Buddhits logical debates according to Kagyudpa school of Tibetan Buddhism.

Exegesis on Buddhist logic and dialectical study; includes fundamental principles of Buddhist philosophy.

On correct method of understanding various Buddhist philosophical concepts according to sutras and tantras in accordance with Karmapa VIII Mi-bskyod-rdo-rje interpreation.

On correct method of understanding various Buddhist philosophical concepts according to sutras and tantras. (Dus gsum gyi rgyal ba sras dang bcas paʹi bstan pa mthaʼ dag dang kyad par Rdo-rje-ʼchang Karma-paʼi dgong pa gsal bar byed paʼi bstan bcos thar paʼi lam chen bgrod paʼi shing rta zhes bya ba ʼdi yin no).

Collected works of Dpal-sprul O-rgyan-ʼjigs-med-chos-kyi-dbaṅ-po, b. 1808, on diverse topics predominantly on Rñiṅ-ma-pa doctrines and Budhist philosophy; includes rituals.

On Buddhist doctrinal and philosophical interpretation of Sakyapa tradition.

Selection of author's works on Svātantrika Madhyamika philosophy and logic.

Exegetical notes on the explanation of philosophical positions (siddhanta) of the Vaibhasika, Sautrantika, Yogacarya, and Madhyamika schools of Buddhism with Hinduism based on the Dkon-mchog 'Jigs-med-dban-po's text.

On elementary Buddhist logic and dialectical studies.

Explanatory notes on the philosophical positions (sidhānta) of Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Yogācāra, and Mādhyamika schools of Buddhism with Hinduism.

Philosophical meditation and images of science.

volume ka-pa [1-13]. ʼDul ba -- volume ka-a [14-25]. ʼBum [Sher phyin] -- volume ka-kha, a [26-28]. Nyi khri -- volume ka-nga [29-32]. Khri brgyad stong pa -- volume ka [33]. Brgyad bstong pa -- volume ka [34.] Sher phyin sna tshogs -- volume ka-ga, a [35-38]. Phal chen -- volume ka-cha [39-44]. Dkon brtsegs -- volume ka-am [45-76]. Mdo sde -- volume ka-wa [77-96]. Rgyud ʼbum -- volume ka-ga [97-99]. Rnyin rgyud -- volume shri [100]. Dus ʼgrel -- volume (...) e-wam101-102. Gzungs ʼdus -- volume 103. Dkar chag. (shrink)

Collected works of Dpal-sprul O-rgyan-ʾjigs-med-chos-kyi-dbang-po, 1808-1887, a Nyingmapa master on diverse topics predominantly on Rnying-ma-pa doctrines and Budhist philosophy; includes rituals.

Study on development of different religious sects of Tibetan Buddhism and their interpretation of Buddhist philosophy.

Indian schools -- Introduction to Tibetan Buddhism -- The Nyingma tradition -- The Kadam tradition -- The Kagyü tradition -- The Shijé tradition -- The Sakya tradition -- The Jonang and minor traditions -- The Geluk tradition 1: Tsongkhapa -- The Geluk tradition 2: Tsongkhapa's successors -- The Geluk tradition 3: the distinctiveness of Geluk -- The Bon tradition -- Chinese traditions 1: non-Buddhist -- Chinese traditions 2: Buddhist -- Central Asian traditions.

Predominantly on Tibetan Buddhist doctrines and philosophy.

