Charles Darwin. On the Origin of Species. Edited by Joseph Carroll. 672 pp., bibl., index. Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press, 2003. $9.95, Can $12.95, £6.99 (paper).

My aim here is to present an editio princeps of a newly discovered Arabic translation of a very important passage from Plato's Republic found in the work entitled Kitāb fī Masā'il al-umūr al-ilāhiyya, penned by the somewhat obscure Neoplatonist Abū Hāmid al-Isfizārī. While an edition of al-Isfizārī's work has been published by Daniel Gimaret, the manuscript he used lacked the literal translation of the Republic passage. The one other known exemplar of the work, MS Zāhiriyya 4871, dated slightly later than (...) the first, appears to be closer to the author's original unedited version; it contains the Republic passage. I am currently preparing a new edition of the work on the basis of the Zāhiriyya manuscript, but it seemed worthwhile to bring the Republic passage to immediate attention. I do not attempt here a thorough evaluation of al-Isfizārī's philosophy as presented in the Masā'il ; this can be done successfully only upon completion of the edition. However, to place the work in its proper context, I do provide a brief overview of the transmission of Plato's Republic in Arabic; a discussion of new information on al-Isfizārī's Nachlass, and a description of the two exemplars of his Masā'il. The edited text of the passage from the Republic is accompanied by a provisional translation. (shrink)

Natalia Lozovsky. “The Earth Is Our Book”: Geographical Knowledge in the Latin West ca. 400–1000. (Recentiores: Later Latin Texts and Contexts.) x + 182 pp., illus., tables, bibl., index. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000. $44.50, £28.

In 1937, a group of researchers in Nazi Germany began investigating tobacco mosaic virus with the hope of using the virus as a model system for understanding gene behavior in higher organisms. They soon developed a creative and interdisciplinary work style and were able to continue their research in the postwar era, when they made significant contributions to the history of molecular biology. This group is significant for two major reasons. First, it provides an example of how researchers were able (...) to produce excellent scientific research in the midst of dictatorship and war. Coupled with the group's ongoing success in postwar Germany, the German TMV investigators provide a dramatic example of how scientific communities deal with adversity as well as rapid political and social change. Second, since the researchers focused heavily on TMV, their story allows us to analyze how an experimental system other than phage contributed to the emergence of molecular biology. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Within the context of national traditions in colonial science, the scientific activities of Jesuit missionaries present us with a unique combination of challenges. The multinational membership of the Society of Jesus gave its missionaries access to virtually every Portuguese, Spanish, and French colony. The Society was thus compelled to engage an astonishingly diverse array of cultural and natural environments, and that diversity of contexts is reflected in the range and the complexity of Jesuit scientific practices. Underlying that complexity, however, (...) was what I see as a unique combination of institutional structures; namely, European colleges, overseas mission stations, and the regular circulation of personnel and information. With this institutional framework as a backdrop, I briefly trace what I see as the most salient themes emerging from recent studies of Jesuit overseas science: 1) the Societys ability to use scientific expertise to its advantage amid the complex web of dependencies upon which it missionary activities rested; 2) the ability of its missionaries to become intimate with a wide range of cultures and to appropriate natural knowledge held by indigenous peoples, especially in the fields of material medica and geography; and 3) the different ways Jesuits used published accounts of “remote nature” (i.e., natural histories of overseas colonies) to advance their corporate and religious causes. (shrink)

ANDREW BARKER, Scientific Method in Ptolemy's Harmonics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. viii+281 pp. $70. ISBN 0‐521‐55372‐5. The quotation is taken from the preface of the treatise,...

Janis Langins, Conserving the Enlightenment, French Military Engineering from Vauban to the Revolution. Cambridge, MA and London: The MIT Press, 2003. xiv+532 pp. 40 Illus. $55.00; £39.95. ISBN 0‐2...

M. B. Hall, Henry Oldenburg: Shaping the Royal Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. xii+369 pp. Frontispiece. $100.00, £70.00. ISBN 0‐19‐851053‐5 The publication by A.Rupert and Marie Bo...

