Fodor claims that cognitive modules can be thought of as constituting a psychological natural kind in virtue of their possession of most or all of nine specified properties. The challenge to this considered here comes from synaesthesia. Synaesthesia is a type of cross-modal association: input to one sensory modality reliably generates an additional sensory output that is usually generated by the input to a distinct sensory modality. The most common form of synaesthesia manifests Fodor's nine specified properties of (...) modularity, and hence, according to Segal (1997), it should be understood as involving an extra module. Many psychologists believe that synaesthesia involves a breakdown in modularity. After outlining how both theories can explain the manifestation of the nine alleged properties of modularity in synaesthesia, I discuss the two concepts of function which initially motivate the respective theories. I argue that only a teleological concept of function is properly able to adjudicate between the two theories. The upshot is a further application of so-called externalist considerations to mental phenomena. (shrink)

Perceptual and recursion-based faculties have long been recognized to be vital constituents of human (and, in general, animal) cognition. However, certain faculties such as the visual and the linguistic faculty have come to receive far more academic and experimental attention, in recent decades, than other recognized categories of faculties. This paper seeks to highlight the imbalance in these studies and bring into sharper focus the need for further in-depth philosophical treatments of faculties such as especially hearing, touch, and proprioception, besides (...) other faculties such as the olfactory and gustatory ones. It also seeks to bring to bear the debate on the role of qualia in perception and overall in cognition in its thesis of the significance of these other modular faculties for genuine insights into cognition as a (now) technologically expanded domain. (shrink)

Noam Chomsky has failed to provide a satisfactory explanation of the "creativity of language" that he maintains is an essential part of the mental representation that makes the acquisition of languages possible. I argue that Chomsky's problems in articulating an acceptable concept of creativity is symptomatic of greater problems embedded in his idea of an "innateness hypothesis." An examination of the historical development of Chomsky's views on the nature of language shows that conclusions with regard to the creativity of language (...) remain either quite speculative or else untenable. This result establishes some agreement with Chomsky on the idea that cognitive capacities are largely structure determined. However, I argue against his idea that creativity is itself a part of those structures. In conclusion, I argue that creativity is an aspect of autonomy. In view of the integrative role of autonomy with respect cognitive capacities in general, we must conclude that creativity does not belong to the biological domain that Chomsky has characterized. (shrink)

The purpose of aesthetic research is to uncover the internal method in human aesthetic behaviors and to answer the following questions: Where do beautiful things come from? Why are things beautiful? What is the reason that some things are beautiful while others are not? How can people derive aesthetic pleasure? Until those fundamental problems are solved, further questions cannot be answered, such as “Why do some people like certain things, while other people like other things?” and “How does human aesthetic (...) taste develop?”The aesthetic study established by the Greek philosophical aesthetician Plato is an ontological approach that suggests that there is something decisive in beautiful things that makes them... (shrink)

Jerry Fodor deemed informational encapsulation ‘the essence’ of a system’s modularity and argued that human perceptual processing comprises modular systems, thus construed. Nowadays, his conclusion is widely challenged. Often, this is because experimental work is seen to somehow demonstrate the cognitive penetrability of perceptual processing, where this is assumed to conflict with the informational encapsulation of perceptual systems. Here, I deny the conflict, proposing that cognitive penetration need not have any straightforward bearing on the conjecture that perceptual processing (...) is composed of nothing but informationally encapsulated modules, the conjecture that each and every perceptual computation is performed by an informationally encapsulated module, and the consequences perceptual encapsulation was traditionally expected to have for a perception-cognition border, the epistemology of perception and cognitive science. With these points in view, I propose that particularly plausible cases of cognitive penetration would actually seem to evince the encapsulation of perceptual systems rather than refute/problematize this conjecture. (shrink)

(2013). Evolutionary modules and Bayesian facilitation: The role of general cognitive resources. Thinking & Reasoning: Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 27-53. doi: 10.1080/13546783.2012.713177.