Dhammapada. Chos kyi tshigs su bcad pa. Ed. and tr. by Chhi Med Rig Dzin Lama. (The Dalai Lama Tibeto-Indological Studies Series Vol. IV), Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, Sarnath 1982. V + 432 pp. Hbk Rs 75, pbk Rs 55. Dhammapada. (Tr. into Tibetan from the Pali by dGe-'dun Chos-'phel; tr. into English from the Tibetan by Dharma Publishing Staff). Dharma Publishing, Berkeley 1985. xii + 381 pp., including four drawings in the style of traditional Tibetan (...) religious art and one specimen of Tibetan calligraphy. Pbk $12.95. (shrink)

This paper presents the main aspects of the views of the Tibetan logician Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109–1169) on argumentation “by consequence” (thal ʼgyur, Skt. prasaṅga) based on his exposition of the topic in the fifth chapter of his Tshad ma yid kyi mun sel and on a parallel excursus in his commentary on Dharmakīrti’s Pramānaviniścaya. It aims at circumscribing primarily the nature and function of consequences (thal ʼgyur/thal ba) for this author—in particular the distinction between “proving (...) consequences” and “refuting consequences”—and the form prescribed for their enunciation in the context of debate. In addition to pointing out differences with the systems adopted by his predecessors, contemporaries and successors, the paper also discusses some of the similarities and differences between Phya pa’s understanding of argumentation by consequence and the notion of reductio ad absurdum in Western logic. (shrink)

The Tibetan Buddhist logician Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge devoted a large part of his discussion on argumentation to arguments by consequence. Phya pa distinguishes in his analysis arguments by consequence that merely refute the opponent and arguments by consequence that qualify as probative. The latter induce a correct direct proof which corresponds to the reverse form of the argument by consequence. This paper deals with Phya pa’s classification of probative consequences based on the type of the logical (...) reason involved. I first establish the basis of Phya pa’s classification—the typology of logical reasons in inference-for-oneself—with a special attention to logical reasons consisting in the ‘apprehension of something incompatible [with the negandum]’ and among them the specific case of the ‘apprehension of the cause of something incompatible [with the negandum]’. The treatment of the latter is shown to be instrumental in Phya pa’s classification, as well as in explaining the divergences that occur in the models adopted by his successors, such as gTsang nag pa brTson ʾgrus seng ge and mTshur ston gZhon nu seng ge. Turning to Phya pa’s effective application of this typology when he resorts himself to arguments by consequence, I examine Phya pa’s rephrasing, in the form of four arguments by consequence, of the discussion on the relation between the two realities found in the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra and relate it to a parallel discussion in an earlier Madhyamaka work by rGya dmar ba Byang chub grags. I compare the variant versions of these four arguments in three Madhyamaka works of Phya pa and show that the differences pertaining to the identification of the type of the logical reason result from apparently insignificant variations in the formulation of each of the arguments. In the conclusion, I discuss the potential philosophical or practical interest of such a classification. (shrink)

This book explores the contributions to the philosophy of mind made by the Tibetan Buddhist thinker Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109–1169) in his seminal text, the “Dispeller of the Mind’s Darkness.” This study, which includes a critical edition and English translation of those portions of the “Dispeller” devoted to explicating the nature of mental episodes and their objects, contributes to a deeper understanding of Tibetan intellectual history, while also facilitating a wider appreciation of both Phya pa’s theory (...) of mind and its significance within the global history of philosophy. (shrink)

The works of the Tibetan logician Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109–1169) make abundant use of a particular type of argument that I term ‘argument by parallels’. Their main characteristic is that the instigator of the argument, addressing a thesis in a domain A, introduces a parallel thesis in an unrelated domain B. And in the ensuing dialogue, each of the instigator’s statements consists in replicating his interlocutor’s previous assertion, mutatis mutandis, in the other domain (A or B). (...) I show that such a dialogue involves two parallel arguments that develop in an intersecting zigzag pattern, and discuss the principles involved in the establishment of the conclusion from the perspective of parity of reasoning and analogical argument. I examine the overall rhetorical strategy directing the use of arguments by parallels and the pedagogical and explanatory functions they can serve. I also evaluate the plausibility of their use in Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge’s works mirroring a contemporary practice of oral debate, and reflect on the status of such arguments in the framework of Indo-Tibetan logic. (shrink)

dBu ma sar gsum gyi ston thun. Phya pa Chos kyi sen ge. Edited by Helmut Tauscher. Vienna 1999. XXXIII, 146 pp.