David Furley's work on the cosmologies of classical antiquity is structured around what he calls "two pictures of the world." The first picture, defended by both Plato and Aristotle, portrays the universe, or all that there is (to pan), as identical with our particular ordered world-system. Thus, the adherents of this view claim that the universe is finite and unique. The second system, defended by Leucippus and Democritus, portrays an infinite universe within which our particular kosmos is only one of (...) countless kosmoi. Aristotle's argument in De caelo I.9 that the world is necessarily unique is an important contribution to this debate. This argument holds interest because it shows Aristotle wrestling with an apparent inconsistency in his own philosophy, as deeply-held convictions within his cosmology collide with an equally deeply-held conviction within his metaphysics. The following three principles, each of which Aristotle appears committed to, are inconsistent: -/- The cosmic uniqueness principle. The world is necessarily unique. The cosmic form principle. The world is an ordered, structured unity. As such, the world has a form. The possibility of multiple instantiation principle. For all F, if F is a form, it is possible that there exist multiple Fs. In De caelo I.9, Aristotle argues that we can establish the uniqueness of the universe, reject the multiple instantiation principle, yet still retain the distinction between 'this world' and 'world in general,' if the following is true (as it is): the world takes up all the matter that exists. Aristotle illustrates this argument with one of the stranger analogies in his corpus: imagine an aquiline nose that takes up all the flesh in the universe. If this were so, then there could not exist any other aquiline objects whatsoever. (For this reason, we dub the De caelo I.9 argument the 'Cosmic Nose argument.') This paper is an interpretation of how this argument is supposed to proceed and an assessment of its success. The first section states the problem Aristotle is confronted with, sorts through Aristotle's various statements of the Cosmic Nose argument, which exhibit some sloppiness, and reconstructs charitably a single argument. We also spend some time examining the significance of Aristotle's example of a gigantic aquiline nose. We argue that, even charitably reconstructed, the argument appears to commit a serious modal fallacy. The remainder of the paper explores whether this modal fallacy can be overcome. We conclude that, although not a cogent argument for the uniqueness of the world (as this would require a significant revision of our current astronomy), the Cosmic Nose argument does succeed on its own terms. However, it should not be regarded as a free-standing argument for the uniqueness of the world. Instead, it depends crucially on the earlier argument in De caelo I.8 for the universe's uniqueness; De caelo I.9 should be viewed as an attempt to extend the conclusion of De caelo I.8 and to show how this conclusion can be made consistent with Aristotle's metaphysical principles about the nature of form. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Philosophy vs. Science, Continental vs. Analytic France: Neo‐Kantians and Bergson Germany: Neo‐Kantians and Phenomenology France: From Existentialism to Foucault Germany: Habermas and the Frankfurt School France: Poststructuralism and the Abuse of Science?

Review of Joseph Rouse, How Scientific Practises Matter. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003.

Helen Longino seeks to break the current deadlock in the ongoing wars between philosophers of science and sociologists of science--academic battles founded on disagreement about the role of social forces in constructing scientific knowledge. While many philosophers of science downplay social forces, claiming that scientific knowledge is best considered as a product of cognitive processes, sociologists tend to argue that numerous noncognitive factors influence what scientists learn, how they package it, and how readily it is accepted. Underlying this disagreement, however, (...) is a common assumption that social forces are a source of bias and irrationality. Longino challenges this assumption, arguing that social interaction actually assists us in securing firm, rationally based knowledge. This important insight allows her to develop a durable and novel account of scientific knowledge that integrates the social and cognitive. Longino begins with a detailed discussion of a wide range of contemporary thinkers who write on scientific knowledge, clarifying the philosophical points at issue. She then critically analyzes the dichotomous understanding of the rational and the social that characterizes both sides of the science studies stalemate and the social account that she sees as necessary for an epistemology of science that includes the full spectrum of cognitive processes. Throughout, her account is responsive both to the normative uses of the term knowledge and to the social conditions in which scientific knowledge is produced. Building on ideas first advanced in her influential book Science as Social Knowledge, Longino brings her account into dialogue with current work in social epistemology and science studies and shows how her critical social approach can help solve a variety of stubborn problems. While the book focuses on epistemological concerns related to the sociality of inquiry, Longino also takes up its implications for scientific pluralism. The social approach, she concludes, best allows us to retain a meaningful concept of knowledge in the face of theoretical plurality and uncertainty. (shrink)

water paradox has long served as an argument against the Principle of Indifference. A solution to the paradox is proposed, with a view toward resolving general difficulties in applying the principle.