The relationship between bilingual language control and domain-general cognitive control has been a hot topic in the research field of bilingualism. Previous studies mostly examined the correlation between performances of bilinguals in language control tasks and that in domain-general cognitive control tasks and came to the conclusions that they overlap, partially overlap, or are qualitatively different. These contradictory conclusions are possibly due to the neglect of the moderating effect of second language proficiency, that is, the relationship between bilingual (...) language control and domain-general cognitive control might vary with the L2 proficiency of bilinguals. To examine this hypothesis, we recruited 36 unbalanced Chinese-English bilinguals to perform the Simon task, Oxford Placement Test, and picture naming tasks in single-and dual-language contexts. We find that Simon scores positively predicted switching costs in bilinguals with low L2 proficiency, but not in bilinguals with high L2 proficiency. Furthermore, Simon scores positively predicted mixing costs in bilinguals with high L2 proficiency, but not in bilinguals with low L2 proficiency. These results verify the moderating effect of L2 proficiency on the relationship between bilingual language control and domain-general cognitive control, that is, bilinguals with more proficient L2 rely on domain-general cognitive control less for local language control and more for global language control. This may imply a shift from local to global for the dependency of bilingual language control on domain-general cognitive control during the L2 development of bilinguals. (shrink)

Dan lloyd (2011) issues a salutary warning against the assumption of what I shall call neural modularity—the view that there is a one-to-one mapping between cognitive functions and distinct brain regions. He shows how the assumption can distort the interpretation of neuroimaging studies and blind researchers to global structures and activity patterns that may be crucial to many aspects of cognitive function and dysfunction.In this note, I want to add a further dimension to the discussion by making connections (...) with the notion of mental modularity developed by evolutionary psychologists. What is the relation between mental and neural modularity? Do the arguments for massive mental modularity also support neural .. (shrink)

Empirical research suggests that motive states modulate perception affecting perceptual processing either directly, or indirectly through the modulation of spatial attention. The affective modulation of perception occurs at various latencies, some of which fall within late vision, that is, after 150 ms. poststimulus. Earlier effects enhance the C1 and P1 ERP components in early vision, the former enhancement being the result of direct emotive effects on perceptual processing, and the latter being the result of indirect effects of emotional stimuli on (...) perceptual processing that automatically capture exogenous attention. Other research suggests that emotional stimuli do not capture attention automatically but attentional capture is conditioned on the context. Since context dependent effects are first registered with the elicitation of N1 ERP component about 170 ms. poststimulus, emotional stimuli affect late vision. However, the early affective modulation of early vision by emotive states threatens the cognitive impenetrability of early vision since emotive states are associated with learning and past experiences. I argue that the emotive modulation of early vision does not entail the cognitive penetrability of early vision. First, the early indirect affective modulation of P1 is akin to the effects of spatial pre-cueing by non-emotive cues and these preparatory effects do not signify the cognitive impenetrability of early vision. Second, because the direct modulation of C1 signifies an initial, involuntary appraisal of threat in the incoming stimulus that precedes any cognitive states. (shrink)

What are the landmarks of the cognitive revolution? What are the core topics of modern cognitive science? Where is cognitive science heading to? Leading cognitive scientists--Chomsky, Pylyshyn, Gallistel, and others--examine their own work in relation to one of cognitive science's most influential and polemical figures: Jerry Fodor.

ABSTRACTDespite interest in exercise as a treatment for anxiety disorders the mechanism behind the anxiolytic effects of exercise is unclear. Two observations motivate the present work. First, engagement of attention control during increased working memory load can decrease anxiety. Second, exercise can improve attention control. Therefore, exercise could boost the anxiolytic effects of increased WM load via its strengthening of attention control. Anxiety was induced by threat of shock and was quantified with anxiety-potentiated startle. Thirty-five healthy volunteers participated in two (...) types of activity, exercise and control-activity. After each activity, participants completed a WM task at low- and high-load during safe and threat. Results were not consistent with the hypothesis: exercise vs. control-activity increased APS in high-load. However, this incre... (shrink)

