies' transitions implicate policy change for anti-corruption and nation-building. New indexes for the political domain should be developed using hierarchical complexity to account for and measure a multitude of political tasks regardless of content or context. Measurement offers a (...) reliable, empirical basis to resist attempts to rush development. Hierarchical complexity accounts for why such efforts are doomed in advance to fail. (shrink)

The existential insecurity of human beings has induced them to create protective spheres of symbols: myths, religions, values, belief systems, theories, etc. Rationality is one of the key factors contributing to the construction of civilisation in technical and symbolic terms. As Hankiss (2001) has emphasised, protective spheres of symbols may collapse – thus causing a profound social crisis. Social and political transformations had a tremendous impact at the end of the 20th century. As a result, management theories have been revised (...) in order to deal with transition and uncertainty. Francis Fukuyama's (2000) approach is supportive of hierarchical organisation as the best solution when facing a 'disruption'. The notion of Homo Hierarchicus has been based on, allegedly, rational presumptions. This paper contributes to the discussion on hierarchy within contemporary organisations. It criticises so-called 'natural' and 'rational' necessities justifying hierarchy. A key issue identified by the paper is the formalisation of language in claiming value-free knowledge and 'detached' observation as the basis for neutral rationality and aspired efficiency. This should be seriously reconsidered as hindering rather than aiding understanding of social complexity. All in all, Homo Hierarchicus appears to be misleading rather than helping symbolic sphere or construct. (shrink)

What I want to argue is that when we talk about contemporary crisis in culture, the one way of beginning to come to terms with this is having to historicize and pluralize and contextualize the postmodernism debate. How does that relate to the vocation of the intellectual, given the challenge of the technical intelligentsia, given the challenge of the middlebrow journalist? What kind of role and function can the humanistic intellectual have in advanced capitalist society, given his or her placement (...) within the academic’s life of the professional managerial class of this particular society? (shrink)