This article presents a Kuyperian critique of ideological uniformity and political integralism in Europe and Indonesia. The background of Kuyper’s articulation of the principle of sphere sovereignty was his struggle with the liberals, the French Revolution, and the German idea and application of state sovereignty. Kuyper struggled with the liberals because he rejected ideological uniformity. He struggled with the ideals of the French Revolution because he rejected popular sovereignty and, later on, political integralism. Kuyper’s rejection of ideological uniformity and political (...) integralism resulted in the articulation of the principle of sphere sovereignty. Such uniformity and integralism also characterized Suharto’s leadership in twentieth-century Indonesia, especially his doctrine of Pancasila as the only basis for the state and civil society and his ideology of the integralist state of Indonesia. I criticize those doctrines from the perspective of Kuyper’s principle of sphere sovereignty. (shrink)

How do we know the degree of imagination involved in knowing a reality? This is essentially an epistemological question. This essay discusses first the role of imagination in Polanyi’s epistemology since it is used here as the basis of integrative reality. The essay then discusses the degree of imagination involved in three types of integrative reality that are found respectively in technology, science, and humanities. It concludes with a discussion on the role of imagination in education.

A common assumption in the selection of nonhuman animal subjects for research and the approval of research is that, if the risks of a procedure are too great for humans, and if there is a so-called scientific necessity, then it is permissible to use nonhuman animal subjects. I reject the common assumption as neglecting the central ethical issue of the permissibility of using nonhuman animal subjects and as being inconsistent with the principle of justice used in human subjects research ethics. (...) This principle requires that certain classes of individuals not be subjected to a disproportionate share of the burdens or risks of research. I argue for an extension of this principle to nonhuman animal research and show that a prima facie violation of the principle occurs because nonhuman animals bear an overwhelmingly disproportionate share of the risks of research without sufficient justification or reciprocal benefit. (shrink)

Knyha 1. Teoretyko-metodolohichni osnovy -- Knyha 2. Sot︠s︡iokulʹturni pidstavy i︠e︡vropeĭsʹkoho konstytut︠s︡ionalizmu.