Exercise may influence components of executive functioning, specifically cognitive control and action monitoring. We aimed to determine whether high level exercise improves the efficacy of cognitive control in response to differing levels of conflict. Fitter individuals were expected to demonstrate enhanced action monitoring and optimal levels of cognitive control in response to changing task demands. Participants were divided into the highly active or low-active group based on self-reported activity using the International Physical Activity Questionnaire. A modified flanker (...) task was then performed, in which the level of conflict was modulated by distance of distractors from the target and congruency of arrows. Electroencephalography was collected during 800 trials; trials were 80% congruent, 20% incongruent, 50% close, and 50% far. The error-related negativity and error positivity were extracted from the difference wave of correct and incorrect response locked epochs, the N2 from the difference wave of congruent and incongruent stimulus locked epochs and the P3 from stimulus locked epochs. The HA group showed a larger Pe amplitude compared to the low-active group. Close trials elicited a larger N2 amplitude than far trials in the HA group, but not the low-active group, the HA group also made fewer errors on far trials than on close trials. Finally, the P3 was smaller in the lowest conflict condition in the HA, but not the low-active group. These findings suggest that habitual, high levels of exercise may influence the endogenous processing involved in pre-response conflict detection and the post-error response. (shrink)

The three introductory questions posed by Hobson et al. point toward further investigations of cellular, circuit, and systems mechanisms involved in cognitive function that include the effect of CNS-state related modulatory systems on these mechanisms. [Hobson et al.].

It is thought that just as hunger itself, the expectancy to eat impacts attention and cognitive control toward food stimuli, but this theory has not been extensively explored at a behavioral level. In order to study the effect of expectancy to eat on attentional and cognitive control mechanisms, 63 healthy fasting participants were presented with an affective priming spatial compatibility Simon task that included both food and object distracters. The participants were randomly assigned to two groups: an “immediate (...) expectancy” group made up of participants who expected to eat immediately after the task and a “delayed expectancy” cohort made up of individuals who expected to eat a few hours later. Slower reaction times toward the food and non-food distracters and a more pronounced effect on the RTs in the incompatible condition [i.e., the Simon effect ] were noted in both groups. The effect of the food and non-food distracters on the RTs was more pronounced in the immediate with respect to the delayed expectancy group. The magnitude of the SE for the food and the non-food distracters was also greater in the immediate with respect to the delayed expectancy group. These results seem to indicate that when the expectancy to eat is short, the RTs are delayed, and the SE is more pronounced when food and non-food distracters are presented. Instead, when the expectancy to eat is more distant, the distracters have less of an effect on the RTs and the correspondence effect is smaller. Our results suggest that the expectancy to eat can modulate both attention orienting and cognitive control mechanisms in healthy fasting individuals when distracting details are competing with information processing during goal directed behavior. (shrink)

I applaud Huang & Bargh's theory that places goals at the center of cognition, and I discuss two ingredients missing from that theory. First, I argue that the brains of organisms much simpler than those of humans are already configured for goal achievement in situated interactions. Second, I propose a mechanistic view of the “reconfiguration principle” that links the theory with current views in computational neuroscience.

People have little difficulty distinguishing effects they cause and those they do not. An important question is what underlies this sense of agency. A prevailing idea is that the sense of agency arises from a comparison between a predictive representation of the effect and the actual effect that occurs, with a clear match between the two producing a strong sense of agency. Although there is general agreement on this comparison process, one important theoretical issue that has yet to be fully (...) determined is whether these computations are consciously performed. Here, we studied this issue by requiring participants to perform a simple judgment of agency task under conditions of different concurrent working memory load. Working memory operations are known to tax conscious cognitive resources. We found that agency judgments were moderated by working memory load, with lower agency ratings being observed in the high load condition, suggesting that the sense of agency is dependent on the availability of conscious cognitive resources. An examination of the time-course of this load effect suggests that it is the construction of the mental representation of the predicted effect which is particularly dependent on said resources. (shrink)

