Although deductive reasoning is a closed system, one's beliefs about the world can influence validity judgements. To understand the associated functional neuroanatomy of this belief-bias we studied 14 volunteers using event-related fMRI, as they performed reasoning tasks under neutral, facilitatory and inhibitory belief conditions. We found evidence for the engagement of a left temporal lobe system during belief-based reasoning and a bilateral parietal lobe system during belief-neutral reasoning. Activation of right lateral prefrontal cortex was evident when subjects inhibited a prepotent (...) response associated with belief-bias and correctly completed a logical task, a finding consistent with its putative role in cognitive monitoring. By contrast, when logical reasoning was overcome by belief-bias, there was engagement of ventral medial prefrontal cortex, a region implicated in affective processing. This latter involvement suggests that belief-bias effects in reasoning may be mediated through an influence of emotional processes on reasoning. (shrink)

Human reasoning is often biased by stereotypical intuitions. The nature of such bias is not clear. Some authors claim that people are mere heuristic thinkers and are not aware that cued stereotypes might be inappropriate. Other authors claim that people always detect the conflict between their stereotypical thinking and normative reasoning, but simply fail to inhibit stereotypical thinking. Hence, it is unclear whether heuristic bias should be attributed to a lack of conflict detection or a failure of inhibition. We introduce (...) a neuroscientific approach that bears on this issue. Participants answered a classic decision-making problem while the activation of brain regions believed to be involved in conflict detection and response inhibition was monitored. Results showed that although the inhibition area was specifically activated when stereotypical responses were avoided, the conflict-detection area was activated even when people reasoned stereotypically. The findings suggest that people detect their bias when they give intuitive responses. (shrink)

Much of the cognitive lies beyond articulate, discursive thought, beyond the reach of current computational notions. In Sketches of Thought, Vinod Goel argues that the cognitive computational conception of the world requires our thought processes to be precise, rigid, discrete, and unambiguous; yet there are dense, ambiguous, and amorphous symbol systems, like sketching, painting, and poetry, found in the arts and much of everyday discourse that have an important, non-trivial place in cognition. Goel maintains that while on occasion our thoughts (...) do conform to the current computational theory of mind, they often are - indeed must be - vague, fluid, ambiguous, and amorphous. He argues that if cognitive science takes the classical computational story seriously, it must deny or ignore these processes, or at least relegate them to the realm of the nonmental. Along the way, Goel makes a number of significant and controversial interim points. He shows that there is a principled distinction between design and nondesign problems, that there are standard stages in the solution of design problems, that these stages correlate with the use of different types of external symbol systems, that these symbol systems are usefully individuated in Nelson Goodman's syntactic and semantic terms, and that different cognitive processes are facilitated by different types of symbol systems. (shrink)

A key question for cognitive theories of reasoning is whether logical reasoning is inherently a sentential linguistic process or a process requiring spatial manipulation and search. We addressed this question in an event-related fMRI study of syllogistic reasoning, using sentences with and without semantic content. Our findings indicate involvement of two dissociable networks in deductive reasoning. During content-based reasoning a left hemisphere temporal system was recruited. By contrast, a formally identical reasoning task, which lacked semantic content, activated a parietal system. (...) The two systems share common components in bilateral basal ganglia nuclei, right cerebellum, bilateral fusiform gyri, and left prefrontal cortex. We conclude that syllogistic reasoning is implemented in two distinct systems whose engagement is primarily a function of the presence or absence of semantic content. Furthermore, when a logical argument results in a belief–logic conflict, the nature of the reasoning process is changed by recruitment of the right prefrontal cortex. (shrink)

In a recent study we demonstrated that reasoning with categorical syllogisms engages two dissociable mechanisms. Reasoning involving concrete sentences engaged a left hemisphere linguistic system while formally identical arguments, involving abstract sentences, recruited a parietal spatial network. The involvement of a parietal visuo–spatial system in abstract syllogism reasoning raised the question whether argument forms involving explicit spatial relations are sufficient to engage the parietal system? We addressed this question in an event-related fMRI study of three-term relational reasoning, using sentences with (...) concrete and abstract content. Our findings indicate that both concrete and abstract three-term relational arguments activate a similar bilateral occipital–parietal–frontal network. However, the abstract reasoning condition engendered greater parietal activation than the concrete reasoning condition. We conclude that arguments involving relations that can be easily mapped onto explicit spatial relations engage a visuo–spatial system, irrespective of concrete or abstract content. (shrink)

