O objetivo desse trabalho é relacionar os três princípios, ou prazeres, estéticos de um videogame, isto é, imersão, agência, transformação, com o summum bonum e as categorias fenomenológicas de Charles S. Peirce. O summum bonum pode ser entendido como uma mistura entre sentimento, ação e razão. Os sentimentos, ações e pensamentos do jogador são responsáveis pela concretização e ampliação desse horizonte estético. A imersão é um princípio estético de primeiridade. Podemos entender o ato de imergir como um prazer (...) de primeiridade – pois o jogador, metaforicamente e literalmente, vai para outro lugar, estando sem relação com o que está fora da imersão. O princípio estético da agência é regido pela secundidade. Obtém-se prazer em forçar-se contra o mundo do jogo, controlando-o mecanicamente, agindo e reagindo. Todos os jogos possuem secundidade, mas os jogos de competição, lutas, corridas, e mesmo alguns RPGs online, possuem características marcantes de força mecânica, embate, ação e reação. O terceiro e último princípio estético é a transformação. A transformação é um processo. Jogos que permitem diferentes abordagens costumam ser jogos em que há um processo de crescimento, tanto na questão do gameplay quanto da própria narrativa do jogo. O mundo do jogo e o personagem vão se transformando em algo diferente no decorrer do tempo – há uma evolução, e essa evolução é caracterizada como um fenômeno de terceiridade. Concluiu-se que, embora todos os videogames tenham esses três princípios estéticos, cada jogo individual privilegia um ou dois desses princípios. É justamente esses princípios estéticos que direcionarão a escolha do que vai ser jogado, muito mais do que a temática ou o gênero desse jogo. (shrink)

The paper compares Comenius’ usage of the terms unum, verum and bonum in his metaphysical writings both with the expression of the image of the Trinity in De civitate dei by Aurelius Augustinus and with the concept of existence as three basic movements in the philosophical work of Jan Patočka. The purpose of the text is to show, despite the differences in historical periods, language and life experience, the possible similarity or connection of the vision that Augustine, Comenius and (...) Patočka mediate in their works. (shrink)

How to explain the existence of evil if being by its very nature is good? My paper examines an interesting and perhaps significant parallel between two exponents of the metaphysical tradition usually thought to stand widely apart, Thomas Aquinas and Hegel. I argue that Hegel's system shares certain features of Aquinas' convertibility thesis, that upon closer inspection will yield a set of interesting reflections not only about the problem of evil, but also about the limits and possibilities of metaphysical method. (...) I discuss Aquinas' thesis of the convertibility of being and good and how it determines his treatment of evil. I then construct a Hegelian version of convertibility and argue that Hegel's system fails for similar reasons to provide a satisfactory account of the problem of evil. This leads to my central question: should the inadequacy of traditional approaches to evil call for a reversal or abandonment of metaphysics, or invite a deeper reflection about reality that would not subsume the world's darkness under what Hans Blumenberg once called "metaphysics of light"? (shrink)

How to explain the existence of evil if being by its very nature is good? My paper examines an interesting and perhaps significant parallel between two exponents of the metaphysical tradition usually thought to stand widely apart, Thomas Aquinas and Hegel. I argue that Hegel's system shares certain features of Aquinas' convertibility thesis, that upon closer inspection will yield a set of interesting reflections not only about the problem of evil, but also about the limits and possibilities of metaphysical method. (...) I discuss Aquinas' thesis of the convertibility of being and good and how it determines his treatment of evil. I then construct a Hegelian version of convertibility and argue that Hegel's system fails for similar reasons to provide a satisfactory account of the problem of evil. This leads to my central question: should the inadequacy of traditional approaches to evil call for a reversal or abandonment of metaphysics, or invite a deeper reflection about reality that would not subsume the world's darkness under what Hans Blumenberg once called "metaphysics of light"? (shrink)

I am primarily concerned here with C. I. Lewis’s suggestion in a letter to me that some admitted defects in his ethical views might be removed by appealing to Peirce’s views on the summum bonum, which Peirce identified as the evolutionary process whereby the universe becomes more and more orderly. Since Lewis held in his published writings that what is morally obligatory can never be determined by empirical facts alone, I argue that since the alleged growing orderliness of the (...) universe must be established empirically, Lewis cannot analyze an obligatory action as one that contributes to that process without abandoning his view that obligatoriness cannot be established empirically. I also argue that if Lewis were to abandon his opposition to a naturalistic theory of obligation, appealing to Peirce’s summum bonum would not help Lewis out of what he called his predicament in ethics. (shrink)