On Buddhist logic of cognition and reasoning; Rnying-ma-pa tradition.

Critical study on the life and works of Chos rgyal Khri-srong-lde-btsan, the 38th king of Tibet with special reference to Nyaya (tshad ma) text Bka' yang dag paʼi tshad ma.

On the history, structure, and importance of the elementary Buddhist logic and dialectrical studies in Tibet.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Holy Trinity in Ippolito Desideri's Ke ri se ste aṇ kyi chos lugs kyi snying poTrent PomplunOn April 10, 1716, Ippolito Desideri, a Jesuit who had but recently arrived in Tibet, wrote a long letter to another Jesuit missionary, Ildebrando Grassi, who was stationed in Mysuru, India. Desideri recounted his adventures since the two men had last been together, three and a half years earlier, at the (...) Jesuit residence in Goa. He told of his travels to Surat, Delhi, Lahore, Leh, and Lhasa, and recalled his first impressions of Tibetan religion and culture. Tibetans, he told Grassi, were gentle and docile, but coarse and uncultivated. In Desideri's opinion, they had neither arts nor sciences, but they did reject the doctrine of transmigration and appeared to have some knowledge of the Christian faith.1 "Here is what I learned about the Tibetans' religion," he wrote,They call God könchok (dkon mchog), and they appear to have some notion of the adorable Trinity, for at times they call Him könchok chik (dkon mchog gcig), that is, the One God, and at other times they call Him könchok sum (dkon mchog gsum), that is, the Triune God. They also use a kind of chaplet, over which they repeat the words Oṁ ah hūṁ, and they say that the word Oṁ signifies knowledge or an arm, that is, power; ah is the word, and hūṁ is the heart, or love, and that these three words mean God. They also worship a being named Padmasaṃbhava, who was born some seven hundred years ago. When asked if he were God or man, some people replied that he was both God and man, having neither father nor mother, but having been born from a flower. Even so, they have statues representing a woman with a flower in her hand, whom they call Padmasaṃbhava's mother, and they venerate several others whom they treat as saints. In their churches, one finds an altar covered with cloth and ornaments, and a sort of tabernacle sits in the middle of the altar, where they say Padmasaṃbhava dwells, though they also assert that he is in heaven.2This letter, which survives only in a French translation, is noteworthy if only because Ippolito Desideri would later repudiate almost everything he affirmed in it. In a matter of months, the Jesuit missionary would change his mind about Tibetans' capacities for art, for science, and for culture. He would also change his mind considerably about their religion. [End Page 117]Perhaps the most significant change—and one that would later play a large role in his legal battle with the Capuchins for control of the Tibetan mission—concerned the knowledge that Tibetans had of the Holy Trinity, the central Christian mystery that God is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. In what follows, I would like to explore Ippolito Desideri's explanation of the Holy Trinity, especially in the Ke ri se ste aṇ kyi chos lugs kyi snying po (The Essence of Christian Doctrine). I will briefly situate Desideri's account of Tibetans' knowledge of the Trinity in the general historical and theological context of the early modern missions, outline his various attempts to explain this central Christian mystery in Tibetan, and offer some tentative speculations on the Jesuit's motives for choosing certain Tibetan terms. I hope this discussion of Desideri's treatment of the Holy Trinity might contribute to Christian theologians and Buddhist philosophers who are engaged in interreligious dialogue and assist them in their reflections about how best to translate their respective faiths in such dialogue. Desideri's translations are not always perspicacious—as we shall see—but they are instructive, especially to the extent that they show us the issues that must be considered when anyone wishes to translate the basic terms of his own religion into an alien language. With this difficulty in mind, we might also consider the inadequacy of all language, human or angelic, when confronted with the mystery of God's infinite transcendence.Ippolito Desideri in ContextBefore addressing Desideri's translations, I would like to point out that the description of Tibetan religion... (shrink)