Cognitive science uses the notion of computational information processing to explain cognitive information processing. Some philosophers have argued that anything can be described as doing computational information processing; if so, it is a vacuous notion for explanatory purposes.An attempt is made to explicate the notions of cognitive information processing and computational information processing and to specify the relationship between them. It is demonstrated that the resulting notion of computational information processing can only be realized in a restrictive class of dynamical (...) systems called physical notational systems (after Goodman's theory of notationality), and that the systems generally appealed to by cognitive science-physical symbol systems-are indeed such systems. Furthermore, it turns out that other alternative conceptions of computational information processing, Fodor's (1975) Language of Thought and Cummins' (1989) Interpretational Semantics appeal to substantially the same restrictive class of systems. (shrink)

Logic is widely considered the basis of rationality. Logical choices, however, are often influenced by emotional responses, sometimes to our detriment, sometimes to our advantage. To understand the neural basis of emotionally neutral and emotionally salient reasoning we studied 19 volunteers using event-related fMRI, as they made logical judgments about arguments that varied in emotional saliency. Despite identical logical form and content categories across “hot” and “cold” reasoning conditions, lateral and ventral medial prefrontal cortex showed reciprocal response patterns as a (...) function of emotional saliency of content. “Cold” reasoning trials resulted in enhanced activity in lateral/dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex and suppression of activity in ventral medial prefrontal cortex. By contrast, “hot” reasoning trials resulted in enhanced activation in VMPFC and suppression of activation in L/DLPFC. This reciprocal engagement of L/DLPFC and VMPFC provides evidence for a dynamic neural system for reasoning, the configuration of which is strongly influenced by emotional saliency. (shrink)

Although patient data have traditionally implicated the left prefrontal cortex in hypothesis generation, recent lesion data implicate right PFC in hypothesis generation tasks that involve set shifts. To test the involvement of the right prefrontal cortex in a hypothesis generation task involving set shifts, we scanned 13 normal subjects with fMRI as they completed Match Problems and a baseline task. In Match Problems subjects determined the number of possible solutions for each trial. Successful solutions are indicative of set shifts. In (...) the baseline condition subjects evaluated the accuracy of hypothetical solutions to match problems. A comparison of Match Problems versus baseline trials revealed activation in right ventral lateral PFC and left dorsal lateral PFC. A further comparison of successfully versus unsuccessfully completed Match Problems revealed activation in right ventral lateral PFC, left middle frontal gyrus and left frontal pole, thus identifying the former as a critical component of the neural mechanisms of set-shift transformation. By contrast, activation in right dorsal lateral PFC covaried as a function of the number of solutions generated in Match Problems, possibly due to increased working memory demands to maintain multiple solutions ‘on-line’, conflict resolution, or progress monitoring. These results go beyond the patient data by identifying the ventral lateral aspect of right PFC as being a critical component of the neural systems underlying lateral transformations, and demonstrate a dissociation between right VLPFC and DLPFC in hypotheses generation and maintenance. (shrink)

It is proposed that there are important generalizations about problem solving in design activity that reach across specific disciplines. A framework for the study of design is presented that (a) characterizes design as a radial category and fleshes out the task environment of the prototypical cases; (b) takes the task environment seriously; (c) shows that this task environment occurs in design tasks, but does not occur in every nondesign task; (d) explicates the impact of this task environment on the design (...) problem space; and (e) demonstrates that, given the structure of the information-processing system, the features noted in the problem spaces of design tasks will not all occur in problem spaces where the task environment is vastly different. This analysis leads to the claim that there are a set of invariant features in the problem spaces of design situations that collectively constitute a design problem space. Protocol studies are reported in which the problem spaces of three design tasks in architecture, mechanical engineering, and instructional design are explored and compared with several protocols from nondesign problem-solving tasks. (shrink)

One of the important questions cognitive theories of reasoning must address is whether logical reasoning is inherently sentential or spatial. A sentential model would exploit nonspatial properties of representations whereas a spatial model would exploit spatial properties of representations. In general terms, the linguistic hypothesis predicts that the language processing regions underwrite human reasoning processes, and the spatial hypothesis suggests that the neural structures for perception and motor control contribute the basic representational building blocks used for high-level logical and linguistic (...) reasoning. We carried out a [15O] H2O PET imaging study to address this issue. (shrink)