I am primarily concerned here with C. I. Lewis's suggestion in a letter to me that some admitted defects in his ethical views might be removed by appealing to Peirce's views on the summum bonum, which Peirce identified as the evolutionary process whereby the universe becomes more and more orderly. Since Lewis held in his published writings that what is morally obligatory can never be determined by empirical facts alone, I argue that since the alleged growing orderliness of the (...) universe must be established empirically, Lewis cannot analyze an obligatory action as one that contributes to that process without abandoning his view that obligatoriness cannot be established empirically. I also argue that if Lewis were to abandon his opposition to a naturalistic theory of obligation, appealing to Peirce's summum bonum would not help Lewis out of what he called his predicament in ethics. (shrink)

Cette contribution se propose de revenir sur la thèse stoïcienne rapportée par Sénèque dans la lettre 102, selon laquelle la claritas (« illustration ») est un bien. Notre hypothèse est que Sénèque fait référence à la théorie stoïcienne de la τιμή (« honneur »). Le propos de cet article est double : d’une part, examiner les sources stoïciennes relatives à la τιμή, afin de montrer que ce qu’on sait de l’honneur stoïcien concorde parfaitement avec ce que Sénèque dit de la (...) claritas ; d’autre part, réfléchir aux raisons qui ont pu déterminer Sénèque à traduire τιμή par claritas. (shrink)

This article deals with Kant’s intentions in adding § 12 of the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. Here, Kant remarks on the so-called transcendentals (unum, verum, bonum) in the metaphysical or ontological tradition. This article focuses on their trans-categorial character to clarify their role in the system formation of Kant’s three critiques. In order to clarify Kant’s difficult terminology in § 12, fragments from his reflections and transcripts of his lectures are analyzed. Furthermore, an examination of (...) Kant’s references to qualitative unity, plurality, and perfection reveals that these logical criteria of cognition in general help him to organize the content of the three critiques. (shrink)

I am primarily concerned here with C. I. Lewis’s suggestion in a letter to me that some admitted defects in his ethical views might be removed by appealing to Peirce’s views on the summum bonum, which Peirce identified as the evolutionary process whereby the universe becomes more and more orderly. Since Lewis held in his published writings that what is morally obligatory can never be determined by empirical facts alone, I argue that since the alleged growing orderliness of the (...) universe must be established empirically, Lewis cannot analyze an obligatory action as one that contributes to that process without abandoning his view that obligatoriness cannot be established empirically. I also argue that if Lewis were to abandon his opposition to a naturalistic theory of obligation, appealing to Peirce’s summum bonum would not help Lewis out of what he called his predicament in ethics. (shrink)

Las implicaciones de la interpretación suareciana de la metafísica como ontología podrían conferir a sus planteamientos el carácter de mayor centro de referencia para la metafísica anterior y posterior a él. Su exposición de la ratio ontologica y el depositum fidei desempeña en ello un papel fundamental en tanto constituye un verdadero círculo hermenéutico en el que coinciden las tareas y los problemas de la metafísica y la teología.

I argue that Before Sunrise, Before Sunset, and Before Midnight are best seen as an example of memento mori art. Memento mori, the admonition to remember death, can take many forms, but the idea remains the same, namely that an awareness of our inevitable end should bear on how we live. I show how Richard Linklater’s warning works in each of the movies and argue that with the Before trilogy he makes a Frankfurt-style case that romantic love is life’s summum (...) bonum--i.e. "the ultimate ground of practical rationality.". (shrink)

The philosophy of Aristotle remains a beacon of our culture. But no part of Aristotle's work is more alive and compelling today than his contribution to ethics and political science — nor more relevant to the subject of the present volume. Political science, in his view, begins with ethics, and the primary task of ethics is to elucidate human flourishing. Aristotle brings to this topic a mind unsurpassed in the depth, keenness, and comprehensiveness of its probing.

: As Spinoza presents it, the knowledge of God is knowledge, primarily, of oneself and, secondarily, of other things. Without this know‐ledge, a mind may not consciously desire to persevere in being. That is why Spinoza claims that the knowledge of God is the most useful thing to the mind at IVP28. He claims that the knowledge of God is the highest good, however, not because it is instrumental to perseverance, but because it is also the best among those goods (...) that we seek for their own sakes. It is acquiescentia in se ipso, the highest form of laetitia. (shrink)