Although deductive reasoning is a closed system, one's beliefs about the world can influence validity judgements. To understand the associated functional neuroanatomy of this belief-bias we studied 14 volunteers using event-related fMRI, as they performed reasoning tasks under neutral, facilitatory and inhibitory belief conditions. We found evidence for the engagement of a left temporal lobe system during belief-based reasoning and a bilateral parietal lobe system during belief-neutral reasoning. Activation of right lateral prefrontal cortex was evident when subjects inhibited a prepotent (...) response associated with belief-bias and correctly completed a logical task, a finding consistent with its putative role in cognitive monitoring. By contrast, when logical reasoning was overcome by belief-bias, there was engagement of ventral medial prefrontal cortex, a region implicated in affective processing. This latter involvement suggests that belief-bias effects in reasoning may be mediated through an influence of emotional processes on reasoning. (shrink)

Proponents of the dominant paradigm in evolutionary psychology argue that a viable evolutionary cognitive psychology requires that specific cognitive capacities be heritable and “quasi-independent” from other heritable traits, and that these requirements are best satisfied by innate cognitive modules. We argue here that neither of these are required in order to describe and explain how evolution shaped the mind.

In line with recent efforts to empirically study the folk concept of weakness of will, we examine two issues in this paper: (1) How is weakness of will attribution [WWA] influenced by an agent’s violations of best judgment and/or resolution, and by the moral valence of the agent’s action? (2) Do any of these influences depend on the cognitive dispositions of the judging individual? We implemented a factorial 2x2x2 between–subjects design with judgment violation, resolution violation, and action valence as (...) independent variables, and measured participants’ cognitive dispositions using Frederick’s Cognitive Reflection Test [CRT]. We conclude that intuitive and reflective individuals have two different concepts of weakness of will. The study supports this claim by showing that: a) the WWA of intuitive subjects is influenced by the action’s (and probably also the commitment’s) moral valence, while the WWA of reflective subjects is not; b) judgment violation plays a small role in the WWA of intuitive subjects, while reflective subjects treat resolution violation as the only relevant trait. Data were collected among students at two different universities. All subjects (N=710) answered the CRT. A three-way ANOVA was first conducted on the whole sample and then on the intuitive and reflective groups separately. This study suggests that differences in cognitive dispositions can significantly impact the folk understanding of philosophical concepts, and thus suggests that analysis of folk concepts should take cognitive dispositions into account. (shrink)

We investigate the processes underlying the feeling of control over one’s actions . Sense of agency may depend on internal motoric signals, and general inferences about external events. We used priming to modulate the sense of agency for voluntary and involuntary movements, by modifying the content of conscious thought prior to moving. Trials began with the presentation of one of two supraliminal primes, which corresponded to the effect of a voluntary action participants subsequently made. The perceived interval between movement and (...) effect was used as an implicit measure of sense of agency. Primes modulated perceived intervals for both voluntary and involuntary movements, but the modulation was greatest for involuntary movements. A second experiment showed that this modulation depended on prime–movement contiguity. We propose that sense of agency is based on a combination of internal motoric signals and external sensory evidence about the source of actions and effects. (shrink)

How does the brain generate our experience of being in control over our actions and their effects? Here, we argue that the perception of events as self-caused emerges from a comparison between anticipated and actual action-effects: if the representation of an event that follows an action is activated before the action, the event is experienced as caused by one’s own action, whereas in the case of a mismatch it will be attributed to an external cause rather than to the self. (...) In a subliminal priming paradigm we show that participants overestimated how much control they had over objectively uncontrollable stimuli, which appeared after free- or forced-choice actions, when a masked prime activated a representation of the stimuli immediately before each action. This prime-induced control-illusion was independent from whether primes were consciously perceived. Results indicate that the conscious experience of control is modulated by unconscious anticipations of action-effects. (shrink)

To what extent are cognitive capacities, especially perceptual capacities, informationally encapsulated and to what extent are they cognitively penetrable? And why does this matter? Two reasons we care about encapsulation/penetrability are: (a) encapsulation is sometimes held to be definitional of modularity, and (b) penetrability has epistemological implications independent of modularity. I argue that modularity does not require encapsulation; that modularity may have epistemological implications independently of encapsulation; and that the epistemological implications of the cognitive penetrability of perception are (...) messier than is sometimes thought. (shrink)