We tested an architect with a lesion to the right prefrontal cortex in a real-world architectural design/planning task that required him to develop a new design for our lab space and compared his performance to an age- and education-matched architect. The patient understood the task and even observed that “this is a very simple problem.” His sophisticated architectural knowledge base was still intact and he used it quite skilfully during the problem structuring phase. However, the patient's problem-solving behaviour differed from (...) the control's behaviour in the following ways: he was unable to make the transition from problem structuring to problem solving; as a result preliminary design did not start until two thirds of the way into the session; the preliminary design phase was minimal and erratic, consisting of three independently generated fragments; there was no progression or lateral development of these fragments; there was no carry-over of abstract information into the preliminary design or later phases, and the patient did not make it to the detailing phase. This suggests that the key to understanding our patient's deficit is to understand the cognitive processes and mechanisms involved in the preliminary design phase. We appeal to a theory of design problem solving that associates cognitive processes involved in preliminary design with “lateral” state transformations and argues that “ill-structured” representational and computational systems are necessary to support these transformations. We conclude that the neural basis of this system is selectively damaged in our patient. (shrink)

It is proposed that there are important generalizations about problem solving in design activity that reach across specific disciplines. A framework for the study of design is presented that (a) characterizes design as a radial category and fleshes out the task environment of the prototypical cases; (b) takes the task environment seriously; (c) shows that this task environment occurs in design tasks, but does not occur in every nondesign task; (d) explicates the impact of this task environment on the design (...) problem space; and (e) demonstrates that, given the structure of the information-processing system, the features noted in the problem spaces of design tasks will not all occur in problem spaces where the task environment is vastly different. This analysis leads to the claim that there are a set of invariant features in the problem spaces of design situations that collectively constitute a design problem space. Protocol studies are reported in which the problem spaces of three design tasks in architecture, mechanical engineering, and instructional design are explored and compared with several protocols from nondesign problem-solving tasks. (shrink)

The neural basis of developmental changes in transitive reasoning in parietal regions was examined, using voxel-based morphometry. Young adolescents and adults performed a transitive reasoning task, subsequent to undergoing anatomical magnetic resonance imaging brain scans. Behaviorally, adults reasoned more accurately than did the young adolescents. Neural results showed less grey matter density in superior parietal cortex in the adults than in the young adolescents, possibly due to a developmental period of synaptic pruning; improved performance in the reasoning task was negatively (...) correlated with grey matter density in superior parietal cortex in the adolescents, but not in the adult group; and the latter results were driven by the more difficult trials, requiring greater spatial manipulation. Taken together, the results support the idea that during development, regions in superior parietal cortex are fine-tuned, to support more robust spatial manipulation, resulting in gre... (shrink)

We respond to Farah (1994) by making some general remarks about information encapsulation and locality and asking how these are violated in her computational models. Our point is not that we disagree, but rather that Farah's treatment of the issues is not sufficiently rigorous to allow an evaluation of her claims.

Much of cognitive science is based on the Computational Theory of Mind hypothesis. The claim is that the mind is in part a computer and as such requires a representational medium--a language of thought--in which to represent information and to carry out computations. ;But the Computational Theory of Mind is much more than a bland commitment to internal representations. It requires that the system of representation have some very stringent properties. In this dissertation it is demonstrated that, depending on which (...) version of the computational theory one prefers one is necessarily committed to a mechanism with most or all of the following seven properties: causally efficacious syntax, syntactic disjointness, syntactic differentiation, right causal connections, unambiguity, semantic differentiation, and the maintenance criterion. These properties are referred to as the CTM-properties because they are entailed by the Computational Theory of Mind. A subset of these properties apply to symbol systems in general and are referred to as the CTM$\sp\prime$-properties. ;The main thesis advanced is that, while it may be true that in certain cases the system of internal representation can be characterized as a language exhibiting the CTM-properties, there are also genuine cognitive situations where it needs to exhibit very un-CTM-like properties, in particular, properties associated with symbol systems of sketching. This leads to a dilemma which can only be solved by either circumscribing the domain of cognitive processes to be explained by a CTM-type symbol system or by reworking our notions of computation and representation. ;Two problem solving studies involving expert designers are carried out and described. The first study identifies some of the cognitive processes involved in open-ended, ill-structured problem solving situations like design and notes a correlation between certain of these cognitive processes and certain external symbol systems used by designers. Some of these symbol systems possess the CTM$\sp\prime$-properties while others do not. The second study manipulates the external symbol systems subjects are allowed to use along these dimensions. It is predicted that this manipulation will hamper some cognitive functions and not others. The results indicate statistically significant differences along the lines predicted. (shrink)