This book is the first monograph in German dealing exclusively with F.C.S. Schiller, until now and even given today‘s "Renaissance of Pragmatism" the most neglected of the classical pragmatists. It tries for the first time to analyse aspects of his oeuvre as a "twofold Humanism": consisting of a more descriptive "methodical humanism" on the one side and a more normative "prophetic humanism" on the other side. These two and irreducible perspectives of Schiller's writing allow him to take into account the (...) human condition not, as most of the interpreters suggest, in a radical but in a holistic manner: man existing as an individual and as a member of society, as an I in relation to God, as a biological fact and as a still not yet realized ideal in the light of multiple forms of criticism and reform. Thus it becomes clear that Schiller's complex thought - logical, ethical, social, educational and metaphysical - cannot be confined to individual aspects, particularly not to the topos of the "theory of truth" as the common "reading" of his writing stereotypically insinuates. Rather, it revolves around the most fundamental question of philosophy as such: concerned with the meaning of life in its entirety, especially in the light of the modern threat of nihilism and pessimism. -/- Table of Contents (translated) -/- 1. Oversight 2. The Philosophically Designated Path into the Abyss 2.1. Agnosticism 2.2. Scepticism 2.3. Pessimism 3. The Methodical Humanism as Possibilism – The Conversion of Thought from Destinity to Possibility 3.1. In the Antechamber of Practice 3.2. Excursion: William James' Concept of the "Will to Believe" 3.3. "All that has become has History" 3.4. The Ethical Unmasking of Knowledge 3.5. Bertrand Russell's Critique of Pragmatism – Ennobling the Human by Degrading him 3.6. "Problems of Belief" – The Complexity of the Person 3.7. The Bilocal Fixation of Philosophy – as Public Office and Private Poetry 3.8. On the Half-Way – Retrospect and Prospect 4. The Prophetic Humanism Consisting in Personalistic Speculation and Genetic Manipulation 4.1. The Speculative Humanism 4.1.1. Naturalizing the Human as Humanizing the Nature 4.1.2. Excursion: The "Personal Idealism" of George Holmes Howison 4.1.3. Schiller's Theatrum Mundi – The World as a Pedagogical Play between God and Man 4.2. The Eugenical Humanism 4.2.1. Putting it on its Feet – Schiller's Political Diagnosis 4.2.2. The Eugenically Reformist March Through the Institutions 4.2.3. Excursion: The Humanistic Mobilization of Religious Reserves in John Dewey's "A Common Faith" 5. Follow-up. (shrink)

As Spinoza presents it, the knowledge of God is knowledge, primarily, of oneself and, secondarily, of other things. Without this know‐ledge, a mind may not consciously desire to persevere in being. That is why Spinoza claims that the knowledge of God is the most useful thing to the mind at IVP28. He claims that the knowledge of God is the highest good, however, not because it is instrumental to perseverance, but because it is also the best among those goods that (...) we seek for their own sakes. It is acquiescentia in se ipso, the highest form of laetitia. (shrink)

Neste e no próximo artigo, buscamos articular a visão compreensiva arquitetônica de Peirce a respeito do fenômeno da retórica relacionando sua abordagem em Ideas, Stray or Stolen, about Scientific Writing com seu tratamento na classificação muito negligenciado das ciências práticas. Neste artigo, primeiro, reconstruímos o principal eixo conceitual de Ideas, Stray or Stolen, que é erguido pelos termos ‘arte universal da retórica’, ‘retórica ordinária’, e ‘retórica especulativa’. Na medida em que este eixo nos guia para a classificação dos estudos especiais (...) da retórica que Peirce propõe na seção final de Ideas, Stray or Stolen, a cuidadosa reconstrução deste eixo constitui um dever hermenêutico, a negligência do qual impediria uma compreensão adequada do que Peirce está classificando no fim de sua abordagem mais madura da Retórica Especulativa. Em seguida, procedemos à exposição das raízes aristotélicas da concepção de Peirce da arte universal da retórica e analisamos a relação intrínseca que a semiose retórica tem com o summum bonum como uma de suas formas evolutivas históricas. Se esta interpretação da concepção de retórica do Peirce é adequado, no entanto, devemos esperar que ele nos dê em algum lugar uma descrição da capacidade de evolução da retórica – e portanto, de crescer – antes de tudo. Será a tarefa de um segundo artigo subsequente mostrar que e de que maneira a concepção de Peirce da a retórica como ciência prática e faculdade instintiva enraizado no “instinto gráfico” responde pela sua capacidade para o crescimento. (shrink)

The Stoics maintained that virtue was the only good; everything else, therefore, was not-good. On the other hand, regarded by itself, this huge class was not equally valueless. Vice, of course, was bad; but everything else was thought to be ‘indifferent’: wealth, health, for example; indifferent, that is, with regard to the summum bonum. Of these Intermediates, men, from human nature, had a leaning to some; these were , had value, were called , that is, preferred, and virtue itself (...) lay in choice exercised among them. (shrink)

The Stoics maintained that virtue was the only good; everything else, therefore, was not-good. On the other hand, regarded by itself, this huge class was not equally valueless. Vice, of course, was bad; but everything else was thought to be ‘indifferent’: wealth, health, for example; indifferent, that is, with regard to the summum bonum. Of these Intermediates, men, from human nature, had a leaning to some; these were, had value, were called, that is, preferred, and virtue itself lay in (...) choice exercised among them. (shrink)