We investigated the contribution of bilingual experience to the development of cognitive reserve when compared with other, traditionally more researched, CR proxies, in a sample of cognitively healthy senior bilingual speakers. Participants performed in an online study where, in addition to a wide inventory of factors known to promote CR, we assessed several factors related to their second language use. In addition, participants’ inhibitory executive control was measured via the Flanker Task. We used Structural Equation Modeling to derive a (...) latent composite measure of CR informed by traditional CR proxies. We examined whether bilingualism may act as a mediator of the effects of such proxies on cognitive performance therefore assessing the unique contribution of dual language use to CR. First, our analyses revealed facilitatory effects of both L2 age of acquisition and L2 proficiency on the executive performance. Second, our analyses confirmed the moderating role of bilingual experience on the relationship between other factors known to promote CR and cognitive integrity, revealing a strong contribution by bilingualism to CR development. Our findings provide further support to the notion that bilingualism plays an important role in mitigating cognitive decline and promoting successful aging. (shrink)

We recently demonstrated, by means of short latency afferent inhibition (SAI), that before an imagined movement, during the reaction time (RT), SAI decreases only in the movement-related muscle (sensorimotor modulation) and that a correlation exists between sensorimotor modulation and motor imagery (MI) ability. Excitatory anodal transcranial direct current stimulation (a-tDCS) on M1 could enhance the MI outcome; however, mechanisms of action are not completely known. Here, we assessed if a-tDCS on M1 prior to an MI task could affect sensorimotor modulation. (...) Participants imagined abducting the index or little finger in response to an acoustic signal. SAI was evaluated from the first dorsal interosseus after the “go” signal, before the expected electromyographic (EMG) activity. Participants received 20-min 1.5 mA a-tDCS or sham-tDCS on M1 on two different days, in random order. Results showed that a-tDCS on M1 increases the sensorimotor modulation consisting of a weakening of SAI after the Go signal with respect to sham-tDCS, in the movement-related muscle right before the beginning of MI. These results suggest that a-tDCS on M1 further potentiate those circuits responsible for sensorimotor modulation in the RT phase of MI. Increased sensorimotor modulation during MI may be one of the mechanisms involved in MI improvement after a-tDCS over M1. (shrink)

Transcranial direct current stimulation has been widely utilized in research settings and modulates brain activity. The application of anodal tDCS on the prefrontal cortex has indicated improvement in cognitive functioning. The cingulate cortex, situated in the medial aspect of the prefrontal cortex, has been identified as a core region performing cognitive functions. Most of the previous studies investigating the impact of stimulation on the prefrontal cortex stimulated the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, however, the impact of stimulation on cingulate has (...) not been explored. The current study investigates the effect of stimulation on the resting-state functional connectivity of the anterior cingulate cortex with other regions of the brain and changes in behavioral results in a color-word Stroop task, which has repeatedly elicited activation in different regions of the cingulate. Twenty subjects were randomly assigned to the experimental and sham group, and their medial prefrontal area was stimulated using MRI compatible tDCS. Resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging and cognitive Stroop task were monitored before, during, and after the stimulation. Neuroimaging results indicated a significant decrease in resting-state functional connectivity in the experimental group during and after stimulation as compared to before stimulation in two clusters including right insular cortex, right central operculum cortex, right frontal operculum cortex and right planum polare with the left anterior cingulate cortex selected as the seed. The behavioral results indicated a significant decrease in reaction time following stimulation in the experimental group compared to the sham group. Moreover, the change in functional connectivity in subcortical regions with L-ACC as the seed and change in RT was positively correlated. The results demonstrated that ACC has a close functional relationship with the subcortical regions, and stimulation of ACC can modulate these connections, which subsequently improves behavioral performance, thus, providing another potential target of stimulation for cognitive enhancement.Clinical Trial Registration: ClinicalTrials.gov Identifier: NCT04318522. (shrink)